


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
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HISTORY
OF
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BY
HENRY C. SHELDON
PROFESSOR OF HISTORICAL THEOLOGY IN BOSTON UNIVERSITY

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.

FROM A.D. 90 TO 1517

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P R E F A C E.

It has been our aim to make this work as strictly historical as the title imports. The distinction between history and dogmatics, or apologetics, has been kept steadily in view. Only a very moderate amount of direct comment has been indulged upon the opinions recorded.

We have endeavored to draw as far as possible from original sources. For the earlier fathers we have followed quite largely the translations published by Clark, of Edinburgh. For the succeeding fathers and the scholastics down to the thirteenth century, we have used mainly the text of Migne's *Patrologia*. But however much we may have depended upon the primary sources, as a matter of course we are under large obligations to such investigators as Gieseler, Neander, Baur, Hagenbach, Dorner, Kahnis, and Schaff. Nor should we forget to acknowledge the aid which has come to us through the kindness and broad scholarship of the late Dean of the Theological School of Boston University, James E. Latimer.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY,
September, 1885.

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HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Scripture record, like the stars, is the same from age to age; the words of prophets, the sayings and the deeds of Christ, and the teachings of apostles, are constant luminaries in the moral firmament. As the stars address all men, as they kindle the hearts of all by the spectacle of their glory, as they guide the uncultured sailor as well as the master scientist, so the divine oracles address all men, and speak a language from which all may receive spiritual quickening and guidance.

A still further analogy may be predicated. The starry heavens challenge study and interpretation, in the course of which difficult questions are likely to be raised, and upon these conflicting answers may be, and indeed often have been elicited. In like manner the Scriptures challenge study and interpretation. In many instances they suggest much more than they expressly state. What they give in the shape of historical facts is often fitted to serve as a basis for a whole train of inferences respecting the divine kingdom. So the mind is sent off upon far-reaching paths. What it finds in the pursuit of one topic it naturally wishes to compare with the results of its inquiry upon other topics. Hence theological disquisition, definition, and ultimately the theological system. As the subject is

complex and touches upon the profoundest mysteries, one interpreter is naturally found disagreeing with another. The importance of the subject, as lying within the realm of sacred things and of immortal interests, tends to magnify the import of the disagreement in the eyes of the parties concerned. The result is earnest controversy,—controversy quenched at one point only to break out at another,—controversy threatening to be endless. To save from this calamity, as they regard it, some would say, Cease to dogmatize; cease to trouble yourself and the world with theological definitions and systems; deal with the Scriptures practically, and use them simply for stimulus and direction in righteous living. This advice has the semblance of practical sagacity, and no doubt within certain limits may be healthfully applied; but when designed for a sweeping application it becomes utopian and false. It is to be granted that the one who uses the stellar luminaries simply to enkindle the fires of poetic sentiment, or to guide his voyage, may be profited by them more than the one who becomes absorbed in the mathematics of the skies. It is to be granted that he who uses the Scriptures simply to warm his heart and to enliven his imagination by glimpses of spiritual beauty and majesty, or to guide his conduct by maxims of practical wisdom, may be more benefited by the sacred Word than the one who is occupied with constructing the exact definition and the comprehensive theological system. In either sphere a purely intellectual absorption may stand in the way of acquiring the best riches. But no one on this account thinks of putting a veto on astronomical science; no more should one think of putting a veto upon theological science, or, in other words, upon exact definition and systematic arrangement in connection with the topics of theology. Such a veto would be useless. The scientific impulse of the human mind cannot be held in fetters in any sphere, and must assert itself in the region of religious thought as well as in

any other. Indeed, there is a sacred obligation that it should be so asserted ; for while an abnormal engrossment in the intellectual tends to rob the heart and to impoverish the spiritual nature, that nature is enriched by all consecrated use of the intellect. Clear and comprehensive views, searching and subtle thoughts, when not perverted into a mere instrument of mental gymnastics, are an abundant spring of holy emotion and endeavor.

It has been, therefore, in obedience to a natural and normal impulse that the Church in all ages has attempted a construction of Christian doctrine. Its work, however, in this direction, while in part normal, has often been carried on in a wrong temper and by illegitimate methods. Force has often invaded the domain of reason, and free thought has been crushed before an arrogant assumption of infallibility. Factors alien to the essence of Christianity have crept into the Church. False dogmas have sometimes been invented to give countenance to false customs, or to minister to hierarchical pride. Tradition has usurped in no small degree the place of revelation, and theologians have comported themselves like the astronomer who should judge the stars by the theories of some ancient star-gazer, rather than the theories by the facts which may be gained from the stars themselves. Reaction against such perversions has not always stopped at the right limit. Extreme dogmas have been opposed by extreme dogmas. Radicalism has sometimes been as indiscriminate in tearing down as conservatism has been in retaining. In consideration of the alternation between doing and undoing, the reviewer may be reminded of the weaving of Penelope, and be led to question the reality of any progress toward the perfect fabric of Christian doctrine. Upon a deeper scrutiny of the subject, however, he will be likely to adopt a more hopeful verdict ; he will remind himself that it is wellnigh inevitable, in a sphere so deep and complex as is that of Christian thought, that progress should be made

through an alternation of advances and retreats, or at the expense of many false and abnormal movements.

The course of doctrinal development, whether it has been normal or abnormal, is replete with interest and instruction. The investigator who is ready to scrutinize it with due care and energy will derive at least two great advantages. In the first place, he will find illustrations of the natural tendencies, theoretical and practical, of different doctrinal positions. In the second place, he will gain a needful preparation for a proper understanding and appreciation of the different doctrinal systems of the present. A thing is completely known only as its antecedents are known. To understand well the theological world of the present, one must go back and consult the process of its formation.

The history of Christian doctrine, as a branch or discipline receiving distinct and general recognition, is of quite recent date. Most of the works upon the subject, in which an historical rather than a polemical spirit is dominant, have appeared within the present century.

The place which the history of doctrine occupies is easily defined. The importance and extent of its subject matter make it worthy of a special treatment apart from general church history. At the same time the dogmatic writer has repeated occasion to refer to the facts of doctrinal history. To do this without being cumbersome, he must take ascertained results, instead of indulging in lengthy investigations. His work presupposes a treatise in which exact historical criticism has already been accomplished. The history of doctrine, therefore, holds an intermediate place between general church history and systematic theology. It supplements the former and prepares for the latter.

In conducting this branch, it is an obvious rule that the chief attention should be bestowed upon the main current of doctrinal thought in each successive era. The subordinate and less characteristic developments must receive only

a subordinate place. Mere curiosities of individual opinion or speculation, if noticed at all, must be touched very lightly. Space is to be given to a consideration of philosophy, of heresies, and of the secular power, in proportion to the breadth and permanence of the influence which they have exerted upon the cardinal movements of the theological world.

Several cautions need to be kept in mind by the investigator. As Gieseler remarks, care must be taken not to credit an age with more definite ideas than those really entertained. Dogmas have sometimes had their starting-point in the indeterminate. Now, to take advantage of this primeval mist, and to say that it covers the complete dogma of after times, is a great sin against the truth. It is an unwarranted leap, for example, to conclude that the doctrine of transubstantiation was entertained in the early centuries, simply because we find here the idea that a special sanctity, or perchance even an ineffable presence, pertains to the elements of the eucharistic service. Again, it is to be remembered that identity of phraseology is far from being a sure proof of identity of doctrinal belief in different ages. The rhetoric of one era may become the dogmatic teaching of another.

Historians are not fully agreed as to the proper division into periods. As it seems to us, the first period ought to extend to the reign of Constantine. Whatever transitions there may have been previously, that which the Church experienced under the first Christian Emperor was far more marked. We meet here, not merely a new order of external circumstances, but a new order of theologians and of theological discussions. The exact year that shall be fixed upon as the limit of the period is a matter of subordinate concern. In general church history there are good reasons for fixing upon the year 313, when the Milan edict of toleration was issued, since this marks the relative close of the heathen persecutions, and supplies an opportunity to take a

connected view of the whole administration of Constantine as a patron of Christianity; but in the history of doctrine the person of the Emperor claims less consideration, and the dividing line may well be drawn at the beginning of the Arian controversy, about the year 320. This division will enable us to locate Lactantius in the first period, where in truth he belongs, since his writings contain nothing which specially reminds us of the Arian era. The second period is appropriately made to include the whole chain of related controversies which agitated the Christian Empire at large. Having this scope, it could not end before the year 680, and there are reasons for extending it on to about the year 726. This date brings us to John of Damascus, the great dogmatic authority of the mediæval Greek Church. It brings us also to the iconoclastic controversy which alienated the Papacy from the Eastern Empire, stimulated its endeavors to build up an independent Western Empire, and so helped toward the unrestricted development of the Latin type of Christianity. The limit of the third period is of course the opening of the Reformation. A precise historical turning-point, which may serve as a limit of a fourth period, is not easily found. There are quite substantial reasons, however, for drawing a dividing line about the year 1720. This brings us to the neighborhood of Moravianism under Zinzendorf, and of Methodism under the Wesleys. It is also a date which is favorably related to a consideration of the great rationalistic movement of modern times. To be sure, it does not place us at the very beginning of English Deism, for Lord Herbert, Shaftesbury, and Toland came upon the stage before 1720; but it does place us before the deistical writers of England whose works were most influential upon the Continent; before the principal work of Collins, his "Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion," published in 1724; before Woolston, whose "Discourses on the Miracles" appeared in 1727-29; before Tindal, whose "Christianity as Old as

Creation" was published in 1730, and translated into German in 1741; before Morgan also, and Chubb, and Bolingbroke. As respects France, this date brings us to the eve of scepticism as led by Voltaire. In Germany it marks the rise of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy, which served actually, if not designedly, among the factors contributing to the initiation and spread of German rationalism. A fifth period is properly extended to the present. We have then these five periods:—

- I. From the close of the Apostolic Age to 320.
- II. From 320 to 726.
- III. From 726 to 1517.
- IV. From 1517 to 1720.
- V. From 1720 to the present.

Each of these periods has its distinguishing characteristic, though this is not to be asserted in any case in a too exclusive sense. In the first period it was necessary to defend Christianity as a whole against heathenism, and also against heresies so radical as to assail the very essence of the Christian faith. It may therefore be called the Age of Apology. The second, as the period of sharp controversy over individual points of the Christian system, may be termed the Age of Polemics. The third, or the mediæval period, was characterized by the endeavor to systematize and to defend the existing faith of the Church, and is known as the Age of Scholasticism. In the fourth period Protestantism was called upon to define and to vindicate its position against Romanism; on the other hand, Romanism was stimulated to make an elaborate and authoritative restatement of its faith; Protestantism, moreover, became divided into a number of communions, each ardently bent upon vindicating its own special tenets; controversies and creeds abounded; the period is fitly termed, especially as regards Protestantism, the Age of Confessions. In the fifth period the doctrinal movement has

been exceedingly complex, and it is difficult to give a brief statement of its leading characteristics. Perhaps we describe as amply as is possible in a single sentence, when we say that the period has been distinguished by an assertion of the claims of reason against those of revelation, or of the natural against those of the supernatural, together with attempts to reconcile the opposing claims. It appears pre-eminently as the Age of Strife and of Attempted Reconciliation.

First Period.

FROM THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO 320.

First Period.

FROM THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO 320.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I.—PHILOSOPHY.

It was a just discrimination which led early Christianity to seek, especially in the great middle era of Greek culture, for a congenial philosophy. The philosophical developments beginning with Socrates and ending with Aristotle have at the same time the greatest intrinsic worth and the highest interest from the Christian standpoint. In the pre-Socratic philosophies there was little that was suited to engage the appreciation of a Christian writer of the first centuries. Their spirit and content were in general remote from a truly theological vein. The drift of their investigation was neither toward God as a moral sovereign, nor toward man as the subject of a moral dominion. The great problem with them was to find out the element or principle underlying the phenomenal world. In some instances the attempt was made to explain the universe by physical analogies, and first principles of a material nature were assumed. This was the case with the Ionian school. In other instances speculation tended to idealism, and first principles of a metaphysical nature were adopted. This was the case with the Pythagoreans and the Eleatic school.

In individual instances a recognition was given to both orders of principles. This was especially the case with Anaxagoras (an important forerunner of Socrates), who made a clear distinction between the world of mind and the world of matter. An occasional reference, of a worthy character, to a Supreme Being, may no doubt be found in these early philosophies; but in the main they paid little tribute to that which is of the highest concern in Christian thought,—to God as the centre of moral excellence and dominion, to man's relations with God, and to the far-reaching import of moral conduct.

The post-Aristotelian philosophy, also, as represented by the Epicureans and the Stoics, had little which might claim the appreciation of Christianity. Both of these schools, indeed, assumed to be practical. In contrast with the speculative cast of the pre-Socratic philosophies, they were mainly concerned with the life, and sought an ideal standard for the regulation of individual conduct. The leading problem with them was how to master and to utilize the conditions of this present world. The age naturally fostered such an inquiry. It was an age of political decline, of uncertainty, of turmoil and disruption. Outward circumstances could not be trusted. Hence there was an occasion to think upon life, and to lay hold of some definite rule for its conduct, some standard by which its experiences might be estimated. At the same time, a degenerate age was likely to be far from apprehending the normal, healthful rule.

In essential contrast with Christianity, Epicureanism made pleasure the standard. It taught that every pleasure is in itself a good, and that it becomes an evil only as it stands in the way of a greater pleasure. It pointed the individual to no immutable standard of right, to no God who requites conduct. To such phantom-like gods as it chose to recognize, it assigned no interest whatever in the affairs of this world. Its panacea against all fear of death

and the future was the dogma that there is nothing after death. In fine, the best principle of Epicureanism was nothing higher than a certain prudence in the choice of pleasures. "With coarse and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus would inevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whose temperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it would develop a refined selfishness, a perfect egoism, which Epicurus has adorned with the name 'tranquillity of mind.'" (B. F. Cocker, *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*.)

Stoicism was much more healthful in tone. It made virtue, or a life conformed to reason, the supreme good, taught the doctrine of the brotherhood of the race, and laid great stress upon resignation to one's lot in life. Nevertheless, Stoicism had but little kinship with Christianity. Its view of God and the world was pantheistic rather than theistic, and it was only by an inconsistency that it could give any place to divine providence or to human freedom in the proper sense. Whatever scope it may have allowed to a life after death, it denied the immortality of the soul. Its doctrine of a universal brotherhood was little else than an empty theory, there being joined with it no deep and tender love for man as man. The resignation, too, of which it made so much account, was not the Christian virtue of the same name; the resignation of the Stoic was a determined will repressing murmurings, rather than the submission of a meek and lowly heart casting itself upon Eternal Love. Indeed, the marked tendency of Stoicism was to nurture the antichristian spirit of pride and self-sufficiency. Epictetus and some others may not reveal this tendency; still it was inherent in the system.

Of the two great authors who represent the crowning era of Greek philosophy, both were by no means equally qualified to receive a welcome within the circle of early Christianity. While Aristotle had his special pre-eminence, destined to a special recognition in the age of Scholasti-

cism, it was not of a character to commend itself to the theologians of the first centuries. Their interest lay not so much in the direction of analysis and system as in that of spirit and subject-matter. Naturally, therefore, they were specially attracted by the writings of Plato, with their soaring spirit and deep ethical vein.

Among the features of Platonism commending it to the appreciation of Christianity, the following held an important place:—1. It was theistic. There are, to be sure, some representations in the Platonic writings which might be thought to have an adverse bearing toward the proper theistic theory, or the theory of a supreme *personal* God. In the doctrine of Ideas, a pre-eminence is assigned to the Idea of the Good. It is ranked so high as seemingly to leave no place for anything higher. The Idea of the Good is described as that which imparts truth to the object and knowledge to the subject; as being in the intellectual world what the sun is in the visible world; as the author, not only of the knowledge in all things known, but of their being and essence; as lord of light in this world and source of truth and reason in the other; as the highest and best in the sphere of being. (Republic, Bks. VI., VII., Jowett's translation.) Such language, no doubt, favors the conclusion that Deity, if affirmed at all, is to be identified with the Idea of the Good; and the Idea of the Good is naturally suggestive of the impersonal rather than the personal. Still, the exegesis which would deny the doctrine of a personal God to Plato is utterly at fault. There are eminent interpreters who hold that Plato entertained a consistent theory as to the relation of God to the Ideas. Thus Ritter says that the Platonic Ideas denote "certain determinations of the divine reason." (History of Ancient Philosophy.) According to this, the Idea of the Good would be nothing else than the most fundamental and inclusive aspect of the divine reason. Upon this point, however, it is not necessary to pronounce. Whether Plato clearly defined to himself or

not the relation of God to the Ideas, he entertained and taught the theory of a personal God. "Plato," says Zeller, "often speaks of God as a person; and we have no right to see in this only a conscious adaptation of his language to the popular religious notions. Such a mode of representation was indispensable to him, on account of the immobility of ideas, in order to explain phenomena." (Plato and the Older Academy.) In the Platonic writings God is described as the only wise, as the author of good, but far removed from any agency in the production of evil; as unchangeable, incapable of falsehood, the fairest and best that is conceivable, absolutely perfect in all his attributes; the Father of the universe, who framed all things after an eternal and unchangeable pattern; the careful Creator and Ruler, who attends to the perfecting of the small as well as of the great; the true measure of all things. (See in particular Bk. II. of the Republic, the Timæus, and Bks. IV. and X. of the Laws.) 2. Platonism embraced elevated and spiritual views of the proper aims and acquisitions of the soul. It asserted three truths of the utmost import; namely, that there exist immeasurable and imperishable riches, that these are attainable by the human spirit, that they are not to be found in the phenomenal world. With a confidence truly sublime and quickening, Platonism from first to last affirmed that in the region of the supersensible exist realities absolutely superior to the imperfection and vanity of earth. In the Symposium, for example, we have a description of an absolute beauty, which knows no waxing or waning; which, without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things; which endows the one in true communion with itself with power to bring forth, not mere images of beauty, but realities. A like description is applied in the Republic to the absolute good, in the contemplation of which it is said that the soul is made radiant with intelligence,

and delivered from the twilight of varying opinion in which he dwells who does not rise above the seen and the temporal. (Bk. VI.) The attitude toward these invisible realities is made the test of wisdom, and to discard them in any sphere is declared to be folly. "I conceive," says the chief speaker in the Laws, "that the true lawgiver aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, when separated from virtue." (Bk. IV.) The praise which is rendered to love in the Symposium may be regarded as a tribute to the same truth; for love, according to the Platonic conception, is deep regard for and yearning after the perfect and everlasting. The phraseology of Plato is, to be sure, contrasted to some extent with the Christian. He does not make that definite association between all this unspeakable reality and the person of God which belongs to Christian thought; yet it is so easy to supply the connecting link that the effect is almost the same as if it had been distinctly affirmed. Men of deep and mystical piety in all ages have used the Platonic representations as descriptive of divine perfections, and have been stimulated thereby in their aspirations after union with God. Moreover, Plato is not far from stating that the soul has its everlasting portion in God, and that the vision of Him is the true beatific vision. He represents God as enriching with His friendship the man who strives to be like Him, and describes the departure of such a man from this world as a journey toward the good God.

3. Platonism taught the immortality of the soul, and was characterized by an earnest and solemn tone in reference to future awards. "I am confident in the belief," Socrates is reported as saying, "that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil." Among the philosophical grounds of this confidence, the uncompounded nature of the soul and its power

of self-motion are adduced. "The soul," he says, "is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable." (Phædo.) "If the soul be truly affirmed to be self-moving, then must she also be without beginning and immortal." (Phædrus.) In proportion to this stretch of being before the soul is the import of her moral conduct here. "O my friends," exclaims Socrates, "if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not merely in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful." (Phædo.) "No man but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below, having a soul which is like a vessel full of injustice, is the last and worst of evils." (Gorgias.) Future punishment, according to Plato, is in the main corrective, continuing perchance for ages, but finding an ultimate limit. It is possible, however, for sin to become incurable and unpardonable. Men who have indulged the extreme of wickedness, especially those who, like the tyrant, have abused high and sacred trusts, pass under a hopeless doom. "Such are hurled into Tartarus, which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out." (Phædo and Gorgias.) As respects the nature of punishment, Plato gives expression to the rational view, that the greatest penalty of evil-doing "is to grow into the likeness of bad men, and, growing like them, to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad." (Laws, Bk. V.)

Other approaches to Christian ideas might be mentioned. We find the opinion that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but the gift of God. (Meno.) We are taught that "we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him." (Crito.) Very important contrasts, no doubt, may be spe-

cified between Plato's philosophy and Christianity. Even those representations which most remind us of the Gospel, when interpreted in connection with his general system, are sometimes found to differ quite materially from the Scriptural teachings. Still the points of real kinship are numerous and palpable.

Among the early fathers, Justin Martyr indicates a general preference for Platonism by his more frequent reference to this system than to any other, as also by the statement that it came the nearest to satisfying his heart prior to his acquaintance with Christianity. (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, II.) Theophilus mentions Plato as "the most respectable" among philosophers. (*Ad Autolicum*, III. 6.) Clement of Alexandria speaks of the "truth-loving Plato," and though he claims that the eclectic method, which selects the best elements from the several philosophies, is the true one, shows nevertheless quite a decided leaning to Platonism. (*Stromata*, Lib. I. cap. 7, 8.) Minucius Felix remarks: "Plato has a clearer discourse [than the other philosophers] about God, both in the matters themselves and in the names by which he expresses them; and his discourse would be altogether heavenly, if it were not occasionally fouled by a mixture of merely civil belief." (*Octavius*, XIX.) Arnobius styles Plato "that sublime head and pillar of philosophers," and also speaks of him as "the divine Plato, many of whose thoughts are worthy of God." (*Adv. Gentes*, I. 8; II. 36.) Lactantius mentions Plato as being, in the common judgment, the wisest of all philosophers, and asserts Cicero's claim to the rank of a philosopher on the ground that he was an imitator of Plato. (*Divine Institutes*, I. 5, 15.) No such ample line of favorable references as the above can be found to Aristotle in the writings of the early fathers. It is quite clear, therefore, that their preference was given to Plato. Perhaps we shall approach as near as possible to accuracy by saying that the philosophy of cultured Christians of the first three

centuries was an eclectic system, in which Platonism held a decided pre-eminence so far as factors from the heathen world are concerned.

As respects the worth of heathen philosophy as a whole, a considerable difference appears in the estimates of different church fathers. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, are examples of the most favorable estimate. Justin Martyr imputes to every race of men a share in the Word, that is, the divine reason or enlightening principle, and says of the heathen philosophers, poets, and sages, that "each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermiatic Word." (1 Apol., XLVI.; 2 Apol., XIII.) Clement of Alexandria is still more positive and explicit in recognizing a divine factor in the heathen learning. He does not hesitate to declare that philosophy "is in a sense a work of Divine Providence," and says that it had the office of a "schoolmaster to bring the Hellenic mind to Christ. . . . As the proclamation [of the Gospel] has come now at the fit time, so also at the fit time were the law and the prophets given to the barbarians, and philosophy to the Greeks, to fit their ears for the Gospel." Not only did it train the Greeks in righteousness, but it serves still as a kind of preparatory training to those who attain to faith through demonstration, or it supplements the faith already entertained by supplying greater breadth of view and greater firmness of conviction. (Stromata, I. 1, 2, 5, 7; VI. 6, 17.) Origen in open terms paid less tribute to philosophy than Clement; but indirectly he recognized it still more, since he imported it more largely into his own system of thought.

It is not to be imagined, however, that any of the fathers in their appreciation of philosophy were inclined to assign it a co-ordinate place with the Gospel. "Philosophy," says Aekermann, "was of little value to them, as such; and their estimation of it, whether slight or high, had respect only to its agency as preparatory to Christianity and as conducive

to the development of Christian faith. Their commendation did not proceed from a heart divided between Plato and Christ; their whole ardor and enthusiasm was unalterably directed to the Lord; and when they pointed with commendation to Plato, this was only because he seemed to them to point to Christ, and because, in their opinion, if he had lived till the time of Christ, he would have fallen in homage before the Lord Jesus, and would have beheld with joy the realization of his ideals in and through Him." (The Christian Element in Plato.) The same writers who have been quoted as commending philosophy are emphatic in their declarations of its insufficiency, and indeed of its poverty, as compared with the Christian revelation. Both Justin and Clement are found qualifying the relative merit of the philosophers by the supposition that they obtained their noblest thoughts from the Jewish Scriptures. (1 Apol., XLIV.; Strom., V. 1, 5.) Both affirm the fragmentary nature of the Greek wisdom. Justin teaches that, whereas lawgivers and philosophers were permitted to gaze only upon some part of truth, and so often fell into contradiction with themselves, truth full-orbed and entire has been manifested in Christ. (2 Apol., X.) The sects of the philosophers, says Clement, have treated truth as the Bacchantes treated Pentheus when they tore his limbs asunder; they have torn off "a fragment of eternal truth, not from the mythology of Dionysus, but from the theology of the ever-living Word." Besides its failure to comprehend the whole truth, the Hellenic philosophy is destitute of strength to perform the commandments of the Lord. "Philosophers are children unless they have been made men by Christ." (Strom., I. 11, 13, 16.) "The Gospel," says Origen, "has a demonstration of its own more divine than any established by Grecian dialectics." (Contra Celsum, I. 2.)

Irenæus appears to have occupied a comparatively neutral position, neither specially opposing nor specially com-

mending heathen philosophy. In one instance he quotes Plato in favorable contrast with the Gnostic heretics. (*Contra Hæreses*, III. 25. 5.) An historical, practical interest was dominant with this eminent exponent of Christian faith and life.

On the part of some of the fathers, we find wellnigh a wholesale disparagement of philosophy. Tatian questions whether any noble thing has been produced by philosophy, and says of the philosophers that they "dogmatize one against another, though each one vents but the crude fancies of the moment." (*Oratio ad Græcos*, II., III.) Tertullian acknowledges that philosophers have sometimes entertained truths which are held by Christians. But he gives them no special credit for the possession, since, as he maintains, they have come to it by chance, as a ship might fortunately make harbor in the dense darkness, or else by virtue of that intelligence which is common to all men. He sees a strong presumption against philosophers, in the fact that they have supplied to heresy its chief arsenal, and indeed may fairly be named "patriarchs of heretics." He concludes, therefore, that all fellowship with philosophy should be disclaimed. "What," he exclaims, "has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from the porch of Solomon. Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the Gospel!" (*De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, VII.; *De Anima*, II., III.) As if to predicate the most extreme opposition possible, he says (referring to Christ's death and resurrection), "It is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd; the fact is certain, because it is impossible." (*De Carne Christi*, V.) Such language, however, is not to be taken too seriously. Tertullian speaks here, as in many instances, in

hyperboles; and probably meant little else than the commonly accepted truth, that many things incredible to the natural man are most worthy of God, and altogether within the compass of His power. In his own range Tertullian was among the most alert of men to find reasons for his faith. With Lactantius also we find on the whole a very adverse estimate of heathen philosophy. In his view, its theoretical value is reduced wellnigh to nothing by the disagreements of its exponents, while its want of practical value is clearly proved by its failure to reform the lives of its votaries. (Div. Inst., Lib. III.)

It may justly be concluded from the above review, that the Catholic fathers in general had little inclination to consult heathen philosophy for the substance of any part of their teaching. They reveal everywhere a conviction of the superiority and adequacy of their own oracles as regards the essence of religious truth. We are warned, therefore, against assuming a too radical influence from philosophy upon their teaching. At the same time, it must be conceded that philosophy was somewhat of a factor in the doctrinal developments of the period. 1. In so far as it contributed to the rise of heresies, it supplied an occasion for a definite construction of Christian doctrines. 2. It nurtured in quite a proportion of the fathers a tendency to speculative thought, a tendency to explore Christianity upon its theoretical side, instead of being wholly occupied with its practical aspects. 3. It colored the exposition of certain points of Christian theology. Platonism, for example, directly or indirectly modified the mode of expounding the doctrine of the Logos. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the substance of this doctrine came from Platonism, or that even the form of its exposition was not under obligation to other than Platonic antecedents. 4. It supplied to the most speculative of the fathers some of their less central tenets. Origen, for instance, adopted the Platonic theory of the pre-existence of

souls, and gave it considerable importance in his system of thought.

Neo-Platonism had its origin in this period. As a developed system, however, it came after the great majority of the ante-Nicene fathers. The more conspicuous examples of its influence belong to the next period. It will be of practical advantage, therefore, to defer its consideration.

SECTION II.—HEATHEN CRITICISM AND HERESIES.

Heathen assaults upon the persons and upon the faith of Christians served as a direct occasion of doctrinal development. In order to justify themselves before the persecuting power, and to moderate its fury, it was necessary to answer the charges that were made against their conduct and their beliefs. These charges in the first instance were only brief comments expressive of contempt or abhorrence. But after the middle of the second century more ample notice began to be taken of Christianity by heathen authors, and we have the ironical portraiture by Lucian, and the serious attempts at refutation by Celsus and Porphyry. References of either sort were a challenge to Christian writers, and their replies involved an effort at the definite construction and clear statement of Christian doctrines.

Not less was the incentive which came from heresies. It was with no false sense of their responsibility that the fathers of the Church set themselves with full vigor against those alien systems which used the name of Christianity to cover dogmas contradictory to its essence. In this early formative period, when there was no record of long-established creeds to exercise a conservative influence, it was exceedingly important that all corruptions and counterfeits of Christianity should be thoroughly exposed and vanquished. The circumstances of the case warranted the zeal which was expended upon the refutation of heresies.

At the same time, this very zeal was attended with its own dangers, and it cannot be said that it was always wisely directed. Aversion to heresy tended in some instances to an abnormal emphasis upon ecclesiastical authority. In the region of pure dogma, also, ardor in opposing one extreme sometimes inclined the disputant toward the opposite extreme.

The heresies of the first three centuries may be assigned to three principal groups: (1.) The Jewish; (2.) The Gnostic and Manichæan; (3.) The Monarchian. In the estimate of the early Church, Montanism was also a heresy. No doubt the emphasis which it laid upon extraordinary spiritual gifts, especially upon prophesying in ecstatic condition, could easily serve as a door to dogmatic innovation. In fact, however, it assailed no important doctrine of the current orthodoxy. Its fault was in the line of addition rather than of rejection. An ultra supernaturalism and an ascetic morality were its distinguishing characteristics.

JEWISH HERESY.—As the writings of Paul abundantly indicate, there was a party of Judaizers in the apostolic age which troubled the Church by insisting upon the necessity of keeping the law of Moses. Persistence in this teaching could not fail to develop the party into a sect. In the second century we find a sect of Judaizers mentioned under the general name of Ebionites. So they are styled by Irenæus (I. 26. 2). Hippolytus and Origen, in the third century, employ the same designation (*Philosophoumena*, VII. 22; *Cont. Cel.*, II. 1 and V. 61). Irenæus and Hippolytus specify no distinctions among the Ebionites, but Origen speaks of them as a twofold sect; and at an earlier date Justin Martyr had indicated that there were two general classes among the Judaizers. The distinction expressed by Justin lay in the fact that one class insisted that all must keep the Mosaic law; while the other kept it themselves, without, however, insisting upon its universal observance. According to Origen, one class denied and

the other accepted the supernatural conception of Christ. This latter class is probably to be associated with the more liberal party mentioned by Justin, as also with the Nazarenes, who still maintained some congregations in Syria at the end of the fourth century. Both parties held the doctrine of Christ's second coming and personal reign upon earth. The more rigid class, in harmony with their theory of the continued validity of the Mosaic law, utterly repudiated Paul's claim to the apostolic office. In the view of this faction, Christ was a mere man, conceived in the ordinary way, and distinguished only by a peculiar endowment of the Holy Spirit, which he enjoyed from the time of his baptism. In some instances the Ebionite doctrines were combined with a speculative bent, and Jewish and Gnostic elements were brought within the compass of the same system. This was the case with the teaching of Cerinthus, who figured in Asia Minor in the later years of the Apostle John. Both orders of elements appear also in the Pseudo-Clementine writings (Homilies, Recognitions, and Epitome, the first being the most original and important), which were produced after the middle of the second century.

The Ebionites, as a distinct sect, were undoubtedly of small consequence numerically. It may also confidently be affirmed, that the distinctive tenets of Ebionism never found place with any large fraction of the Christian body after the Church had reached wide limits in the Gentile world. A contrary view has indeed been asserted. Some have had the courage to maintain that the Church, even far into the second century, was largely dominated by Ebionite views, at least as respects the person of Christ. One of the main evidences quoted for this theory is found in the statements of Hegesippus, the extant fragments of whose writings are contained for the most part in the Church History of Eusebius. After giving an account of his journey to Rome, about the year 160, Hegesippus adds, "In every succession and in every city the doctrine pre-

vails according to what is declared by the law and prophets and the Lord." (Euseb., IV. 22.) In another place he speaks with enthusiastic praise of the ascetic piety of James the Just. From this it is concluded that he had a Jewish bias, that he was in fact an Ebionite, and, since the doctrines of the various churches were agreeable to his mind, it follows that they were also Ebionite. To this is added his adverse comment upon a sentence in one of Paul's Epistles, which Gobarus, a Monophysite of the sixth century, adduces. (Neander.) The comment is thought to prove a rejection of Paul's authority, and hence the acceptance of the Ebionite standpoint.

As respects this line of argument, it is to be observed that there are two distinct points to be considered: first, the doctrinal position of Hegesippus himself; and secondly, that of the churches about which he testifies. It is conceivable that Hegesippus might have been an Ebionite, and at the same time that his testimony about the churches, so far as it implies an agreement with his Ebionism, might be false, and capable of being proved false by overwhelming evidence. But it is by no means clear that Hegesippus was an Ebionite. His description of James the Just scarcely goes further toward proving him an Ebionite than it does toward proving the same of Eusebius, who not only quotes his description, but adds himself an expression of admiration for the character of James. The utmost conclusion that this passage would authorize is that Hegesippus was of Jewish antecedents, was by disposition an admirer of ascetic piety, and was specially acquainted with the history of the church at Jerusalem. As regards the comment quoted by Gobarus, we have no proper assurance that Hegesippus had at all in mind the words of Paul, or aimed his strictures against their Pauline sense. (Neander.) A single isolated statement of this kind ought surely not to be allowed to outweigh the commendation of Eusebius, who had before him the writings of Hegesippus. How could Eusebius

speak of him as a distinguished champion of the truth against heretical impieties (IV. 7, 8), if there was anything in his productions which showed him to be an Ebionite? How could the same historian who condemns the "absurdity" and "irreligion" of the Ebionites (III. 27) bestow such high praise upon an Ebionite author? "As respects his Christological views," says Dorner, "the charge that he was an Ebionite is utterly unfounded." (History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.) This makes it at least uncertain that the testimony of Hegesippus is at all in favor of assuming an Ebionite character in the churches of his day. But upon this point his testimony is not needed. The assumption that at the middle of the second century a large portion of the churches, including some holding the most representative position, professed an Ebionite type of doctrine, is abundantly disproved. It is contradicted by every argument for the genuineness of John's Gospel, of most of the Epistles also, and indeed of the greater part of the New Testament. It is contradicted by the major part of the writings of the apostolic fathers. It is contradicted by the writings of Justin Martyr and the apologists who followed him, all contemporaries of Hegesippus, who assumed to be representatives of the general Church of their time, and have always been recognized as such. It is contradicted by the statements of Irenæus, who wrote his great work at just about the same time that Hegesippus was engaged upon his production, and only about two decades after the journey of the latter to Rome (both apparently having written when Eleutherus was Bishop of Rome). Irenæus was in no wise inclined to Ebionism, and sets forth a creed which in important points contradicts Ebionism, and declares this to be the creed of the universal Church of his time. "The Church," he says, "having received this preaching and this faith, although scattered throughout the whole world, yet, as if occupying but one house, carefully preserves it. . . . The churches

which have been planted in Germany do not believe or hand down anything different, nor do those in Spain, nor those in Gaul, nor those in the East, nor those in Egypt, nor those in Libya, nor those which have been established in the central regions of the world." (I. 10.)

GNOSTICISM AND MANICHEISM. — Gnosticism was embodied not so much in an organized sect as in a multitude of shifting schools. With few exceptions, among which Marcion is especially noteworthy, its representatives were possessed far more by a speculative than by a practical bent. The rise of Gnosticism may be referred in general to a false conservatism. As many Jews wished to import Judaism into Christianity, so many heathen, when they adopted the Christian name, wished to carry their heathenism with them, or at least some factors of it, and so mingled with the new system speculative tenets of an entirely alien cast. Among specific causes were the spirit of intellectual aristocracy, so largely dominant in the ancient world, Oriental mysticism, and a deep but misguided sense of the power of evil. The materials employed were as varied as the Gnostic sects were numerous. The different systems of Greek philosophy, Judaism, and the various religions of the Orient, were all laid under contribution. The most notable and influential factor borrowed from Christianity was the great idea of redemption. Clear indications of the existence of Gnostic heresy are found in the writings of the Apostles Paul and John; but the era of its rankest growth and widest influence was the second century.

The Gnostic systems (to use substantially the same description which we have employed elsewhere) agreed, in the main, upon the following points. God is the unfathomable abyss, exalted above all contact with the creature world. From God an unfoldment has proceeded, His attributes or powers going forth in personal form, the first emanations serving as sources for those more remote, until a chain of celestial beings, or æons, appears between the

supreme Father and the material realm. The material is the seat of evil, something essentially opposed to the divine. The fashioner of the material world, the Jehovah of the Old Testament, is a subordinate being, standing below even the æons, and representing psychical rather than spiritual existence. The Saviour is a being from the æonic world, who united himself with Jesus of Nazareth. This union, however, which was only temporary, was not of the nature of a real incarnation, and involved no subjection to bodily needs and sufferings. Men are by nature divided into different moral classes, and so fitted for different destinies. No member of a lower class can transcend the circle which fate, or an absolute predestination, has drawn about him.

Among the features distinguishing Gnostic systems from each other were the different degrees of dualism which they affirmed. The Syrian were in general more dualistic than the Alexandrian. Some, much after the fashion of the Indian pantheists, regarded the material realm as the region of emptiness and illusion, the void opposite of the *pleroma*, that is, of the æonic realm, or the world of reality and spiritual fulness; others assigned a more positive nature to the material, and regarded it as capable of an evil aggressiveness, even apart from any quickening by the incoming of life from above. Some sects were less hostile to Old Testament Judaism than others. Hence, while some represented Jehovah as a positively malicious being, others represented him as merely a limited being, unconsciously fulfilling the will of a higher power. In their use of the Scriptures, the Gnostics generally were very arbitrary; but some were disposed to sustain their views chiefly by far-fetched allegorizing, while others rejected outright large portions of the Bible, and worked over the remainder to suit their own ideas. In their moral codes there were also notable differences. Contempt of the world led some to adopt in theory and practice a strict asceticism; others pleaded the same thing as a ground of license, and ran into an extreme Antinomianism.

Manichæism, which arose in the latter part of the third century, was, like Gnosticism, a mixture of heathenism with Christianity. It differed from average Gnosticism by its smaller appropriation of Christian ideas, its more radical and undisguised naturalism, and its more thorough organization.

MONARCHIANISM. — Between the closing part of the second century and the third quarter of the next century two series of Monarchians or Anti-trinitarians appeared. One of these (not to mention the obscure sect of the Alogians) was represented by Theodotus and Artemon, who were condemned at Rome not far from the year 200, and finally culminated in Paul of Samosata, whose condemnation and deposition from the bishopric of Antioch were pronounced in 269. The other series, the so-called Patripassian, began at Rome with Praxeas, near the end of the second century, was represented also by Noctus, and probably by Beryllus of Bostra, and at last culminated in Sabellius, who was excommunicated in Alexandria in 261.

Some of this list of Monarchians had probably only a local influence as respects winning adherents, and it may be questioned whether a very extensive following was gained by any of them. The fact that Monarchianism appeared at the same time in two diverse types, and was generally condemned, indicates that, as a whole, it was no product of the traditions of the Church, but rather a speculative attempt to get over certain difficulties pertaining to the Christian system.

Paul of Samosata and Sabellius appear as the most significant representatives of their respective classes. Both held to the single personality of the Godhead, this being the common tenet of Monarchianism. But on the question whether the one divine person was incarnated, they answered differently. Paul, like the predecessors of his school, replied in the negative. Christ, as he taught, had no existence prior to His supernatural conception and birth. God was to some

extent in Christ, but not strictly as a factor of His person; He was in Christ only in the sense of giving to Him a superior endowment of wisdom and power. In virtue of this endowment and the high mission with which He was intrusted, Christ, though only a man in essence, obtained a species of divine dignity. Sabellius, on the other hand, held, with Praxeas and Noetus, that the one divine person was in Christ, not after the mode of a charism or endowment, but as the central factor of His being; that indeed the human in Christ was only a vestment assumed by the divine person. According to Sabellius, there is a trinity, but it is only a trinity of manifestations. God as the outward moving, as the creator and ruler of the universe, — in other words, God in His general revelation, — is the Logos. God, as specifically revealed in the giving of the law, in the provision of redemption, and in the sanctifying of believers, is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. These three titles are indicative, not of distinctions in the divine nature, but of stages in the divine economy; they denote the same divine person under successive forms of manifestation. The human in Christ appears in this scheme to serve only as a transient instrument of the divine, and the incarnation takes more the character of a theophany than of an incarnation, in the sense of an abiding union between God and man. The abridgment in this way of the significance of the historical Christ brings the system of Sabellius, notwithstanding it seems at its starting-point the opposite of Ebionism, into a certain affinity with the same. “The one point alone,” says Dorner, “that he reduces the revelation of Christ to the rank of a mere means, and does not also regard Him as an end in Himself, is a degradation of Him, which approximates to Ebionism.”

As the literature of the second and third centuries attests, the Catholic Church received from Gnosticism and Monarchianism profound incentives toward a more definite construction of Christian doctrine. The Judaic Ebionism,

though receiving some attention, was treated in these centuries as a matter of subordinate importance.

SECTION III. — AUTHORS AND THEIR WORKS.

	Genuine Writings.	Approximate Date.
I. APOSTOLIC FATHERS.		
Clement, Bishop of Rome,	First Epistle (under his name) to the Corinthians	A. D. 92-101
Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch,	Seven Epistles (shorter or Vossian recension) . . .	107-116
Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna,	Epistle to the Philippians	Soon after the Ignatian.
Barnabas	Epistle	A. D. 100-150
Hermas	Pastor of Hermas (an allegorical work)	100-140
Unknown Writer	Epistle to Diognetus	100-140
Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia	Expositions of Oracles of the Lord (only a few fragments being extant)	120-160
II. APOLOGISTS OF THE SECOND CENTURY.		
Justin Martyr	Apology I.; Apology II.; Dialogue with Trypho	138-166
Tatian	Address to the Greeks	Near 150
Athenagoras, of Athens	Embassy (or Plea) for Christians; On the Resurrection	170-180
Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch	Three Books to Autolyceus	168-188
Quadratus	Fragments	117-138
Aristo		
Melito, Claudius	Mainly Fragments	160-180
Apollinaris		
III. GREEK WRITERS OF ALEXANDRIA.		
Clement	Exhortation; Educator; Stromata, or Miscellanies; On the Rich Man	190-202
Origen	De Principiis; Against Celsus; Commentaries on the Old and New Testaments	210-254
Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria	Important Fragments	248-264
IV. OTHER GREEK WRITERS.		
Gregory Thaumaturgus, Bishop of Neo-Cæsarea	Declaration of Faith; Panegyric; Canonical Epistle	244-270
Methodius, Bishop of Tyre	Banquet of Virgins, etc.	Before 311

	Genuine Writings.	Approximate Date.
V. WRITERS OF GREEK AN- TECEDENTS OR CULTURE IN THE LATIN CHURCH.		
Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons . .	Five Books against Heresies Philosophoumena; Christ and Antichrist; Against Noetus, etc. }	A. D. 180-190
Hippolytus, (probably) Bishop of Portus Romanus. }		200-236
VI. LATIN WRITERS.		
Tertullian }	Works against Praxeas, Hermogenes, and Mar- cion; Treatises on Re- pentance, Baptism, the Flesh of Christ, the Res- urrection of the Flesh, the Soul, etc. }	190-220
Minucius Felix }	Octavius }	200-250
Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage . }	Epistles; Treatise on the Unity of the Church, etc. }	245-258
Novatian }	The Trinity; Jewish Meats	250-260
Arnobius }	Adversus Gentes }	295-305
Lactantius }	Divine Institutes; Anger of God; Workmanship of God; Manner in which the Persecutors died . . }	315-325

It is hardly necessary to state that these writings are commonly quoted by their Latin titles; the work of Tatian, for example, as “Oratio ad Græcos,” the Plea of Athenagoras as “Legatio,” the treatise of Theophilus as “Ad Autolyceum,” the “Exhortation” and “Educator” of Clement as “Cohortatio” and “Pædagogus.”

The only writing claiming to be from Clement of Rome which is undoubtedly genuine is his Epistle (in fifty-nine chapters) to the Corinthians. The second and shorter Epistle to the Corinthians which bears his name is mentioned by no writer prior to Eusebius (Hefele, “Patrum Apostolicorum Opera”), who speaks of it in these dubious terms: “We know not that this is as highly approved as the former, and we know not that it has been in use with the ancients.” (III. 38.) In form and substance, too, this writing gives evidence of being a homily rather than an

epistle. There is little reason, therefore, for ascribing it to Clement. The most important of the writings forged under the name of Clement are those already mentioned, — the “Homilies” (with their “Epitome”) and the “Recognitions,” the latter being the less remote of the two from orthodoxy. Besides these productions, the Pseudo-Clementine literature embraces two epistles concerning Virginity, discovered in a Syriac version, and several decretal letters in the collection of the pseudo-Isidore. Clement is also associated (as the instrument of their transmission) with the so-called “Apostolical Constitutions.” The eight books of this work treat mainly of morals, discipline, and worship. They are believed to have been composed, for the most part, at the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century.

Of the fifteen Epistles bearing the name of Ignatius, the spurious character of eight is clearly evinced by their style and contents, and by the lack of any reference to them up to the sixth century. The remaining seven are found in a longer and a shorter recension, and three of them, in an abbreviated form, have been discovered in a Syriac version. The drift of recent criticism, as well as the balance of evidence, authorizes the preference of the shorter recension, as giving the seven epistles substantially in the form in which they were left by Ignatius.

It is commonly conceded that the author of the Epistle which bears the name of Barnabas could not have been Paul's distinguished companion of that name.

The identity of Hermas is somewhat a matter of conjecture. By the author of the “Canon of Muratori,” written in the latter half of the second century, he is called the brother of the Roman Bishop Pius. This would place him toward the middle of the second century. It should be noticed, however, that some historians have inferred from statements of Hermas himself that he was a contemporary of Clement of Rome.

A writing entitled the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," recently brought to light and bearing marks of genuineness, appears to have claims to be associated, in point of age, with the literature of the apostolic fathers.

Besides the three writings which are unquestionably from the pen of Justin Martyr, there are several treatises bearing his name for whose genuineness some claim may be put forward. Here belong the "Address to the Greeks," the "Cohortatio," or "Hortatory Address to the Greeks," the "Sole Government of God," and fragments from the work on the Resurrection. Quite a number of critics contend for the genuineness of the "Hortatory Address," and the treatise on the "Sole Government of God."

Tatian is properly given a place among the fathers of the Church, since the single treatise which has come down from him was written before he became associated with Gnosticism.

A distinction may be drawn between the writings of Tertullian composed before and those composed after he espoused Montanism. The distinction, however, is not of great importance in the history of doctrine. In both orders of writings the same views are found upon the leading topics of theology; and where Montanism affected the teaching of Tertullian, it for the most part simply intensified characteristics and tendencies already at hand.

Hippolytus and Novatian may be reckoned among the exponents of the Catholic theology of their age, though both were in relations of hostility to the Roman see, and the latter finally became the leader of a schism. With Novatian the ground of separation was the lax discipline, as he regarded it, of the Roman bishops. Hippolytus, according to his own account, had occasion to complain, not only of loose discipline, but also of affiliation with the Patripassian heresy on the part of the bishops Zephyrinus and Callistus. He was evidently a man of broad learning,

and with Irenæus and Tertullian ranks among the writers of prime dogmatic importance in the West.

Arnobius and Lactantius remained in heathenism until mature life, and neither of them seems to have become thoroughly acquainted with the Christian system. Their writings, therefore, cannot be taken, without some qualification, as representative of the doctrinal standpoint of their time.

Among the several groups of writers, the apostolic fathers appear distinguished by their practical interest. Little of the speculative is contained in their writings. Their words bear mainly upon the Christian life of the individual and of the Church. Still they touch upon many points of doctrine, and their testimony has special value, on account of its nearness to the age of the apostles. With Justin Martyr and his co-apologists we find a more speculative bent, and a more positive endeavor to construct and to defend Christian doctrines. This was only in accordance with their antecedents as men well versed in the Hellenic philosophies. In the early Alexandrian school the intellectual interest was still more prominent. Theorizing here was no doubt pushed somewhat to an extreme, at least in case of Origen; but at the same time, some of the best products of Christian thinking in the early centuries came from this school, and some of its opinions stand in favorable contrast with those of writers less given to idealism. In the Latin Church there were theologians who showed a good degree of intellectual activity and productiveness, but on the whole the disposition to philosophize was less native to the West than to the East. Something of the characteristic bias of the Latin Church, in the direction of administration and of those departments of doctrine most plainly concerning man's practical interests,—namely, anthropology and soteriology,—may be discovered in the literature of the period. Of the ambition and faculty for administration, Cyprian appears in this period as a specially eminent representative.

SECTION IV. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. CANON. — To the writers immediately succeeding the apostles, the Holy Scriptures were pre-eminently the books of the Old Testament. They were conversant with more or less of the apostolic writings, and no doubt regarded them as containing unimpeachable truths of the new dispensation. But they were not yet prepared to think of a New Testament as standing over against the Old, and made up of a definite list of sacred books. Church must commune with church, one quarter of Christendom must receive ample and credible information as to what was in other quarters, before there could be any positive and wide-spread conviction as to the proper compass of the apostolic literature.

Even with respect to the proper limits of the Old Testament, there was occasion in the early Church for inquiry and investigation. At first, however, this occasion was unrecognized. Writings claiming a place in the Old Testament, or found in juxtaposition with its books, were readily quoted as inspired Scripture by Christian authors. By the time of Christ, a number of such books had appeared. These were held in minor regard by the Palestinian Jews; but by the Alexandrian Jews they were highly esteemed. Still, the latter knew how to distinguish them from the proper canonical Scriptures. Philo, who was doubtless well acquainted with them, never cites them in his references to the Jewish oracles. (Gieseler, "*Dogmengeschichte*.") Less discrimination was naturally shown by the Christians. Being for the most part unacquainted with the Hebrew, they were not distinctly apprised of any dividing line between the older books and the later additions. Both alike were known by them in the Greek language, and were found within the compass of the same version; namely, the Septuagint. Hence, we find about

the full list of what are currently termed the apocryphal books, such as the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, Judith, Baruch, and the Books of the Maccabees, quoted by one Christian writer or another. In some instances, writings not recognized by the Septuagint were cited. Thus, the Fourth Book, or the Apocalypse, of Ezra, (written perhaps within the Christian era,) is cited by the Epistle of Barnabas and by Clement of Alexandria; and Tertullian attempts to prove that the Jews were wrong in rejecting the inspired Book of Enoch from their canon. (*De Cultu Fem.*, I. 3.)

It is in the latter half of the second century that we first meet with a definite attempt, on the part of Christian writers, to ascertain the proper limits of the Old Testament. About the year 170, Melito, Bishop of Sardis, made inquiries upon the subject in Palestine. In a letter written to his brother Onesimus, he gives in his list of Old Testament books those which belong to the Hebrew canon proper (with the exception of Esther), and none others. (*Euseb.*, IV. 26.) Origen, at a later date, called attention to the same list, including, however, in the Book of Jeremiah the so-called Epistle of Jeremiah. (The omission of the minor prophets in the citation of Eusebius, VI. 25, must be regarded as accidental.) Origen, to be sure, considered some of the apocryphal books worthy of a place in the canon, and attributed their non-acceptance to the false motives and prejudices of the Jews. But the distinction, after it was once made, between the proper Hebrew Testament and the later additions gained increasing force, especially in the Greek Church. In the fourth century, as also thereafter, the Greek fathers, in general, accepted only the Letter of Jeremiah and the Book of Baruch, in addition to the strict Hebrew canon.

Some of the Latin fathers who were especially conversant with Greek literature discriminated against the apocryphal books. Here belong Hilary of Poitiers, Rufinus, and

Jerome. Augustine, on the other hand, and several councils in which he took part, namely, that of Hippo in 393, and those of Carthage in 397 and 419, decided expressly for admitting into the canon the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, Judith, and the two Books of the Maccabees. Near the same time, a like judgment was rendered by the Bishop of Rome. These decisions secured the balance in the Latin Church in favor of the above-named apocryphal books, though long after this era there were here and there learned men in the Latin Church who manifested a conviction that these books were not to be accounted of full canonical worth. Even Gregory the Great quoted the first Book of the Maccabees as if its title to a place in the canon might be questioned. (Moral., XIX. 21.) See also list of others who made strictures upon the Apocrypha, as given by J. Gerhard (*Loci Theol.*, I. § 89).

As the interval which separated the Church from the apostolic age was increased, and the traditions of that age were more liable to be questioned, there was naturally an increased incentive to fix the exact bounds of the apostolic literature, and thus definitely to circumscribe the oracles of the new dispensation. To this incentive, necessarily involved in the conditions of the case, was added the spur which came from the arbitrary conduct of heretics, in curtailing, remodelling, or adding to the apostolic writings. Marcion, for example, remodelled Luke, and rejected the rest of the New Testament, with the exception of ten Epistles of Paul (Tertul., *Adv. Marcion*, IV. 2, 3). A Gospel according to the Egyptians is mentioned by Hippolytus among heretical writings (*Phil.*, V. 2), and was probably of quite early origin. Irenæus, speaking of a Valentinian sect, the Marcosians, says, "They adduce an unspeakable number of apocryphal and spurious writings, which they themselves have forged to trouble the minds of foolish men and of such as are ignorant of the scriptures of truth." (*Cont. Hær.*, I. 20. 1.) "The Church," says Origen, "has

four Gospels, heretics many ; of which one is entitled according to the Egyptians, another according to the Twelve Apostles. Basilides also has dared to write a Gospel, and to inscribe it with his own name. I know a certain Gospel which is named according to Thomas and according to Matthias." (In Luc., Hom. I.) No doubt there is ample evidence that heretical parties gave much recognition to genuine writings, and their testimony enters into the sum total of proof for the apostolic origin of the New Testament books. But there was enough of arbitrary procedure on their part to intensify the natural demand within the Catholic Church for a fixed canon.

About the middle of the second century, at least within the limits of the third quarter of that century, there was rendered a very positive and general recognition of the Scriptural character of the great body of our present New Testament books. Even before this date there was a collection, whatever may have been its compass, which was read at the stated services of the Church ; for we find Justin Martyr, in the earliest of his writings, stating that it was the custom of Christians to have the "Memoirs of the Apostles" read to the congregation on the first day of the week. (1 Apol., LXVII.) The so-called "Canon of Muratori," written probably about the year 170, indicates, notwithstanding its somewhat fragmentary character, that the Church of that date was substantially united upon the acceptance of the four Gospels, the Book of Acts, the Apocalypse, and nearly all of the Epistles. Only one uncanonical book, namely, the Apocalypse of Peter, is added to the New Testament list by this document, and concerning this it is said that it was not universally admitted. (See Westcott on the Canon.) The writings of Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, men representing sections of the Church widely separated geographically, testify to a general acknowledgment of a like collection. In fine, we may say without hesitation that the Catholic

Church (that is, the great body of Christians of that age) in the latter half of the second century unanimously assigned a canonical character to the four Gospels, the Acts, thirteen Epistles of Paul, the First Epistle of John, and the First Epistle of Peter, and did not as a whole receive any book now reckoned uncanonical.

Among the remaining books of our New Testament, the Apocalypse was very largely quoted, and no church father of the first three centuries, except Dionysius of Alexandria, questioned its apostolic origin. He regarded it as "the work of some holy and inspired man," by the name of John, but not to be identified with the Apostle John. Some of the Greek fathers of the fourth century followed the opinion of Dionysius; but Athanasius and others contended for the apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse, and in the course of the fifth century their verdict became substantially universal in the Greek Church. The Epistle to the Hebrews was estimated very highly in the Greek Church, and was frequently quoted as a production of Paul. Origen often quotes it in this way, though in his more specific statement he decides that it is to be regarded as Pauline simply in substance, having been written by an immediate disciple of the Apostle. The early Latin fathers leave it unnoticed, or else decide against its apostolic authorship. Its right to a place in the canon, however, was commonly acknowledged in the Latin Church from the time of Augustine and Jerome. Some exception was taken to the Epistle of Jude and to the Second and Third Epistles of John, as appears from the testimony of Eusebius and Origen; but each of them was approved by individual writers in the first three centuries, and there was probably never in the Church at large a serious disinclination to receive them. The Epistle of James and the Second Epistle of Peter obtained little recognition from early writers, and, largely on this account, were regarded with doubt by Eusebius and some later authors. At the close of the fourth century, however, the

Church was substantially united upon affirming the canonical rank of these, as of all other books in our New Testament collection.

A few books besides those now in the canon were assigned, for a certain interval, and by a fraction of the Church, a canonical or semi-canonical character. We learn from Eusebius that the Epistle of Clement of Rome was read in many of the churches for a considerable time (III. 16, IV. 23), though this does not necessarily imply that it was placed fully on a par with the apostolic writings. Clement of Alexandria quotes the Epistle of Barnabas as the writing of the Apostle Barnabas, evidently attributing to it the character of sacred Scripture, and Origen treats it with nearly equal respect. (Strom., II. 6, 7, 20; De Prin., III. 2, 4.) Both of these writers indicate also by their quotations that they attributed a high degree of authority to the "Pastor" of Hermas. The way in which the "Canon of Muratori" mentions the Apocalypse of Peter has already been noted. According to Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria included the same among the books upon which he wrote brief comments. (VI. 14.) None of these books, however, were ever assigned a Scriptural character by any general authority, and in time they lost the partial recognition accorded them. As regards the larger and more essential portion of the New Testament canon, there was a marked unanimity in the Church from the first consideration of the subject.

2. INSPIRATION AND AUTHORITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. — The writings of Philo indicate the existence at the opening of the Christian era of a very emphatic theory of inspiration. According to this exponent of the highest Jewish culture of Alexandria, the prophets were passive instruments in the hands of the revealing God, and even the Septuagint translation was inspired word for word. The human nature, he teaches, must sink below the horizon, and be lost in trance, before the divine orb can arise. "When the divine light shines, the human light sets, and

when the divine light sets, this other rises and shines; and this very frequently happens to the race of prophets, for the mind that is in us is removed from its place at the arrival of the Divine Spirit, but it is again restored to its previous habitation when that Spirit departs, for it is contrary to holy law for what is mortal to dwell with what is immortal." (Heir to Divine Things, LIII.; Life of Moses, Bk. II., Chaps. V.-VII.; Rewards and Punishments, IX. Translation by C. D. Yonge.)

The earliest Christian writers who express any theory upon the subject of Scriptural inspiration approximate to the representations of Philo. Justin Martyr says that the utterances of the prophets were not their own, but the utterances of the Divine Word which moved them. (1 Apol., XXXVI.) In a writing attributed to him, the souls of the prophets are compared to a harp or lyre, upon which the Holy Spirit, as a kind of divine plectrum, descends, and from which He brings forth superhuman and accordant responses. (Cohortatio, VIII.) In like manner Athenagoras says that the Spirit from God "moved the mouths of the prophets like musical instruments," that the Spirit lifted Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the other prophets "in ecstacy" above the natural operations of their minds, and made use of them as the flute-player breathes into the flute. (Legatio, VII., IX.)

Perhaps it would be concluding too much to affirm that by such figures these writers meant to indicate absolute passivity, or the complete loss of self-consciousness in the inspired agent. Among the early Christians the distinct utterance of this theory was characteristic of the Montanists. Accordingly Tertullian, speaking as a Montanist, makes the following comment on the statement that Peter upon the Mount of Transfiguration knew not what he said: "Was his ignorance the result of simple error? Or was it on the principle which we maintain in the cause of the new prophecy, that to grace ecstacy or rapture is incident?"

For when a man is rapt in the Spirit, especially when he beholds the glory of God, or when God speaks through him, he necessarily loses sensation, because he is overshadowed by the power of God; a point concerning which there is a question between us and the carnally minded." (Adv. Marc., IV. 22.) By the carnally minded, or psychics, Tertullian denotes here the non-Montanists; and his phraseology indicates that the Catholic Church, at least after the rise of Montanism, was averse to the theory that the state of inspiration is a state of ecstasy, in which sensation and self-consciousness are wholly lost. Origen is distinguished among early writers as explicitly opposing this theory, and asserting the contrary idea, that inspiration elevates and quickens the natural faculties of the agent. He predicates, moreover, a close connection between inspiration and moral character. The fact that the Pythian priestess was beside herself in the act of prophesying, he declares to be an evidence that her mind was clouded by an evil demon. Far different the effect of a divine working. "The Jewish prophets, who were enlightened as far as was necessary for their prophetic work by the Spirit of God, were the first to enjoy the benefit of the inspiration; and by the contact, if I may so say, of the Holy Spirit, they became clearer in mind, and their souls were filled with a brighter light. . . . They were selected to receive the Divine Spirit, and to be the depositaries of His holy oracles, on the ground of their leading a life of almost unapproachable excellence." (Cont. Cel., VII. 4-7.)

But though the Montanist theory was generally repelled after the latter part of the second century, the majority of Christian writers still entertained a very positive conception of Scriptural inspiration. Irenæus says, that we may be "assured that the Scriptures are perfect, since they were spoken by the Word of God and His Spirit" (II. 28. 2); and Clement of Alexandria, though he is not very explicit, seems strongly to emphasize the instrumental posi-

tion of the sacred writers. Origen in one place speaks as though he conceived that the prophets, having received from God the substance of their revelations, were left to clothe them in their own language. (*Selecta in Deut.*) Still the whole plan of his exegesis, making so much account as it did of individual words and phrases, as well as his declarations that deep meanings are to be found in the smallest items of Scripture, virtually assumed verbal inspiration. In general, the tendency, no doubt, was to regard inspiration as extending not merely to the main subject matter, but also to the very words employed.

The earliest of the writers quoted above — namely, Justin Martyr and Athenagoras — had directly in mind the Old Testament in their references to the subject of inspiration. But whatever theory was applied to the Old Testament was naturally applied to the New, when once the apostolic writings had been collected into an acknowledged canon. We find such authors as Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen asserting the unity of the dispensations, and connecting quite as emphatic an idea of inspiration with the New as with the Old Testament. (*Cont. Hær.*, II. 28, IV. 9; *De Præscrip.*, XXXVI.; *Strom.*, VII. 16; *In Lev. Hom.*, VI. 2.)

The theory of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures involved, of course, the theory of their plenary authority and inestimable value. Irenæus calls the four Gospels the four pillars of the Church. (III. 11. 8.) Cyprian speaks of the Scriptures as “founts of divine fulness,” *divinæ plenitudinis fontes*. (*Adv. Jud.*, *Proëm.*) “The divine Scriptures and institutions of wisdom,” says Clement of Alexandria, “form the short road to salvation.” (*Cohort.*, Chap. VIII.) Origen declares it an impious sentiment, that a merely historical character is to be ascribed to the Scripture records, as though they did not have in the present a positive bearing upon our welfare and salvation. Everywhere, even under the very stones of stumbling, some

good may be found. "If we are commanded," he says, "not to utter any vain or useless word, what must be thought concerning the prophets? Must it not be concluded that every word which proceeded from their mouth is efficacious?" (In Num. Hom., XXVII. 2; In Jer. Hom., XXXIX.)

3. INTERPRETATION AND USE OF THE SCRIPTURES. — Though exegesis was in its infancy, some sound hermeneutical maxims were enunciated in this period. Clement of Alexandria, for example, lays down the principle, that Scripture must be compared with Scripture, and that interpretation preferred which agrees best with the body and texture of the sacred volume. (Strom., VII. 16.) A similar principle is involved in the protest of Irenæus against the Gnostic perversion of holy writ by excerpting passages from their connection and arbitrarily stringing them together. (I. 9. 4.) Tertullian, too, hit upon a noteworthy idea, when, in opposition to Marcion's excision from the Bible of everything deemed counter to the attribute of love in God, he asserted that analogy teaches us that *antitheses*, or contrasted features, are to be expected in written revelation, inasmuch as the revelation of God in nature abounds in such. (Adv. Marc., IV. 1.)

One of the most palpable faults in early exegesis was an almost universal tendency to excess in the direction of allegorical interpretations. Origen represents the extreme of this tendency. To remain upon the low ground of the letter, he repeatedly urges, is to fail of the true bread. The kernel, the spirit, the proper food, lies beyond the outward envelope. "As man consists of body, soul, and spirit, so in the same way does Scripture." Every part is to be credited with a spiritual meaning, but there are certain passages to which a bodily sense is not to be imputed at all. "Sometimes a few words are interpolated which are not true in their literal acceptation, and sometimes a larger number." The Evangelists in some cases varied from the

historical order of the narrative, and where it was not possible to preserve both the bodily and the spiritual sense, sacrificed the former. The passages, however, "that are true in their historical meaning, are much more numerous than those which are interspersed with a purely spiritual signification." (De Prin., Bk. IV., Chap. I. 11-20; In Joan., Tom. X. 4.)

That the reading of the Scriptures was practised generally by all classes in this period, can hardly be asserted. Lack of copies and lack of education must have excluded many from the privilege. But there was no obstacle in the theories of the times to this general reading. The Bible was an open book to laymen as well as to priests. Justin Martyr advises the heathen of their privilege to peruse the sacred writings, and urges them to make use of the same. (1 Apol., LXIII.; Cohort., XXXV.) "Examine," exhorts Tertullian, "our sacred books, which we do not keep in hiding, and which many accidents put into the hands of those who are not of us." (Apol., XXXI.) Origen justifies the simple style of the Scriptures against the objections of the polished Greek, on the ground that they were designed for every class of men. "Our prophets," he says, "and Jesus Himself and His apostles were careful to adopt a style of address which should not merely convey the truth, but which should be fitted to gain over the multitude." (Cont. Cel., VI. 1, 2.) "Many passages appear in the writings of Origen which make it evident that the general reading of the Scriptures was regarded in this age not merely as permissible but as necessary." (Gieseler.)

4. RELATION BETWEEN SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION. — The facts stated with reference to the formation of the New Testament canon cannot fail to suggest that for an interval large dependence must have been placed upon the spoken Word. The testimony of those who followed the apostles must have served as a chief certificate of the true apostolic teaching. In the lack of a generally acknowledged and

widely distributed New Testament, the channel of oral communication had, in point of availability, a certain superiority over that of written communication. Even in his day Irenæus could speak of many nations of believers in Christ as "having salvation written in their hearts by the Spirit, without paper and ink" (III. 4. 2); and at an earlier date such a description must have been capable, relatively speaking, of a still more general application.

Truth handed down in this oral way was styled tradition. As the pressure of heresy was felt, there was naturally an incentive to give connected statements of the main points embraced in the traditional teaching. Brief summaries of Christian faith, corresponding in substance to the so-called Apostles' Creed, came to be recognized very generally by the churches. A summary of this kind was called a rule of faith, *κάνων τῆς ἀληθείας*, *regula fidei*. The rule of faith differed from the fixed creeds of later times as not being formally set forth and enforced by any general authority, and consequently not being confined to an unvarying phraseology, though preserving essentially its identity of substance. The confidence felt respecting its agreement with the apostolic teaching may be judged from such preambles as the following: "The Church, though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith." "This rule of faith has come down to us from the beginning of the Gospel, even before any of the older heretics." "The rule of faith is altogether one, — alone, immovable, and irreformable." (Irenæus, I. 10; Tertul., Adv. Prax., II.; De Veland. Vir., I.) Language like this evidently assumes that the rule of faith was based on unbroken tradition, and was comparatively independent of written oracles. The rule of faith was not, of course, coextensive with tradition, but only its most important embodiment.

The relative completion of the New Testament canon in the latter half of the second century naturally affected the

position of tradition. It hastened its subordination to the written Word. The two continued, no doubt, to be regarded as the same in substance. Accordingly Irenæus speaks of the apostles as first proclaiming the Gospel in public, and afterwards handing down the same in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of the faith. (III. 1.) However, the more explicit, ample, and steadfast statements of the written oracles gave them a special advantage as a standard, and invited appeal to them rather than to tradition. Both were still appealed to; but practically, and in the main theoretically, the preference was given to the Scriptures.

Some statements, to be sure, may appear counter to this conclusion. We find Irenæus, for example, placing great stress upon the idea of a continuous transmission of the truth from the apostles through the succession of bishops, and urging accordingly the importance of consulting the apostolic churches in determining questions of doctrine. In this, however, he is not setting aside Scripture in favor of tradition, but seeking, as he had ample occasion to do in fighting the Gnostics, to guard against arbitrary interpretations of Scripture. His whole emphasis in this direction is of the nature of a practical expedient to check a capricious handling of the sacred Word, rather than a theoretical qualification of the authority of that Word. The abundant references which he makes to the Scriptures indicate clearly enough what was to him, personally considered, the chief standard. About the same may be said of Tertullian. In one place, indeed, he says, "Our appeal must not be made to the Scriptures." But here he was speaking of heretics, with whom there was a controversy as to what should be received as Holy Scripture. The appeal, therefore, he urges, must not be to this in the first instance. We must see first who have the rule of faith handed down from the apostles, for these will be likely to have both the true Scriptures and the true exposition of

them. (De Præscrip., XIX., XXII.) In another connection he intimates that tradition is something less clear and decisive than Scripture. "Of those things," he says, "which are observed on the ground of tradition, we are bound to give a more worthy reason in proportion as they lack the authority of Scripture, until, by some celestial gift, they be either confirmed or corrected." (De Jejun., X.) The mere fact of long-established custom, he declares, is no adequate evidence of validity. "Our Lord Christ has surnamed Himself Truth, not Custom. . . . Whatever savors of opposition to truth, this will be heresy, even though it be ancient custom." (De Veland. Vir., I.) It is the abounding appeals of Tertullian to the Scriptures, however, which most clearly prove that they were to him the unrivalled authority.

In the Alexandrian school there was an evident inclination to rank Scripture above tradition, though in conformity with the age they thought of the two as harmonious rather than antagonistic. "The reading of the Scriptures," says Clement, "is necessary in order to the demonstration of what is said. . . . Those who are ready to toil in the most excellent pursuits will not desist from the search after truth till they get the demonstration from the Scriptures themselves. . . . We establish the matter that is in question by the voice of the Lord, which is the surest of all demonstrations, or rather is the only demonstration." (Strom., VI. 11, VII. 16.) "We must summon," says Origen, "the Holy Scriptures to testimony. For unattested [in this way], our assertions and explanations deserve no credence." (In Jer. Hom., I.)

From Hippolytus we have this statement: "There is one God, the knowledge of whom we gain from the Holy Scriptures, and from no other source. . . . Whatever things, then, the Holy Scriptures declare, at these let us look; and whatsoever things they teach, these let us learn." (Adv. Noctum, IX.) The hierarchical spirit of Cyprian

might be expected to incline him to emphasize tradition. Nevertheless, his controversy with the Roman bishop Stephen gave him occasion to declare the superiority of the written Word, and its deciding power against everything at variance with itself. After speaking of Stephen's appeal to tradition, on the subject of the re-baptism of those who had had only heretical baptism, he proceeds as follows: "Whence is that tradition? Whether does it descend from the authority of the Lord and of the Gospel, or does it come from the commands and epistles of the Apostles? For that those things which are written must be done, God witnesses and admonishes. . . . What obstinacy is that, or what presumption, to prefer human tradition to divine ordinance, and not to observe that God is indignant and angry as often as human tradition relaxes and passes by the divine precepts! . . . Nor ought custom, which had crept in among some, to prevent the truth from prevailing and conquering; for custom without truth is the antiquity of error." (Ad Pompeium, Ep. 73 in Ante-Nicene Lib.)

It is entirely certain that in the third and fourth centuries the great controversies were waged mainly upon the field of Scriptural exegesis. Tradition held in those centuries a subordinate position. It may also be affirmed that it was below equality with Scripture in the latter part of the second century. That it should have been relatively prominent prior to that is not to be regarded as an abnormal state of things. Tradition while yet near to the fountain-head of the apostolic teaching was comparatively vital and trustworthy.

Tradition was regarded as the common property of the Church. Clement of Alexandria, indeed, gave some indulgence to the idea of a secret tradition. "Secret things," he says, "are intrusted to speech, not to writing. . . . The *gnosis* is that which has descended by transmission to a few, having been imparted unwritten by the Apostles." (Strom.,

I. 1, VI. 7.) But such a notion was characteristic rather of Gnosticism than of Catholic Christianity. Clement was the only writer in orthodox repute who made to it any noteworthy concession.

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I.—EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.—There was a feeling in the early Church that the great truths respecting the existence and nature of God scarcely need to be commended by arguments; a conviction that they are so self-evident that only condescension to human perversity urges to any attempt to make them more evident. This conviction was probably wide-spread. Certain is it, that we find several expressions of the belief that truths most worthy of acceptance lie beyond the range of demonstration, and so need rather to be stated than to be argued, at least for one occupying a normal standpoint. In conformity to this opinion, Justin Martyr says of the prophets: "They did not use demonstration in their treatises, seeing that they were witnesses to the truth above all demonstration, and worthy of belief." (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, VII.) Again he remarks: "The word of truth is free and carries its own authority, disdaining to fall under any skilful argument. . . . Nothing is either more powerful or trustworthy than the truth; so that he who requires proof of this is like one who wishes it demonstrated why the things that appear to the senses do appear." (*De Resurrect.*, I.) "First principles," says Clement of Alexandria, "are incapable of demonstration. . . . God, not being a subject for demonstration, cannot be the object of science. . . . All demonstration is traced up to indemonstrable faith. . . . The

knowledge of the first cause of the universe is of faith, but is not demonstration." (Strom. II. 4; II. 5; IV. 25; VIII. 3.)

Emphasis upon this line of thought was necessarily accompanied by much dependence, as regards the proof of the divine existence, upon the testimony of the religious consciousness of men. The unperverted impulses and spontaneous convictions of the soul, it was urged, witness to God; the idea of God is native to the soul. Says Clement of Alexandria, "Far from destitute of a divine idea is man, who, it is written in Genesis, partook of inspiration, being endowed with a purer essence than the other animate creatures." (Strom. V. 13.) Man has, therefore, only to scrutinize the contents of his own consciousness to be apprised of the divine existence. "If one knows himself, he will know God." (Pæd., III. 1.) In another connection he speaks of this knowledge as springing from a certain divine effluence, which is instilled into the hearts of all men; as being born, in other words, of that universal light which is shed, not from the natural, but from the spiritual sun, the living Word. "For the sun could never show me the true God; but that healthful Word [does this], that is the sun of my soul, by whom alone, when He arises in the depths of the soul, the eye of the soul itself is irradiated." (Cohort., VI.) Irenæus testifies, on this wise, to an intuitive knowledge of God: "Since His invisible essence is mighty, it confers on all a profound mental intuition of His most powerful, yea, omnipotent greatness. Wherefore, although 'no one knows the Father, except the Son, nor the Son, except the Father, and those to whom the Son will reveal Him,' yet all do know this one fact, at least, because reason, implanted in their minds, moves them, and reveals to them that there is one God, the Lord of all." (II. 6.) So decisive is the inward testimony, argues Tertullian, that it cancels all excuse for neglecting the worship of the true God. "There is not a soul of man," he says, "that does

not, from the light that is in itself, proclaim the very things that we [Christians] are not permitted to speak above our breath. Most justly, then, every soul is a culprit as well as a witness: in the measure that it testifies for truth the guilt of error lies on it; and on the day of judgment it will stand before the courts of God, without a word to say. Thou proclaimedst God, O soul, but thou didst not seek to know Him." (De Test. Animæ, VI.) "The soul was before prophecy. From the beginning the knowledge of God is the dowry of the soul,—one and the same amongst the Egyptians, and the Syrians, and the tribes of Pontus." (Adv. Marc., I. 10.) Arnobius, also, notwithstanding the inferior ideal of human nature which he sets forth, emphatically maintains that there is in the soul an instinctive acknowledgment of God. (Adv. Gen., I. 33.)

The human soul being thus regarded as having a native affinity for the divine, it was naturally argued that it only needs to be delivered from the weight and the blinding power of sin to become vividly conscious of God. Accordingly, we find Theophilus responding to the heathen challenge, "Show me thy God," as follows: "If you say, 'Show me thy God,' I would reply, 'Show me your man, and I will show you my God.' Show, then, that the eyes of your soul are capable of seeing, and the ears of your heart able to hear. . . . As a burnished mirror, so ought man to have his soul pure. When there is rust on the mirror, it is not possible that a man's face be seen in the mirror; so also when there is sin in a man, such a man cannot behold God." (Ad. Autol., I. 2.) To the same effect is the exhortation of Clement of Alexandria: "If thou desirest truly to see God, take to thyself means of purification worthy of Him; not leaves of laurel fillets interwoven with wool and purple, but wreathing thy brows with righteousness, and encircling them with the leaves of temperance, set thyself earnestly to find Christ." (Cohort., I.)

A second line of evidences for the being of God was

drawn from nature. The manifold indications here of power, intelligence, and design, it was maintained, are clear indications of an all-wise and all-powerful Creator and Ruler. Many of the early writers present this order of proofs with a good degree of animation. (Theoph., I. 5-7; Minucius Felix, XVII., XVIII.; Lactant., *De Ira Dei*, X.; *Div. Inst.*, I. 2; Pseudo-Clem., *Hom.*, VI. 24, 25.) One of the most elevated descriptions is that by Dionysius of Alexandria. Criticising the theory that the world arose by the chance combination of atoms, he asks: "What phalanx ever traversed the plain in such perfect order, no trooper outmarching the others, or falling out of rank, or obstructing the course, or suffering himself to be distanced by his comrades in the array, as is the case with that steady advance in regular file, as it were, and with close-set shields, which is presented by this serried and unbroken progress of the host of the stars? Whence comes it that this mighty multitude of fellow travellers, all unmarshalled by any captain, all ungifted with any determination of will, and all unendowed with any knowledge of each other, have nevertheless held their course in perfect harmony?" (*Adv. Epicur.*, III.)

Metaphysical proofs of the existence of God, such as those adduced by Augustine, Anselm, and Descartes, were quite foreign to the theology of the first three centuries.

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. — In approaching the subject of the divine essence, the early fathers were under the influence of two opposing interests. On the one hand, as claiming to be worshippers of the *perfect* One, they were interested to emphasize the transcendence of God, or His ineffable spirituality and greatness; on the other, they were interested to assert the completeness of the revelation of God in Christianity. Stress upon the elevation of God above all human thought could result in disparaging the revealing power of Christianity, while stress upon the latter might seem to lower the idea of God by making Him too

easily apprehended. To reconcile these two interests has been found a difficult task in all ages of Christian history; and it is not, therefore, to be expected that in the first Christian age it should have been perfectly accomplished.

Many tokens are apparent of a tendency to assert very strongly the transcendence of God. One such may be seen in the reiterated statement that God is properly nameless. "No one," says Justin Martyr, "can utter the name of the ineffable God; and if any one dare to say that there is a name, he raves with a hopcless madness." (1 Apol., LXI.) Similar expressions are used by Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and others. (Ad Autol., I. 3; Strom., V. 11; Octav., XVIII.; Div. Inst., I. 6.) The idea back of such statements, as appears from the explanations offered, was that no earthly vocabulary has a name that is adequate to describe God. The noblest name can only partially express some one function or aspect of the Divine Being. To this was added the notion that names are for the purpose of distinguishing individuals, which admit therefore of comparison, whereas God is alone and beyond all comparison.

The same tendency is more clearly and unqualifiedly evinced by emphatic statements of the exaltation of God above all proper comprehension by the human mind. "Our heart," says Minucius Felix, "is too limited to understand Him, and we are then worthily estimating Him when we say that He is beyond estimation." (Octav., XVIII.) Before the majesty of God, according to Novatian, all eloquence and reason are mute. Discourse and thought stand far below Him. "Whatever in any respect you might declare of Him, you would rather be unfolding some condition and power of His than Himself." (De Trin., II.) "There is but one thing," says Arnobius, "man can be assured of regarding God's nature: to know and perceive that nothing can be revealed in human language concerning God." (III. 19.) Clement of Alexandria also emphasizes the unmeasured

eminence of Deity above all finite thought; and indeed, he may be regarded as the most noteworthy representative in the period of the negative mode of defining God. "We may reach somehow," he says, "to the conception of the Almighty, knowing not what He is, but what He is not. . . . The First Cause is not in space, but above space and time and name and conception." (Strom., V. 11.) The various predicates applied to Him involve an accommodation to human weakness. Even His unity is something ineffable. "God is one, and beyond the one, and above the Monad itself." (Pæd., I. 8.) Origen speaks of God as incomprehensible, as a Being "whose nature cannot be grasped or seen by the power of any human understanding, even the purest and brightest." (De Prin., I. 1. 5.)

In the preceding paragraph are contained the most radical declarations indulged by the early Christian writers on the transcendence of God. These statements, therefore, cannot be taken unqualifiedly as representative of the thought of the age. Even the same writers who make the boldest assertions concerning the impossibility of knowing God, assume, or even assert, that there is a certain knowledge of Him. Thus Clement of Alexandria says, "It remains that we understand, then, the Unknown, by divine grace, and by the word alone that proceeds from Him." (Strom., V. 12.) Compared with each other, Clement's statements leave, as the ultimate result, a declaration of a real though partial knowledge of God. Deity proves to be, in his view, unknown in these two senses: (1.) He cannot be strictly demonstrated; (2.) He cannot be fully grasped or comprehended by any finite mind. "No one can rightly express Him *wholly*." (Strom., V. 12.) Origen, who was in general less inclined than Clement to push the idea of God into the region of utter abstraction, very plainly decides for a real, though incomplete knowledge of God. The following sentences illustrate his standpoint: "Whatever be the knowledge which we are able to obtain of God, either by

perception or reflection, we must of necessity believe that He is by many degrees far better than what we perceive Him to be." (De Prin., I. 1. 5.) "The statement [of Celsus] that 'He cannot be expressed by name' requires to be taken with a distinction. If he means, indeed, that there is no word or sign that can represent the attributes of God, the statement is true, since there are many qualities which cannot be indicated by words. Who, for example, could describe in words the difference betwixt the quality of sweetness in a palm and that in a fig? But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of God's attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so to enable him to comprehend something of God, so far as is attainable by human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that 'He *can* be described by name.'" (Cont. Cel., VI. 65.) "God is invisible, because He is not a body, while He can be seen by those who see with the heart, — that is, the understanding; not indeed with any kind of heart, but with one which is pure." (Ibid., VI. 69.) Irenæus, while he declares that it is not possible to know God "as regards His greatness," sees, nevertheless, in His very greatness, or in the vastness of His resources, a guaranty of God's ability to reveal Himself to men. "Man," he says, "does not see God by his own powers; but when He pleases He is seen by men, by whom He wills, and when He wills, and as He wills. For God is powerful in all things." (IV. 20.) In general it may be said that early Christian theology assumed something more than a "regulative knowledge" of God; it assumed a *genuine* though partial knowledge of Him.

While some expressions are found which, taken by themselves, seem to push the transcendence of God beyond the true limit, others occur which strike one as falling short of that limit. Tertullian, for example, appears to have been unable to rise to the conception of pure spirit. "Nothing,"

he says, "lacks bodily existence but that which is non-existent." (*De Carne Christi*, XI.) This idea he applies directly to God, in these terms: "Who will deny that God is a body, although 'God is a spirit'? For spirit has a bodily substance of its own kind, in its own form." (*Adv. Prax.*, VII.) It might be suggested that Tertullian used the word "body" as equivalent to substance. No doubt he conceived of the divine body as invisible to mortal eyes, and immeasurably contrasted with earthly grossness; but he seems, nevertheless, to have contemplated it under the aspect of extension, and so to have included it within the category of bodies proper. According to Origen, Tertullian had been anticipated in this positive ascription of a body to God, by Melito. (*Select. in Gen.*) Less directly he was anticipated by some others, who, notwithstanding their emphatic conviction of the spirituality of the divine nature, interpreted the omnipresence of God very much in accordance with bodily analogies. Athenagoras, for example, argued that there can be only one God, since there is no room for a second, — no room, as His words imply, in a spatial sense, as well as in respect of governing functions. (*Legat.*, VIII.) Theophilus, also, unless his language imperfectly represents his thought, indulged a similar conception of omnipresence. (*Ad. Autol.*, I. 5; II. 3.) It is to be observed, however, that a little lapse from scientific exactness of expression is so easy upon such a subject, that a verdict is not hastily to be passed upon the real theory of an author. Among those most decidedly repudiating all bodily characteristics from God, and grasping the purest conception of the divine omnipresence, were the Alexandrians. "God is not in place," says Clement, "but above both space and time." (*Strom.*, II. 2.) Origen urges that we are not to think of God as in any degree corporeal, and declares the proposition of the Stoics, that God is a spirit diffused through all things, and containing all things within Himself, to be no dogma of Christians, since the Christian

doctrine shuns to apply to God the notion of containing or being contained in the proper spatial sense. (De Prin., I. 1; Cont. Cel., VI. 71.)

Origen, however, had his own way of compromising the transcendence of God, inasmuch as he affirmed a necessary limitation upon divine power and knowledge. The limitation which he predicated had its foundation in a notion which has been ventilated not a little in modern philosophy, — the notion that the boundless or the infinite cannot be known. This notion, when applied to Deity, involves either a denial of His infinitude, or a denial of His personality. Now Origen, notwithstanding a measure of affiliation with Neo-Platonism, was decidedly averse to its obscuration of the personality of God. In this relation he was in full sympathy with the general drift of the first centuries, and had a strong interest in the perfect freedom and self-consciousness — or, in other words, in the proper personality — of the Supreme Being. Unwilling to abate aught in this direction, he was logically driven to qualify God's infinitude. Hence we find him, in connection with his proposition on the necessary limitation of the created universe, indulging the following statements: "We must say that the power of God is finite, and not, under pretence of praising Him, take away His limitation. For if the divine power be infinite, it must of necessity be unable to understand even itself, since that which is naturally illimitable is incapable of being comprehended. He made things, therefore, so great as to be able to apprehend and keep them under His power, and control them by His providence." (Epistle of Justinian to Menas. Compare version of Rufinus in De Prin., II. 9.) Again he remarks: "That which is boundless in nature cannot be comprehended, since it is the nature of knowledge to bound what is known." (In Matt. Tom., XIII. 1.) Origen seems to have been led astray here through judging the divine by the human. Knowledge within the human range implies circumscrip-

tion. Not so, however, in the divine range. God's knowledge is not to be conceived as circumscribing His being, nor His being as setting bounds to His knowledge. Circumscription and bounds are to be ruled out of all connection with either the one or the other. When this is done, there will be no obstruction to the *notion* of the co-existence in God of infinite being and infinite knowledge; though of course the human mind, as it cannot *image* the infinite at all, cannot distinctly image to itself the co-existence in question. (Nitzsch, in his *System der Christ. Lehre*, § 72, exeulpates Origen, as meaning to affirm determinateness in God, or the presence of definite predicates, rather than any limitation proper; but it may be doubted whether the language of Origen allows him to be thus excused.)

Some of the passages already quoted indicate that time relations were regarded as foreign to God, and others to the same effect might be cited. That God is immutable and impassible was often asserted. (In Num. Hom., XVI. 4; Select. in Gen.; Legat., VIII.; Adv. Prax., XXIX.; Div. Inst., I. 3.)

As respects moral attributes, it naturally characterized an age rejoicing in the new-found treasure of redemption to dwell especially upon the love of God. Still, the sterner attributes were not overlooked. In opposition to Marcion's one-sided emphasis upon divine love, a place was claimed for divine justice. Tertullian in particular was zealous to assert this aspect of Deity. In proportion, he argues, as God is the lover and defender of the good, He must necessarily be the hater and punisher of the evil; such a weakling as Marcion puts in the place of God can never command the reverence needful to the conservation of moral order. There is no antagonism between goodness and justice. "God is wholly good, because in all things He is on the side of good." (Adv. Marc., I. 26, 27, II. 13.) According to Tertullian, vindication of law and essential

hatred of sin are leading motives with God in the infliction of punishment. By the Alexandrians, on the other hand, especially Origen, the corrective design of punishment was largely emphasized. We find Origen, indeed, protesting against the Marcionite disparagement of justice, and claiming, like Tertullian, that it is in perfect agreement with goodness and must have a place in any normal conception of God; but he gives a very different turn to his argument by asserting that God punishes in kindness, and for the sake of the improvement of the punished as well as for the security of moral order in general. (De Prin., II. 5.)

Among special views bearing upon God's holiness, none is perhaps more noteworthy than the idea of Origen that power to sin would involve a limitation of God. He maintains that "God is not able to commit wickedness, for the power of doing evil is contrary to His deity and its omnipotence." (Cont. Cel., III. 70.) To fall into sin implies wavering and weakness; an infinite lapse from righteous strength, an unthinkable imbecility, must ensue ere God can indulge any wickedness.

SECTION II. — THE LOGOS, OR SON OF GOD.

1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS. — In every system of thought which does not rest upon the low plane of materialism, or lose the distinction between God and the world in a pantheistic maze, there is a natural occasion to dwell upon the idea of mediation. God in His exaltation above time and space and every material characteristic, appears in unspeakable contrast with the visible world. How to soften the antithesis, or to bridge over the interval between the two, becomes a problem of foremost interest. Among the first essays at a solution, a more definite analysis of the general idea of God naturally claims a place. It is realized that, if a world-

ward side can be predicated of God, which is at the same time in harmony with His transcendence, something has been done towards spanning, in a consistent manner, the cleft between God and the world. This worldward side is found in the divine mind, as holding in itself from eternity the immaterial forms or patterns of all things in the universe of creatures. Thus an antecedent of the visible world is discovered,—an ideal world in the divine mind. Herein a kind of medium is provided between the general concept of God and the concept of the world. And this evidently may serve as a basis for a further development. The worldward side may be so far distinguished from the general notion of God as to acquire a relative independence; in other words, the sum of divine ideas forming the ideal world may obtain in figure, or even in actual belief, the position of a personal intelligence, and be represented as the *conscious* instrument of creation, the conscious instrument of the universal revelation of the hidden God. Thus, finally, there may be set forth a veritable medium between God and the world. As being, on the one hand, immanent to the Godhead, this medium may be viewed as truly divine; as holding, on the other hand, an instrumental place, it may be conceived under the aspect of subordination. The name Logos, or Word, as aptly expressing the function of revelation, is naturally included among the philosophic designations of the medium.

The preceding statements cannot fail to suggest that among the antecedents of the doctrine of the Logos a place must be given to Platonism, or at least that Platonism was essentially adapted to occupy such a place. The confirmation of this suggestion, it is to be observed, is independent of the acceptance of this or that theory as to Plato's own meaning in his teaching upon the subject of the Ideas. His general representations of the Ideas as supersensible realities, as forming the eternal pattern of the visible universe, as the unchanging source of all excellence and genuine

being in the world, as the sole medium of absolute knowledge, were in themselves fitted to assist those having a firm hold of theistic faith in developing the doctrine of a divine Mediator between God and the world, or the doctrine of the Logos. A clear illustration of this is found both in Jewish and Christian writings. Among the protean shapes, for example, which Philo gives to his theory of mediation, we have one which is openly based upon the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. God is represented as describing to Moses the invisible attendants of Himself in these terms: "You must conceive that the powers which are around me invest those things which have no distinctive qualities with such qualities, and those things which have no forms with precise forms, and that without having any portion of their own everlasting nature dismembered or weakened; and some of your race, speaking with sufficient correctness, call them Ideas, since they give a peculiar character to every existing thing, arranging what had previously no order, and limiting and defining and fashioning what was before destitute of all limitation and definition and fashion." (On Monarchy, I. 6.) The powers are here, to be sure, spoken of as a plurality; but, as Philo exemplifies, it was very easy to combine them into one, or to postulate the Logos as the Idea, inclusive of all the other Ideas. An equally indubitable reference to the Platonic teaching is found with Origen, where he says: "It is also a question for investigation, whether the 'only begotten' and 'first-born' of every creature is to be called 'substance of substances' and 'Idea of Ideas,' and the 'principle of all things.'" (Cont. Cel., VI. 64. Compare Clement, Strom., V. 3.) The representations also of Plato, that the Ideas are the essential condition of science, and indeed of true rationality, find a parallel in the teaching of a number of early Christian writers, that the Logos is in all men the principle of the higher reason.

Besides supplying in his doctrine of Ideas a general basis

for the Logos teaching, Plato indulged some scattered statements, which are indeed quite obscure, but capable nevertheless of suggesting a plurality of persons in the Godhead. In a letter to Dionysius there is an enigmatic reference to a triad of divine principles or persons, and in a letter to Hermias, Erastus, and Corsicius mention is made of a divine guide and of the father of the guide. (Quoted by Theodoret, Græc. Affect. Curat., Serm. II. Compare Eusebius, De Præp. Evang., XI. 10 ; Petavius, Theol. Dogmat., De Trin., I. 1.) Little account, however, is to be taken of these two letters, since eminent critics pronounce them spurious. In the Republic, Book VI., he speaks of *the good* as begetting a child in his own likeness. In the Timæus he represents the Creator as forming the world after an eternal pattern, and placing a living soul at its centre. What was Plato's own meaning in these statements may stand in question. But their bearing in the way of suggestion is obvious enough in itself, and is further indicated by the fact that the Neo-Platonists regarded them as implying their trinitarian scheme. As Theodoret represents, Plotinus and Numenius taught that Plato affirmed three eternal subsistencies, the good, mind, and the soul of the world.

Earlier than Platonism, Judaism furnished antecedents to the Christian conception of the Logos. In this category is to be reckoned the Old Testament characterization of the "word of the Lord" as the instrument of creation and revelation. Strongly re-enforcing the suggestion contained in this phraseology came the custom, initiated in the Solomonic era, of personifying wisdom. The eighth chapter of Proverbs may justly be ranked among the principal factors in shaping the doctrine of the Logos. Wisdom is here described as the primal companion of God, as His first-born son. "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His way, before His works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth." Representa-

tions like these, in the hands of a speculative Judaism, could hardly fail to be utilized in developing a theory of mediation between God and the world. Judaism of this cast was especially nurtured by the atmosphere of Alexandria, where Oriental religion came into contact with Greek culture, and eclecticism flourished as nowhere else in ancient times. Something of the philosophizing tendency naturally engendered by such surroundings appears in the so-called Wisdom of Solomon, a book written probably about a century before Christ. In this writing, terms are employed which directly anticipate the doctrine of the creative function, the enlightening office, and the eternal generation of the Logos. Wisdom is described as the "worker of all things," as "one, manifold, subtle, quick, loving, gentle, steadfast"; as "overseeing all things and containing all spirits"; as "more active than all active things"; as a "vapor of the power of God and a certain pure emanation of the glory of Almighty God"; as "the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness"; as remaining ever the same, renewing all things, and through nations conveying herself into holy souls. (Chap. VII. Compare Ecclesiasticus, I., XXIV.)

But the most eminent exponent by far of the speculative Judaism of Alexandria was Philo, who wrote in the early years of the Christian era. In him we find the utmost freedom in blending the stores of Greek philosophy with the tenets of his Hebrew faith. Many systems yielded him their contributions. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers was exceedingly agreeable to his mind; but it was upon the works of Plato, whom he mentions as "that sweetest of all writers," that he fed with special avidity.

As already indicated, Philo presents the Logos under a variety of aspects. We find him, for one thing, identifying the same with the divine reason, viewed as planning the world or holding in itself the plan of the world. Such, at

any rate, his representation is made to appear when statement is compared with statement. "If any one," he says, "were to use more undisguised terms, he would not call the world which is perceptible only to the intellect anything else than the reason of God already occupied in the creation of the world; for neither is a city, while only perceptible to the intellect, anything else than the reason of the architect, who is already designing to build one perceptible to the external senses." (On the Creation of the World, VI.) In the same treatise he indicates that reason viewed in this light may be called the image of God. This image, or intellectual world, he affirms, is far above all comparison with the visible world, as much more brilliant than the latter as the sun is than darkness, or day than night. In another connection he applies to this divine image the name of Logos, or Word, and declares that it is the archetype of the visible world and the instrument of its formation. "The shadow of God," he writes, "is His Word, which He used like an instrument when He was making the world. And this shadow, and as it were model, is the archetype of all things. For as God is Himself the model of that image which He has now called a shadow, so also that image is the model of other things." (Allegories of the Sacred Laws, III. 31.) God created everything out of the formless essence, "without indeed touching it Himself, for it was not lawful for the all-wise and all-blessed God to touch materials which were all misshapen and confused, but He created them by the agency of His incorporeal powers, of which the proper name is ideas." (On Those who offer Sacrifice, XIII.) In the following sentence these powers are viewed as one: "Now the image of God is the Word, by which all the world was made." (On Monarchy, III. 5.) In accordance with the office which the Logos has in fashioning the world, its dividing or distributing function is emphasized. It moves swiftly, like the flaming sword by which it is symbolized, outstrips everything, divides and

distributes everything in nature. (The Cherubim, etc., IX. ; Sacrifices of Abel and Cain, XVIII. ; Heir of Divine Things, XXVII., XLVIII.) As being the universal model, the Logos claims priority to all other things. "The Word of God is over all the world, and is the most universal of all the things that are created." (Allegories, III. 61.) The Word of God is "the first beginning of all things, the original species or the archetypal idea, the first measure of the universe." (Questions and Solutions, IV.) Holding thus the next place to the Highest, the Logos, in the view of Philo, may be styled the *second Deity*. "No mortal thing," he says, "could have been formed in the similitude of the supreme Father of the universe, but only after the pattern of the second Deity." (Ibid., LXII.) Finally, the Logos is represented as holding the place of a mediator or intercessor between God and the race. The most marked description to this effect is perhaps the following: "The Father who created the universe has given to his archangelic Word a pre-eminent gift, to stand on the confines of both, and separate that which had been created from the Creator. And this same Word is continually a suppliant to the immortal God on behalf of the mortal race, which is exposed to affliction and misery, and is also the ambassador sent by the Ruler of all to the subject race. And the Word rejoices in the gift, and boasts of it, saying, 'And I stood in the midst between the Lord and you ; neither being uncreate as God, nor yet created as you, but being in the midst between these two extremities, like a hostage as it were of both parties : a hostage to the Creator, as a pledge and security that the whole race would never fly off and revolt entirely, choosing disorder rather than order ; and to the creature, to lead it to entertain a confident hope that the merciful God would not overlook His own work.' " (Heir of Divine Things, XLII. Compare Life of Moses, III. 14.)

Some of Philo's representations suggest that he regarded the Logos simply as an aspect or power of God, while

others seem to assume for it a personal character. Which theory he really entertained is a question which has divided critics. Dorner decides against the distinct personality of Philo's Logos, and thinks the same may be described as follows:—(1.) A divine faculty, whether of thought or creation, or both together. (2.) A divine activity, the act of thinking or generating the ideal world. (3.) The thing thought,—namely, the ideal world. (4.) The formative principle of the sensible world. (Hist. of Doct. of Person of Christ.) Possibly Philo himself wavered between the personal and the impersonal in his conception of the Logos. He was by no means tied down to exact and methodical thinking. Speculation appears to have been regarded by him as a kind of mental luxury, and he roams through its wide ranges with but moderate regard for self-consistency.

Philo's teaching did not at all embrace the idea of an incarnation of the Logos. A divine incarnation, such as Christianity teaches, was utterly alien to his system of thought. His radical disparagement of the body as the great enemy of virtue, and his idealistic temper, excluded all sympathy with the idea of the Word becoming flesh. As might be inferred from this, Philo's doctrine of the Logos had no real connection in his mind with his Jewish faith in a Messiah. The promise of a Messiah had a minor interest for him; and the hope of His coming and work, which he entertained, consisted simply in the expectation of a kind of theophany, a supernatural manifestation visible only to the just, which should serve in bringing back the scattered Jews to Palestine.

Platonism, the Old Testament, and Philo's combination of the two, served undoubtedly as antecedents of that development of the doctrine of the Logos which we find among the Christian fathers. But there is another antecedent that must not be left out of the account; namely, the facts of the Gospel history,—that marvellous combination of natural and supernatural factors in the birth, and

life, and teaching, and death, and resurrection, and ascension, of the Redeemer. This unparalleled list of facts would have demanded the formulation of a theory of the Logos, or Son of God, had such never been suggested before. Platonic or Philonic philosophizing may have colored unduly the teaching of some of the fathers upon the subject. So may a regnant philosophy of any age color unduly the exposition given by individual authors of the deeper questions of theology. But an accessory or modifying cause is not to be taken for the principal. The fundamental and permanent occasion for a doctrine of the Logos, or, more broadly speaking, for a trinitarian theory, lies in the facts of the New Testament revelation.

2. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS. — Entire agreement with each other, or even entire consistency on the part of each with himself, could hardly be expected of the first Christian writers who took up the difficult task of developing the doctrine of the Logos. In case of ambiguity or seeming contradiction, fairness requires, of course, that the general drift of an author should be made the chief consideration. One passage is not to be set up as a standard for the interpretation of other passages without the most ample reasons. Too little attention has sometimes been paid to this obvious rule. Gieseler, as it seems to us, falls short of his usual impartiality in his treatment of this subject, and exhibits too much of an inclination, in the first period of his "*Dogmengeschichte*," to interpret everything in the light of passages most adverse to the proper divinity of the Son, or to the trinitarian theory. Petavius also inclines to the side of severity in judging the trinitarianism of the ante-Nicene fathers. On the other hand, writers might be specified who show an opposite bias, and unduly slight expressions indicative of a more or less emphatic subordination of the Son. Bishop Bull, in his celebrated "*Defence of the Nicene Faith*," erred somewhat in this direction.

Whatever the contrariety of statement on the part of the early fathers, it does not appear so radical as to preclude the propriety of embracing the import of their teachings under certain general propositions.

1. *The early Church taught with great unanimity the personal pre-existence of the Son.* The rule of faith, quoted by different writers as embracing the teaching undoubtedly handed down from the apostles, assumes such pre-existence. (Irenæus, I. 10. 1, III. 4. 2; Tertullian, *De Præscrip.*, XIII.; Origen, *De Prin.*, *Præf.*, 4.) Clement of Rome, if his language be taken as the connection of clauses seems to require, represents Christ as speaking in the Old Testament through the Holy Ghost. (1 Epist. XXII.) His carefulness also to qualify the statement that Christ was of the seed of Jacob, by the added clause "according to the flesh," is a hint of his belief in Christ's pre-existence. Ignatius expresses himself very emphatically in reference to this tenet, speaking of Christ as one "who was with the Father before the ages, and in the end was revealed" (*Ad Mag.*, VI.); as one "who is above all time, eternal and invisible, yet who became visible for our sakes." (*Ad Polycarpum*, III.) In the Epistle of Barnabas it is argued that it was necessary that the Son of God should come *in the flesh*, since men who cannot endure to look upon the natural sun, which is the work of His hands, could not by any means endure to look upon His glory unveiled. (V.) The same epistle also makes mention of the Son as the one to whom the divine preface to man's creation was addressed. (V., VI.) Hermas describes, in his allegorical fashion, a great white rock rising out of a plain, the rock ancient in appearance, but having a new gate cut into its side. In the interpretation the rock is said to bear the semblance of age because "the Son of God is older than all His creatures, so that He was a fellow councillor with the Father in His work of creation"; and the gate is new "because He became manifest in the last days of the dispensation." (*Simil.*, IX. 2, 12.)

Hermas, to be sure, uses a rather peculiar phraseology, in that he speaks of the Son of God as a spirit (Simil., IX. 1); and some have concluded that he identified the Son with the Holy Ghost. But even if this identification be granted, it proves simply that Hermas did not acknowledge a *third* personality in the Godhead; it militates not at all against the personal pre-existence of the Son. The passages quoted above certainly imply that the Son was personally distinct from the Father before the incarnation, and that this pre-existent one was the centre of personality in the incarnate Christ. As regards the relation between Son and Holy Spirit, the symbolism of Hermas is no doubt involved in great obscurity. Dorner concludes that his total representation appears most consistent on the supposition that the Son was distinguished in his thought from the Holy Spirit. The epistle to Diognetus speaks of the advent of Christ as a coming from heaven, where He had shared the counsels of God. (VII., VIII.) In the eleventh chapter of the same epistle — which, however, is regarded by many as of later origin than the preceding portion — it is said of the Son, “This is He who was from the beginning, who appeared as if new.” Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Theophilus plainly assume the personal pre-existence of the Son (or the Logos, as they usually term Him). Athenagoras has been thought by some to have acknowledged no personal distinction between the Son and the Father. It is true that he calls the Son the understanding, the reason, the intelligence, and the wisdom of the Father, and emphasizes the inseparability of the one from the other. But writers who beyond all question predicate personal distinctions in the Godhead employ similar expressions. Athenagoras, even when speaking of the Son as the divine reason, might very well have regarded this as assuming the condition of an hypostasis; and, in fact, his language is not without positive indications that such was his conception. He speaks of the *coming forth* of the Logos to serve in the work of creation, in virtue of

which coming forth He might be termed the first product of the Father,—an order of expression which certainly some writers used to describe the generation, or the issuing into personality, of the Logos. The fact, moreover, that in refuting the charge of atheism he thinks it necessary to mention the Son as well as the Father and the angels, and makes the Son the immediate superintendent of the angels, is indicative of an ascription of personality to the former. (Legat., X.) To this it is to be added, that while he mentions the unity of Father, Son, and Spirit, he speaks also of “their *distinction* in unity.” (Legat., XII.) In fine, Athenagoras, whether successful in his aim or not, seems to have had in mind the very design characteristic of Athanasian trinitarianism; namely, the assertion on the one hand of unity of essence, and on the other of personal distinctions. As respects the succeeding writers of the period, it is not necessary to multiply testimony, the fact being notorious that they explicitly taught the personal pre-existence of the Son. This was clearly, therefore, the current teaching of the age. The Ebionites and the Monarchians were exceptions; but, upon grounds already stated, they may be reckoned as having been very decidedly in the minority.

2. *The early Church showed a marked tendency to apply divine predicates to the Son, and to assert His consubstantiality, or unity in essence, with the Father.*

Heathen criticism represents the Christians as assigning a divine rank to Christ. The letter of Pliny to Trajan, written about the year 110, says that the Christians who were brought before his tribunal testified that they were accustomed to assemble on a certain day before sunrise, and to sing responsively among themselves a song of praise to Christ as God (*carmen Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem*). To the same effect are various statements of Celsus. (Cont. Cel., II. 31, II. 67, IV. 2.)

The oldest complete hymn from the early Church is filled

with the praise of Christ, and applies to him such titles as "King of Saints," and "Lord of Immortality." (In works of Clement of Alex.) A writer quoted by Eusebius confirms Pliny's statement on the custom of Christians. "As many psalms and hymns," he says, "as were written by believing brethren from the beginning celebrate Christ the Word of God in terms descriptive of divinity." (Ecel. Hist., V. 28.)

The rule of faith, as quoted by Origen in the translation by Rufinus, asserts that Christ, after serving the Father in the creation of all things, divested Himself and became man, yet remained what He was before, namely, God. (De Prin., Præf.) The version of the rule given by Irenæus speaks of Jesus Christ as "our Lord, and God, and Saviour, and King." (I. 10. 1.) One of the versions contributed by Tertullian describes the Word that was sent into the world as "both man and God, the Son of Man and the Son of God." (Adv. Prax., III.)

In writings dominated by a practical interest, as was the case with some of those from the apostolic fathers, a frequent and distinct application of the divine name to Christ is not to be expected. In a treatise not formally theological, even the most stanch trinitarian naturally uses, in the main, such titles of Christ as are descriptive rather of His office and human manifestation than of His place in the Godhead. The earliest Christian literature after the New Testament, however, will not be found destitute of significant tributes to the divinity of Christ.

Clement of Rome terms Christ "the sceptre of the majesty of God," and the brightness of the divine majesty, and portrays Him as the medium of all spiritual blessings. (1 Epist. ad Cor., XVI., XXXVI.) The second Epistle bearing Clement's name, though not from his hand, is of quite ancient date. Its opening sentence is as follows: "Brethren, it is fitting that you should think of Jesus Christ as of God,—as the judge of the living and the

dead." In the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians it is said of Christ, "To Him all things in heaven and earth are subject." (Chap. II.) The same writing represents the Son as being joint source with the Father, of every spiritual grace. (XII.) The Epistle of Barnabas names Christ the Lord of all the world, and the Judge of the living and the dead. (V., VII.) Ignatius speaks of Christ as unproduced in respect of His higher nature, as "God existing in flesh," as the "eternal Word," as "our God." (Ad Eph., VII.; Ad Mag., VIII.; Ad Tral., VII.; Ad Rom., III.) He also indulges in the expression, "the blood of God." (Ad Eph., I., both in the shorter Greek and the Syriac recensions.) "The name of the Son of God," says the Pastor of Hermas, "is great, and cannot be contained, and supports the whole world. If, then, the whole creation is supported by the Son of God, what think ye of those who are called by Him?" (Simil., IX. 14.) The Epistle to Diognetus teaches that the invisible God did not send a servant or an angel to men, "but the very Creator and Fashioner of all things. . . . As a king sends his son, who is also a king, so sent He Him; as God, *ὡς θεὸν*, He sent Him." (VII.)

With Justin Martyr and the apologists immediately following, we find a more formal and definite attempt to define the place of the Son in the Godhead than characterized the apostolic fathers. The representations of this group of writers remind, to some extent, of Philo's teaching. The Son, according to their leading conception, is the Word and Wisdom of God, and, as such, the immediate antecedent of the world, and the principal medium of divine revelation. The fact that He is begotten places Him, in their view, somewhat below an exact equality with the unbegotten Father. Still they assert for Him lofty predicates and an essentially divine rank.

Justin Martyr teaches that, after God the Father, the Word is the most kingly ruler; that next to the unbegotten

God He is worshipped and loved by Christians. He is the wisdom, and power, and glory of the Father, by whom He is begotten after a peculiar and ineffable manner. As fire kindles fire without itself being diminished, so the Father begat the Son before the beginning of creation. As in origin, so in nature the Son is immeasurably distinguished from every creature. He is the great source of truth in the universe, so that a participation in truth or reason is a participation in Him. "Christ," says Justin, in one place, "is King, and Priest, and God, and Lord"; and in several instances he applies to Him the full title of Deity. He declares also that, as God, He is impassible. Such, at least, is the statement of a fragment attributed to Justin. (1 Apol., XII.; 2 Apol., X., XIII.; Dial. cum Tryph., XXXIV., XLVIII., LVI., LIX.-LXI., CXXVI., CXXVIII.; Frag. X. in Ante-Nicene Lib.) The less ample statements of Tatian indicate a belief quite similar to that of Justin, and the former uses the same figure as the latter in describing the generation of the Son. (V., VII.) The references already made to Athenagoras, in connection with the subject of pre-existence, indicate with sufficient clearness that the Word was located by him within the circle of the Godhead proper. Theophilus speaks of the Word as having always been present with the Father, as begotten before all creatures, as the agent by whom all things were made, as the Divine Person who walked in Paradise, as God from God. (II. 10, II. 22.)

Clement of Alexandria and Irenæus are distinguished in a measure from the preceding group, as also from the writers who followed them. They came late enough to see the rankest growth of Gnosticism, and to feel the need of combating its peculiar tenets; but at the same time they came too early to share in the reaction against the Patripassian or Sabellian heresy. The daring and elaborate specifications of the Gnostics about the generation of æons, of whom the Logos was reckoned as one in their scheme,

naturally inclined them to a cautious and negative attitude on the question of the generation of the Son. An incentive of this nature and from this source is decidedly apparent in Irenæus. He reproaches the Gnostics with attempting to describe the indescribable, with talking about the generation of the Word with as much assurance as if they themselves had been present at His birth. He urges that the utterance of a word by a human tongue is no suitable illustration of the divine generation. "If any one," he writes, "says to us, 'How then was the Son produced by the Father?' we reply to him that no one understands that production, or generation, or calling, or revelation, or by whatever name we may describe His generation, which is in fact altogether indescribable." (II. 28.) The divine nature is not to be judged by human standards. The parental relationship on earth is no satisfactory image of the relation between the Divine Father and Son. God has in Himself nothing more ancient or late than another. (II. 13.) Occupying this position, Irenæus had naturally no interest in the distinction, made by the preceding group of writers, between the immanent and the uttered Word, *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικός*. The same is true of Clement, who declares that "the Word of the Father of the universe is not the *λόγος προφορικός*." (Strom., V. 1.) Both emphasize the immanent Word or the union of the Son with the Father. Their total representation indicates that they recognized the personality of the Word; but they were not so much interested as those who came after them to bring out the personal aspect, since they were not called upon to contend against the Patripassian denial of distinct personality.

Clement of Alexandria styles the Word the supramundane wisdom, the image of God, the archetypal light of light, the commander-in-chief of the universe, the circle of all powers rolled and united into unity. He was and is the divine source of all things. He was in the beginning

and before the beginning. As Creator He bestowed life upon us, as Instructor He taught us when He appeared in the flesh. "Believe Him," exhorts Clement, "who is man and God. Believe, O man, the living God, who suffered and is adored." The Divine Word is truly "most manifest Deity." He is eternal, the one great High Priest. He is God in the form of God, and God in the form of man. To think of any imperfection in Him were monstrous. "For Him to make any addition to His knowledge is absurd, since He is God." His nature precludes transitions. "From His own point of view the Son of God is never displaced; not being divided, not severed, not passing from place to place; being always everywhere and contained nowhere; seeing all things, hearing all things, knowing all things." (Cohort., I., X., XII.; Pæd., I. 2, I. 6, I. 7, I. 8; Strom., IV. 25, VII. 2.) "On the part of Clement," says Baur, "an endeavor is visible throughout to carry over to the Logos all absolute predicates."

Irenæus speaks of the Word as the Founder, and Framers, and Maker of all things; as the Saviour of all, and the Ruler of heaven and earth; as the measure of the immeasurable Father; as having been always with the Father, and having glorified Him before all creation; as both God and man, since He forgave as God and suffered as man. "Vain," he says, "are the Ebionites, who do not receive by faith into their soul the union of God and man." (I. 15. 5; III. 9. 3; III. 11. 8; IV. 4. 2; IV. 14. 1; IV. 20. 3; V. 17. 3; V. 1. 3.)

Tertullian and the writers who followed him in the third century had to contend against the denial by Praxeas, Sabellius, and others, of personal distinctions in the Godhead. They were concerned, therefore, as has already been intimated, to assert clearly the distinct personality of the Son. At the same time, the criticisms of their opponents made them feel the need of securing the divine unity. It is quite conceivable that this double demand

might have given a bias, at a certain stage, toward the idea of subordination, since a second Person subordinate to the first would naturally seem less antagonistic to unity than co-ordinate Divine Persons. In some of the writers of the third century a bias of this sort is no doubt discernible. Still the same era abounds in testimony to the essential divinity of the Son.

According to Tertullian the Son is the supreme Head and Master of divine grace, the Enlightener and Trainer of mankind. In substance he is one with the Father. As a ray is of the same nature as the parent sun, as the stream is of the same substance as the fountain, so the Son is of the same substance as the Father. "He proceeds forth from God, and in that procession He is generated; so that He is the Son of God, and is called God from unity of substance with God." Divinity admits of no degrees, since it is unique. Divine persons must be distinguished by something else than difference of substance. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three, not in substance, but in form. There is only one substance in three coherent and inseparable [Persons]. The Son, though revealed by means of the flesh, is, considered in Himself, like the Father, invisible, since He is God. He is at once truly God and truly man. While He is the Son of the Almighty, He is likewise Himself Almighty. As the Father is omnipresent, so also is the Son. (Apol. XXI.; Adv. Prax. II., XII., XVII., XXIII.; Adv. Hermog., VII.; Adv. Marc., V. 20.) Tertullian, it must be granted, in his somewhat headlong polemics sometimes stumbles on unsuitable illustrations; as, for example, when he describes the relation of Father and Son by the category of whole and part. (Adv. Prax., IX.) But even this crude and materialistic representation, while it is adverse to the Son's full equality, argues a belief in His oneness of substance with the Father.

Hippolytus taught that the Son is of the substance of God, and speaks of Him as "the God above all," as "our

Lord Jesus Christ who is also God," as "God the Word [who] came down from heaven," as "the impassible Word of God," who needed to be incarnated in order to become subject to suffering. While he asserts that there is, not merely a relative, but an absolute difference between the human and the divine, between the finite and the infinite, he affirms the coexistence of both in Christ. (Phil. X. 29, X. 30; De Chr. et Antichr., VI.; Adv. Noct. XV., XVII.; Adv. Beron, Frag. I.; Comm. in Ps., II.)

Novatian characterizes the Son in terms very similar to those of Tertullian, applying to Him the divine name, styling Him both God and man, and affirming that He exercised prerogatives and powers peculiar to God, such as forgiving sins, knowing the secrets of hearts, and being everywhere present. (De Trin.)

Whatever the writings of Origen may contain that is at variance with the idea of the proper divinity of the Son, they assert His actual possession of essentially divine attributes. The statement appears repeatedly that the virtues shared in by creatures have in Christ an absolutely full and complete subsistence. Language is used which certainly implies that these virtues exist nowhere in fuller measure than they do in the Son. What else is the import of the following sentences of Origen? "He whom we regard and believe to have been from the beginning God, and the Son of God, is the very Logos, and the very Wisdom, and the very Truth." (Cont. Cel., III. 41.) "Our Saviour does not partake of righteousness, but being Himself righteousness, He is partaken of by the righteous." (Ibid., VI. 64.) "All things belonging to God are in Him. Christ is the wisdom of God. He Himself is the power of God, He Himself the righteousness of God," etc. (In Jer. Hom. VIII. 2. Compare In Ioan. Tom., VI. 3.) Referring to this order of expressions, Baur says of Origen's teaching: "Everything absolute, which can never be thought of except as an essential determination of God, is ascribed also

to the Logos." Still further, the Son is represented as the light of the intelligible universe (In Ioan. Tom., I. 24) and the brightness of divine glory. In person, as well as in substance, He is to be thought of as eternal. He was always with the Father, as brightness is always with the light, His generation being ever complete and ever continued. (In Jer. Hom., IX. 4; In Ioan. Tom., I. 32.) He is omnipresent; His coming to men in no wise compelled Him to vacate the seat previously occupied. With those who know Him, and with those who know Him not, He is everywhere present. (Cont. Cel., IV. 5, V. 12.) As in His divine nature He is above the limitations of place, so also He is above the limitations of circumstances. The assumption of a human body and soul by "the immortal God, the Word," wrought no change in Him, and put no constraint upon Him, save the constraint which holy benevolence gladly adopts for the sake of those in need. (Cont. Cel., IV. 15.) In the measure of His knowledge, also, He shows Himself to be truly divine. Those are greatly at fault who think that His divinity cannot be proved from the Gospel of Matthew, inasmuch as that Gospel ascribes to Him a power which is peculiar to God, the power of knowing men's hearts. (In Matt. Tom., XII. 6.) "Thou, O Son of God, who knowest all things, knowest what is in man." (In Ioan. Tom., X. 30.)

The preceding paragraph is based upon writings of Origen of which the Greek text is extant. In quoting from works preserved only in ancient Latin translations, there will be of course somewhat less of confidence,—unless perchance the subject matter is counter to the views held by the translator. Among writings of this order the "*De Principiis*," as rendered by Rufinus, is distinguished by very clear statements of the essential divinity of the Son. The following are some of its statements: "What belongs to the nature of deity is common to the Father and the Son." (I. 1. 8.) "Let him who assigns a beginning to the Word

or Wisdom of God take care that he be not guilty of impiety against the unbegotten Father Himself, seeing that he denies that He had always been a Father." (I. 2. 3.) "If all things which are the Father's are also Christ's, certainly among those things which exist is the omnipotence of the Father; and doubtless the only-begotten Son ought to be omnipotent." (I. 2. 10.)

Origen, according to Dorner, held a view which afforded a natural ground for predicating the same divinity in Father and Son. "Instead," he says, "of resorting to a quantitative division, Origen adopts a different view of the mode of existence of the divine as a whole. This is one of the most important and luminous features of Origen's system. He saw that finite things are characterized by a certain exclusiveness; he who makes something external his property, by that act withdraws it from others; and so far as another is in possession, I am not in possession. But in the sphere of the spiritual and divine the case is otherwise. The art or science of any man is not lessened by its being in the possession of others; and as it is with wisdom, so it is also with goodness, with ethical perfection. They are indivisible, it is true, in the sense that no one can truly possess any portion thereof without possessing the principle of the whole; but this does not imply that only one individual can possess them. On the contrary, their nature is to be principally indivisible and yet communicable; that is, they can be entirely possessed by more than one subject at the same time." (Hist. of the Doct. of the Person of Christ, Div. I. Vol. II.)

Dionysius of Alexandria, influenced largely by his opposition to Sabellianism, seems to have used expressions which at least could be taken in a sense very disparaging to the relative dignity of the Son. But, on the other hand, the vigorous protests which his language called forth, and his own explanations and interpretations, were of the nature of a very positive tribute to the doctrine of the Son's true

divinity. In an epistle to the Roman bishop, designed as a response to his critics, Dionysius declared his belief in the eternity of the Son, and indicated with sufficient clearness his opinion that the Son might properly be termed "consubstantial" with the Father, although this precise word was not to be found in the Scriptures.

Lactantius indulges in a rather crude description of the Son's generation. He testifies, however, very explicitly to His consubstantiality with the Father. "The Father," he says, "cannot exist without the Son, nor can the Son be separated from the Father, since the name of Father cannot be given without the Son, nor can the Son be begotten without the Father. Since, therefore, the Father makes the Son, and the Son the Father, they both have one mind, one spirit, one substance." (Div. Inst., IV. 29.)

3. *A number of the early fathers admitted into their view of the Son points of subordination not allowed by later standards of the Church.*

It is quite evident from the preceding review that the image of Christ, which hovered before the mind of the early Church, was the image of a divine Person holding by rank and nature a place within the circle of the Godhead. The central current of theology was steadfastly in the direction of acknowledging in the Godhead a dual (not to speak at present of a trinal) personality. This result of our investigation, however, leaves still a question to be considered. While there was a general belief in a plurality of divine Persons, was this belief formulated in harmony with later standards? Did all the fathers of the first three centuries come up to the Nicene standard as respects the relation of the Son to the Father, and affirm only such a subordination of the Son as is necessarily involved in holding a second place in the order of thought and of personal relations?

This question must be answered in the negative. In two points, in particular, individual writers subordinated the Son

beyond the measure of later standards. The first of these consisted in attributing the generation of the Son to an act of will, rather than to a necessity of the divine nature. No doubt, some of the Christian apologists who indulged this style of representation were not consciously drawing a contrast between a voluntary and a necessary generation. What they were interested to bring out was the contrast between the generation of the Son of God and the generation which the mythology of the heathen associated with the progeny of their gods. Hence they represented the former as belonging purely to a spiritual range, as effected by the Father without any partnership, effected by His simple will. Their representations, nevertheless, as they stand, place an act of will rather than a necessity of nature back of the generation; and the one position, it is to be observed, involves quite a significant subordination as compared with the other. The affirmation, in connection with the generation, of a necessity which extends over the Father as well as over the Son, goes very far toward eliminating the inequality which is otherwise implied. Among those who may fairly be designated as referring the generation to an act of will are Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, Tertullian, and Novatian. (Dial. cum Tryph., LXI., CXXVIII.; Orat. ad Græc., V.; Ad Autol., II. 10, II. 22; Adv. Prax., VII.; De Trin., XXXI.)

The second point consisted in a qualification of the absolute eternity of the *personal* subsistence of the Son, the absolute eternity of His essence being at the same time unquestioned. If it be assumed that the early writers uniformly regarded the generation of the Son as giving rise to His personal subsistence, then the teaching of most of the writers named in the preceding paragraph included this element of subordination. For, in that event, inasmuch as they discriminated between an unbegotten and a begotten Logos, they will be found drawing a positive distinction between the state of the Logos as being without personal

subsistence and His state as having personal subsistence, — a distinction which cannot be indulged without compromising the absolute eternity of His person, even though it be said that time first began with the creation. An unbegotten state and a begotten state of the same subject cannot be equally eternal. A distinction of this kind involves at least an obscuration, if not an intentional denial, of the feature of strict eternity. As to the assumption in question, it has been opposed by some eminent critics. It is, nevertheless, quite remote from the appearance of an arbitrary assumption, since the term “generation,” or “being born,” naturally implies the origination of personal subsistence, and not merely the sending forth of an already existing person. But whatever the case with the other writers under consideration, Tertullian and Novatian certainly indulged statements adverse to the absolute eternity of the Son’s personal subsistence. Tertullian speaks of the Father as alone older than the Son, represents that the latter had a beginning, and declares that there was a time when He did not exist with the Father. (*Adv. Hermog.*, III., XVIII.) “It is essential,” says Novatian, “that He who knows no beginning must go before Him who has a beginning. . . . He [the Son] is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made.” (*De Trin.*, XXXI.) Both of these writers, to be sure, placed the Son before time as measured by created things, and predicated the absolute eternity of His essence; but, as the statements quoted show, they obscured the notion of His eternal, personal subsistence. The language of Athenagoras also seems to involve this feature of subordination. (*Legat.*, X.)

Origen associated the generation of the Son with the will of the Father, but at the same time seemed inclined to locate its ground in the divine essence. “This is a point,” says Baur, “upon which only wavering and uncertain expressions are found on the part of Origen. . . . He con-

tinually vacillated between placing the principle of the Son's existence in the essence of the Father, and placing it in His will." According to the interpretation of Dörner, the Son, in the view of Origen, is not so much the product of an act of will as the expressed will itself, or the eternal energy of the Father. The question concerning the eternity of the Son's person, Origen endeavored to answer decidedly in the affirmative. On the two points specified, therefore, he is less clearly exposed to the charge of subordinating the Son than are some of his predecessors. But in another respect he went much farther than any of those named above in the direction of subordination. We find him declaring that the Father alone can be termed God in the most eminent sense; that He is God with the article (*ὁ θεός*), while the Son is God without the article (*θεός*); that His knowledge and contemplation of Himself are greater than the contemplation which the Son has of Him; that there is an interval between Him and the Son like that between the latter and creatures. (In Ioan. Tom., II. 2, XXXII. 18, XIII. 25.) This seems in most palpable contradiction to the ascription by Origen of essentially divine attributes to the Son. How is the apparent discrepancy to be explained? The most probable solution lies in the consideration that Origen laid immense stress upon the fact that the Son is begotten; that while He has the divine predicates, He does not have them in the most original sense, but by virtue of a communication from the Father. This one distinction, as he conceived, involved an immeasurable superiority of the Father. Such is the explanation which Dörner offers. "He had no intention whatever," he says, "of denying to Him [the Son] the fulness of veritable divine powers, that is, divine essence; but he did not consider Him to be the primary ground. In the Son, therefore, is indeed the entire fulness of God; but He is God in a derived sense." The same exposition is given by Redepenning. "The subordination of the Son," he writes concerning Origen's theory, "con-

sists entirely in this, that He is the Son and not the Father ; the mode of His personal subsistence (*sein Personsein*) alone establishes the subordination in which He stands as secondary to the sole primal and absolute One." (Origenes, II. p. 93.)

The negative attitude of Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria toward the doctrine of the Son's generation saves them from being exposed to the charge of entertaining either of the two elements of subordination most characteristic of the theology of the age. The extent of their distinction between the relative dignity of the Father and the Son is not exactly definable. Irenæus in one connection attempts to read a lesson of humility to the Gnostics, on the ground that even the Son of God disclaimed knowledge of the very day and hour of the judgment. (II. 28. 6.) This implies a certain superiority in the Father, though by no means such a superiority as to contradict Irenæus's belief in the essential divinity of the Son. His total representation plainly assumes such divinity ; and, moreover, it is to be noted that respectable theologians have been found, in the present age, who deny that it is a prerogative even of the absolute God to foreknow every future event. Little account is to be taken of the representations of some ancient writers that Clement designated the Logos as *κτίσμα*. If he used this term he must have employed it in an uncritical way, and without reference to the contrast which was afterward so emphatically drawn between creation and generation. The ample application which he makes to the Logos of the highest predicates of divinity forbids the assumption that creaturehood proper entered at all into his idea of Him. His statement that the nature of the Son is nearest to Him who is alone the Almighty One (Strom., VII. 2) implies, it is true, a certain subordination of the former. But the extent of this remains in question, and one is evidently warned against making too much of the expression when he finds Clement styling also the Son Almighty.

(Pæd., I. 9.) On the whole, Clement of Alexandria came nearer to obliterating the distinction between the Son and the Father than he did to interposing the Arian gulf between them.

SECTION III. — THE HOLY SPIRIT.

As practical Christianity preceded the speculative, so naturally an acknowledgment of the Trinity of revelation preceded an acknowledgment of an essential Trinity, or the Trinity pertaining to the Godhead as such. The earliest references to the subject among Christian writers include little else than the Scriptural phraseology, and speak of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit simply as revealed and operative in the world. A reference of this kind, for example, is found with Ignatius, whose exhortation reminds his readers of their relations to Father, Son, and Spirit. (Ad. Mag., XIII.)

From the outset the Holy Spirit was fully recognized in the life and worship of the Church, and was conjoined with the Father and the Son in the brief and simple compendiums of the faith that found common acceptance. The Rule of Faith, in Origen's version, says: "The apostles related that the Holy Spirit was associated in honor and dignity with the Father and the Son." (De Prin., Præf. Comp. Irenæus, I. 10.) In the line of dogmatic construction, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit received far less attention than the Son. In this the natural order was followed. An approach toward a settlement of the great questions relating to the Son needed to be made before the doctrine of the Spirit could receive full and specific attention.

The rather scanty references to the nature of the Holy Spirit involve somewhat more of ambiguity than that which pertains to the references to the Son. However, the great

majority of the writers may safely be accredited with acknowledging the personality of the Spirit. Here belong Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Novatian, Origen, Methodius, and others. (1 Apol., VI., XIII.; Ad Autol., II. 15; Pæd., I. 6, II. 2, III. 12; Strom., V. 14; Cont. Hær., IV. 20; Adv. Prax., IX.; Adv. Noet., VIII., XII., XIV.; De Trin., XVI., XXIX.; In Ioan. Tom., II. 6; Sympos. Virg., X.) Justin Martyr speaks of Christians as worshipping the Spirit and holding Him in the third place. Theophilus uses this somewhat peculiar phraseology: "The three days which were before the luminaries are types of the Trinity (*Τριάδος*), of God, and His Word, and His Wisdom. And the fourth is the type of man, who needs light, that so there may be God, the Word, Wisdom, man." Confining ourselves to this passage, we might perhaps question whether Theophilus meant to denote by Wisdom the Holy Spirit. The usage of other writers, however, suggests that such was his design. Irenæus in several instances plainly identifies Wisdom with the Holy Spirit, and as plainly teaches His personality. "With Him," he says, "were always present the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and spontaneously, He made all things, to whom also He speaks, saying, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness.'" (IV. 20. 1.) A single expression of Hippolytus has been interpreted by some against his belief in the personality of the Spirit. "I shall not," he says, "speak of two Gods, but of one; of two persons, however, and of a third economy, namely, the grace of the Holy Ghost." This, to be sure, is somewhat ambiguous and objectionable when measured by the standard of a complete trinitarian terminology. But considering the indefinite use of terms in his day, and the factors which enter into his total representation, he cannot fairly be pronounced guilty of the charge in question. The following sentences are certainly indicative of faith in the Spirit's

personality: "A man is compelled to acknowledge God the Father Almighty, and Christ Jesus the Son of God, who, being God, became man, to whom also the Father made all things subject, Himself excepted, and the Holy Spirit [also excepted], and that these, therefore, are three. . . . We see the Word incarnate, and we know the Father by Him, and we believe in the Son, we worship the Holy Spirit. . . . It is through the Trinity that the Father is glorified; for the Father willed, the Son did, the Spirit manifested." Upon the subject of this paragraph the testimony of Kalnis, based upon full investigation, is worthy of notice. "The representation," he says, "which became wellnigh a reigning one in the era of the 'Illumination,' that the ante-Nicene fathers did not regard the Holy Spirit as a divine personality, and for the most part identified Him with the Son, we must characterize as utterly unfounded. Only in case of Lactantius, where it can plead the authority of Jerome, is it justified." (Dogmatik, Vol. II.)

The Spirit was placed third in order of thought, and in the general representation there was affirmed of Him a certain subordination to the Son. Origen in one instance carries this aspect of subordination to an extreme, even numbering the Spirit among the things made by the Son. (In Ioan. Tom., II. 6.) Still, to say, without qualification, that Origen reduced the Spirit to the rank of a creature, would convey wrong impressions, and would involve the uncritical procedure of allowing a general expression to weigh more than many specifications. The Spirit, in the view of Origen, was widely distinguished from a creature, as the term is ordinarily used. If we may trust the version of Rufinus, He is described by Origen as having immediate knowledge of the Father, as being in the unity of the Trinity, as possessing an uncreated substance. "There was nothing," it is said, "which was not made, save the nature of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit."

(De Prin., IV. 1. 35.) But, leaving these more doubtful sources, we find Origen associating the Spirit with the Son, predicating of both alike an indefinite superiority to the creature world at large, distinctly ranking the Spirit as one of the three Divine Hypostases. (In Ioan. Tom., XIII. 25, II. 6.)

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

It was the common teaching of the early Church, that the world was created out of nothing, the notion that matter existed from eternity being repudiated. Justin Martyr, it is true, says in one place that God in the beginning created all things out of unformed matter; but in another connection he sufficiently indicates his belief that the formless matter itself was the product of a creative act. (1 Apol., X.; Cohort., XXII., XXIII.) To affirm the eternity of matter seemed to the Christian writers to contradict the pure supremacy of God. Hence Tertullian accused Hermogenes of introducing two Gods, inasmuch as he ascribed to matter the divine attribute of eternity. (Adv. Hermog., IV.) "To suppose," argues Lactantius, "that it is necessary that God should be furnished with materials, is to dishonor Him by an unworthy comparison with men." (Inst., II. 9.)

Creation was viewed as an entirely free act, springing from divine goodness. "The world," says Athenagoras, "was not created because God needed it, for God is Himself everything to Himself." (Legat., XVI.) Nature was regarded as designed for the service of man. "The creation," says Irenæus, "is suited to man; for man was not made for its sake, but creation for the sake of man." (V. 29.) Man himself, according to the same writer, was made that God might have some one upon whom to confer benefits. (IV. 14.)

Theophilus, who was the first to give an extended commentary on the Mosaic days of creation, understood them literally. (Ad Autol., Lib. II.) A like view is implied in the following statement of Irenæus: "In as many days as this world was made, in so many thousand years shall it be concluded." (V. 28. 3.) Tertullian, in his refutation of Hermogenes, represents creation as taking place by successive acts, and most likely had the scheme of literal days in mind. (XXIX., XLV.) The opening words of Genesis are well described by him as being of the nature of a general introduction to the specific account which follows. "First comes," he says, "a prefatory statement, then follow the details in full; first the subject is named, then it is described." (Adv. Hermog., XXVI.) The Church at large probably concurred with these writers, and understood by the Mosaic days divisions of time, and, indeed, divisions of the length of an ordinary day. This, however, was not the unanimous teaching. Clement of Alexandria taught that creation took place in an indivisible moment before time, which it itself initiated, and that the days were used in the Mosaic account for presenting created objects in the order of their worth or in their logical connection. "Something," he says, "must needs have been named first. Wherefore those things were announced first from which came those that were second, all things being originated together from one essence by one power. For the will of God is one, in one identity. And how could creation take place in time, seeing time was born along with the things which exist?" (Strom., VI. 16.) Origen was equally averse to accepting the literal sense of the days, regarding it as derogatory to God that He should be represented as proceeding with His work after the manner of a day-laborer, and holding that all things were probably made at once by the simple fiat of Deity, the Mosaic days being used only for the sake of orderly representation. (Select. in Gen.; De Prin., IV. 1. 16.) The seventh day was understood by him to be co-

extensive with the duration of the existing world. (Cont. Cel., VI. 61.)

With Origen, the exceptional view appears that the existing world has been preceded by a series of other worlds, reaching back indefinitely; each world, after fulfilling its appointed term, having given place to a new creation. He maintains that this view involves an answer to the question, What was God doing before the creation of the world? and also that it is demanded, in order to secure God's immutability. God, he argues, could not have been omnipotent, without things to govern, any more than He could have been a father without a son. To place creation at a fixed point is to affirm a change in God from a less to a more perfect state; hence the creative process must be pushed back into the depths of eternity. (De Prin., 1. 2. 10; III. 5. 3.) The immediate occasion of the material world, according to Origen, was the fall of souls, who were thus made unworthy of their celestial habitations. It may also be numbered among the tokens of Origen's speculative boldness on this subject, that he favored the supposition that the stars are living and rational beings. (De Prin., I. 7.)

SECTION II. — ANGELS AND DEMONS.

THE subject of angelology exhibits, in connection with considerable freedom of representation, an approximate unanimity upon a number of points. It was commonly taught, with respect to unfallen angels, that they are personal beings, of a lofty order, endowed like men with freedom, engaged in joyful service of God, and especially employed by Him in ministering to the welfare of men. It was also quite a common opinion, that they possess bodies of a refined, ethereal nature. Direct statements of this opinion in no wise abound, but it seems to be implied by the current view respecting the fall of angels (noticed in

the next paragraph), and also by the representations of certain writers that demons are glutted with the fumes of burning sacrifices. (Tertullian, *Apol.*, XXII.; Origen, *Cont. Cel.*, III. 29, IV. 32, VIII. 60.) Tertullian, furthermore, definitely ascribes to angels a peculiar kind of body. (*De Car. Christi*, VI.)

With respect to evil angels, it was taught that they were created good; that they fell through a misuse of their freedom; that at their head is Satan, who held originally an eminent rank, but by reason of pride and envy became an apostate. Several of the fathers (Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, and Methodius) held that the envy which incited to the apostasy was exercised toward man. (*Cont. Hær.*, IV. 40. 3; *De Patient.*, V.; *De Dono Patient.*, XIX.; *De Resurrect.*) Lactantius offered the theory that the devil originally stood next to the Divine Son in the order of being, and fell through his envy of Him. (*Inst.*, II. 9.) The fall of the other angels who lost their first estate was quite generally attributed to lust after the daughters of men. (Justin, 2 *Apol.*, V.; Athenagoras, *Legat.*, XXIV.; Clement, *Strom.*, III. 7; Tertullian, *De Cult. Fem.*, I. 2; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, II. 15; Methodius, *apud Epiphan. Hær.*, LXIV.) This view agreed with the current interpretation of Genesis VI. 2, according to which the "sons of God" who mingled with the daughters of the Cainites were angels. The souls of the giants sprung from this intermingling were regarded as identical with demons, — beings occupying an intermediate place between men and evil angels, and serving with the latter as patrons of heathenism, with all its lying wonders, oracles, superstitions, impurities, and delusions.

The ideas entertained of angels had a close connection with the theory of divine providence. Good angels were regarded as instruments of God in the government of the world. Several of the fathers, following hints of the Jewish Scriptures, especially of the Septuagint version of Deut.

XXXII. 8, 9, represented that each nation has its presiding angel or angels. (Strom., VI. 17; De Prin., III. 3; In Ex. Hom., VIII. 2.) Origen suggests that the "Man of Macedonia," who appeared to Paul, was probably an angelic guardian of that region. (In Luc. Hom., XII.) Angels were also associated by some with individual churches and with individual men. Hermas and Origen assume that an angel, or rather two angels, a good and an evil, are specially connected with each individual, at least with each member of the Church, the one or the other standing nearest to him according to his conduct. (Pastor, Mandat., VI. 2; Hom. in Num., XX. 3, XXIV. 3; In Ezech., VI. 8; In Luc., XXXV.) Also Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian give intimations of belief in a special angelic superintendence of the individual. (Strom., VI. 17; De An., LVII.) Already with Clement we find the idea that the gradations of the ecclesiastical hierarchy are an image of the angelic ranks. (Strom., VI. 13.)

Aside from evil influences upon the hearts of men, violent diseases, pestilences, and irruptions of nature were regarded as chief tokens of the agency of evil angels and demons in the world. A view quite exceptional was that of Cyprian, that the evils of his time were largely to be accounted for by the advancing age of the world. "The world," he says, "has now grown old, and does not abide in that strength in which it formerly stood; nor has it that vigor and force which it formerly possessed." (Adv. Demet., III.)

Meanwhile care was taken to guard against so magnifying the agency of angels as to abridge the proper province of God or of man. While Athenagoras speaks of God as exercising a general providence over the whole, the particulars being left to angels (Legat., XXIV.), there were writers, on the other hand, who made explicit statements of the doctrine of special providence. That God cares for the least things and for the parts, as well as for the great

whole, is clearly stated by Clement of Alexandria, Novatian, and Minucius Felix. (Strom., VI. 17; De Trin., VIII.; Octav., XVIII.) Quite as definitely it was taught that man, in the use of available resources, is more than a match for evil angels and demons, and is under no necessity of becoming a prey to their wiles. "Fearing the Lord," says Hermas, "you will have dominion over the devil, for there is no power in him." (Mandat., VII. Comp. Origen, De Prin., III. 2; Lact., Inst., II. 16.)

While the good offices of angels were so largely recognized, it was still not regarded proper to worship them or to address prayers to them. The single passage of Justin Martyr (1 Apol., VI.) which has an ostensible bearing in the direction of angel worship, cannot weigh aught against this verdict; so far is its apparent sense contradicted by other statements of Justin (1 Apol., XIII., XVI., LXI.), as well as by the literature of the age, that it must be reckoned as an instance of hasty, inconsiderate expression, or as a case of ambiguous grammar. Origen represented the general standpoint of the Church in his time, when, referring to Celsus, he said, "If he would have us seek the favor of others after the Most High God, let him consider that, as the motion of the shadow follows that of the body which casts it, so in like manner it follows that, when we have the favor of God, we have also the good-will of all angels and spirits who are friends of God." (Cont. Cel., VIII. 64.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — It may be questioned whether the Church of the first three centuries entertained so high a view of Adam's original endowments as came forth later in the Augustinian theology. At any rate, we find some expressions of the opinion that the primal state of Adam was that of the undeveloped,

though perfectly innocent man. Speaking of God's withholding from Adam the knowledge of good and evil, Theophilus says, "He wished man, infant as he was, to remain for some time longer simple and sincere." (Ad. Autol., II. 25.) According to Clement of Alexandria, Adam had, at the outset, capacities for acquiring high moral character, rather than such character itself. "He was not perfect in his creation, but adapted to the reception of virtue." (Strom., VI. 12.) Still it was a noble position which, in early Christian thought, was assigned to the first man. It was taught that he possessed the uncorrupted image of God, that he was blessed with dominion over nature, that he enjoyed intimate companionship with his Maker, that he was fully endowed with freedom, and was competent in the right use of his powers to acquire present and eternal blessedness. An exceptional position was occupied by Arnobius in his radical disparagement of the ideal of human nature.

The image and likeness of God, embodied in Adam, were somewhat differently understood by different writers. In the view of all, the more essential meaning of the terms was to be found in rational and moral traits, in the intellect, the will, the capacity for holiness in spirit and deed. But some included also bodily traits. Thus we find Irenæus and Tertullian drawing a distinction between the two words "image" and "likeness," applying the one to bodily characteristics and the other to the spiritual nature. In predicating this corporeal resemblance they had in mind, as their representations indicate, the Divine Person who walked in Paradise and who talked with Moses upon the mount,—the Word in the form in which He was revealed before His incarnation. (Cont. Har., IV. 38. 4, V. 6, V. 16; De Bap., V.; De Res. Car., VI.; Adv. Prax., XIV.; Adv. Marc., II. 5-9.) Clement of Alexandria and Origen, on the other hand, rejected all bodily analogies. They however distinguished, though not steadily, between the two

words "image" and "likeness." While both words, as they taught, have reference to the inner nature, the one denotes characteristics pertaining to man as man, the other characteristics which may be cultivated or be lost. "Scriptural usage," says Origen, "conveys no other meaning than this: that man received the dignity of God's image at his first creation, but that the perfection of his likeness has been reserved for the consummation, namely, that he might acquire it for himself by the exercise of his own diligence in the imitation of God." Clement employs almost the same terms, and indicates that the distinction in question had been drawn by preceding writers. (Strom., II. 22; Cohort., IV.; De Prin., III. 6; In Gen. Hom., I. 13.) The view of Philo, that man is more directly the image of the Word, and so is the image of an image, was one which also found expression with Christian writers.

The Scriptural account of the abode of the unfallen man was generally taken in a literal sense, though writers advocating the literal meaning claimed the privilege of finding in the description some items of a mystical import. Theophilus states that Paradise was an actual place upon the earth, though in respect of beauty intermediate between earth and heaven. (Ad Autol., II. 24. Comp. Iren., III. 23, V. 5; Hippol. Hexaëm., in Joan. Damasc.) The Alexandrians, on the other hand, especially Origen, were inclined to attribute an allegorical sense to the account in Genesis. "Who is so foolish," asks Origen, "as to suppose that God, after the manner of a husbandman, planted a Paradise in Eden, and placed in it a tree of life, visible and palpable, so that one tasting of the fruit by the bodily teeth obtained life? and again that one was partaker of good and evil by masticating what was taken from the tree? And if God is said to walk in Paradise in the evening, and Adam to hide himself under a tree, I do not suppose that any one doubts that these things figuratively indicate certain mysteries, the history having taken place in appearance, and not

literally." (De Prin., IV. 1. 16.) Again, Origen cites, as a probable conjecture, the notion that by the coats of skins provided for the fallen pair are to be understood bodies. (Select. in Gen.) This implies the belief that the fall was the cause of man's advent to this world, rather than a calamity which took place upon the earth.

As respects those cardinal features of human nature which have their place in each man as well as in Adam, there was also a variety of opinion. The New Testament diversity of expression, as regards the number of components in the nature of the individual, is reflected in the literature of the early centuries. Tertullian, it is quite certain, was a dichotomist, holding that man in his proper person is composed simply of body and soul. Soul and spirit, he argues, are not two, for they cannot be separated. Spirit is only a name for an aspect or operation of the soul. (De An., X., XI.) Irenæus and the Greek fathers generally were inclined to speak of a threefold division of man's nature. Some of these, however, were not strict trichotomists, since either they did not think of the spirit as a fixed factor in the individual, or the distinction which they drew between soul and spirit did not amount to a distinction as to substance. In the former category, Tatian and Irenæus are to be reckoned. By the spirit, they understood the Holy Spirit, "so far as the same obtains in man concrete form," (Kahnis,) and the retention or loss of this, as they represented, depends upon the conduct of the individual. (Orat. ad Græc., XII., XIII; Cont. Hær., V. 6. 1, V. 9.) Justin Martyr says: "The body is the house of the soul, and the soul the house of the spirit. These three, in all who cherish a sincere hope and unquestioning faith in God, will be saved." (De Resur., X.) Justin here speaks seemingly as a trichotomist; but in a preceding chapter (VIII.) of the same work he asks the question, "What is man but the reasonable animal, composed of body and soul?" Origen also expresses himself differently in dif-

ferent connections. He takes pains, in several instances, to specify that the soul holds an intermediate rank; but it may be questioned whether his distinction between soul and spirit was, after all, anything more than a distinction between higher and lower faculties and tendencies of a single nature or substance. (*De Prin.*, III. 4; *Cont. Cel.*, VII. 38; *Hom. in Gen.*, I. 15; *Hom. in Luc.*, VIII.; *In Matt. Tom.*, XIII. 2; *Ioan. Tom.*, XXXII. 11; *Comm. in Epist. ad Rom.*, I. 5, VI. 1, VII. 3.)

The soul was thought of as widely distinguished in nature from the body. It was not, however, regarded by all as strictly incorporeal. Tertullian taught expressly that it is corporeal, being a subtile extended something, invisible to eyes of flesh, but capable of being seen by the spirit, as is proved by the fact that it has been seen by persons in prophetic trance. It is also, says Tertullian, an indication of its corporeal nature that it is able to sympathize with the body. (*De An.*, V.—IX.) In this line of positive and outspoken opinions, Tertullian appears as an exception. Still, there were others who evidently assigned a species of corporeity to the soul, whether by preference or because of their inability to represent to themselves the purely incorporeal. Tatian says, "The human soul consists of many parts, and is not simple; it is composite, so as to manifest itself through the body." (XV.) Irenæus also, though he terms the soul incorporeal, assigns to it the leading corporeal characteristic of extension, and represents that it is conformed to the shape of the body, whether it be in or out of the same. (II. 19. 6; II. 34. 1; V. 7. 1.) Origen, on the other hand, declares that the soul is independent of such a condition of bodily existence and activity as space, and urges that it must be incorporeal, since otherwise it could not perceive and understand, as it does, that which is manifestly incorporeal. (*De Prin.*, I. 1.)

As respects the natural immortality of the soul, three writers of the second century — viz. Justin Martyr, Tatian,

and Theophilus — expressed themselves adversely. Neither of them, however, definitely stated that any human beings are, as a matter of fact, to cease to be. “Some,” says Justin, “which have appeared worthy of God, never die; but others are punished so long as God wills them to exist and to be punished.” (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, V.) Tatian, while he says that the soul is naturally mortal, and becomes immortal only by union with the divine, speaks, nevertheless, of a painful state for the wicked in immortality. (XIII., XIV.) It may be questioned how far death was identified by these writers with extinction. Baur gives his verdict upon the subject in the following terms: “These teachers did not understand by death a complete extinction, but only a loss of consciousness, which the soul possesses just because of its union with the spirit. The soul does not fully cease to be; it is only severed from the connection in which it hitherto had existed as an integral part of an ego, a personality, and sinks to the unconscious impersonal condition, to the merely animal life which pertains to it when separated from the spirit.” It will be noticed, however, that Tatian assumes for the wicked a condition of conscious suffering beyond the era of the resurrection. Meanwhile, the denial of the natural immortality of the soul was not able to hold its ground. Irenæus and the writers who followed gave their verdict in favor of natural immortality, Arnobius being the only conspicuous exception among the authors of the third century. Lactantius states that “immortality is not the consequence of nature, but the reward and recompense of virtue.” (*Inst.*, VII. 5.) But his language here has no reference to a mere continuance of conscious existence, since he says a little later in the same treatise, “Death does not entirely extinguish and destroy, but visits with eternal torments; for the soul cannot entirely perish, since it received its origin from the Spirit of God, which is eternal.” (VII. 12.) It should be added, that some Arabians in the third century taught that the

soul shares the fate of the body, dying with it and being raised with it, — a view finding expression also with Tatian. (XIII.) According to Eusebius, Origen converted the Arabians from their opinion. (Ecl. Hist., VI. 37.)

On the generative faculty of human nature only a few positive statements were indulged, and these indicative of different theories. Tertullian taught that body and soul are produced simultaneously, and that both are from the human parents. His theory was strict traducianism. Among the arguments for it he emphasized the frequently observed fact that children repeat the disposition of their parents. (De An., XXV.) Clement of Alexandria speaks of the *introduction* of the soul into the body; a style of expression indicative of creationism, or the theory that the soul is originated by a special act of God. (Strom., VI. 16.) Lactantius taught that the soul comes into being solely by the agency of God. (De Artif. Dei, XIX.) Origen denied that there are earthly fathers and mothers of our souls. As already stated, his theory was that of pre-existence. This, as he maintained, is commended by the explanation which it offers of God's dealings with men. If it be assumed that souls existed and sinned in a previous state, then it may be urged that their unequal conditions in this world are in harmony with the different degrees of ill-desert with which they came into their earthly estate. (De Prin., II. 9. 8, III. 3. 5; Select. in Ezech.; In Matt. Tom., XV. 35.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — Those who accepted, in general, the literal sense of the Scriptural account of Paradise, were satisfied with a literal interpretation of the story of the fall. Those, on the other hand, who made free to depart from the letter, found as much occasion to allegorize at this point as anywhere. Origen, as already indicated, was utterly disinclined to see in the trespass of Adam and Eve the literal partaking of literal fruit. Some of the Gnostics used the account of the fall as an argument against

marriage. The Catholic theologians, holding, as they did, to the actual birth of Christ and the divine institution of marriage, were compelled emphatically to repudiate such an application. Still we find Clement of Alexandria favoring the idea that the first human trespass pertained to connubial relations, not because such relations may not be holy and acceptable in the sight of God, but because the first pair prematurely, and while yet in their youthful state, assumed to make use of the connubial privilege. (Strom., III. 17.) On the part of all Catholic teachers the essence of the primal sin was located in a misuse of freedom, a disobedience to the known will of God, to which indeed the wiles of the devil tempted, but for which there was no necessity or valid excuse.

As regards the connection of Adam's posterity with the primal transgression, there was in these centuries no assertion of the stricter theory of imputation, namely, that the first sin was immediately charged by God upon every child of the race. Tertullian makes the nearest discoverable approach to such a theory, when he says that man was entrapped by Satan into breaking the divine commandment, "and being given over to death on account of his sin, the entire human race, tainted in their descent from him, were made a channel for transmitting his condemnation." (De Test. An., III.) As might be judged from this passage, and as appears more clearly in other passages, Tertullian did not look upon Adam's sin as by itself involving the condemnation of his posterity, but saw in the inherited taint or corruption the ground of that condemnation. It is because corruption is propagated (and corruption leads to transgression) that condemnation is propagated. The sequence, as understood by Tertullian, is implied in this statement of his: "Every soul, by reason of its birth, has its nature in Adam, until it is born again in Christ; moreover, it is unclean all the while that it remains without this regeneration, and because unclean it is actively sinful." (De

An., XL.) Neither by Tertullian, nor by any other writer of this period, was the doctrine of direct imputation taught. Clement of Alexandria declares that there is no imputation or record made against any one, except for voluntary transgressions. "Those are not reckoned that are not the effect of choice." (Strom., II. 15.) The same writer asks respecting the newly born child, apparently in a spirit of deprecation, "How did he fall under the curse of Adam, who had done nothing?" (Strom., III. 16.) To similar effect is the declaration of Athenagoras, that children, having done neither good nor evil, are not candidates for the judgment. (De Res., XIV.)

A second negative proposition on the subject may be put in this form. It was not thought, in this period, that the transmitted effects of the fall are such as to destroy man's moral freedom, or to eliminate all elements of good from his nature. It was the reiterated declaration of the eminent and representative men of the Church, that the individual has an element of free will, can choose good or evil, can turn toward God or turn away from Him, can use or abuse the grace which offers all assistance needful to normal moral activity. (1 Apol., XLIII.; 2 Apol., VII.; Dial. cum Tryph., CXLI.; Legat., XXIV.; Strom., IV. 13; Hippol., Phil., X. 29; De Prin., I. 8. 3, III. 1.) Arnobius appears as a stranger to the general current of Christian thought, when he says that natural infirmity rather than choice makes a man a sinner. (I. 49.) Such a statement certainly was not less alien to the prevailing sentiment of the Church than was the teaching of Origen, that freedom of choice is so characteristic of the creature that it will involve forever the possibility of falls and recoveries, though in this view Origen was no doubt occupying an exceptional position. Affirmations of the common sinfulness of men appear on the part of various writers; but even Tertullian, who went as far in this direction as any one, took pains to assert that no man is destitute of some elements of good. "There is,"

he says, "a portion of good in the soul, of that original, divine, and genuine good which is its proper nature. For that which is derived from God is rather obscured than extinguished. . . . Just as no soul is without sin, so neither is any soul without seeds of good." (De An., XLI.) The same writer also does not hesitate to speak of childhood as "the innocent period of life." (De Bap., XVIII. Comp. Cyprian, Epist. ad Fidum, No. 58.) Origen, as his general system dictated, evidently believed that no human soul in this world is wholly alien from God and righteousness. "Without doubt," says he, "every one who walks upon the earth is a partaker of the Holy Spirit, receiving it from God." (De Prin., I. 3, 4.) In another place he speaks of the Word, who is the true light, as being in all men, increasing in some and diminishing in others. (In Jer. Hom., XIV. 10.)

A positive and exact statement of the moral consequences commonly attributed to the fall is not easily made. It is quite certain that the Church as a whole believed that the fall resulted in a sad depravation of the moral opportunities of man, or the conditions of his moral activity; that it left him without that strong support which he primarily enjoyed in his perfect communion with God; that it rendered him, through the lack of this intimate communion, very liable to become a prey to evil spirits, and to the lower powers of his own nature. How far the fall depraved or positively corrupted the moral nature itself, as well as the conditions of moral activity, is a question which very few writers of the first centuries attempted to answer definitely. Tertullian was unusually explicit for his age. As has been noted, he assumed, as a result of the fall, a positive corruption of the moral nature of all men, though not a corruption so radical as to exclude elements of good. It is very probable that his view was rather more emphatic than that of the Greek theologians of his time, and that he represents the beginning of the Latin type of anthropology, which ulti-

mately became widely distinguished from the Greek by its stronger emphasis upon the innate or inherited depravity of men. Origen indulges some very definite expressions, to the effect that from the day of birth the taint of impurity is upon every one born in this world (Hom. in Lev., VIII. 3, XII. 4); but statements of this kind had with him a peculiar sense, and are very little indicative of the standpoint of the Church upon the subject of original sin. The impurity which he predicates had in his thought scarcely any connection with the fall of Adam. Each newly born child is impure for two reasons: (1.) Because of personal transgression in a previous state; (2.) On account of the mystery of generation. (In Matt. Tom., XV. 23.) Origen, holding as he did a semi-Gnostic view with regard to the body, could very easily persuade himself that the pre-existent soul, in the process of reaching its earthly nativity, contracts of necessity a certain taint.

Illustrating the general subject under consideration by comparison, we may say that the Church of the first three centuries maintained, quite as strongly as does Arminian Methodism, the actual possession of free will by the descendants of the fallen Adam, but on the whole fell somewhat below the latter in stress upon inherited corruption and dependence upon divine grace.

The death which was universally regarded as resulting from the fall seems to have been interpreted wholly in a spiritual sense by Clement of Alexandria. (Strom. III. 9; VII. 11.) But it may be concluded that Theophilus and Irenæus were nearer the current of Christian thought in making the death penalty attached to sin include the dissolution of the body. (Ad. Autol., II. 25; Cont. Hær. IV. 39, V. 19, V. 23.)

Formal definitions of the nature of sin are rare in early Christian literature. We find, however, statements bearing more or less directly upon the subject. The principle that

sin is the offspring of a free act of the soul, rather than a necessary accompaniment or inherent property of a material body, was asserted by certain writers in opposition to an heretical disparagement of the body. "In what instance," asks Justin Martyr, "can the flesh possibly sin by itself, if it have not the soul going before it and inciting it?" (De Resur., VIII.) "Although sins," says Tertullian, "are attributed to the body, yet they are preceded by the guilty concupiscence of the soul; nay, the first motion of sin must be ascribed to the soul, to which the flesh acts in the capacity of a servant." (Adv. Marc., I. 24.) There was a strong occasion for the Church to assume this position, as it ministered to the defence of the doctrine of the resurrection; but, at the same time, there were ascetic tendencies in the Church inclining in a contrary direction. If these did not go so far as to invoke a denial of the freedom of the soul over against the body, they did nurture the idea, as appears in the case of Origen, that the body is an undesirable incumbrance. It is noteworthy, also, that we have even in this early period an example of the negative conception of sin. This appears in the writings of Origen. Placing the essence of virtue in a voluntary and normal *activity* or *exertion*, he not unnaturally looked upon a relative cessation of this exertion as initiating apostasy. Moral defection, he taught, begins in lassitude of soul. Sin has, therefore, a negative rather than a positive ground. The good is the really existent; evil, being the opposite of the good, is the non-existent, τὸ οὐκ ὄν. (De Prin., I. 4, II. 9. 2; In Ioan. Tom., II. 7.) A speculative account of sin, destined to find less acceptance than the above in Christian thought, appears with Lactantius. While he represented that the attitude of God toward moral evil is one of opposition and hatred, he seemed, nevertheless, to regard evil as a necessary constituent of a moral world,—a condition of the existence of its opposite. "He permitted the evil," he says, "on this account, that the good might also shine

forth, since, as I have often taught, we understand that the one cannot exist without the other," just as "there cannot be a higher place without a lower, nor a rising without a setting, nor warmth without cold, nor softness without hardness." (De Ira Dei, XV.) It may be suggested that the idea which Lactantius had in mind was that the *possibility* of moral evil, not its *actual existence*, is the necessary counterpart of the existence of moral good; but that is not what he states. In the same connection, also, he falls into the grossly dualistic representation that the body is the seat and centre of evil; the soul, of good. Lactantius, in this whole description, was treading on dangerous ground. A more guarded statement on the relation of evil to the order of the world appears with Clement of Alexandria, who declares that, while evil is not a necessary factor, it is compelled by the overmastering wisdom of God to yield a measure of compensation. "It is the greatest achievement," he says, "of Divine Providence, not to allow the evil which has sprung from voluntary apostasy to remain useless and for no good." (Strom., I. 17.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

As repeatedly portrayed in early Christian literature, Christ appears as both divine and human, the Son of God and the Son of Man; the new head of the race, in whom the ideal of manhood flowers forth in matchless perfection and beauty; the mediator between the sinful and the holy; the perfect bond between the creature and the Creator. Some may have interpreted the description of Isaiah as bearing against the comeliness of His appearance. (Clem., Pæd., III. 1; Tertul., De Carne Chr., IX.; Origen, Cont. Cel., VI. 75.) But in the view of these same writers this feature was no detraction, being fully compensated by the emphasis which it put upon the purely spiritual, and by the condescension which it revealed. No shadow of doubt rested upon the doctrine of His perfect sinlessness. Origen, to be sure, felt constrained to allow that His reception of a body by human birth involved the contraction of a certain taint; but he makes it of small import,—something cancelled by the simple ceremonial cleansing. His statement is as follows: "*Omnis anima quæ humano corpore fuerit induta, habet sordes suas. Oportet ergo ut pro Domino et Salvatore nostro, qui sordidis vestimentis fuerat indutus, et terrenum corpus assumpserat, ea offerrentur quæ purgare sordes ex lege consueverant.*" (In Luc. Hom., XIV.) In other connections Origen affirms the sinlessness of Christ, and from various writers we have unqualified declarations of the same truth. (In Ioan. Tom., XX. 25; Ep. ad Rom.,

III. 3; Just., Dial., CX.; Clem., Pæd., I. 2; Tertul., De An., XLI.)

The teachings of the Ebionites and others gave occasion for a special consideration of the divine nature of Christ. A previous chapter has shown what answer was given to the denial of that nature. A strong occasion for asserting the reality of the human nature of Christ, at least so far as concerns the body, was supplied by the Gnostics, who were disposed to deny the reality of the flesh of Christ, or the reality of His union with the flesh. The vigorous protest against this denial, which meets us in the writings of the Apostle John, was renewed again and again from the days of Ignatius to those of Origen. If Christ was not truly incarnate, urges Tertullian, if He had no more than the phantom of a body, then His work was imaginary, and His salvation is a delusion. (Adv. Marc., III. 8-11.) Origen, if he did not value the body for itself, could appreciate the sublime moral purpose and use subserved by the incarnation. A truly eloquent strain is that which he indulges over the manifestation of the God-man. "Since we see in Him some things so human that they appear to differ in no respect from the common frailty of mortals, and some things so divine that they can appropriately belong to nothing else than to the primal and ineffable nature of Deity, the narrowness of human understanding can find no outlet, but, overcome with the amazement of a mighty admiration, knows not whither to withdraw, or what to take hold of, or whither to turn. If it think of a God, it sees a mortal; if it think of a man, it beholds Him returning from the grave, after overthrowing the empire of death, laden with its spoils. . . . To utter these things in human ears, and to explain them in words, far surpasses the powers either of our rank, or of our intellect and language. I think that it surpasses the power even of the holy apostles; nay, the explanation of that mystery may be beyond the grasp of the entire creation of celestial powers." (De Prin., II. 6. 1.)

While Clement of Alexandria and Origen attributed to Christ a real body, made of earthly substance, their speculative bent still led them to suppose that it was distinguished by certain remarkable properties, if not in virtue of its own constitution, at least in virtue of its union with the Logos. Clement taught that Christ was impassible, free from all bodily necessities and appetencies. "He ate not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him." (Strom., VI. 9.) According to Origen, the body of Christ had a different appearance to different persons, glorious in the eyes of the spiritual and appreciative, but uncomely to those of opposite character and disposition. His explanation of this fact is given as follows: "It is not a subject of wonder that the matter, which is by nature susceptible of being altered and changed, and of being transformed into anything which the Creator chooses, should at one time possess a quality agreeably to which it is said, 'He had no form or beauty,' and at another, one so glorious, and majestic, and marvellous, that the spectators of such surpassing loveliness should fall on their faces." (Cont. Cel., VI. 77.)

The earlier writers were satisfied with the general statement that the Word became flesh. The theological exigencies of the age led them to emphasize in particular the reality of Christ's human body. Having less occasion to speak of His possession of a human soul, they did not indulge definite statements upon this point, and stopped short with the general representation that Christ assumed human nature. Their writings are characterized neither by a formal denial nor by a formal affirmation of a rational human soul in Christ. It was about the end of the second century that writers began to be explicit upon this subject. Tertullian and Origen declared, very definitely, that one factor in the person of Christ was the rational soul. Irenæus is to be credited with the same belief, since he speaks of Christ as

giving His soul for man, as well as His body, and in his terminology soul was inclusive of the rational principle. From the time of these writers, the full manhood of Christ was accepted in the common belief of the Church.

Among the writers of the second century there are three — viz. Hermas, Justin Martyr, and Clement of Alexandria — whose statements have been thought to imply a denial of the rational soul. Hermas speaks of the holy pre-existent Spirit as dwelling in a body (Simil., V. 6), from which it has been concluded that his view of Christ embraced simply these two factors. But by body or flesh Hermas seems to have meant something more than flesh proper, since he speaks of it as walking religiously, and obtaining, on this account, the reward of being taken into full partnership with the Spirit. “How can a body,” says Dorner, “be rewarded by being exalted to the rank of the Son of God, and put on a level with the Holy Spirit? One might, with much greater reason, say that Hermas approximates to the view of the Adoptionists, who held that the humanity of Christ participated in Sonship, not so much on the ground of its connection with the Son of God as because of its own holy walk.” (Vol. I., Note PP.) The ground of the assumption against Justin Martyr is his trichotomy, together with his statement that Christ consisted of body, Logos, and soul. (2 Apol., X.) According to the trichotomist theory, soul is only the principle of animal life, and hence it is concluded that Justin must have put the Logos in place of the rational soul. But this is not decisive. As already indicated, Justin was not so strict a trichotomist but that he could have used the word “soul” in a broader sense than the one specified. Equally devoid of substantial proof is the assumption against Clement of Alexandria. He speaks, to be sure, of Christ as impassible, while yet he numbers passibility among the attributes of the human soul. (Strom., VI. 9; Pæd., III. 1.) This is proof against belief in the customary experiences of the soul, but not against a belief in the existence of a

soul in Christ. Clement may have assumed for the Logos as much of a controlling power over the soul as over the body included in His person.

The soul of Christ, according to Origen, was, like all others, pre-existent, and was the most eminent of all; a soul which had perfectly maintained its allegiance to God from the beginning. Its union with the Logos, therefore, was of the nature of a reward. (De Prin., II. 6.)

The incarnation was, no doubt, commonly regarded as involving a permanent union of the divine and the human. It was no mere theophany, no temporary assumption of a body after the type of the incarnations taught by Indian myths, but an indissoluble incorporation of the human with the divine. Some of Origen's statements, it is true, may seem to run counter to this conception of the incarnation. "Although he was man," he says of Christ, "yet now is He in no wise man." (In Jer. Hom., XV. 6.) But we are warned against attaching too much meaning to such expressions, inasmuch as we find Origen declaring that the saints, in general, are to cease to be men. (Ibid., and In Matt. Tom., XVII. 30.) An elimination of the body and a peculiarly close union between the finite soul and the Logos was probably all that Origen wished to assume, as regards the disappearance of Christ's manhood. It is to be noted, too, that Origen allowed that Christ took his resurrected body to heaven; but there is evidence that he regarded the incorporeal as the ideal state, and hence the state destined ultimately to be reached by the Son of Man.

SECTION II.—THE REDEPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

THE writings of the early fathers contain little upon this topic except brief and incidental references. While there was no lack of exuberant and grateful feeling over the amazing facts of redemption, there was little effort to elicit

from these facts a full and explicit theory. In no treatise was the subject taken up exclusively, and treated at length. The redemptive work was viewed in its manifold aspects; and no one aspect claimed, on the whole, a prominence which overshadowed the rest. The more current ideas may be indicated by the following propositions:—

1. *Christ was regarded as the one and the sufficient Mediator between God and men.* Clement of Rome speaks of Christ as “the High Priest of all our offerings, the defender and helper of our infirmity.” (1 Epist., XXXVI.) Christ is characterized by Ignatius as the High Priest “to whom the holy of holies has been committed, and who alone has been intrusted with the secrets of God,” as “the door of the Father, by which enter in Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, and the prophets, and the apostles, and the Church.” (Ad Philadel., IX.) Other writers speak with equal emphasis of the mediatorial work of Christ, describing Him as the medium of revealing God and of bringing about the proper union between Him and mankind. “From Him,” says Origen, “there began the union of the divine with the human nature, in order that the human, by communion with the divine, might rise to be divine, not in Jesus alone, but in all those who not only believe, but enter upon the life which Jesus taught.” (Cont. Cel., III. 28.)

2. *The death upon the cross was regarded as the crowning feature of the redemptive work.* “Let us look steadfastly at the blood of Christ,” exclaims Clement of Rome, “and see how precious that blood is to God, which, having been shed for our salvation, has set the grace of repentance before the whole world.” (1 Epist., VII.) The utmost fervor of Ignatius is called forth by the contemplation of the crucifixion. “Let my spirit,” he says, “be counted as nothing for the sake of the cross, which is a stumbling-block to those who do not believe, but to us salvation and life eternal.” (Ad Eph., XVIII.) “To me Jesus Christ is in the place of all that is ancient; His cross, and death, and res-

urrection, and the faith which is by Him, are undefiled monuments of antiquity." (Ad Philadel., VIII.) Christ, argues Justin Martyr, in that He was hanged upon a tree, bore the curse that was due to all; not that He became actually accursed in the sight of God, but as suffering for the liberation of the race from the curse resting upon it. (Dial. cum Tryph., XCIV., XCVI., CXI.) Irenæus describes the passion of Christ as the supreme manifestation of the God-man, the means of bringing to a complete measure the saving efficacy accruing from His voluntary obedience. (V. 16. 3.) Christ's death, according to Tertullian, is the basis of Christian hope and the very foundation of the Gospel. (Adv. Marc., III. 8.) If Origen, upon the one hand, seemed to depreciate the significance of Christ's death by styling the preaching of the cross an inferior stage, Christ being revealed chiefly as the eternal Wisdom among the perfect, on the other hand he endeavors to expand its significance to the widest conceivable limits. He gives it a bearing not merely upon this world, but upon all worlds, upon every rational creature. Christ, he represents, is the High Priest of angels as well as of men. He sacrifices for the celestial as well as the terrestrial, — a corporeal offering in the one case, a spiritual in the other. (In Ioan. Tom., I. 40; Hom. in Lev., I. 3, 4; Hom. in Num., XXIV. 1.) He alone is able to atone for all; the offerings of holy men may serve in a measure to cancel sins, but they cannot avail for the sins of the whole world. (In Num. Hom., XXIV. 1; In Ioan. Tom., XXVIII. 14.) And, moreover, such efficacy as they do possess, they possess in virtue of the great offering of Christ which lies back of them. (So at least Redepenning interprets Origen.) There were individual writers, it is true, who made the teaching function of Christ rather more prominent than the sacrificial function which found expression in His death. This was the case with Clement of Alexandria. But in the current representation the death of Christ was ranked as a factor

of pre-eminent significance in the redemptive work; and the writings of Clement, too, are not without tokens of a warm appreciation of its significance. (Pæd., I. 9, II. 2, II. 8.)

3. *The death of Christ was looked upon as a vicarious sacrifice for man.* The bearing of this sacrifice upon divine justice was in the main neither definitely analyzed nor stated. But the fact that it was a vicarious offering, and was designed to bring undeserved benefits, was fully acknowledged. "On account of the love He bore us," says Clement of Rome, "Jesus Christ our Lord gave His blood for us by the will of God; His flesh for our flesh, and His soul for our souls." (Chap. XLIX.) Almost the same words are repeated by Irenæus. "The Lord has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh." (V. 1. 1.) In the Epistle to Diognetus we have this beautiful tribute to Christ's vicarious sacrifice: "He Himself took on Him the burden of our iniquities. He gave His own Son a ransom for us, the holy One for transgressors, the blameless One for the wicked, the righteous One for the unrighteous, the incorruptible One for the corruptible, the immortal One for them that are mortal. For what other thing than His righteousness was capable of covering our sins? By what other One was it possible that we, the wicked and the ungodly, could be justified than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable device! O benefits surpassing all expectation! That the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors!" (Chap. IX.)

Among the more advanced views of Christ's death, a foremost place may be claimed by a conception of Irenæus already touched upon. The death of Christ, according to a cardinal representation of this writer, is to be regarded as the consummation of Christ's holy obedience; and in

this obedience, as a whole, we are to recognize an offset to man's disobedience. The essence of the atonement lay in the voluntary obedience of the God-man to the laws which belong to the human sphere. Speaking of the cross, Irenæus says: "Doing away with that disobedience of man which had taken place at the beginning by the occasion of a tree, 'He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,' rectifying that disobedience which had occurred by reason of a tree, through that obedience which was upon the tree." (V. 16. 3. Comp. III. 18. 7, V. 21.)

4. *The work of Christ was regarded as bringing redemption negatively, by limiting the power of Satan and his angels.* This was a view of no little significance in the first centuries. Heathenism appeared then as the dominant power in the world, laying its hand, when it pleased, with crushing force upon the worshippers of the true God; and heathenism was believed to be under the patronage of Satan, and the evil angels and demons leagued with him. No wonder, under such circumstances, that there was a vivid feeling respecting Satanic and demoniacal agency, and a lively rejoicing over all tokens that in Christ there was a power competent to defeat and limit such agency. According to the representations of several writers, the ministry of Christ made a positive inroad upon the kingdom of the adversary, and abridged the power and confidence of its votaries. "Christ was made man," says Justin Martyr, "for the sake of believing men, and for the destruction of the demons." (2 Apol. VI.) "We call Him Helper and Redeemer, the power of whose name even the demons do fear, and at this day, when they are exorcised in the name of Jesus Christ crucified under Pontius Pilate, they are overcome." (Dial. cum Tryph., XXX., XLIX.) Irenæus repeatedly describes Christ as the stronger than the strong man, who was, therefore, able to bind the latter. (III. 8. 2; III. 18. 6; III. 23.) He urges also that it was needful that the Son of God should become man, born of a woman, in

order that His victory over the adversary might properly accrue to the benefit of men. "Therefore," he says, "does the Lord profess Himself to be the Son of Man, comprising in Himself that original man, out of whom the woman was fashioned, in order that, as our species went down to death through a vanquished man, so we may ascend to life again through a victorious one." (V. 21. 1.) Origen dwells also at considerable length upon the bearing of Christ's work upon the dominion of the devil. The mythical tone of some of his representations upon this subject will be noticed in another part of the present section.

5. *The work of Christ was regarded as bringing redemption positively by the introduction of a divine life.* The incarnation ushered in, as was conceived, a new spring-time in the moral history of the race. Like a fountain opened in a desert, it became the source of a new vitality, bringing into the midst of the corruptible and decaying a principle of incorruption and fadeless growth. This was a view deeply permeating the mind and heart of the early Church. "Ignorance was removed," exclaims Ignatius, "and the old kingdom abolished, God himself being manifested in human form to bring newness of eternal life." (Ad Eph., XIX.) To heal man's corruption, argues Justin Martyr, it was necessary that the Word, with His incorruptible life, should come into the human sphere. (Frag.) The same idea is very emphatically expressed by Irenæus: "By no other means could we have attained to incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be joined to incorruptibility and immortality, unless first incorruptibility and immortality had become that which we also are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by incorruptibility, and the mortal by immortality, that we might receive the adoption of sons?" (III. 19. 1.) "The Word became flesh," says Hippolytus, in order that, "by mixing the incorruptible with the corruptible, and the strong with the

weak, He might save perishing man." (Chr. et Antichr., IV.) "Excellent is the medicine of immortality!" exclaims Clement of Alexandria. (Cohort., X.) "That which is predicted by the prophets," writes Origen, "is worthy of God, that He who is the brightness and express image of the divine nature should come into the world with the holy human soul, which was to animate the body of Jesus, to sow the seed of His word, which might bring all who received and cherished it into union with the Most High God, and which would lead to perfect blessedness all those who felt within them the power of God the Word, who was to be in the body and the soul of a man." (Cont. Cel., VII. 17.)

One factor in the life-giving power of Christ, as discerned by leading writers, was the moral influence or the holy persuasion emanating from His ministry. His person, words, and deeds, it was claimed, invite to a contemplation that is elevating and purifying to thought and feeling. Clement of Alexandria, for example, names Christ "the holy charmer of the sick soul," the physician who is able to adapt Himself to all varieties of spiritual maladies, who has "many tones of voice and many methods for the salvation of men." (Pæd., I. 2; Cohort., I.) "So great is the power of the cross of Christ," says Origen, "that if it be placed before the eyes and faithfully held in mind, so that the eye of the mind looks with intent gaze upon the very death of Christ, no concupiscence, no lust, no fury, no envy, can prevail." (Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., VI. 1.) A disciple of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, styles Christ "the most lovely object of all, who attracts all irresistibly toward Himself, by his unutterable beauty." (Orat. Panegy.)

The theory that the redemptive price was paid to Satan is found in this period, but it is to be questioned whether it is discoverable in the writings of more than one author, —namely, Origen. Irenæus has been charged with enter-

taining the theory, but upon insufficient grounds. He states, indeed, that the incarnate Word redeemed man from the apostasy — that is, the devil — by His own blood ; that He recovered man, not by violence, but in a righteous way and by means of persuasion. (V. 1. 1 ; V. 2. 1.) To one having the theory in mind, it may seem to be implied by such statements ; but a different interpretation is possible, as is claimed by such critics as Duncker, Gieseler, Dorner, and Kahnis. The persuasion may be regarded as applying, in the thought of Irenæus, not to the devil, but to man ; and by redemption from the devil may be denoted, not the payment to him of a price, — viz. the blood of Christ, — but redemption simply in the sense of deliverance from thralldom, the blood of Christ being the means of the deliverance in a sense quite different from the commercial. Granting the possibility of such an interpretation, we are compelled by the general tone and by many specific statements of the writings of Irenæus to accept its entire probability. (1.) He nowhere allows a right in the devil over fallen men, but uniformly represents his dominion as an usurped and iniquitous dominion. (2.) He says that God did not, like the devil, resort to a stratagem for carrying out His purpose. This is quite significant. For the conditions forbade that the devil should be thought of as receiving any real gain out of the transaction ; he must necessarily be regarded as being outwitted, since the end to be achieved was an abridgment of his dominion. So manifest was this, that those writers, whether in this or the succeeding period, who went farthest in acknowledging the payment of a ransom to Satan, went farthest also in confessing therein a divine stratagem. (3.) Irenæus represents that Satan's dominion over men was overthrown, not in virtue of a contract with the adversary, but by the victorious righteousness of Christ, which foiled the tempter and prepared for a similar victory on the part of men. Sin, as he states, was the bond which held man to Satan, and hence, as men through

the good offices of the Word are purified from sin, they are freed from their former bonds. (4.) The view of Irenæus, that the sayings of Christ revealed to the devil, for the first time, his everlasting doom, and stirred him up to blasphemy, does not harmonize with the supposition that the blood of the Redeemer was given to him in answer to a contract. The contract theory, as shaped by its advocates, pictures the devil as deluding himself with a false hope of victory, not as blaspheming over certain defeat. (See V. 2. 1; V. 21. 3; V. 26. 2.)

Origen undoubtedly gave expression to the theory in question, being easily betrayed into it by his verbal exegesis, taken in connection with his bold, speculative temper, which was more alert to seize upon every material of thought than to harmonize the ingathered materials. The following is, perhaps, Origen's most explicit statement of his peculiar view: "To whom did He give His soul as a redemptive price for many? Not, indeed, to God. Was it, then, to the evil one? He, in truth, had us in his power, till the soul of Jesus was given as a redemptive price to him, deceived with the idea that he could exercise mastery over it, not perceiving that he could not bear the pains involved in retaining it. Wherefore, death, which seemed to have subjected Him to its own dominion, now rules Him no more, since He was made free among the dead and stronger than the power of death; and so far stronger, that, of those whom death had conquered, whoever wished could follow Him, death possessing no more power against them, for whoever is with Jesus cannot be assailed by death. . . . The soul, indeed, of the Son of God was given as a redemptive price for us, but not His spirit, for previously He had delivered that to the Father, saying, 'Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit'; nor, indeed, His body, for we have found nothing to that effect in the Scriptures. And since He gave His soul as a redemptive price for many,—but it did not remain with him to whom it had

been given,—He says in the fifteenth Psalm, ‘Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell.’” (In Matt. Tom., XVI. 8.) It is clear, from the above, that the acknowledgment of a right in Satan, and the payment to him of a ransom, turn out, on the theory of Origen, to be a mere sham. Satan makes no new acquisition, and loses the power already possessed. So little of anything like a real exchange appears, according to the total representation of Origen, that Gieseler concludes that he did not have such in mind. “Origen does not consider,” says he, “that Christ, in the proper sense, gave His soul as a ransom to the devil, but only in a figurative and qualified sense.”

It is unnecessary to add, that this mythical transaction with the devil by no means filled up the circle of Origen’s contemplation of the saving office of Christ. He viewed His work from a great variety of standpoints. If he affirmed a certain connection between His death and Satan, he affirmed no less explicitly that His death was of the nature of a sacrifice to God and a propitiation for the sins of the world. The following are some of his sentences bearing upon this point: “He who was made in the likeness of men, and was found in fashion as a man, without doubt presented to God for the sin which He had received from us (for He bore our sins) an immaculate victim; that is, His spotless flesh.” (In Lev. Hom., III. 1.) “Thou who hast come to Christ, the true High Priest, who by His blood has made God propitious to thee, and reconciled thee to the Father,” etc. (In Lev. Hom., IX. 10.) “Purer than all living things, this man dies for the people, bearing our sins and infirmities; for He was able to blot out all the sins of the whole world received into Himself, since He did no sin, neither was deceit found in His mouth.” (In Ioan. Tom., XXVIII. 14.)

Following the intimations of Scripture (Ps. XVI. 10; Eph. IV. 9; 1 Pet. III. 19, 20), several writers taught that Christ descended into Hades to carry thither the knowl-

edge and the benefits of the Gospel. According to Clement of Alexandria, His ministry there, as well as upon earth, was for Gentiles no less than for Jews, and could be accepted or rejected with the same freedom which belongs to men of this world. (Strom., VI. 6.) Origen makes frequent mention of the descent into Hades, and brings out the idea that this advent, as well as the earthly, had its forerunners; namely, the prophets, in particular John the Baptist. (Cont. Cel., II. 43; In Lev. Hom., IX. 5; Lib. Regum, Hom., II.; In Matt. Tom., XII. 3; In Luc. Hom., IV.) Christ's coming, as he represents in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, was a signal of release for those held in Hades not so much on account of crime as on account of the mere fact that they were numbered with the dead. (V. 1.) Hippolytus also speaks of the descent into Hades, and says that John the Baptist was made a forerunner of this visitation, "that there too he might intimate that the Saviour would descend to ransom the souls of the saints from the hand of death." (Chr. et Antichr., XLV.) Clement of Alexandria represents that the apostles also engaged in the ministry to the inhabitants of Hades, and a like office is assigned them by Hermas. (Strom., VI. 6; Simil., IX. 16.) Meanwhile, this tenet concerning the preaching of Christ in Hades did not acquire sufficient importance, in the general estimate, to claim a place in the symbols of the churches till after the middle of the fourth century.

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

"It stands as an assured fact, a fact knowing no exceptions, and acknowledged by all well versed in the matter, that all of the pre-Augustinian fathers taught that in the appropriation of salvation there is a co-working of freedom

and grace." (Kahnis.) There was no favor in the Catholic Church of the first centuries for any theory of irresistible grace, or of absolute predestination to eternal life. The Gnostics may have cherished the idea that there is an elect class, a class of pneumatic persons, who from their very nature are incapable of being despoiled of an inheritance in the upper heaven; but in the Church at large neither this nor any kindred idea found sympathy, and it was emphatically taught that God is ready to welcome all, and that he saves none without their own co-operation. The maxim of Philo, that, while a good of some kind always comes from seeking God, it is not by any means certain that He will be found, was not at all congenial to the minds of the early Christians. "Seek and ye shall find," was uttered by them without doubt, or any other qualification than the Scriptural requirement of earnestness, sincerity, and humble submission to the truth so far as made known.

Predestination, accordingly, so far as it was affirmed in connection with the destiny of men, was regarded as conditioned by God's foreknowledge of the free acts of men. Origen, in particular, develops this doctrine. "That which is to be," he says, "does not take place because it is known; but it is known that it will be, because it is to take place." (Comm. in Gen.) "Many things are carried on without His will, nothing without His providence." (In Gen. Hom., III. 2.) "Not because the prophets predicted did Judas betray; but because he was to be a betrayer, they foretold those things which he was to do from the wickedness of his purpose, since, indeed, Judas had it in his power to be like Peter and John, if he had so willed." (Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., VII. 8.) In harmony with this standpoint, Origen affirmed that the Scriptural representations concerning God's hardening of the heart must be taken with some qualification. It is unworthy of God and inconsistent with human responsibility that He should, independent of man's

choice, harden the heart. In any case of hardening, as, for example, that related of Pharaoh, the result is to be imputed to the misuse of light and forbearance. As the forbearance of a benevolent master leads the perverse servant farther into corruption, as the same rain which prepares wholesome fruits on one piece of ground nurtures upon another only thorns and briers, as the same sun which melts the wax hardens the clay, so divine dealing misused by Pharaoh corrupted and hardened his heart. (De Prin., III. 1. 8-12; Comm. in Ex.; Cant. Cant., Bk. II.) But while Origen teaches with constant decision the inalienable freedom of man, he still allows that man's part in the work of personal salvation is small compared with God's part. (De Prin., III. 1. 18.)

There was a wide-spread faith in the early Church in the power of the Gospel to work sudden transformations, to bring the seeker speedily into possession of the essential prize of the Christian calling. But we find, on the other hand, declarations to the effect that time is needed properly to consummate the work of moral renovation. "It is probably impossible," says Clement of Alexandria, "all at once to eradicate inbred passions; but by God's power, and human intercession, and the help of brethren, and sincere repentance, and constant care, they are corrected." (Quis Div. salv., XL.) God frequently, argues Origen, allows a certain experience of evils, and cures by a gradual process, in order that the cure may be permanent. "For God governs souls, not with reference, let me say, to the fifty years of the present life, but with reference to an illimitable age." (De Prin., III. 1. 13.)

Faith was commonly regarded as the pre-eminent means in the appropriation of salvation, and strong affirmations that it is the sole means may be found. "We, being called," says Clement of Rome, "by His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, nor by our wisdom, or understanding, or godliness, or works which we have

wrought in holiness of heart, but by that faith through which, from the beginning, Almighty God has justified all men." (Chap. XXXII.) "Man is justified by faith," writes Origen, "the works of the law making no contribution to his justification. Where, accordingly, faith is absent, which justifies the believer, even if one have the works of the law, nevertheless, because they are not built upon the foundation of faith, however good they may seem to be, they cannot justify their doer, because faith is wanting, which is the seal of those who are justified by God." (Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., III. 9.) "Faith toward God justifies a man," is a declaration of Irenæus. (IV. 5. 5.) According to Clement of Alexandria, simplicity, knowledge, innocence, decorum, and love are all the daughters of faith. (Strom., II. 12.)

The "justification" resulting from faith was not defined with the careful discrimination which appears in later times. The fact that remission was closely associated with regeneration in the minds of many writers, indicates that there was no such decisive distinction drawn between the terms *justification* and *regeneration* as is made, in the main, by Protestantism.

A definition of faith, which may be characterized as the current one, can hardly be quoted. While in some instances the word was used merely to denote the acceptance of truth on testimony, in other instances it was employed in a deeper sense, and was made to include the self-surrender of the soul to the truth intellectually received, or the spirit of consecrated loyalty. This latter sense may be inferred from the relation which different writers affirmed between faith and works. Ignatius, for example, says, "Faith cannot do the works of unbelief, nor unbelief the works of faith" (Ad Eph., VIII.),—a statement which evidently includes in the conception of faith the inner moral disposition. To the same effect is the following from the same author: "The beginning is faith and the end is love. Now these

two, being inseparably connected together, are of God, while all other things which are requisite for a holy life follow after them. No man [truly] making a profession of faith sinneth; nor does he that possesses love hate any one. The tree is made manifest by its fruits." (Ad Eph., XIV.) Origen also very explicitly includes a right moral disposition in the idea of genuine faith. It is not the mere assent of the intellect. "Faith, properly speaking, belongs to him who receives with his *whole soul* what is believed in baptism." (In Ioan. Tom., X. 27.) "The absence of transgression is an indication of true faith, as on the contrary the presence of transgression is an indication of unbelief." (Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., IV. 1.) "Since Christ is not only the wisdom of God, but also the power of God, he who believes in Him, in so far as He is the power of God, will not be powerless for noble achievements. In like manner, regarding Him as patience and fortitude, we shall say that, if we shrink from labors, we do not believe in Him, in so far as He is patience, and if we are faint-hearted, that we do not believe in Him, in so far as He is the embodiment of strength and firmness." (In Ioan., XIX. 6.)

Attempts to define the relation of faith to knowledge were especially characteristic of the Alexandrians. Clement sometimes speaks as though faith was regarded as the initial stage, the acceptance in a general way of truth, whereas knowledge is the grasp which one has of truth when its grounds and relations have been analyzed and demonstrated. (Strom., VII. 10.) But in other instances he affirms a reciprocal relation between them, an inherent tendency of the one to pass over into the other. "Knowledge," he says, "is characterized by faith; and faith, by a kind of divine mutual and reciprocal correspondence, becomes characterized by knowledge." (Strom., II. 4.) Origen also assumed an easy and natural transition from faith to the higher spiritual knowledge, a transition, however, which, instead of eliminating faith, contributes to its per-

fection. What the apostle said of knowledge, "Now I know in part," may be applied, as Origen claims, to faith. Perfect faith, as well as perfect knowledge, lies beyond our present estate. (In Ioan., X. 27.)

Notwithstanding the clear declarations quoted above, that faith is the one condition of salvation, whose place works cannot usurp, there was an initial tendency even in this period to displace faith from this supremacy, a tendency to allow the outward to trench upon the domain of the inward. Bearing in this direction was the stress which came quite generally to be laid upon baptism, not simply as an expression of allegiance to Christ, but as a means of absolution. There was also an ascetic spirit which worked in the same direction; a disposition, more or less entertained, to attach special merit to certain forms of self-denial. Certain works crucifying to the natural desires, such as liberal alms-giving and abstinence from marriage, were thought by some to be especially praiseworthy; and there was somewhat of a tendency in the latter part of the period to view such works apart from the inner spirit, and to make them in some degree co-ordinate with faith as a means of securing the divine favor. Hermas is one of the earliest of the Christian writers who gives clear indications of this temper. He even teaches the doctrine of works of supererogation, if one expression of his is to be taken without qualification. "If you do any good," he says, "beyond what is commanded by God, you will gain for yourself more abundant glory." (Simil., V. 3.) Too much stress, however, is not to be laid upon a single sentence like this. Hermas might have had reference, not to what is absolutely beyond divine requirements, but only to what is beyond the ordinary and commonly understood requirements of God. More emphasis is to be laid upon his general representations of the efficacy of certain forms of outward works, like alms-giving, as also upon his statement that "he who repents must torture his soul, and be afflicted with many kinds of affliction." (Simil.,

VII.) Tertullian exhibits a similar vein, not merely styling repentance the price of pardon and a species of satisfaction for sins, but insisting strongly upon outward humiliating tokens of penitential sorrow, and declaring in connection with the demand for these, "The less quarter you give yourself, the more will God give you." (*De Pœnit.*, IX.) "The remedies for propitiating God," says Cyprian, "are given in the words of God Himself; the divine instructions have taught us what sinners ought to do, that by works of righteousness God is satisfied, that with the deserts of mercy sins are cleansed." (*De Op. et Eleem.*, V.) Referring to the Book of Tobit, the same writer adds: "The angel certifies that our petitions become efficacious by alms-giving, that life is redeemed from dangers by alms-giving, that souls are delivered from death by alms-giving." Like others emphasizing works of this kind, Cyprian regarded them specially needful for sins committed after baptism, the sacramental cleansing itself being supposed to do away with all sins committed before baptism. (*Ibid.*, II.) Origen affirms that in the Gospels seven remissions of sins, or seven occasions of remission, are indicated: (1.) Baptism; (2.) Martyrdom; (3.) Alms-giving; (4.) Forgiveness of our brothers; (5.) Conversion of the sinner from the error of his way; (6.) Abundant Love; (7.) The deep repentance which makes tears the bread of the sinner day and night, and inclines him to confess his guilt and to seek healing. (*In Lev. Hom.*, II.) No doubt much of this order of statements which appears in the writings of the fathers is to be taken with some qualification, inasmuch as other statements of theirs indicate a belief that outward works are of value only as they are sanctified by a right inner condition, — a condition of faith and holy purpose. Both orders of statements must be taken together. But even when we do this, we must allow that there was an initial drift toward ceremonialism, and toward a legal rather than an evangelical view of good works. A fully Protestant consciousness

did not characterize the Church of the second and third centuries upon this subject; nor ought we to expect to find such under the conditions then existing. An already developed Romanism was the natural antecedent of a clearly and sharply defined Protestantism. At the same time, the standpoint of the Church of that age cannot be described as Romish; it embraced simply certain initial tendencies toward Romanism.

Only a moderate approach was made toward the characteristic of a later age, as respects obstructing direct approach to Christ by the interposition of subordinate agents. Reverence for confessors or martyrs tended near the end of the period to a somewhat excessive valuation of their intercessions. A few items, also, favorable to the special importance of the Virgin Mary appeared. The opinion was already entertained by some, that, notwithstanding the birth of Jesus, Mary remained virgin. (Clem., Strom., VII. 16. Comp. Origen, Comm. in Matt. Series, XXV.) She continued, however, beyond the close of this period, to be assigned to the same plane essentially as the rest of the saints, and neither she nor they became so prominent before the Constantinian era as materially to obstruct the direct vision of Christ, at least so far as the great body of Christians were concerned. Tertullian in one connection strongly denounces an overvaluation of the intercessions of martyrs. Reminding the martyr that it was the purity of Christ which enabled Him to suffer effectually in behalf of others, he says to him: "If you yourself have done no sin, suffer in my stead. If, however, you are a sinner, how will the oil of your puny torch be able to suffice for you and for me?" (De Pud., XXII.)

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I.—THE CHURCH.

OWING to the manner in which they originated, the different congregations possessed at the outset a good degree of independence. Still from the first they felt the uniting power of a moral bond,—a bond which Gnostic and other perversions tended, in the main, only to strengthen. Not far from the middle of the second century, those churches which held in common the apostolic traditions began to appropriate to their communion the name of “Catholic” (Euseb., IV. 15), regarding themselves as belonging to the Universal or Catholic Church, as opposed to any local factions standing outside of their fellowship. (“Catholic” and “Roman Catholic” have different meanings in our terminology.)

An interest in preserving unity very naturally led responsible representatives of the Catholic Church to emphasize the importance and necessity of being within its fellowship. This is especially apparent in the case of Ignatius, Irenæus, and Cyprian. The first of these, to be sure, does not directly insist upon adhesion to the Catholic Church. He had more in mind the preservation of the unity of each individual congregation through the subordination of all its members to the governing head, namely, the bishop. But he assumed, as an existing fact, the communion of the individual churches with each other, and his emphasis upon episcopal authority was no doubt connected in his

mind with a certain stress upon Catholic unity. Among his vigorous assertions of the need of unity and of subjection to constituted authority is the following: "If any one be not within the altar, he is deprived of the bread of God." (Ad. Eph., V.) Irenæus outlines quite distinctly the idea of a Catholic Church, and represents it as comprising the churches distributed throughout all lands and continuing in fellowship with the chief depositaries of pure tradition, namely, the churches founded and instructed by the apostles in person. To willingly hold a place outside of the Church, thus defined, indicated, in his view, both a lack of love and a lack of truth, both a wrong spirit and false doctrines, and hence an alien position as regards the grace of Christ. "Where the Church is," says he, "there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church, and every kind of grace; but the Spirit is truth. Those, therefore, who do not partake of Him, are neither nourished into life from the mother's breasts, nor do they enjoy that most limpid fountain which issues from the body of Christ; but they dig for themselves broken cisterns." (III. 24.) Cyprian is no less emphatic, declaring that there is one Church in the world which alone has valid sacraments, within whose bounds alone can true martyrdom find place. (Epist. ad Confessores, No. 50; De Unit. Eccl., XIV.)

Such language seems certainly to express the dogma that there is no salvation outside of the Church. But it is to be noted that these writers represent the most hierarchical side of their age; and, moreover, that they had in mind, in their strong statements, not so much the mere fact of being outside of the Church, as the fact of being placed outside by a wilful and unholy breaking of the bond of unity and peace. It may be questioned whether such a man as Irenæus, or even such a man as Cyprian, had the case been distinctly put, would have asserted that salvation under the new dispensation is absolutely dependent upon

being included within a definite outward, earthly organism. Such, certainly, was not the position of the leading Greek fathers in this period. The favorable view which Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria took of the Greek philosophers, as also certain specific statements of theirs, preclude the idea that in their view salvation was strictly bounded by the circumference of the Catholic Church, as instituted in this world. (1 Apol., XLVI.; Strom., VI. 6.) A like belief may also be affirmed of Origen. To be sure, while commenting on the conditions under which Rahab's house was spared, he declares that, outside of this house, — that is, outside of the Church, — no one is saved, and whoever goes without becomes responsible for his own death. (In Jesu Nave, Hom., III. 5.) But it is probable that, in Origen's definition, the bounds of the Church were not strictly identical with the line marked out by a connected hierarchy. His total representation, including his view of the sacraments, forbids the assumption that he believed that salvation is strictly dependent upon adherence to a definite outward organism. This as regards present salvation. The forfeiture of eternal salvation from lack of connection with the Church in this world was, on the theory of Origen, altogether out of the question.

Whatever the qualification made in any quarter upon the necessity of union with the Catholic Church, nowhere was the distinction clearly drawn and firmly upheld between the visible and invisible Church. In this very lack there was provided a noteworthy opportunity for the growth of that ecclesiasticism which locates the essence of the Church in its outward organism, and declares everything outside of its circle alien to the Church and to the grace of God.

The episcopacy was regarded by those most given to hierarchical views as the chief means of expressing and conserving the unity of the Church. Within the episcopal

body, the Roman bishop, as was clearly dictated by the imperial and apostolic associations of Rome, enjoyed a certain pre-eminence in point of honor; but there was no general acknowledgment in this period of his possession of a constitutional supremacy or rightful governing authority over the whole Church. Cyprian gave expression to the essential points of the hierarchical theory of his age in the following sentences: "The Church which is catholic and one is not cut nor divided, but is indeed connected and bound together by the cement of priests, who cohere with one another." (Epist. ad Flor. Pupianum, No. 68.) "The episcopate is one, each part of which is held by each one for the whole." (De Unit. Eccl., V.) Among the Montanists, a portion of the importance elsewhere assigned to the bishops was awarded to the oracles of the "new prophecy." Tertullian's references to the subject of this section are divided between the standpoint of Irenæus and that of the Montanists.

SECTION II.—THE SACRAMENTS.

The Latin word *sacramentum*, and the corresponding Greek word *μυστήριον*, had a very wide application in the first centuries. They were admissible in connection with anything to which the idea of sanctity could be attached. Tertullian, accordingly, speaks of the works of the Creator as *magna sacramenta*; of the work of the incarnate Christ, as *sacramentum humanæ salutis*; and styles the death of Christ *sacramentum passionis*. (Adv. Marc., V. 18, II. 27; Adv. Jud., X.) The term "sacrament," however, was specially associated with baptism and the eucharist.

BAPTISM.—As already indicated, great significance was attached to baptism. It was looked upon as the completing act in the appropriation of Christianity,—the seal of positive adoption into the family of God. From at least

the middle of the second century, the normal execution of the rite was commonly regarded as procuring a full remission of all past sins. At the same time, we find baptism styled an instrument of regeneration and illumination, the sacrament which sets free into eternal life, the laver of regeneration, the laver of saving water, the water of new birth. (Just. Mart., 1 Apol., LXI.; Clem., Pæd., I. 6; Tertul., De Bap., I.; Iren., III. 17; Origen, Select. in Deut.; Cyprian, Epist. ad Donat., No. 1.)

In view of such expressions, it may be said that Justin Martyr and the succeeding fathers taught the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; but at the same time there are important limitations which must go with this statement. 1. It was assumed by these writers that, in case of adult candidates, baptism is made efficacious only in connection with the right inner disposition and purpose. Tertullian, to be sure, in connection probably with his materialistic idea that a cleansing power is imparted to the very water itself, seemed to think that a remission must ensue from the mere reception of the rite; but he considered that the grace received would be valueless unless the candidate had exercised due repentance, since the absence of repentance would be quite sure to involve the speedy loss of what had been unrighteously gained. (De Pœnit., VI.) Others holding less materialistic notions were not driven to any such awkward argumentation. Origen, for example, says: "Not all receive to their salvation the baptismal washing." (In Ezech. Hom., VI. 5.) "He who has ceased from his sins receives remission in baptism. But if any one comes to the font still harboring sin, he obtains no remission of his sins." (In Luc. Hom., XXI.) "When, therefore, we come to the grace of baptism, renouncing all other gods and lords, we confess only God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But while making this confession, unless we love the Lord our God with all the heart, and with all the soul, and with all the strength cleave to Him, we

receive no part in the Lord." (In Ex. Hom., VIII. 4.)

2. These writers did not regard baptism as absolutely essential to the initiation of spiritual life, or what, in an allowable use of the term, might be called regenerate life. It was viewed by them as the *completing part* of a process of moral cleansing and renovation. Even Tertullian, with all the emphasis which he laid upon the baptismal grace, clearly brings out this point. "That [baptismal] washing," he says, "is a sealing of faith, which faith is begun and is commended by the faith of repentance. We are not washed in order that we may cease sinning, but because we have ceased, since in *heart* we have been bathed already." (De Pœnit., VI.) "Not all baptized with water," says Origen, "have been forthwith baptized with the Holy Spirit, as, on the contrary, not all who are ranked among the catechumens are aliens and destitute of the Holy Spirit. For I find in the Divine Scriptures certain catechumens counted worthy of the Holy Spirit, and others who had received baptism counted unworthy of the grace of the Holy Spirit." (In Num. Hom., III. 1.)

The practice of infant baptism was, evidently, the policy of the Church in the time of Origen and Cyprian, the former of whom declares it a matter of apostolic tradition. The practice was also quite current in the time of Tertullian, who opposed it on the ground of the inexpediency of placing young and innocent children under the heavy responsibilities of the baptismal covenant. Earlier than Tertullian, there is no very certain reference to the maxims or practice of the Church as respects infant baptism.

It was not considered that valid baptism ought in any case to be repeated. But a question was raised as to whether the baptism administered by heretics, in case one should come from their ranks to the doors of the Catholic Church, ought to be acknowledged as valid. Among the leading disputants on the subject were Cyprian and the Roman Bishop Stephen, the former taking the negative

and the latter the affirmative. The Roman policy finally gained the ascendancy, and it became a general maxim that those who had once been baptized, according to the Trinitarian formula, should not be rebaptized. A considerable list, however, of exceptions was allowed in the East.

The mode of administering baptism was very rarely a matter of dogmatic specification in this period. If the literature is thought to testify in favor of the currency of immersion, there is contemporaneous, and quite as explicit, evidence that immersion was not regarded as of the essence of baptism. (See in particular the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," and Cyprian's Epistle to Magnus.)

THE EUCHARIST.—A mere repetition of the words employed at the original institution of the eucharistic service is, of course, by itself, scarcely at all indicative of dogmatic belief. Such a repetition, without further evidence, cannot fairly be quoted as favoring the doctrine of the real bodily presence. In Protestant services of the present day, the elements are named, without any hesitation, the body and blood of Christ, where there is no idea that they are such in a literal sense. A like economy of words may have found place in the usage of the primitive Church.

A convenient introduction to the faith of the early Church upon the subject of the eucharist may be found in considering the question, whether the doctrine of transubstantiation was enunciated by any writer of the first three centuries. If taught at all, it was undoubtedly taught by Justin Martyr and Irenæus; for nowhere are statements found which bear more the semblance of this doctrine than do those which appear in the writings of these two authors. The principal passage from Justin is as follows: "Not as common bread and common drink do we receive these; but in like manner as Jesus Christ our Saviour, having been made flesh by the Word of God, had both flesh and blood for our salvation, so likewise are we taught that the food which is blessed by the prayer of His word, and from which

our blood and flesh by transmutation are nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh." (1 Apol., LXVI.) Irenæus in one or two instances indulges language quite similar. "As the bread which is produced from the earth, when it receives the invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the eucharist, consisting of two realities, earthly and heavenly; so also our bodies, when they receive the eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection to eternity." (IV. 18. 4.) "When, therefore, the mingled cup and the manufactured bread receives the Word of God, and the eucharist becomes the body of Christ, from which things the substance of our flesh is increased and supported, how can they [the Docetists] affirm that the flesh is incapable of receiving the gift of God, which is life eternal, which [flesh] is nourished from the body and blood of the Lord, and is a member of Him?" (V. 2. 3.) Now, it is not to be denied that an alert fancy may find in these statements the complete doctrine of transubstantiation; in that event, however, it will find more than a critical discernment can discover. But do not Justin and Irenæus teach that, in virtue of the consecration, the elements of the eucharist become the body and blood of Christ? Yes, and any and every theory of the eucharist that was ever formed teaches the same. The only question concerns the sense in which the bread and wine were regarded as being made the body and blood of the Redeemer. Was it conceived that their essence was transformed into the actual body, the crucified and glorified body of Christ? Neither Justin nor Irenæus says any such thing. But do they not teach that bread and wine in the act of consecration cease to be common bread and wine? Yes, and so did Tertullian teach that the water consecrated to baptismal use ceases to be common water. Why no longer common? Not on account of the transformation of the essence of the water into anything else, but on account of the brooding presence of the

Spirit. Why assume anything more as respects the belief of Justin and Irenæus? Why not stop where their representations stop, and say that they taught that the bread and wine in the eucharist are conjoined with the heavenly Word, exhibit in virtue of this union an image of the primal assumption by the Word of flesh or earthly material, so that they may be styled His body and blood, and in virtue of the same union possess a peculiar virtue which makes them food of immortality? To go beyond this is to go beyond warrant. They do not say that the change in the bread and wine is a change of essence. They do not say that it is any other change than the change to a condition of new worth and virtue by reason of the presence of a divine component. To discover here the doctrine of transubstantiation (or consubstantiation) requires imagination aided by a peculiar dogmatic impulse. What we have is simply the doctrine of a mystical presence in the eucharist. This is well expressed by Baur, who says of the teaching of Irenæus: "We have here the same idea that appears with Justin. Bread and wine become the flesh and blood of Christ, not through a real transformation into the body of Christ, but only through the relation in which, in virtue of the act of consecration, they are placed to Christ or the Logos, whereby there is transferred to them a divine something which fits the body of the recipient for the resurrection."

That the doctrine of transubstantiation was not entertained by Justin and Irenæus is indicated by the standpoint of succeeding writers. Clement of Alexandria, in his rather obscure references to the subject, suggests, beyond the symbolical use of the elements, certainly nothing more than a mystical presence of the Logos in the eucharist. Tertullian teaches unmistakably that the consecrated elements are *symbols* of Christ's body and blood. A few rhetorical expressions, or current phrases, such as are found elsewhere in his writings (De Res. Carn., VIII.; De Pud.,

IX.), have no force against the plain import of the following statement of his: "Having taken the bread and given it to His disciples, He made it His own body, by saying, 'This is my body,' that is, the figure of my body. A figure, however, there could not have been, unless there were first a veritable body." (Adv. Marc., IV. 40.) Tertullian defines in what sense the eucharistic bread is the body of Christ, and states that it is such as being the figure or symbol of His body. Dogmatism may say that it was such, in the view of Tertullian, in another unstated and more literal sense; but exegesis has nothing of this sort to offer. Cyprian also uses expressions indicative simply of a symbolical relation between the elements and Christ's body. Speaking of the necessity of using wine as well as water, he says: "Blood cannot appear to be in the cup, when in the cup there is no wine, whereby the blood of Christ is shown forth. . . . I wonder very much whence has originated this practice, that, contrary to evangelical and apostolical discipline, water is offered in some places in the Lord's cup, which water by itself cannot express the blood of Christ. . . . We see that in the water is understood the people, but in the wine is showed the blood of Christ." (Epist. ad Cæcilium, No. 62.) Origen abounds in expressions which assume the presence of Christ's flesh and blood only in a metaphorical or symbolic sense, and deny a literal partaking of them. The flesh and blood, as he teaches, which are true meat and drink, are the flesh and blood of the divine word; that is, wholesome doctrine, truth vitalized from above. (In Gen. Hom., X. 3; Ex. Hom., VII. 8; Lev. Hom., VII. 5.) "We are said to drink the blood of Christ not only in the sacramental rite, but also when we receive His words." (In Num. Hom., XVI. 9.) "Not that visible bread which He was holding in His hands did God the Word call His body, but the word in whose mystery (*in cuius mysterio*) that bread was to be broken. Nor did He call that visible drink His blood, but the word in whose

mystery that drink was to be poured out. For the body or blood of God the Word, — what else can it be than the word which nourishes and the word which rejoices the heart?" (Comm. in Matt. Series, LXXXV. Comp. Tom. in Matt., XI. 14.) In the Apostolical Constitutions we have this statement: "Instead of a bloody sacrifice, He has appointed that reasonable and unbloody mystical one of His body and blood, which is performed to represent the death of the Lord by symbols." (VI. 23.)

In the development of the doctrine of the eucharist, the idea of sacrifice was earlier asserted than was the change of substance. As compared, however, with the later teaching, very important limitations were placed in this period upon the sacrificial character of the rite. While associations with Judaism naturally suggested that the bread and wine which, with other gifts of the congregation, were brought to the altar, should be called a sacrifice, they were so termed only as being a thank-offering to God, as having a kindred significance with the prayer of thanksgiving, the *εὐχαριστία*, which gave the name to the entire rite. Such is the sacrificial character assigned to the elements by Justin Martyr. (Dial. cum Tryph., CXVII.) The representations of Irenæus are to the same effect. He styles the eucharistic sacrifice a rendering of the first fruits to the Creator, and emphasizes especially the idea that it is an expression of gratitude. It is not an offering designed to atone for sin. "Sacrifices do not sanctify a man, for God stands in no need of sacrifice; but it is the conscience of the offerer that sanctifies the sacrifice when it is pure, and thus moves God to accept as from a friend." (IV. 18. 3.) "Now, we make an offering to Him, not as though He stood in need of it, but rendering thanks for His gift, and thus sanctifying what has been created." (IV. 18. 6.) Cyprian advances a step or two beyond Irenæus, in that he puts the priest in place of the congregation, and represents him as imitating in his offering the sacrifice of Christ; that is, as offering

what can fitly symbolize the sacrifice of Christ, his argument in this connection being against the use simply of water in the eucharistic cup. (Epist. ad Cæcil., No. 62, § 14.) Meanwhile, this feature of the eucharist was by no means dwelt upon by the whole body of Christian writers. Speaking of the first three centuries, Gieseler says: "It is to be observed that Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Cyprian are the only church teachers who speak of the eucharist as a sacrifice." Origen clearly teaches that, apart from the sacrifice made by Christ, none except spiritual offerings have any place under the new dispensation; and other writers give intimations of the same order of thought. "The sacrifice of the Church," says Clement of Alexandria, "is the word breathing as incense from holy souls. . . . The righteous soul is the truly sacred altar, and incense arising from it is holy prayer." (Strom., VII. 6.)

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. CHILIASM. — The doctrine that the end of the present dispensation is to be preceded by the personal reign of Christ upon earth was entertained in the second century not only by Ebionites, and by writers who, like Cerinthus, mixed with their Gnosticism a large element of Judaism, but by many (very likely a majority) of those in the Catholic Church. There is, to be sure, no inculcation of the doctrine in the writings of Polycarp, Ignatius, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus. It was expressly advocated, however, by writers as representative of their age as Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian, as well as by Papias. "I and others," says Justin Martyr, "who are right-minded Christians on all points, are assured that there will be a resurrection of the dead and a thousand years in Jerusalem, which will then be built, adorned, and enlarged. . . . There was a certain man with us, whose name was John, one of the apostles of Christ, who prophesied, by a revelation made to him, that those who believed in our Christ would dwell a thousand years in Jerusalem; and that thereafter the general, and in short the eternal, resurrection and judgment of all men would likewise take place." (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, LXXX., LXXXI.) Irenæus reproduces some of the extravagant descriptions of Papias respecting the fruitfulness of the earth during the millennial reign, places the coming of Antichrist just before the inauguration of that reign, teaches that the just will be resurrected by the descended Saviour, and dwell, with the remnant of believers still in the

world, in Jerusalem, being there disciplined for the state of incorruption which they are to enjoy in the New Jerusalem, which is from above, and of which the earthly Jerusalem is an image. (V. 33-36.) "Of the heavenly kingdom," says Tertullian, "this is the process. After its thousand years are over, within which period is completed the resurrection of the saints, who rise sooner or later, according to their deserts, there will ensue the destruction of the world and the conflagration of all things at the judgment." (Adv. Marc., III. 24.)

Near the close of the second century, a current adverse to this order of ideas was started. An initial cause of this was the great prominence which Montanism gave to the doctrines of Chiliasm. This, in connection with the general reprobation of Montanism, tended naturally to lessen enthusiasm for those doctrines. Then came the positive opposition of the Alexandrian school, which, with its bias to idealism, could hardly fail to challenge the theory of a visible personal reign of Christ upon earth. Origen devoted a chapter of his "De Principiis" to a refutation of materialistic notions of the millennial reign (II. 11), and his disciple, Dionysius of Alexandria, controverted, with great zeal, the tenets of the Egyptian Chiliasts. At the end of the third century, therefore, Chiliasm held a disputed place in the Church. In the early part of the next century, it became virtually obsolete. As late a writer as Lactantius, it is true, appears as an ardent believer in it, and pictures at length the second advent and the earthly kingdom (Div. Inst., Lib. VII.); but he in no wise represents the drift of his age, for the cessation of the persecutions and the erection of a Christian Empire gave a new direction to thought and desire. Nothing was more natural, while the storm of heathen violence was raging, than for Christians to long for the coming of their Deliverer, and for a manifest triumph of His kingdom over the kingdom of this world. The storm, however, having ceased, and the kingdom of

this world having passed under a Christian sceptre, their desire for the special and open intervention of their Divine Leader was necessarily relaxed.

2. CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION. — The doctrine of an intermediate state was prevalent in the early Church, as appears from the writings of Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Irenæus, Hippolytus, Novatian, Origen, and Lactantius. (Dial. cum Tryph., V.; De An., LV., LVIII.; Cont. Hær., V. 31; Orat. ad Græc., I.; De Trin., I.; De Prin., II. 11. 6; Cont. Cel., VII. 5; Div. Inst., VII. 21.) By some of these writers, this doctrine was asserted, in express opposition to the Gnostic view, that *pneumatic* Christians pass at once into the *pleroma* on their departure from the body.

Much after the manner of the later Judaism, the early Christians assumed, in the main, a wide common receptacle for the souls of the dead, — the invisible region, or Hades. This was sometimes described (and probably was generally regarded) as an under-world. Though having in a sense a common abode here, the dead were not regarded as being subjected to a common lot; for Hades was described as a place of partial rewards and punishments, the righteous having foretastes of the fruition awaiting them, and the wicked, of the punishments impending over them. Also, in a local respect, the lot of the two classes was regarded as in a measure distinguished, as may be judged from references to the sixteenth chapter of Luke. Paradise seems not to have been reckoned within the bounds of Hades. Tertullian, apparently, describes it as a region in this world, but inaccessible, save to those for whom it is appointed. (Apol., XLVII.) Origen, also, assigns an earthly location to the more immediate Paradise. (De Prin., II. 11. 6.)

Tertullian expresses with much confidence the belief that all souls are detained in Hades till the resurrection, martyrs alone excepted. "No one," he says, "on becoming absent

from the body, is at once a dweller in the presence of the Lord, except by the prerogative of martyrdom, whereby [the saint] gets at once a lodging in Paradise, not in Hades." (De Res. Carn., XLIII.) "The sole key to unlock Paradise is your own life's blood." (De An., LV.) Just how far Tertullian's view was shared by the Church at large is difficult to determine. He seems to have found those who were disposed to claim that at least the patriarchs and prophets were removed from Hades in the retinue of the Lord's resurrection. At any rate, he introduces one as urging this supposition, and replies as follows: "How is it, then, that the region of Paradise, which, as revealed to John in the spirit, lay under the altar, displays no other souls as in it besides the souls of the martyrs?" (Ibid.) It is to be noted, also, that the language of Cyprian is rather indicative of sympathy with the opinions which Tertullian controverts than otherwise. Speaking of earthly losses and calamities, he asks, "What is this to Christians? What to God's servants whom Paradise is inviting?" (Adv. Demet., XX.) "It is for him to fear death who is not willing to go to Christ. It is for him to be unwilling to go to Christ who does not believe that he is about to reign with Christ. . . . The righteous are called [at death] to their place of refreshing, the unrighteous are snatched away to punishment. . . . Let us greet the day which assigns each of us to his own home, which snatches us hence, and sets us free from the snares of the world, and restores us to Paradise and the kingdom. . . . We regard Paradise as our country. We already begin to consider the patriarchs as our parents: why do we not hasten and run that we may behold our country, that we may greet our parents? There a great number of our dear ones is awaiting us, and a dense crowd of parents, brothers, children, is longing for us, already assured of their own safety, and still solicitous for our salvation." (Tract. de Mortal.) Certainly the man who indulged this language either did not believe that death takes

the righteous soul down into Hades, or else in the intensity of Christian hope and in his rhetorical fervor he forgot, for the time being, his creed. Whatever the dogmatic belief of Cyprian may have been, Origen taught distinctly that since the death of Christ Hades no longer holds righteous souls; that Christ transported to Paradise the righteous men of former ages who had been detained in Hades; that under the Christian dispensation the good pass directly into Paradise. "I think," he says, "that all the saints who depart from this life will remain in some place situated on earth, which Holy Scripture calls Paradise, as in some place of instruction, and, so to speak, class-room or school of souls, in which they are to be instructed regarding all the things which they have seen on earth, and are to receive also some information respecting things which are to follow in the future." (De Prin., II. 11. 6. Comp. In Lib. Regum Hom., II.)

It was commonly believed that the close of the present dispensation is to be signalized by a conflagration, — a testing and destroying fire. Of a belief in a purgatorial fire between death and the resurrection, we find no distinct intimation, except in the writings of Origen. In one place he represents that there is a fire which confronts every one at death; that those who are free from sin pass through it without harm, as the Israelites passed through the Red Sea; that the wicked, on the other hand, are submerged in it as in a fiery river or lake. (In Psal. Hom., III. 1.) In another connection he represents that those who have only a certain admixture of dross are purged by the fire, while those whose natures are wholly composed of dross sink into the abyss. (In Ex. Hom., VI. 4. Comp. Hom. in Ezech., I. 13; Hom. in Luc., XXIV.; Cont. Cel., V. 15.) As regards the nature of the purifying fire, Origen indicates plainly enough that he understood by the term not so much a material flame as a spiritual test and discipline. (In Jer. Hom., XVI. 6; In Ezech., II. 7.) Redepenning defines Origen's

fire as "nicht ein materielles Brennen, sondern ein inneres Gericht." It is hardly necessary to add, that the ideas and the imagery of Origen were well fitted to aid in developing the doctrine of Purgatory which afterwards claimed the credence of the Church.

3. THE RESURRECTION. — While the Gnostics accepted the resurrection only in a figurative and spiritual sense, Catholic Christians were zealous advocates of an actual resurrection of the body, and many treatises were devoted by their representative writers to a specific consideration of the subject. In the common view, the resurrection assumed a very literal aspect, and was regarded as destined to restore to the soul the same body, as respects substance as well as form, with which it had been united in this life. A clear indication of such a conception of the resurrection is seen in the theory entertained of the millennial kingdom by many, as a kingdom in this world and possessing the essential marks of an earthly kingdom, while yet a principal part of its citizens were described as resurrected saints. An indication quite as decisive is the exegesis given, by various writers, of Paul's declaration that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." In their comments on this statement, Tertullian, Novatian, and Methodius teach that the exclusion from the divine kingdom has no reference to the flesh as such, but to its sinful works, its guilt, its irrational impulses. When purified from these, it is altogether fit for the divine realm. (Adv. Marc., V. 10; De Trin., X.; De Resur., as quoted by Photius.) We find also many direct statements to the effect that the substance of the present body is to be in the resurrected one. (Just., De Resur., X.; Tatian, Chap. VI.; Athenag., De Mort. Resur., XXV.; Irenæus, V. 3; Tertul., De Res. Carn., LX.) Still, those most inclined to the literal interpretation were ready to admit some exceptions to an exact restoration of the body. All of them at least conceived that blemishes would be excluded from the bodies of the saints; and Tertullian allowed that, though

all the parts known to us are to be in the resurrected body, we may still presume upon a suspension of the grosser functions of the same. It is to be observed, also, that some of the Chiliasts relieved quite materially the grossness of their conceptions by affirming a new transformation at the end of the millennial reign, in virtue of which the saints are to enter into the angelic state. Speaking of this consummation, Tertullian says: "We shall then be changed in a moment into the substance of angels, even by the investiture of an incorruptible nature, and so be removed to that kingdom in heaven of which we have been treating." (*Adv. Marc.*, III. 24.)

Origen is distinguished among the early fathers by his steadfast endeavor to spiritualize the conception of the resurrection. As already stated, he seems to have regarded the incorporeal as the ideal state. Still he accepted the fact of a bodily resurrection. The resurrected body, as he taught, is of the angelic type from the very first, an ethereal, spiritual body. It is historically related to the body which previously had partnership with the soul; the latter supplies to the former its germ or underlying principle. "We maintain," says Origen, "that as above the grain of wheat there arises a stalk, so a certain power is implanted in the body, which is not destroyed, and from which the body is raised up in incorruption." (*Cont. Cel.*, V. 23.) "Although the bodies die and become corrupted, and are scattered abroad, yet by the word of God that very germ which is always safe in the substance of the body raises them from the earth, and restores and repairs them." (*De Prin.*, II. 10. 3.) This language seems to assume a germ of some kind as common to the bodies of the two states. That Origen was entirely unwilling to proceed any further than this, as respects assuming identity of substance, is quite clear from his comments on the first Psalm. He remarks here that our bodies are fitly compared to a river, since they are in perpetual flux, retaining the same form

indeed, but continually changing as respects substance. The resurrection body accordingly will be after the type of the present body; but we are not, Origen states, to look for a reappearance of the same substance.

In defending and establishing the doctrine of the resurrection, the following were the principal considerations urged:—(1.) The power to resurrect is the complement of the power to create. (2.) Though the substance of one body may in part pass into another body, the divine economy will prevent an assimilation of the same to the latter. All the material that is needful for the perfection of the body of each heir to the resurrection will be held in reserve by the Lord of all things. (3.) The transitions in the realm of nature are highly suggestive of a resurrection. (4.) The resurrection of the body will be no more of a prodigy than was its primal formation from an infinitesimal germ. (5.) As body and soul have been partners in virtue and vice in this life, so should they be partners in the rewards and punishments of the life to come. (6.) As the blight of the fall came upon both body and soul, so should the restoring power of God be manifested and glorified by the perfect redemption of both.

4. FINAL AWARDS.—Justin Martyr seems to have placed the resurrection of the wicked, as well as of the just, at the beginning of the millennial reign (1 Apol., LII.); but other Chiliasts included only the saints in the pre-millennial resurrection, and made the second resurrection the immediate antecedent of the final judgment.

That rejecters of the Gospel in this world have no probation beyond the grave was the dominant view of the early Church. The preaching of Christ or of His apostles in Hades, as assumed by several writers, can hardly be regarded as involving an exception to this belief, inasmuch as this preaching had reference to those who had died before Christ had come and offered the grace of salvation. References to the intermediate state assume, in general,

that in that state the wicked anticipate certain doom instead of progressing toward recovery. As respects the awards rendered on the great day of judgment, it was almost a universal belief that they are to seal the everlasting fortunes of souls. The great majority of writers quote the strongest terms of the New Testament in describing future punishment, add no qualification, and in many instances indicate, by specific statements or by their general system of thought, that they admitted of no qualification. (Clem., 2 Epist., VI.; Ignatius, Ad Eph., XVI.; Epist. ad Diognetum, X.; Hermas, Simil., IX. 18; Just. Mart., 1 Apol., VIII., LII.; Theoph., I. 14; Iren., I. 10. 1, IV. 39. 40; Tertul., De Præscrip., XIII.; De Res. Carn., XXXV.; Lactant., Div. Inst., VII. 10, 11, 21; Apost. Const., II. 13.) Arnobius steps aside from the current representation, by assuming that punishment will end in the annihilation of the soul. "This is man's real death," he says, "this which leaves nothing behind. For that which is seen by the eyes is [only] a separation of soul from body, not the last end,—annihilation. This, I say, is man's real death, when souls which know not God shall be consumed in long-protracted torment with raging fire." (II. 14.) Justin Martyr also speaks as though punishment might end in extinction of being (Dial. cum Tryph., V.); but he does not say positively that it will, and in view of other statements of his, it cannot be said that he entertained such a supposition. In his first "Apology," he not only applies the term "eternal," *αἰώνιον*, to the punishment of the wicked, but indicates that the term is employed in the sense of endless duration, by expressly opposing it to the period of a thousand years, which is specified by Plato. (Chap. VIII.) The position of Clement of Alexandria has been diversely interpreted. His strong emphasis upon the corrective design of punishment and upon the absence of all hatred from the bosom of God, as well as his ascription of moral freedom to Satan (Pæd., I., VIII.;

Strom., I. 17, VII. 2, 12, 16) favors the supposition that he extended probation into the future life, and assigned to it no definite limit. On the other hand, Clement speaks of an "unavailing remorse with punishment" as visiting the sinner in the world to come (Cohort., X.), of a condemnation which may be pronounced after fair trial (Strom., VI. 6), and, according to a fragment from his lost work on the "Soul," states expressly the doctrine of endless punishment. The fragment is as follows: "Immortal are all souls, even those of the wicked, for whom it had been better not to have been incorruptible; for, punished by a limitless infliction of unquenchable fire, and dying not, they obtain no end of their misery." (Patres Græci, Vol. VI., Wireceburgi.)

Origen was the only writer who distinctly advocated the doctrine of endless probation. Some of his statements, too, seem to fall in with the current teaching, and to assume a limit to probation. "A day of propitiation," he says, "remains to us until the going down of the sun; that is, until the end of the world." (In Lev. Hom., IX. 5.) The suggestion of a limit is naturally drawn from this statement, as also from his language in another connection, where, deriving his figure from the work of the potter, he says that, after we have passed through this life, if we are found as a broken vessel, there will be no longer any chance for a reconstruction. (In Jer. Hom., XVIII. 1.) Little stress, however, is to be laid upon these instances. A better index of his real belief may be found in his characterization of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as indeed a sin which is to be forgiven neither in this world nor in the world (or age) about to be, but is not necessarily excluded from pardon in the *ages to come*. (In Ioan. Tom., XIX. 3.) In numerous instances he indicates clearly enough his faith in the possible restoration of every rational creature. (De Prin., I. 6, II. 10, III. 5; Cont. Cel., VIII. 72; In Ioan. Tom., I. 37.) Origen was led to this theory both by his conception of

God and his conception of man. He believed that there is no inexorable justice in God which should move Him to punish simply for the purpose of vindicating law, without reference to the amendment of the transgressor; and that free will is an inalienable possession which makes it ever possible for the creature to gravitate toward the good. It is to be observed, however, that this freedom, as viewed by Origen, makes another fall possible. His was not the theory of a universal *irreversible* restoration, but the theory of a universal restoration which is probably to be followed by new falls and new restorations.

Quite a diversity of representation appears as respects the nature of future punishment. Lactantius teaches that the fire which preys upon the wicked is actual fire, a peculiar liquid fire unmingled with smoke. (Div. Inst., VII. 21.) Some of Tertullian's expressions indicate the like conception. (De Pœnit., XII.) By Origen, on the other hand, the essence of future punishment was located in separation from God, and in the pains of a guilty conscience; and Irenæus gives expression to a kindred view. (De Prin., II. 10; Cont. Hær. IV. 39.) The more or less spiritual temper of the writer was also a factor in determining the conception entertained of future rewards. In general, however, so strong was the consciousness in this age of obligation to the Redeemer, that the privilege of beholding Him in His glory and of being received into the more intimate companionship with Him was a large part of the felicity anticipated by all earnest Christians.

Second Period.

320-726.

INTRODUCTION.

THE reign of Constantine naturally ushered in the AGE OF POLEMICS. The preceding period had closed with unsettled problems. It had been pre-eminently a canvassing period. Not a little, it is true, had been accomplished toward building up a system of Christian doctrine. The ranker heresies, such as the Judaic Ebionism and the heathen Gnosticism, had been vanquished. The two contrasted types of anti-trinitarianism, which culminated in Paul of Samosata and Sabellius, had been condemned. In every department of doctrine, outlines destined to be retained through succeeding ages had been drawn. There had been a positive drift towards certain standards. But the drift had not yet acquired momentum enough to swallow up opposing currents. Much was still left indeterminate. Upon the most important themes there was a lack of formulas, which might give apt and accurate expression to the dominant belief of the Church. Doctrinal development had proceeded far enough to awaken a practical and a speculative interest in such themes, while yet a satisfactory and authoritative settlement was wanting. To rest under such circumstances was an impossibility. The Church was necessarily impelled to strive for a more complete and definite construction of doctrine.

At the same time the pursuit of this end was beset with great difficulty. The questions themselves were so pro-

found as easily to give occasion to divergent views. Those who aspired to their solution were biased by antecedents as wide apart as Christianity, heathenism, and Judaism. Unanimity, if attainable at all, was plainly not to be gained except at the expense of much indoctrination and discussion.

In view of these conditions, it must be allowed that an earnest doctrinal activity was legitimate to the age. It was among the great providential tasks of that era to labor for an adequate statement and exposition of the faith. This conclusion, however, does not imply that the task was executed altogether in a legitimate manner. As a matter of fact, abnormal factors and false methods claimed a large place. Relief from the strong outward pressure of heathen persecution inclined brethren to be less tolerant than heretofore, of differences among themselves. The characteristic disputatiousness of the Greeks added fuel to controversy in many quarters. The untamed populace of the large cities looked to theological strife as to a coveted theatre for the exercise of the same fierce partisanship and lawless impulses which had characterized them as heathen. Companies of monks, in lack of engrossing occupation, were naturally possessed with a zest for controversial warfare, and disposed to prove their superior piety by extra heat against heresy. The emphasis laid upon a correct creed became an occasion, to the unthinking, of confounding faith with orthodoxy, and so of exaggerating enormously the relative worth of the latter, and the merit of its defence. The interference of the government frequently complicated and embittered the strife. The history, in consequence, presents phases decidedly repulsive to enlightened sentiment. Brotherly discussion, on the basis of reason and revelation, was often made to give place to force and finesse. Zeal for truth often passed over into dogmatic rage, and invective usurped the place due to argument.

Fixing the attention on the darker side, one might easily incline to the verdict that this whole period was characterized by waste rather than by acquisition. But in reality this era of unintermitted agitation was far from being fruitless. If false elements claimed a place, there was still an earnest examination of truth on its merits. Alongside the superficial and the external, there was a profound intellectual engagement. Some of the noblest minds which God has given to the Church applied their resources to the questions in dispute. Those questions, in some instances, were of as vital concern as are the cardinal conceptions of God and of man's relations to Him. In fine, this polemical period is entitled, as it certainly is destined, to be a factor in theological thinking for all time. Opinions may differ as to the worth of its positive decisions, but all well informed and unbiased minds must value the illustration which it affords of significant types of belief.

Second Period.

320-726.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

THE attitude of the Church in this period toward heathen philosophy was, in large part, the same as in the preceding centuries. We observe the same twofold method of using the philosophers,—on the one hand friendly quotation, on the other sharp criticism, according as opinions were deemed agreeable or contrary to Christianity. We note, also, the same dominant belief, that heathen philosophy, as compared with the Christian oracles, contains only fragments of truth. The main difference between the two eras concerns the ratio between appreciation and disfavor. Even here no very radical diversity can be asserted; yet there is ground for the conclusion that in the present period there was somewhat of a tendency toward a slackened interest in the classic systems of philosophy. The current of appreciation, at least in the closing centuries of the period, was relatively narrower than it was in the era of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen. The development that went on in the mind of Augustine was, in a measure, reflected in the age. His later utterances, as compared with his earlier, exhibit the philosopher giving

place to the theologian. We find him, in his *Retractations*, taking pains to qualify the praises which he had bestowed upon the different Greek schools. Examples, it is true, of a very intimate alliance with philosophy appear in the latter part of the period; but the main current of the age was in a different direction, — more toward an inert and satisfied orthodoxy than toward the speculative activity and ambition which might serve to create an interest in the nobler products of heathen culture.

The preference which the preceding age entertained for Plato, descended to this age. He was regarded as the most lofty in spirit and the most nearly Christian in doctrine of all the heathen philosophers. Eusebius of Cæsarea frequently points out the agreement between the Platonic writings and the Scriptures. (*Præp. Evang.*) Ambrose styles Plato *princeps philosophorum*. (*De Abraham*, I. § 2.) Augustine speaks of him as “that noble philosopher” (*De Trin.*, XII. 15), and affirms that he “is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles.” (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 4.) He also commends various points in the Platonic conception of God, the chief defect being, in his view, a failure to apprehend the divine humility which came to manifestation in Christ, and is, above everything else, the effective instrument for conquering the sinful pride of men. (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 5–11; *Confess.*, VII. 9; *Epist.*, CXVIII.) The statements of these writers may be taken as a fair index of the relative estimate which their age placed upon Plato.

By the great majority of theologians Aristotle was still ranked as decidedly inferior to Plato. This is apparent from the fact that they assume in common the pre-eminence of Plato, and take no pains to distinguish Aristotle from the mass of subordinate philosophers. Some instances also occur of a positive disparagement of Aristotle. Thus Theodoret declares that his antagonism to Plato was ill-grounded; that he was the author, not of better, but of

much worse dogmas than his master, inasmuch as he denied the immortality of the soul, and limited the providence of God. (Græc. Affect. Curat., Sermo V.) The dialectics of Aristotle are described by Gregory of Nyssa as an evil art (*κακοτεχνία*), and an occasion of impiety to the arch-heretics of his time. (Contra Eunom., I.) A like opinion is implied by the language of Epiphanius, who characterizes the Arians as "the new Aristotelians." (Hær., LXIX. 69.) References of this latter order indicate that Aristotle was cultivated to a certain extent by Christian writers, but at the same time that he was cultivated in a way to prejudice his claims upon the appreciation of the Church at large. Champions of the trinitarian faith, calling to mind the preference which such heretics of a previous age as Artemon and Theodotus had shown for the Aristotelian philosophy, and observing that later and kindred heretics found in the same philosophy a chief source of their dialectic subtilties, very naturally were inclined to regard Aristotle with suspicion and disapprobation. Still, the period shows a measure of advance in his favor. The Arians having been put to rout, an opportunity was, in time, provided for viewing the Aristotelian philosophy apart from association with radical heresy. We have, accordingly, in the sixth century, tokens of a growing appreciation for Aristotle. Among the means of commendation were the translations and commentaries by Boëthius.

The relative place of Platonism, however, is not adequately determined by mere comparison of its fortunes with those of Aristotelianism. For Neo-Platonism was a very significant factor in the religious and philosophic thought of the period. As this in part coincided with Platonism, its spread involved to some extent the spread of the latter. Still it had its specific features, and it is incumbent upon us to take note of these, and to ascertain to what extent, as a distinctive philosophy, it usurped the place of original Platonism in the uses of Christian writers.

Ammonius Saccas, who taught in Alexandria in the first half of the third century, is sometimes named the founder of Neo-Platonism, but the roots of the system go back at least to Philo. In Plotinus, who flourished in the third quarter of the third century, it acquired its developed form. Later exponents, such as Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Proclus, made no essential advance upon the ideas of Plotinus; on the contrary, they showed a disposition to lower the philosophical character of Neo-Platonism by the wide scope which they gave to various superstitions. Jamblichus, in particular, led on in this direction. Much account was made by him of theurgic arts.

Neo-Platonism represents the last stage in the development of Greek philosophy. It was the philosophy of the mixed cosmopolitan era, in which, as a consequence of Greek and Roman conquests, Oriental elements were plentifully intermingled with the civilization of the more western countries. It was also the philosophy of an age religiously restless and aspiring, an age dissatisfied with the inherited systems of worship and thought, and longing for a more perfect knowledge of God and of the world to come. In harmony with these conditions, Neo-Platonism was (1.) eclectic, (2.) strongly tinged with Oriental mysticism, (3.) a professedly religious philosophy, or one giving a large measure of attention to man's religious wants. As respects its Oriental and religious character, the description by Zeller may fitly be quoted. "Neo-Platonism," he says, "is the intellectual reproduction of Byzantine imperialism. As Byzantine imperialism combines Oriental despotism with the Roman idea of the state, so Neo-Platonism fills out with Oriental mysticism the scientific forms of Greek philosophy. . . . It is clear that in Neo-Platonism the post-Aristotelian philosophy has lost its original character. Self-dependence and the self-sufficingness of thought have made way for a resignation to higher powers, for a longing for some revelation, for an ecstatic departure from the do-

main of conscious mental activity." (Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.) Ackermann, upon the same points, remarks: "That which characterizes New Platonism chiefly on the side of religion is its theosophy and theurgy. Both of these apparently had their origin in the East. Every one who is only moderately acquainted with these things knows that this effeminate and voluptuous kind of divine illumination and piety is especially at home in India, and that the formulas of conjuration, by which it is pretended that the divine powers can be made subject to the human will, form a principal constituent of the Asiatic religions. With the theosophy are connected the pantheistic and emanational ideas of New Platonism, and the necessary consequence of the theurgy is an extraordinary cultivation of the doctrine of demons." (The Christian Element in Plato.)

Some of the cardinal ideas of Neo-Platonism, as they are found in the writings of Plotinus, are the following. God is the absolutely simple and transcendent, without self-consciousness, without will, above everything that can be named, above even existence itself. He is the fountain of all things, which He originates, not with knowledge and will, but by a necessity of nature, such as is the shining of the sun. The nearer subordinate beings stand to Him, the more they resemble Him, though the most remote still bear His impress, and it is the one divine life which streams through all things, and the one divine power and essence which come to manifestation in all. Next to the solitary Monad, as the first emanation from the same, stands the Reason (*νοῦς*), the self-conscious Spirit, the head of the world of Ideas, or the Idea inclusive of all others. From this, by an unconscious and necessary emanation, is derived the World-Soul, the medium between the supersensible and the sensible, the immediate ruler of nature. From out of the World-Soul proceed from eternity the different orders of souls, — the divine souls (or subordinate gods), the demoniacal, and the human. Matter is akin to formlessness and nonentity, and the ca-

lamity of possessing a material body is due to the sins committed by souls in a previous state. The ideal state of the soul is one of complete emançipation from the material, and of union with the supreme God, the absolute ground of all existence. Moral and ascetic living and spiritual contemplation are preparatory to this state, but its actual attainment is through the ecstacy in which thought and volition are entirely eliminated, and the soul has immediate vision of God. This ecstacy may be enjoyed in this life. (Plotinus is reputed to have experienced it several times.) Those souls that fail in this life to fit themselves for the divine fellowship, are condemned in the hereafter to transmigration into new bodies. Evil is nothing substantial; it is an accident; it lies essentially in the subjection of the soul to the material and sensible, but is not an attribute of matter as such.

The above description may serve to suggest the leading points in which Neo-Platonism differed from the system of Plato. Taken as a whole, it was less scientific, more disposed to accommodate the tendencies of the existing heathenism, more eclectic. It diverged from Plato in the extreme emphasis which it put upon the negative conception of God and in compromising His personality, in its doctrine of emanations and strong pantheistic bias, in its dependence upon an ecstatic transporting of the soul as a means of union with God in this life, in its patronage of theurgic arts.

Evidently the divergences from original Platonism were largely such as to be the reverse of a commendation to Christian theologians. To this is to be added the fact that Neo-Platonism in the earlier portion of the period was palpably one of the strongest supports of the declining system of heathenism, and helped to nurture no less an enemy of the Church than Julian the Apostate. Under such conditions a much higher appreciation was naturally entertained for Plato than for the later school. Few Christian writers in the first part of the period were probably

conscious of any special obligations to Neo-Platonism, or thought of it as comparable in value to the system of the great philosopher. Still, it infected to some degree the intellectual atmosphere of the age, and writers unconscious of borrowing therefrom may, nevertheless, have had their thinking colored by some of its tenets. In particular, its ascetic teachings and its doctrine of God's transcendence, or elevation above all understanding and definition, may be suspected of having acted upon the thought of the Church.

As the period went on, however, Neo-Platonism commanded something more than this indirect influence. Individuals appeared as appreciative students, and of some it even became the chosen philosophy. Augustine, on the whole, indicates a rather favorable estimate. He indulges in quite frequent quotations from the leading writers of the school, and speaks of them as the most illustrious of recent philosophers. (De Civ. Dei, VIII. 12.) It cannot be affirmed, however, that he was greatly influenced by their teachings. In Synesius, belonging to the first part of the fifth century, we have an example of a professing Christian who was in large part a Neo-Platonist. He had been a friend and disciple of Hypatia, and after his conversion to Christianity did not regard himself as obligated to renounce some of the most characteristic beliefs of the system in which he had been indoctrinated. Another bishop of about the same date, Nemesis, was imbued to some extent with Neo-Platonism. It found, also, a measure of influence with the Eastern monks of the sixth and seventh centuries. But the writer of greatest historical consequence, who made, in this age, a positive alliance with the New Platonism, was the one who wrote under the assumed name of Dionysius the Areopagite. His works comprise treatises on the Celestial Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Divine Names, and Mystical Theology, besides several epistles. The time at which the pseudo Dionysius wrote was not earlier than the middle part of the fifth century. Erdmann decides that

he was a Christian who had been educated in the school of Proclus.

The works of Dionysius first gained acceptance with an heretical party, the Monophysite monks of the East, to whom their mystical type of piety was congenial. The Catholic Church in the first instance regarded them as spurious, and reminded the Monophysites, who cited their statements (in the year 533), that writings which had never received a mention during the Arian and Nestorian controversies could not have the antiquity claimed for them. This opposition, however, was of short duration. The mystical and hierarchical elements in the works were in accord with the general drift of the age, and bore down the most palpable and conclusive evidences against their genuineness. They soon won a wide-spread recognition in the Eastern Church. In the seventh century they were formally defended by the presbyter Theodorus, and were admired and used by the philosophizing monk Maximus. Within the Latin Church, as early a writer as Gregory the Great speaks of Dionysius as "*antiquus videlicet et venerabilis pater*" (Hom. in Evang., XXXIV. 12), while by the mediæval scholasticism and mysticism of the Latin Church he was generally regarded as the veritable Arcopagite of New Testament history, and was ranked as no mean authority.

The main peculiarities in the teachings of the pseudo Dionysius are the following: (1.) An extreme emphasis upon the transcendence of God. On this point he rivals Philo and the most radical of the Neo-Platonists, repeatedly naming God the super-essential, and declaring that He is to be described by negation rather than by affirmation. (2.) The doctrine that the knowledge of God is most perfectly reached by an absolute separation from the world and self, and indeed by a kind of transcendental nescience, — an experience essentially identical with the Neo-Platonic ecstasy. (3.) Representations which have a pantheistic

sound, or which seem to leave no room for real being outside of God. (4.) The definition of evil as negation or privation. (5.) An elaborate scheme of the angelic hierarchy. (6.) The distinction between an exoteric and an esoteric theology.

From this enumeration it is plain that the system of the pseudo Dionysius had prominent points of kinship with Neo-Platonism. But, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that there were some prominent points of contrast. The theory of involuntary emanations, for example, which Neo-Platonism taught, was rejected, and in its place was put the doctrine of free creative acts.

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SECTION II. — MONASTICISM.

IN the preceding centuries individuals had chosen an ascetic mode of living. They had not, however, become widely distinguished as a class from the general body of Christians. In the early part of the fourth century, this incipient and unorganized asceticism was succeeded by monasticism as a prominent factor in church life. The contagious example of Anthony drew thousands of hermits into the deserts of Egypt and of the neighboring countries. Before the death of Anthony, the cloister life was instituted by Pachomius, and it soon rivalled the hermit life in the number of its votaries. Monasticism moved on with the force of an invincible tendency. An easy conquest was made of the East. The opposition of the West proved but a temporary barrier. In the fourth and fifth centuries, men of conspicuous talent, like Martin of Tours, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and John Cassianus, appeared as advocates of the monastic *régime*, and in the first half of the sixth century it obtained from Benedict of Nursia a constitution admirably adapted to extend its sphere and to perpetuate its influence in the Latin Church.

A uniform effect of monasticism upon doctrinal development cannot be affirmed, since monasticism itself was far from being a uniform fact. We find it the servant of an ignorant zeal, rating bodily austerities above knowledge and culture, supplying an army of hot-headed zealots to controversial warfare. But, on the other hand, we find it the patron of learning, and sending forth from its discipline some of the broadest and most enlightened minds with which the Church was favored. It appears as an enemy of the true Christian ideal, assigning a false superiority to the external over the internal, nurturing the impression that piety belongs to a mode of life, rather than to a temper of heart, substituting a legal for an evangelical type of religion, dishonoring grace by imputing salvation to works. On the other hand, however, men appear in the cloister whose experience of ascetic rigors has only deepened their conviction of the worthlessness of all outward mortifications and works when disconnected from the grand essentials of inward piety, — men zealous in their advocacy of spiritual conceptions of divine requirements. In some instances monasticism was predominantly of the contemplative type, and made alliance with a mystical theology; but in other instances it was imbued with a practical spirit, and served as a right hand of missionary enterprise, and of the aggressive work of the Church in general. The one feature pertained more to the East, the other to the West.

Still there were traits in monasticism sufficiently general to authorize an estimate of its total influence upon doctrinal development. (1.) A system so generally admired, and laying such stress upon outward peculiarities, must have favored an exaggerated impression as to the worth of external works. After all allowance has been made for exceptions, it must still be granted that monasticism tended to the substitution of a legal for an evangelical type of piety. (2.) Monasticism added a certain impetus to the bias of

the age toward the marvellous and the magical. As might be judged from the mass of miracles claimed for the monks, their mode of life created a special appreciation for supernatural workings and experiences. The solitude of the hermit's cell, or even the comparative isolation of the cloister life, favored the fullest growth of the mystical and imaginative bent of the heart; such a bent naturally forwarded belief in the transcendent nature and magical effect of sacramental rites, and in the mysterious character of the worship in general.

SECTION III.—THE ALLIANCE OF CHURCH AND STATE.

THE espousal of Christianity by Constantine brought the State and the Church at once into close relation to each other. A strict constitutional union was not, indeed, forthwith effected. There were no definite articles specifying the extent of the Emperor's prerogatives within the ecclesiastical sphere. His obvious ability, however, to bestow great benefits upon the Church, together with the disposition of the age to accord him an arbitrary sovereignty, secured him ample opportunity to interfere with spiritual matters. We find, accordingly, the first Christian Emperor summoning a general council for the settlement of doctrinal questions, publishing its decrees, banishing ecclesiastics dissenting from the authorized creed, prohibiting the assemblies of heretics and confiscating their houses of worship, paying salaries to the clergy from the state treasury, confirming to the bishops certain judicial functions. Succeeding rulers were not less disposed to extend their administration over the affairs of the Church. Every one of the six ecumenical councils convened within the period was assembled at the call of an Emperor, and in some of them the imperial presidency was quite as conspicuous as the episcopal. In individual instances, Emperors assumed, on

their own authority, to issue decrees for the direct settlement of doctrinal points. Justinian and Zeno, among others, went to this length of interference.

The doctrinal bearing of such a condition of things is sufficiently obvious. The inevitable tendency was to repress free speculation, and to induce an inert orthodoxy. The State may have had no power adequate to reverse the main theological currents of the age, but it did have power, when allying itself with those currents, to limit dissent, to raise barriers against innovating opinions, and so to help a stereotyped form of theology to maintain its supremacy. Where the State was strongly in the ascendant, as was the case in the East, free thought gave way to despotism, and doctrinal development finally came to a standstill. In this quarter the work of theologians after the seventh century was mainly retrospective, consisted in reproducing and arranging what had already been brought forward by good authority. In the West the State was obliged to divide the rule with the Church, or even to yield to the supremacy of the latter. These features, on the whole, offered a rather better opportunity for a free theological movement than was feasible under the overshadowing imperial despotism of the East. Still, in the Latin Church the conditions were none too favorable to such a movement. The persecuting temper of the State itself, or its subjection to the will of the hierarchy, often provided a temporal sword against heretics and dissenters, and gave a wide sweep to spiritual despotism. The greater doctrinal activity of the West in the mediæval period, as compared with the East, is probably to be imputed to the greater vitality of a new and growing civilization, quite as much as to any relative lack of external repression.

SECTION IV. — AUTHORS AND THEIR CHIEF WORKS OF
DOGMATIC IMPORT.

	Writings.	Date of Death.
I. GREEK WRITERS OF THE ARIAN ERA.		
Eusebius of Casarea	{ Ecclesiastical History; Evangelical Preparation; Evangelical Demonstration; On Ecclesiastical Theology	A.D. 340
Athanasius	{ Against the Heathen; On the Incarnation of the Word; Orations against the Arians; Exposition of the Faith; On the Decrees of the Council of Nicæa; Epistles to Serapion; Against Apollinaris	373
Basil	{ Homilies on the Hexaemeron, etc.; Against Eunomius; On the Spirit	379
Gregory Nazianzen	{ Orations	390
Gregory of Nyssa	{ Book on the Hexaemeron; On the Formation of Man; Catechetical Oration; On General Notions; Against Eunomius; Against Apollinaris	395
Cyril of Jerusalem	{ Catechetical Discourses	386
Didymus	{ On the Trinity; On the Holy Spirit	395
II. GREEK WRITERS OF THE CHRISTOLOGICAL ERA.		
Epiphanius	{ Against Heresies	403
Cyril of Alexandria	{ On Worship in Spirit and Truth; Against Nestorius; Commentaries on the Old and the New Testament	444
Diodorus of Tarsus	{ Fragments	394 (or earlier).
Chrysostom	{ Homilies on the Old and the New Testament	407
Theodore of Mopsuestia	{ Commentaries on the Twelve Prophets, and fragments of other works	429
Theodoret	{ Healing of the Heathen Affections; Dialogues; Heretical Fables; Commentaries; Ecclesiastical History	457
Socrates	{ Ecclesiastical History	After 439
Sozomen	{ Ecclesiastical History	After 443
Evagrius	{ Ecclesiastical History	After 593
Maximus	{ On Various Questions of Holy Scripture; Dialogues on the Holy Trinity; On the Theology of the Son of God and the Economy of His Incarnation	A. D. 662

	Writings.	Date of Death.
III. LATIN WRITERS.		
Hilary of Poitiers	Tractates on the Psalms; On the Trinity	A. D. 368
Ambrose	Treatises on the Hexaemeron, Paradise, Cain and Abel, Noah and the Ark, Abraham, and other Old Testament Themes; On Mysteries; On Sacraments; On the Holy Spirit; Exposition of Psalms	397
Rufinus	Eremitic History; Ecclesiastical History; Apology for his own Faith; Exposition of the Symbol	410
Jerome	Numerous Commentaries and Epistles	419
Augustine	City of God; Confessions; Enchiridion; On the Trinity; On the Spirit and the Letter; On Nature and Grace; On Marriage and Concupiscence; On the Soul and its Origin; On Grace and Free Will; On the Predestination of Saints; On the Gift of Perseverance; Against Julian (two treatises); Reply to Faustus, the Manichean; Anti-Donatist Writings; Tractates on the Gospel of John; Exposition of the Psalms; Retractations; Numerous Sermons and Epistles	430
John Cassianus	Colloquies; On the Incarnation	After 432
Vincentius	Commonitorium	About 450
Faustus, Bishop of Rhegium	On the Grace of God and the Free Will of the Human Mind	About 490
Gennadius	On Illustrious Men; On Ecclesiastical Dogmas	After 495
Prosper of Aquitaine	Responses for Augustine; On the Grace of God and Free Will; Carmen de Ingratis	A. D. 455-463
Fulgentius	Three Books to Monimus; On the Truth of Predestination and the Grace of God; On Faith	533
Salvianus	On the Government of God	After 455
Leo the Great	Sermons and Epistles	A. D. 461
Mamertus Claudianus	On the State of the Soul	About 473
Gregory the Great	Books of Morals, or Exposition of the Book of Job; Homilies on Ezekiel and the Gospels; Dialogues; Epistles	A. D. 604
Isidore of Seville	On the Life and Death of Saints; Commentaries on the Old Testament; On the Lord's Nativity, Passion, and Resurrection, Kingdom and Judgment	636

Inasmuch as the first stage of the Christological controversy occurred before the close of the strife with Arianism, there were writers who participated in both. Still, the first group of Greek writers may properly be regarded as pre-eminently connected with the Arian era, and the second with the Christological. Diodorus of Tarsus, it may be observed, came as early as one or two in the preceding list. Nevertheless, as a founder of the Antiochian school, which was a main factor in the Christological controversy, he is most appropriately located with the second group.

The entire list of authors given lived and died within the Catholic Church. Theodore of Mopsuestia, however, was fated (more than a century after his death) to be anathematized for heresy, and John Cassianus, Vincentius, Faustus, and Gennadius were to be criticised more or less as representatives of Semi-Pelagianism.

The more prominent writers among those ranked as heretics were, in connection with Arianism, Arius, Aëtius, and Eunomius; in connection with Christology, Apollinarius, Nestorius, and Eutyches; in connection with Pelagianism, Pelagius, Cœlestius, and Julian of Eclanum. Little from the writings of these men, besides the quotations of opponents, is extant.

In the Greek Church of this period Athanasius stands at the head as respects dogmatic importance. In near proximity to him appear Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa. Cyril of Alexandria, though his character may provoke severe criticism, must be allowed quite an eminent place as a theologian. Some of the writings of Theodoret were subjected to censure in the time of Justinian. Nevertheless, he was one of the most clear-headed of the Greek theologians of the fifth century, and withal, a very faithful representative of the dominant faith of his Church and age. Eusebius of Cæsarea was not fully orthodox, and, in the opinion of those near to his time, succeeded better as an historian and apologist than as a theologian.

Theodore of Mopsuestia was somewhat inclined to independent thinking, and, in some points, stepped aside from current beliefs.

In the Latin Church, Augustine towers above all other writers of these centuries. His theological system, whatever may be thought of its merits, must be ranked, in point of actual influence, as one of the foremost in history. It is still no inconsiderable factor in both Romish and Protestant Christianity. After Augustine, Hilary, Ambrose, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great appear as conspicuous exponents of the Catholic theology. In scholarship, Jerome, the author of the Vulgate translation of the Bible, no doubt excelled all other Latin writers of the period, Augustine himself not excepted. As respects dogmatic significance, however, several names must take precedence of his.

SECTION V. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. INSPIRATION AND AUTHORITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. — In this period, as in the preceding, a very emphatic view of scriptural inspiration was entertained. The sacred writers were commonly regarded as organs of the Holy Spirit, and so completely under His guidance that their words were altogether infallible and divine. Such a theory may be discerned in the statement of Eusebius, that to suppose a mistake on the part of a sacred author, such as the substitution of one proper name for another, must be counted the height of presumption. (Comm. in Psal., XXXIII.) To the same effect is the declaration of Augustine, that he considered himself bound to yield to the canonical Scriptures "such implicit subjection as to follow their teaching, without admitting the slightest suspicion that in them any mistake or any statement intended to mislead could find a place." (Epist., LXXXII.) Again he remarks, "All the divine writings are in full agreement with each other." (Serm., I.)

“All that He was minded to give for our perusal on the subject of His own doings and sayings, He commanded to be written by those disciples, *whom He thus used as if they were His own hands.*” (De Consensu Evang., I. 35.) Not less indicative of a strict theory of inspiration are his comments on the Septuagint translation. The deviations of this version from the Hebrew, where not due to the error of a copyist, were, in his view, to be imputed to the direction of the Holy Spirit. (De Doct. Christ., II. 15, IV. 7; De Civ. Dei, XV. 14.) Surely if translators were thought to have been under such plenary guidance, the original writers must have been regarded as lifted far above all liability to error. Gregory the Great, in the preface to his exposition of the Book of Job, remarks, “It is superfluous to inquire who wrote these things, since the Holy Spirit may properly be regarded as the author of the book. He Himself, therefore, wrote these things who dictated that which was to be written.” In the same connection he affirms that it was not unnatural for the sacred authors to write about themselves, because, filled with the Holy Spirit, they were drawn above themselves, as it were became exterior to themselves (*quasi extra semetipsos fiunt*), and so expressed judgments concerning themselves as if they related to others. Many writers coincided with Gregory in describing the Spirit as the real author of the sacred books. Cyril of Jerusalem, for example, speaks of the Holy Spirit as having uttered the Scriptures. (Catech., XI. 12, XVI. 2. Compare Basil, Hom. in Psal., I. 1; Hilary, Tract. super Psal., Prolog., § 5; Ambrose, Hexaem., I. § 7.)

The human element in the Scriptures was not wholly unrecognized. Jerome even went so far in one connection as to intimate the possibility that the apostolic writer in a certain sentence followed rather his outbreking human temper than the guidance of the Spirit. (In Epist. ad Galat., Lib. III., Chap. V.) Chrysostom took notice of the

differing style and tone of different writers, and of their diverse statement of the minor details of the same events. (Hom. I. in Matt.) Augustine also seems to have allowed a certain scope to the free agency of the writer. (De Consensu Evang., I. 2, II. 12.) According to the strictures of the sixth ecumenical council, Theodore of Mopsuestia passed very free criticism upon the Solomonic writings and the Book of Job. If a true account was given of the case, an exceptional position was occupied by this independent writer. On the whole, it was a very limited recognition which the Church rendered to the human element in the Scriptures. The dominant theory was equivalent to that of full verbal inspiration.

But while the sacred writers were regarded as pliant organs of the inspiring Spirit, they were not regarded as unconscious organs. As in the preceding period, the Montanist theory of an absolute trance was repudiated by the Catholic Church. We find it expressly rejected by such writers as Athanasius, Basil, Epiphanius, and Jerome. (Orat. contra Arianos, III. 47; Comm. in Isaïam, Proem., § 5; Adv. Hær., XLVIII. 3; Comm. in Nahum, Prolog.)

2. INTERPRETATION AND USE OF THE SCRIPTURES. — A genuine advance was made in scriptural exegesis by the Antiochian school, as represented by Diodorus, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Theodoret. Paying large regard to grammatical and historical considerations, and departing from the idea that the Bible is a book of sacred enigmas, they sought to get at its sense much after the style of modern interpreters.

Taking the Church at large, however, the allegorizing method may be said to have been still in the ascendant. The leading Latin writers, as well as those affiliating with the Alexandrian school, cultivated it extensively. Many of the pages of Ambrose are about as prodigal of mystical meanings as are the commentaries of Origen. As an example, we may specify the prefiguration of Christ, which he

finds in Jacob, as the husband of two wives, inasmuch as Christ is the consort both of the law and of grace. (*De Jacob et Vita Beata*, II. § 25.) Augustine also made a liberal use of allegory. Yet it should be noticed that outside of the Antiochian school we find a measure of restriction imposed upon the allegorizing method. Thus Basil rebukes those who are not content with the literal sense of the account of creation, but, yielding a loose rein to their fancy, conjure up some mystical meaning for such terms as water, plant, fish, and beast (*Hexaem.*, IX. 1); and Augustine, besides giving considerable scope in practice to the more sober style of interpretation, distinctly rejects Origen's theory that a spiritual sense is contained in all Scripture. "In this prophetic history," he says, "some things are narrated which have no significance [that is, spiritual or typical sense], but are, as it were, the framework to which the significant things are attached." (*De Civ. Dei*, XVI. 2.)

The Scriptures in these centuries were viewed as the common property of Christians, a most desirable possession for believers generally, so that it was esteemed necessary to translate them into the language of any nation or tribe newly converted to Christianity. The right of the laity to read them was undisputed, as is clear from the testimony of Chrysostom and others. Chrysostom advocated with great frequency the diligent perusal of the Scriptures by all classes. (*Hom. in Matt.*, V.; *Hom. in Johan.*, XI., XXXII.) He taught the people that, so far from considering this the task of priests and monks, they ought to regard it as specially needful to themselves as a safeguard against the manifold temptations of the world, in the midst of whose strife and turmoil they were placed. Responding to the plea that the Bible could not be understood by all, he said, "On this account divine grace caused these books to be written by tax-gatherers, fishermen, tent-makers, and shepherds, ignorant and unlearned men, in

order that no one of the ignorant should be able to take refuge in this pretext, in order that their contents might be understandable, in order that those working with their hands, the slave, and the most unlearned of all, might be able to derive benefit therefrom; for those who were favored with the grace of the Spirit composed all this, not, like other writers, for the sake of fame, but with sole reference to the salvation of their readers." (See the ample quotations in Neander's *Chrysostomus*.) It is true that we find one or two who entertained a less generous view of the common privilege to read the Bible. Gregory Nazianzen regarded it as a matter for regret that no provision was made by the Church for a graduated introduction to the Scriptures, and thought that a wise discretion would select certain books for a certain age and grade of understanding. (*Orat.*, II. 48, 49.) Basil also thought that there was room for discrimination, and feared that the weak might suffer harm from an indiscriminate reading of the Old Testament. Neither Basil nor Gregory, however, had any objection to the reading of the Bible by laymen as such. The limitation which they favored amounted simply to the prescription for youth and ignorance of a certain guidance in the matter.

But while there was the opposite of a prohibition of the Bible to the laity in the theory of the age, there were serious practical obstructions to its general perusal. In the West the inundation by the barbarian tribes induced a wide-spread ignorance. In the East the fixedness of orthodoxy, the limited scope given to individual interpretation, together with the decay of the life of religion, left little ambition for the general study of the Bible.

3. THE RELATION BETWEEN SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.—It may safely be characterized as the prevailing view in this period that the full substance of Christian doctrine is contained in the Scriptures, and that in this respect no supplement is to be looked for, whether in tradition or else-

where. Leading writers affirm the dogmatic sufficiency of the sacred books. "The holy and inspired writings," says Athanasius, "are entirely adequate for the announcement of the truth." (*Contra Gentes*, § 1.) Cyril of Jerusalem teaches that in the mysteries of the faith no one is authorized to bring forward anything whatever which cannot claim the support of the Scriptures. (*Catech.*, IV. 17.) "Among the things," says Augustine, "that are plainly laid down in Scripture, are to be found all matters that concern faith and the manner of life,—hope, to wit, and love." (*De Doct. Christ.*, II. 9.) Having expressed his unqualified submission to the canonical Scriptures, he adds: "As to all other writings, in reading them, however great the superiority of the authors to myself in sanctity and learning, I do not accept their teaching as true on the mere ground of the opinion being held by them; but only because they have succeeded in convincing my judgment of its truth, either by means of these canonical writings themselves, or by arguments addressed to my reason." (*Epist.*, LXXXII.) Vincentius speaks of the completed canon of Scripture as sufficing and more than sufficing. (*Commonitorium.*)

Only minor exceptions appear to the standpoint illustrated by the preceding paragraph. The statement of Augustine, "I should not believe the Gospel except as moved by the authority of the Church" (*Contra Epist. Manich.*, V.), cannot properly be quoted against a belief in the dogmatic sufficiency of the Scriptures. The reference here, as the context implies, is not to the specific contents of the Gospel, but to the fact that it was the testimony of the Church which in the first instance led him to receive the Gospel as a genuine and divine revelation. The exceptions to the view that the Scriptures are the complete treasury of Christian doctrine are found in particular with Basil and Gregory Nazianzen. Basil points to various customs, such as signing of candidates with the cross, turning to the

east in prayer, use of a particular form of invocation in the eucharist, blessing the baptismal water and the anointing oil, threefold immersion in baptism, renouncing of the devil and his angels in baptism, as resting upon apostolic tradition rather than upon the written Word; and by reference to these he attempts to justify the customary formula for paying homage to the Holy Spirit. (De Spiritu, §§ 64–68.) His general statement suggests the idea that some doctrinal points might be contained in tradition that are not embraced in the Scriptures. At the same time, it is to be observed that Basil, as a matter of fact, bases upon the sole authority of tradition only ceremonial and ritualistic points. For the dogma of the Spirit's divinity, as well as for every other essential article of faith, he finds proofs in the Scriptures. "The Old Testament," says Gregory Nazianzen, "clearly proclaimed the Father, the Son more obscurely. The New made the Son manifest, and hinted (ὕπεδειξε) the divinity of the Spirit. Now the Spirit associates with us and gives a clearer manifestation of Himself." (Orat., XXXI. 26.) This language evidently assumes an advance beyond the disclosures of the Scriptures. However, the advance is not to a dogma altogether new, but to a fuller revelation of one already contained in the sacred record.

In the theory of the Church at large, tradition was regarded as supplementing the Scriptures in the way of an authoritative exposition of their contents. Inasmuch as the Arians and other heretics sought to uphold their views by the quotation of scriptural texts, there was a strong incentive on the part of Catholic Christians to challenge their interpretation by an appeal to tradition. Hence we have the case of men who, while they acknowledged the dogmatic sufficiency of the Bible, so far as content is concerned, insisted that arbitrary and capricious interpretations must be avoided by reference to tradition.

As it was felt that there might be spurious traditions,

there was occasion to define the marks of the genuine, and of attempts in this direction that of Vincentius is especially noted. Three marks, according to him, distinguish valid tradition; viz. *universitas, antiquitas, consensio*. What the Church in all lands has confessed, and confessed from the first, and confessed with the united voice of the great majority of her fathers, teachers, and priests, has upon it the impress of truth, and may claim apostolic sanction.

Tradition, no doubt, held a wider place, practically, than was allowed to it theoretically. Its extreme convenience in controversy tended to bring it into requisition. It was much easier to say, in justification of a tenet, that it had long been current in the Church, and ought therefore to be regarded as having come down from the apostles, than it was to make a thorough examination of scriptural evidence upon the subject. Conspiring with this convenience of an appeal to tradition was the weight which came to be attached to the decisions of ecumenical councils. As these councils were great bulwarks of the Catholic faith, Catholic Christians were naturally inclined to magnify their importance. The idea was early entertained that they were under the special guidance of the Holy Spirit. The councils themselves claimed as much by customarily prefacing their decrees with the apostolic formula, "*Visum est Spiritui sancto et nobis*," as well as by assertions in specific instances that the voice of a council was the voice of God. The decrees passed by the Nicene fathers were pronounced by the council of Chalcedon to be in every way unalterable, "for it was not they who spoke, but the Spirit Himself of God and the Father." Said Gregory the Great: "I confess that I receive and venerate the four councils [those of Nicæa, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon] as I do the four books of the Holy Gospel." To the same effect is the language of Justinian: "The doctrines of the four councils we receive as we do the Holy Scriptures, and observe their rules as the laws." (See Schaff, Church His-

tory.) Thus emphatically was recognized an extra-Biblical authority. Now this naturally added to the importance and authority of tradition in the eyes of the Church. It accustomed men to look elsewhere than to the Bible for a doctrinal standard. Moreover, in proportion as there was an unwillingness to regard the decrees of councils as innovations, and it was troublesome to make out for them a scriptural basis, there was a tendency to look upon them as definite expressions of traditions which had been in the Church from the beginning. So the councils became tributary to the growing stream of tradition and traditionary authority.

Some concession was made to the idea of a secret tradition. Basil, for instance, speaks of certain phases of the Church ceremonial, resting upon tradition, as having a meaning concealed from the masses, and designed to be concealed, at least for an interval. With the pseudo Dionysius, we find the distinct assertion of a twofold tradition. "It is to be observed," he says, "that the tradition of theologians is twofold, the one secret and mystical, the other open and more manifest, — that symbolical and pertaining to mysteries, this philosophical and affording demonstration." (Epist., IX.) Again he remarks: "It is unlawful to give a written interpretation of the consecratory invocations, and to make public their hidden sense, and the virtues which God works in them." (De Eccl. Hierarch., VII. 10.)

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I.—EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES
OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.—A Christianity which had triumphed over heathen polytheism was less under pressure to establish the doctrine that there is one true God, than a Christianity still struggling for existence and slanderously charged with impiety and atheism. Moreover, the great controversies upon other themes by which the Church was agitated tended to throw this theme into the background. We might expect, therefore, to find in the age of polemics relatively less interest in proofs of the divine existence, than was apparent in the age of apology.

Still the subject was not left without examination. Sufficient reference appears to evidences based upon external nature, and upon the internal and spontaneous testimony of the soul, to show that the current arguments of the preceding period were still in the minds of theologians. (See Athanasius, *Contra Gentes*; Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.*, XXVIII.; Augustine, *Confess.*, X. 6.) Moreover, we find a new class of arguments, something more in the line of the metaphysical than anything which the preceding centuries brought forward. Three writers in particular aspired to this order of proofs; viz. Diodorus of Tarsus, Augustine, and Boëthius.

Diodorus argues on this wise. Change implies a beginning; that which is unstable and can come to an end must

lack the characteristic of eternity, must have had an origin. All things in the world are observed to have had a beginning, or to be liable to the change which implies a beginning. It will not do to predicate simply an endless line of changes. For change, as being equivalent to that which is effected, demands, as an antecedent, an effector or cause. The unchangeable, the first cause, must be back of the series. And the amazing wisdom exhibited in the manner in which changes are interwoven indicates that the unchangeable first cause is a supreme personal intelligence. (In Photii Bibl., Codex CCXXIII. Compare Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 6.)

Augustine points out to Evodius, his partner in the dialogue, that there are three things in man, — existence, life, and intelligence, or the mind as the seat of reason and wisdom. He brings him to confess that the last is the highest, the first being shared with inanimate nature, and the second with the brutes. He also induces him to confess, that, if anything higher than this can be found, it is to be called God, or rather that the highest entity above the human reason is to be so named. Then he endeavors to show that there is something higher than the reason or wisdom of the individual. As there are true and unchanging laws of numbers, so, he argues, there are true and unchanging laws of wisdom. It is not something determined by the individual, so that there are as many wisdoms as there are wise men. All the wise share in the same wisdom in proportion as they are wise. Wisdom or truth, accordingly, transcends the individual, has an absolute and universal character. Having reached this conclusion, Augustine reverts to the preceding confession of Evodius, and adds: "If, indeed, there is anything more excellent, that is God; but if there is not, truth itself is God." (*De Lib. Arbit.*, II. 3-15.) In brief, Augustine reasons from specific intelligence or truth to the universal, to God as the living and absolute truth.

Boëthius argues that the apprehension of the imperfect necessitates reference to the perfect, inasmuch as the imperfect can only be defined as that which comes short of the perfect. God, whom the common conception of men shows to be the chief good, is the embodiment of this perfection which we are compelled to recognize. (De Consol. Phil., III. 10.)

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. — The anthropomorphic conception of God, represented in particular by Tertullian in the first period, had its radical votaries in this age. They constituted, however, but a small minority, being made up chiefly of the Audians, who appeared in Syria in the fourth century, and of a faction of the Egyptian monks. By these parties a body was ascribed to God.

Theologians generally were strongly inclined to emphasize the transcendence of God, to affirm the impossibility of any adequate knowledge or definition of His essence. The later Arian chiefs, Aëtius and Eunomius, were exceptions. Eunomius is even credited with saying that "God Himself is not better acquainted with His essence than are we." (Socrates, Hist. Eccl., IV. 7.) This conclusion followed, of course, from peculiar premises respecting the divine essence. Eunomius, more distinguished for polemical subtlety than for philosophical depth, located the essence of God in His being *unbegotten*; and as unbegotten is an understandable notion, he inferred that the essence of God may be fully known.

A view so radical as that of Eunomius very likely incited Catholic theologians to a more positive and repeated expression of their theory of the divine transcendence than they would have indulged otherwise. But a theory of this nature was not due to a mere reaction. It was part of the general system of thought within the circle of Catholic theology. It appears in works of Athanasius, written with no apparent reference to the Eunomian or any equivalent view. We find him intimating that we cannot tell what God is,

but only what He is not (Epist. ad Monachos, § 2), and describing Him as *ὑπερέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας*, beyond all essence. (Orat. contra Gentes, § 2.) Basil, in conscious opposition to Eunomius, gives a more full and positive expression to the same order of ideas. God is represented by him as being above the category of quality. No name has ever been discovered by which His essence may be expressed. Our knowledge of God is rather a knowledge of His relations to the world than a knowledge of His essence. (Adv. Eunom., I. 14; Epist., VIII., XVI., CLXXXIX., CCXXXIV.) Gregory Nazianzen, in commenting on the Platonic maxim, that it is difficult to come to a knowledge of God, and impossible to declare Him, remarks: "In my view, to declare Him is indeed impossible, but to come to a knowledge of Him is still more impossible." (Orat., XXVIII. 4.) He says also that divinity is nameless, and adds: "As no one has ever inhaled the whole atmosphere, so has no mind ever fully comprehended, or any form of expression compassed the nature of God." (Orat., XXX. 17.) This last statement might be taken as an intimation that Gregory, notwithstanding his radical comment on the Platonic maxim, admitted the possibility of some partial apprehension of the real nature or essence of God, and not merely of His relations to the world. And the next paragraph in the same oration looks quite as definitely in the same direction. "So far," says he, "as we can discern, *ὁ ὢν* and *ὁ θεός* are somehow more than other terms the names of the [divine] essence, and of these *ὁ ὢν* is the preferable." In thus making this term, which he considers descriptive of absolute being, a measurably fitting term to describe the essential nature of God, Gregory evidently assumes a certain knowledge of that nature. As already noted, the pseudo Dionysius carried to great lengths the idea of God's transcendence. Maximus also used very strong language in his references to the subject. (Epist. VI., ad Archiepisc. Joan.)

In the Latin Church we find Hilary teaching that the human faculties are fitted to take in a certain knowledge of God; but one must be content to observe the appointed limits, since any attempt to transcend them can only result in the loss of the knowledge already possessed, just as excess of light brings blindness to the eyes. (De Trin., X. 53.) Augustine, who may be regarded as representing, among the Latin writers of the period, the maximum of stress upon the divine transcendence, teaches that God is above comprehension, so that anything which one may be pleased to regard as God is not God if it is once comprehended. (Serm., LII., CXVII.) He argues that God is above the category of substance, since substance, as being that in which something inheres, is contradictory to the ineffable simplicity of the divine nature. God is, therefore, to be called essence rather than substance. (De Trin., VII. 5.) The category of quality is also brought into question. God is to be regarded "as good without quality, great without quantity." (De Trin., V. 1.) What are called qualities or attributes of God may conveniently represent Him to human infirmity, but who is assured that they properly describe Him as to His essential nature? The term *just*, for example, may be so far surpassed by divine excellence, that it will scarcely appear a more appropriate designation of God than the manifestly inappropriate expression which describes Him as repenting. (Serm., CCCXII.) To this may be added Augustine's declaration, that creatures, though they may be called beautiful and good, in comparison with God are neither beautiful nor good, nor even existent. (Confess., XI. 4.) Compare the statement of Gregory the Great: "*Omnia enim humana, quæ justa, quæ pulchra sunt, Dei justitiæ et pulchritudini comparata, nec justa nec pulchra sunt, nec omnino sunt.*" (Moral., XXXV. 2.) Some of these representations look like a foreclosure of all attempt at a real definition of the divine nature. It is to be observed, however, that Augus-

tine, in admitting the propriety of the term essence (*essentia*) stops short of the point of complete negation. As the context indicates, the *essentia* of Augustine is closely akin to the *ὁ ὢν* of Gregory Nazianzen.

It is hardly necessary to add, that the more radical assertions concerning the transcendence of God were not consistently followed out by those who uttered them. Take, for example, Basil's theory that all the terms applied to God describe His relation to the world rather than His essence; how much ground would it leave to infer from the Scriptures that the Son is of the same essence as the Father? The Scriptures treat of God almost exclusively in His relations to the world, and if these relations are not truly indicative of the divine essence, of course they are not truly indicative of sameness of essence in the Divine Persons. Yet neither Basil, nor others indulging a similar order of representations, had any idea of cutting short the scriptural proof of the doctrine of identity of essence. The facts illustrate what has already been noticed in connection with the writers of the first period; namely, the struggle between opposing tendencies; between a tendency to exalt God by predicating the unfathomable mystery of His nature, and a tendency to trust in Christianity as a genuine revelation of God.

The emphasis upon the transcendence of God may be imputed in some degree to the practical demands of the trinitarian theory, which no doubt required a background of mystery in the divine nature; but it was due more largely to the religious philosophy which had been dominant in the Church since the middle of the second century.

Among the standard conceptions of the divine attributes was the notion that they must not be regarded as in any way compromising the absolute simplicity of the divine nature. This was a point strongly insisted upon by Augustine. God, as he teaches, is incomparably more simple than the human mind. Whatever pertains to God, His

relations excepted, is of His substance. Attributes and substance in Him are identical. "In the human mind, to be is not the same as to be strong, or prudent, or just, or temperate; for a mind can exist, and yet have none of these virtues. But in God, to be is the same as to be strong, or to be just, or to be wise, or whatever is said of that simple multiplicity or multifold simplicity, whereby to signify His substance." (De Trin., VI. 4.) "If we say eternal, immortal, incorruptible, righteous, good, blessed, spirit, only the last of this list, as it were, seems to signify substance, but the rest to signify qualities of that substance; but it is not so in that ineffable and simple nature. For whatever seems to be predicated therein according to quality, is to be understood according to substance or essence. For far be it from us to predicate spirit of God according to substance, and good according to quality, but both according to substance." (De Trin., XV. 5. Compare De Civ. Dei, XI. 10; Tract. in Evang. Joan., XX. 4.) From the identity of the attributes with the essence follows their identity with each other. "God is truly called in manifold ways, great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatsoever other thing seems to be said of Him not unworthily; but His greatness is the same as His wisdom; for He is not great by bulk, but by power; and His goodness is the same as His wisdom and greatness, and His truth the same as all those things; and in Him it is not one thing to be blessed, and another to be great, or wise, or true, or good, or, in a word, to be Himself." (De Trin., VI. 7.)

The impassibility and immutability of God were commonly assumed. Time and space were counted foreign to Him, categories which His nature transcends. Hilary describes Him as *extra locum* and *ante ævum*. (De Trin., II. 6.) Augustine represents that God does not fill space like an extended body, but is always wholly everywhere. (De Civ. Dei, XVI. 5.) And the same terms are employed by Gregory the Great. (Moral., XVI. 31.) As being above

time relations, God dwells in an eternal now. "In æternitate omnia stant," says Augustine. (Serm., CXVII.) The divine consciousness is free from any experience of succession. "All things simultaneously are at hand in one glance." (De Trin., XV. 7.)

The view of Origen, that the supposition of a power in God to sin is derogatory to His omnipotence, found expression in this period. Thus Gregory Nazianzen remarks: "We say that it is impossible for God to be evil, or to be not at all; for this would argue impotence and imbecility in God rather than power." (Orat., XXX. 11.) Similar expressions are found with Augustine. (De Nat. et Grat., LVII.; De Civ. Dei, V. 10.)

A certain deficiency appeared in the Greek Church as respects the consideration of the moral attributes of God. This naturally revealed itself in the related fields of doctrine. In particular, its influence may be discerned in a lack of care and depth on the subject of human depravity and the work of redemption. On the whole, the Latin Church struck deeper upon these subjects than did the Greek Church.

SECTION II. — THE TRINITY.

1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY.—Previous remarks have indicated that Arianism affiliated especially with the Aristotelian philosophy. The influence of Aristotelianism, however, was more conspicuous in the later representatives than in the founder of the system. No doubt there is something in the spirit of Arius, and in his mode of arguing, which might be counted indicative of the student of Aristotle rather than of Plato. Still there is insufficient ground for predicating any very positive connection with the former. We find Arius deviating from Aristotelian definiteness in assuming the unfathomable mystery of the supreme God, and on this very score subjected to criticism

by the Aristotelian Arians. The Arian historian, Philostorgius, though he extols Arius to the skies, yet asserts that he is "involved in the most absurd errors, because he everywhere affirms that God cannot be known, or comprehended, or conceived by the human mind; and not only by men, but also not even by His own only-begotten Son." (Hist. Eccl., II. 3, as quoted by Photius.) So far as the originator of Arianism is concerned, the teachings of Philo may be regarded as holding a prominent place among its philosophical antecedents. As Hefele remarks: "Like Philo, he exaggerated the distinction between God and the world. Like Philo, he admitted an intermediate being, who, being less than God, was the divine organ of the creation of the world." (Conciliengeschichte.) These were fundamental conceptions with Arius, and justify a certain association of his system with that of Philo, though in other respects noteworthy differences between the two might be specified.

In the theological sphere antecedents to the Arian controversy were supplied by the different stages through which the doctrine of the Son had passed. The Church in the second century had relatively a strong interest in establishing the Son's divinity and unity in essence with the Father. In the third century the long struggle with Sabellianism gave an occasion for a strong emphasis upon the distinct personality of the Son. The fourth century had the difficult task of reconciling the two conceptions. In the main, the Church at the opening of this century was true to the central currents of thought in the preceding centuries, and desired to retain as essential dogmas both the unity of essence and the distinct personality. But some were impatient with the troublesome task of reconciliation, and, yielding themselves without reserve to the reaction against Sabellianism, were ready to sacrifice unity of essence in order to make the personality more distinct. As already indicated, the latter interest had inclined some theologians of the third century to favor a certain subordination of the

Son. In Arianism this tendency passed on to a radical extreme.

A third class of antecedents ought not to be overlooked. It is not without significance that the Arian controversy came in a transition era, an era which marked the transference of the great mass of the heathen population of the Empire to the Christian Church. That this influx gave somewhat of a bias to polytheism is clearly evinced by the history of saint-worship. Such a bias was favorable to the doctrine of a gradation of gods, and so paved the way for Arianism. That so many of the barbarian tribes embraced Arianism before accepting the Catholic faith may also be taken as an indication that polytheistic antecedents were favorable to the spread of Arian doctrines, though this line of facts may be accounted for, in part, by reference to the missionary efforts of the age.

2. RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE PARTIES IN THE CONTROVERSY. — From about the year 320 (when Arius, who was then a presbyter in the Church of Alexandria, gave prominence to his peculiar views) to the council of Constantinople, in 381, the Arian controversy raged without any real cessation. During this period a great variety of outward fortunes befell the different parties. In the first section of the interval the Catholic party was in the ascendant; then the Semi-Arians, together with the secret Arians, who, for the time being, trained under their banner, held the field; then the Arians began to usurp a leading place; then, finally, the Catholic party came to the front, and was crowned with a full victory.

These varying fortunes were due in no inconsiderable degree to external causes, such as the interference of the imperial court and sceptre. Eliminating such factors, we may define the relative strength of parties as follows. In the Latin Church, the Catholic or Nicene faith was dominant from the beginning to the end of the controversy. Seeming alienation from this, so far as it is on record for this

quarter, had little basis of conviction, and was, in the main, the result of outward pressure. In the Greek Church there was more of a division. The strict Arians were ever the smaller faction. According to Sozomen, they numbered seventeen in the council of Nicæa, at the commencement of its sessions; but of these only two persistently refused to sign the creed of that council. The measure of outward success which they secured was due largely to their skilful alliance with the Semi-Arians, and their manipulation of court influence. The latter factor availed them especially under the administration of Valens. The Semi-Arians were at one time a considerable fraction of the Greek Church. They numbered many influential adherents, though the majority of the more able and earnest minds were in the Catholic party.

It should be noticed, however, that the term "Semi-Arian" has a considerable latitude of meaning. The main body of the party approximated to Origen's theory of the Son. They denied that He was created out of nothing. They applied to Him divine predicates, such as eternity and immutability. At the same time they viewed him as subordinate to the Father, and in place of the Catholic term *ὁμοουσιος* they put the term *ὁμοιούσιος*, thus characterizing the Son as of like essence with the Father rather than of the same essence. In a number of synods, (as that of Antioch in 341, Philippopolis in 343, Antioch in 344, Sirmium in 351, Ancyra in 358,) the Semi-Arians condemned the distinctive tenets of Arianism. Some of them, no doubt, were quite as much in sympathy with Arianism as with the Catholic faith; but the more conservative wing was separated less widely in theory from the latter than from the former. Indeed, some who are ranked as Semi-Arians on account of their rejection of the Catholic shibboleth were moved to this rejection by little else than fear of Sabellianism. They could claim, also, a seeming excuse for their scruples, in the fact that Marcellus, who, in the early part

of the controversy, was a prominent representative of the Catholic party, gravitated into a doctrine which at least was in close affiliation with the Sabellian. Photinus, a disciple of Marcellus, developed views very similar to those entertained by Paul of Samosata.

3. THE ARIAN DOCTRINE OF THE SON. — The Son, according to Arius, is a middle being between God and the world. He was the instrument of God in fashioning the world, — a needed instrument, since the world is unworthy of direct contact with the Supreme Being, and unable to bear Him. Neither true humanity nor true divinity pertains to the Son. He is without the human soul, and without the essence and attributes of God. No essential predicate of deity can be affirmed of Him. He was created from nothing, and is simply the most exalted of creatures.

It is true that Arius at one time spoke of the immutability of the Son, as appears from his letter to Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria, by whom he was brought under censure. But in his later statements this predicate was surrendered, and nothing in the Son superior to creaturehood with its characteristic mutability was acknowledged. In the principal dogmatic work of Arius, the *Thaleia*, we find such sentences as these: "Not always has God been Father, but there was a time [or moment] when He was alone, and was not yet Father; later He became Father. Not always was the Son existent; for since all things arose from nothing, the Logos of God also was created from nothing, and there was a time when He was not. God was alone, and not yet was the Logos and Wisdom. But when He willed to create us, then He made a being whom He called Logos, and Wisdom, and Son, in order to create us through Him. There are two Wisdoms, one properly so called and existing with God, and in this Wisdom the Son was made, and only as sharing in this is He called Wisdom and Logos. In nature, like all creatures, the Logos is mutable, and in the free use of His own power, so far as

He pleases, remains good. Since God foreknew that He would be good, He gave to Him by anticipation this glory, which man, from the exercise of virtue, subsequently obtains. The Logos is not truly God. As all things are foreign and unlike to the essence of God, so also is the Logos altogether alien and unlike to the essence and property of the Father. The Father is invisible to the Son, and the Logos is able neither to see nor to know the Father fully and accurately. For of a truth not only does the Son fail to know the Father accurately, but also the Son does not know His own nature." (Athanasius, *Orat. contra Arianos*, I. 5-9.)

Arianism was able to affirm quite a wide interval between the Son and other creatures, inasmuch as it assumed that He was the immediate production of the Supreme Being, while other creatures were made through Him as the instrument of that Being. It could also refer to the constant use of His free will in righteous conduct, as distinguishing Him at least from the great mass of moral agents. Still, it was only a "fantastical under-God" (to use Dorner's phrase) that Arianism made out of the Son; and, on the whole, His distance below essential deity was made more prominent than His superiority to humanity. The more radical Arians, so far from allowing that the Son is of the same essence as the Father, were forward to proclaim that He is of dissimilar essence.

In the field of rational evidence Arianism showed more sharpness in attacking its opponent than ability in constructing its own system. Some of its efforts here may be regarded as a counterpart of its artful attempts to manipulate court influence. "The dialectic arguments of the Arians," says Baur, "were often only small subtleties, drawn from single propositions, and calculated to throw opponents into a momentary perplexity." (*Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*.) Judging from the references of different writers, Arianism made much out of the following dilemma

which it constructed for the Catholic party: The Son was generated either with or without will, on the part of the Father. If the former alternative is accepted, then the eternity of the Son is sacrificed, since an act of the Father's will is made anterior to His existence; if the latter is accepted, then despotism is done to the dignity of the divine nature, since God is set forth as the victim of compulsion. Another chosen device of the Arian dialectics was an unmeasured emphasis upon the contrast between the terms "ungenerated" and "generated," or "unbegotten" and "begotten." Eunomius in particular magnified the import of this contrast. He maintained that these terms are fundamental to the conception of Father and Son; that indeed they stand for their very essence. It follows, therefore, that the natures of the two are as wide apart as the import of the terms. An impassable chasm stands between the unbegotten and the begotten. They are mutually exclusive. The nature of the former can in no wise be communicated to the latter.

In the field of Scripture, the Arians dwelt upon such texts as seem to make the Son inferior to the Father, less in knowledge and power, dependent for the prerogatives of His kingdom, and for all things pertaining to His being and glory. In their exegesis of Prov. viii. 22, they enjoyed the benefit of the Septuagint version, which reads, "God created me," instead of the allowable rendering of the Hebrew, "God possessed me." Other favorite passages were Matt. xxviii. 18; Mark xiii. 32; Luke xviii. 19; John xiv. 28, v. 19; 1 Cor. xv. 28.

4. THE NICENE DOCTRINE OF THE SON. — The essentials of the Catholic doctrine of the Son were laid down at the council of Nicæa in 325, soon after the beginning of the Arian controversy. The vindication of the Nicene creed appears, therefore, as the main task of the Catholic party throughout the controversy. In view of this fact, the teaching of the Fathers generally, who championed the Catholic

cause till its final victory at Constantinople in 381, may not inaptly be called the Nicene doctrine of the Son, or the doctrine of the Nicene fathers. The creed adopted at Nicæa is as follows: "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, begotten of the Father, the only-begotten, that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, and Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance (*ὁμοούσιον*) with the Father; by whom all things were made, in heaven and earth; who, for us men, and for our salvation, came down and was incarnate, and was made man; He suffered, and the third day He rose again, ascended into heaven; from thence He cometh to judge the quick and the dead. And [we believe] in the Holy Ghost. And those who say, there was a time when He [the Son] was not; and, He was not before He was made; and, He was made out of nothing, or out of another substance or thing, or the Son of God is created, or changeable, or alterable, — such the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church condemns."

A creed like this, designed to command universal assent, would, of course, be likely to be quite as moderate in its dogmatic statements as the theory of the dominant party. The conditions assure us, as also a review of authors will abundantly prove, that the Nicene creed did not exalt the Son more than did the beliefs of the Catholic party at large.

In their exposition of the generation of the Son, the Nicene fathers made an advance on the teaching characteristic of at least a portion of the fathers of the preceding centuries. This appears in a twofold respect. In the first place, they were very clear and positive in the declaration that the generation is to be regarded as eternal, something to be associated with the Godhead as such, so that we cannot properly conceive of the first Person in the Trinity apart from the category of fatherhood. This point, touched

upon in the creed above, was often asserted by Catholic writers. Athanasius, for example, describes the generation of the Son as taking place *ἀνάρχως καὶ αἰδίως*, without beginning and from eternity. (Expos. Fid., § 1.) The Son, he says, is eternal, as the wisdom of God is eternal. As effulgence is always at hand where there is light, so the being of the Son is parallel with that of the Father. (Orat. contra Arianos, I. 9, 25, II. 32. Compare Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV. 7, XI. 13; Basil, Adv. Eunom., II. 16; Hilary, De Trin., III. 3, XII. 21.) In the second place, the Nicene fathers regarded the generation as proceeding, not from an act of will, but from a necessity of nature. They were cautious, it is true, about admitting the word "necessity." Thus Ambrose represents that the generation is by nature, rather than by will or by necessity; but he had in mind necessity in the obnoxious sense, as implying compulsion, rather than that inner necessity which is absolutely acceptable to the will, if not under its control. His language is as follows: "Sicut bonus pater non aut ex voluntate est, aut necessitate, sed super utrumque, hoc est natura; ita non generat ex voluntate aut necessitate Pater." (De Fide, IV. 9.) Ambrose here was following in the wake of Athanasius, who indulged about the same representation, rebutting the Arian charge that the Nicene theory imposed necessity upon God, and asserting that the generation is by nature (*φύσει*) rather than by will. (Orat., III. 62-66.)

Like Origen, the Nicene fathers seem to have conceived of the generation, not as something accomplished once for all, but as something parallel with the eternal life of the Son, ever complete and ever continued. Its precise nature they did not pretend to unfold. On the contrary, they repeatedly taught that it is an unfathomable mystery, that there is no image adequate to its explanation, that it is a gross perversion to attach to it any corporeal or earthly sense. (Athanasius, Expos. Fid., § 1; De Decret. Synod.,

§ 11; Orat., II. 36; Basil, Adv. Eunom., II. 17; Gregory Naz., Orat., XX. 11; Eusebius, Dem. Evang., V. 1; Ambrose, De Fide, I. 10.)

The most important item in the Nicene creed, in the view of its defenders, was the phrase describing the Son as *homouousion*, or consubstantial with the Father. If the term was not regarded as absolutely essential in an orthodox system, the idea attached to it was so regarded. Men like Athanasius conceived that Christianity must surrender its claims to be the perfect religion, unless its Redeemer, the Son of God, was allowed to be of the same essence as the Father. In teaching sameness of essence, on the part of the Divine Persons, the Catholic writers, as their language again and again indicates, meant to teach their substantial equality. "Eternal and one," says Athanasius, "is the divinity in the Trinity, and one the glory of the holy Trinity." (Orat., I. 18.) Again he speaks of the Son as "by nature equal to the Father, and consubstantial with Him, because He is begotten of the essence of the Father." (De Incarn. et contra Arianos, § 4.) Cyril of Jerusalem testifies that nothing pertaining to the honor of divinity is wanting to the Son; that Father and Son have one and the same glory. (Catech., IV. 7, VI. 1.) "In Christ," says Hilary, "is the fulness of divinity." (De Trin., I. 13.) He represents Him also as the perfect from the perfect, true, infinite, and perfect God, equal in power and honor to the Father. (De Trin., II. 8-11, III. 17, X. 50.) Ambrose speaks of the Son as "*Deus ex Deo*," "*Princeps ex Principi*," "*æqualis ex æquali*," "*Deus omnipotens et perfectus*," less than the Father only as respects the servant form. (Enarrat. in Psal., XXXV.; De Fide, I. 2, II. 8.) To statements of this kind may be added what a later paragraph will reveal, namely, that in their interpretation of Scripture the Nicene fathers sought to avoid every meaning adverse to any divine predicate in the Son. They disallowed, for example, any limitation of the Son's knowledge,—uniformly insisted

on interpreting Scripture in harmony with His complete omniscience.

In fine, according to the drift of Nicene trinitarianism, the only subordination to be affirmed of the Son is that pertaining to personal relations. He is less than the Father simply as being generated, simply as holding the place of Son. Fatherhood and sonship are the ground of the distinction between the two Divine Persons. They are distinguished as subsisting by different modes. This distinction, however, is not one which reaches to the divine essence. As father and son in the earthly sphere, though standing in different relations to each other, as Adam and Abel, though coming into being by different modes, are not to be accounted of diverse essence, so neither are the Divine Father and Son to be regarded as different in essence. (Athanasius, *Orat.*, II. 35; Basil, *Adv. Eunom.*, I. 25, II. 4, 5, IV. 1; Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, XXIX. 16; Gregory of Nyssa, *De Fide*; Ambrose, *De Fide*, IV. 8.)

The answers rendered to the chief metaphysical objections of the Arians have already been intimated by the preceding paragraphs. The dilemma designed to show that the Nicene theory compromised either the eternity of the Son or the freedom and dignity of the Father, was met with a counter dilemma. Athanasius, for example, asked the Arians whether God was good with will, and told them that, on their own principles, if they should answer in the affirmative, they must confess that there was a time when God was not good; if, on the other hand, they should answer in the negative, they must allow that God was good by necessity and against His will. As respects both the divine goodness and generation, the true statement, in his view, was that they are by nature, not by will, yet in no wise against will. (*Orat.* III. 59-66.) The Arian objection, based on the assumption that the terms "unbegotten" and "begotten" are significant of the very essence of Father and Son, and therefore significant of natures widely con-

trasted, was met with a denial of the assumption, and with the affirmation, as appears in the paragraph immediately preceding, that unbegotten and begotten are expressive of relations or personal peculiarities, and not of essence. Indeed, the Nicene fathers made bold to assert that the two terms indicate community of essence rather than the contrary; that, according to all analogy, the begotten ought to be of the same substance as the begetter.

The Catholic writers did not confine themselves to the defensive, but brought, among others, the following charges to bear against the Arian theory:—1. Affiliation with heathen polytheism, inasmuch as it paid homage to a Saviour who was understood to be a creature. (Athanasius, *Epist. ad Episcopos*, §§ 4, 13; *Orat.*, III. 16; Ambrose, *De Fide*, I. 13.) 2. Making the Son of God of secondary importance to the world of creatures, since He appears to have been created for their sake rather than the contrary. (Athanasius, *Orat.*, II. 30, IV. 11.) 3. An illogical theory of mediation. According to Arius, says Athanasius, the work of creation demanded a medium, inasmuch as the creature could not sustain the immediate presence and action of God. But if the Son is only a creature, then He needs a medium between Him and God, and this medium, as being also a creature (for the Supreme God alone is not made), will need another medium, and so on. Indeed, creation appears as an impossibility on the Arian conception of God and of the creature. It is an incongruity, moreover, to attach power to create out of nothing to a being who is Himself created out of nothing. (*De Decret. Synod.*, § 8; *Orat.*, II., 26, 27.) 4. Offering to men only an imperfect Saviour, since the Son, if He does not possess true divinity, is not fitted to unite man to God, and cannot command absolute confidence. (Athanasius, *Orat.*, II. 70; Ambrose, *De Fide*, II. 13.) 5. Leaving the world without a true and adequate revelation of God, since the Son, if He is not of the same substance as the Father, and does not know Him

truly and perfectly, cannot truly and perfectly reveal Him. (Basil, *Adv. Eunom.*, II. 32.)

In their treatment of the scriptural evidence, the Nicene fathers endeavored to offset the Arian proof-texts by such as the following, which ascribe divine titles, attributes, activities, or honors to the Son: Matt. i. 23, xxviii. 20; John i. 1, ii. 24, 25, vi. 64, xvi. 15, xx. 28; Rom. ix. 5; Col. i. 15-17; Titus i. 3, ii. 13; Heb. i. 2, 6, 8, 10-12, xiii. 8; 1 John v. 20; Rev. i. 8, v. 12, 13. At the same time, moreover, they sought to escape the Arian sense in the texts of their opponents by applying them to the human aspect of Christ, to His servant form in this world, or to His mediatorial office. Referring to Prov. viii. 22, and related passages, Athanasius says: "There is plainly a reasonable ground and cause why such representations as these are given of Him in the Scriptures; and it is because He became man, and the Son of Man, and took upon Him the form of a servant, which is the human flesh. And since He became man, no one ought to be offended with such expressions; for it is proper to man to be created, and born, and formed to suffer toil and pain, to die, and to rise again from the dead." (*Epist. ad Episcopos*, § 10.) Other writers generally gave the same interpretation of the text in Proverbs, though we find Eusebius noting the fact that the original Hebrew implies the idea of possession rather than that of creation. (*De Eccl. Theol.*, III. 2.) Similarly, Matt. xxviii. 18 was applied to Christ in His human character, it being argued that the pre-existent Son was already lord and possessor of all things in virtue of being their Creator. (Athanasius, *In Illud, Omnia Mihi Trad.*, etc.; *Orat.*, IV. 6. Compare Augustine, *De Trin.*, I. 12, 13.) The same office of the Son was also regarded as a guaranty that Mark xiii. 32 is not to be taken in an absolute sense; for, how, it was asked, could He who created all things and gave them their adjustment, be ignorant of a part of His own work, not know how He had Himself or-

dered the times? "Per eum," says Hilary, "enim tempora, et in eo dies est; quia et per ipsum futurorum constitutio est, et in ipso adventus sui dispensatio est." (De Trin., IX. 59.) Nothing argues Athanasius, could be more foolish than the idea that the Son, who knows the Father, and who Himself gave origin to the times and seasons, and to all things, should not also know their end, be able to declare the time of the great consummation. (Orat. III. 42, 43.) It was concluded, therefore, that this sentence was spoken dispensationally. As Athanasius puts it, Christ, humbly associating Himself with men, declared His ignorance, as a man, of the judgment day; as Hilary and some others put it, Christ's declaration of ignorance imported simply that it was no part of His earthly office to make known the day, and that He was not to be inquired of upon that point. (De Trin., IX. 66-73. Compare Basil, Adv. Eunom., IV.; Chrysostom, Hom. in Matt., LXXVIII.; Augustine, Serm., XCVII.; De Trin., I. 12.) Luke xviii. 19 was explained as in no wise showing that Christ is not possessed of absolute goodness, the design of Christ being, not to decline the epithet, but to rebuke the superficial spirit of the young man, or to test his faith. (Hilary, De Trin., IX. 16; Expos. Evang. secund. Luc., VIII. 68. Compare Augustine, De Trin., I. 13.) John xiv. 28 was regarded as indicating either the secondary position of the Son in the line of personal relations, the fact that He is generated by the Father (Athanasius, Orat., I. 58), or the inferiority which pertained to Him, as having emptied Himself and taken the servant form, wherein He might be said to be less, not only than the Father, but also than Himself. (Ambrose, De Fide, II. 8. Compare Augustine, Tractat. in Evang. Joan., LXXVIII.; Leo the Great, Serm., XXV.) The delivering up of the kingdom to the Father, as foreshadowed in 1 Cor. xv. 24-28, was understood to mean neither the acquisition by the Father of a dominion hitherto foreign to Him, nor the loss to the Son of one previously enjoyed.

In like manner, the subjection of the Son was understood to imply neither previous lack of subjection nor subsequent increase of subjection. Christ, it was claimed, presents the kingdom to the Father in presenting to Him the souls made subject by His redeeming work. And Christ is destined to appear in subjection to God the Father, in that He is destined to appear as the head of a body, viz. a redeemed race, brought into full subjection to God. The subjection is not to pertain to the Son viewed by Himself, but as holding a corporate relation to men through the connecting bond of His humanity. (Theodoret, *Interp. Epist. I. ad Cor.*; Athanasius, *De Incarn. et contra Arianos*, § 20; Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, XXX. 5. Compare Augustine, *De Trin.*, I. 8, 10.)

5. THE NICENE DOCTRINE OF THE SPIRIT. — Parties adverse to the divinity of the Son were still more adverse to the divinity of the Spirit. Arianism appeared here at its farthest remove from a Christian consciousness, according personality to the Spirit, but at the same time regarding Him as a creature subordinate to the Son. As represented by Basil, Eunomius taught that neither deity nor power to create is to be ascribed to the Spirit. (*Adv. Eunom.*, III. 5.) Semi-Arianism was inclined to rank the Spirit below the Son in about the same degree that it ranked the Son below the Father, and in some instances to a greater degree. Eusebius of Cæsarea, who, notwithstanding his nominal acceptance of the homousion creed, had a certain bias to Semi-Arianism, predicated a very emphatic subordination of the Spirit. He describes Him, indeed, as vastly exalted above the creature world at large, and having a place in the unity of the Trinity, but still as inferior to the Son, and among the "all things" created by Him. (*De Eccl. Theol.*, III. 5, 6.) In the later stages of the trinitarian controversy a party of Semi-Arians who came to acknowledge the Son as divine, and in all respects like to the Father, refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Spirit. As Macedonius was a prominent

representative of this party at Constantinople, they frequently were mentioned under the name of Macedonians. According to Gregory Nazianzen (*Orat.*, XXXI. 5), there were some who regarded the Spirit as a mere activity or energy; but the great inferiority of these either in number or in influence, or in both, may be assumed with entire safety. A survey of the different parties conveys the decided impression that in the Nicene era the personality of the Spirit was almost universally accepted.

The Catholic creeds appear very moderate in their references to the nature of the Holy Spirit. The creed of Nicæa simply says, "We believe in the Holy Ghost." That of Constantinople also, though more ample than the foregoing, is less explicit on this subject than on the nature of the Son. The following is its statement: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, who is Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets." These brief and general references may be regarded as largely the result of expediency. It was felt that the doctrine of the Son's divinity was the first in the logical order, and that for the time being its acceptance ought not to be hindered by giving a prominent place in the creeds to the divinity of the Spirit, a doctrine still more unacceptable to heterodox parties.

As regards the convictions of the Catholic party on the subject of the Spirit, there is no proper cause for doubt. The same men who are known as champions of the divinity and consubstantiality of the Son appear also as champions of the divinity and consubstantiality of the Spirit. Athanasius clearly affirms that the Spirit has the divine nature, and the same unity with the Father which belongs to the Son. (*Epistolæ ad Serapion.*) Cyril of Jerusalem speaks of the Spirit as knowing and sharing the nature of God, as above the category of created things, as having a place in the unity of the Trinity, as omnipotent in gifts. (*Catech.*, VI. 6, VIII.

5, XVI. 3, 4, 22.) Basil, in criticising the Eunomian statement that the Spirit is third in order and in nature, rejects the latter clause as decidedly heterodox. (Adv. Eunom., III. 1.) Gregory Nazianzen, whatever he may have said about the obscurity of the Scriptures on the nature of the Spirit, had no hesitation about acknowledging His divinity. Father, Son, and Spirit, he says, are one in respect to divinity, three in respect to peculiarities. (Orat., XXXI. 9.) Didymus and Gregory of Nyssa also defended the doctrine of the Spirit's divinity. The language of the latter in repeated instances implies the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Father. (See, for example, his *De Communibus Notionibus*.) Among the Latin fathers, Hilary indulges very little in the line of definite specifications on the nature of the Spirit. Ambrose, on the other hand, plainly enunciates his belief in the Spirit's divinity and sameness of essence with the Father. (De Spir. Sanct., I. 2, 5, 7, 12, III. 16.)

Among the chief points urged in behalf of the divinity of the Holy Spirit were: (1.) His place in the baptismal formula; (2.) the enormity of sin against Him, as appears from the words of Christ and the story of Ananias and Sapphira; (3.) the scriptural teaching that God dwells in believers by means of the Spirit, whereas there could be no truly divine indwelling if the Spirit were not divine; (4.) participation in functions, such as creation, which are above the range of the creature. (See Athanasius, *Epist. ad Serapion*; Basil, *Adv. Eunom.*, Lib. III.; *De Spiritu*.)

The creed of Constantinople describes the procession of the Spirit as being from the Father. In the Greek Church this became the current phraseology. Epiphanius appears as an exception to the theologians of his region, in allowing a double procession, that is, a procession from Father and Son. (*Ancoratus*, § 9.) On the other hand, the Latin Church, as the writings of Augustine and others show, was strongly inclined toward the doctrine of a double proces-

sion. Ultimately the different positions assumed upon this point came to be regarded as a principal dogmatic disagreement between East and West. The chief importance of the subject lay in its bearing upon the relative honor of the Persons of the Trinity.

The doctrine of the Spirit's divinity came to a substantial triumph at the council of Constantinople in 381. Thus was completed the Nicene doctrine of the triune God. The reconciliation of the threefold personality with the unity of God was regarded as sufficiently attained by the affirmation of the oneness of the Persons in essence. To this, however, some added the consideration that there is a single principium in the Godhead, the source of the personality of the Son and of the Spirit being the Father. (Athanasius, Orat., IV. 1; Gregory Nazianzen, Orat., XX. 6. Compare Eusebius, De Eccl. Theol., I. 11, II. 6.) Some expressions, especially on the part of Gregory of Nyssa, verge in appearance very closely upon tritheism. This is the case where he attempts to illustrate the unity in essence of the Divine Persons by referring to the fact that three men, as, for example, Peter, James, and John, have a common essence, viz. that of humanity. But on the whole the writings of Gregory indicate that he did not design that this illustration should be taken unqualifiedly. "It is incorrect to say," remarks Dorner, "that Gregory conceives the hypostatic distinctions in the Trinity to be related to each other as are two individual men; for, on the contrary, he rather reduces the entire distinction between Father and Son to this,—that the former is the *αἰτίον*, the latter *αἰτιατόν*, whereas the distinctions between actual men are much deeper."

As respects the terminology of Catholic trinitarianism, it cannot claim the merit of uniformity through the whole era under consideration; by its close, however, it was quite definitely fixed. In the Greek Church the distinctions which we find with Basil and the two Gregories claimed gen-

eral acceptance. *Οὐσία* became the term for the essence, *ὑπόστασις* for the personality, while for the peculiarity, or *ιδιότης*, of each Person a special term was employed, that of the Father being denoted by *ἀγγελνησία*, that of the Son by *γέννησις*, that of the Spirit by *ἐκπεμφσις*. In the Latin Church, *persona*, though differing in its primary significance from *ὑπόστασις*, was used as its equivalent. The mutual indwelling of the three Divine Persons, the eternal circuit of the divine life, was expressed by the term *περιχώρησις* or *συμπεριχώρησις*.

6. THE AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. — As distinguished from Nicene trinitarianism, the Augustinian shows a greater interest in eliminating all elements of subordination from the conception of Son and Spirit, and also in conserving the unity of God. It may be said that logically both involve the same species of subordination, namely, that which is inseparable from the ideas of generation and procession, a subordination in personal relations. But the subordination herein involved may receive very different degrees of emphasis, as more than one era in doctrinal history shows. Notwithstanding its identity in leading propositions with the doctrines of the preceding age, the Augustinian teaching had its distinctive tone and bias. This appears in the first place in the carefulness of Augustine to associate the three Divine Persons as far as possible in every divine activity. The following may serve as examples of oft-recurring statements: "The same Son was sent by the Father and the Son." (*De Trin.*, II. 5.) "Let it not be supposed that in this Trinity there is any separation in respect of time or place, but that these three are equal and coeternal, and absolutely of one nature; and that the creatures have been made, not some by the Father, and some by the Son, and some by the Holy Spirit, but that each and all that have been or are now being created subsist in the Trinity as their Creator; and that no one is saved by the Father without the Son and the Holy Spirit, or by the Son

without the Father and the Holy Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit without the Father and the Son, but by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the only one, true, and truly immortal God." (Epist. CLXIX. ad Evodium.) "We have already determined that not only the Father, nor only the Son, nor only the Holy Spirit, appeared in those ancient corporeal forms and visions, but either indifferently the Lord God, who is understood to be the Trinity itself, or some one Person of the Trinity, whichever the text of the narrative might signify." (De Trin., III. Præf.) "I would boldly say, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of one and the same substance, God the Creator, the Omnipotent Trinity, work indivisibly; but that this cannot be indivisibly manifested by the creature; just as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot be named by our words, which certainly are bodily sounds, except in their own proper intervals of time, divided by a distinct separation, which intervals the proper syllables of each word occupy. . . . As, when I name my memory and intellect and will, each name refers to each severally, but yet each is uttered by all three; for there is no one of these three names that is not uttered by both my memory and my intellect and my will together; so the Trinity together wrought both the voice of the Father, and the flesh of the Son, and the dove of the Holy Spirit, while each of these things is referred severally to each Person." (De Trin., IV. 21. Compare XV. 11; Epist., XI.; Tract. in Joan., V.; Serm., LII., CXXVI.)

The distinctive character of Augustine's exposition of the Trinity appears also in the illustrations to which he most frequently recurs. An image of the Trinity, as he taught, is to be sought especially in the nature of man. The factors in human nature supplying this image are somewhat differently stated by Augustine in different connections. We find him citing being, knowledge, and love. "We both are," he says, "and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it." (De Civ. Dei, XI. 26-28.)

Again, he specifies being, knowledge, and will (Confess., XIII. 11), an enumeration substantially identical with the preceding, since love and will were regarded by him as in a measure equivalent terms; at least, he asks the question, "What else is love, except will?" (De Trin., XV. 20.) In another instance, he teaches that by pondering the single notion of love we may get a glimpse of the Trinity, for love always implies three things,—itself, him that loves, and that which is loved. "What is love," he asks, "except a certain life which couples or seeks to couple together some two things, namely, him that loves and that which is loved?" (De Trin., VIII. 10.) But perhaps that may be characterized as the cardinal illustration of Augustine which specifies *memoria*, *intellectus*, and *voluntas*, memory, understanding, and will, as supplying an image of the Trinity. (De Trin., X. 11, XIV. 6; Epist., CLXIX.; Serm., LII.) Memory, as the condition of the sense of identity, as making the mind at hand to itself, is a condition of the knowledge of self, and this again is a condition of love for that pertaining to self. (De Trin., XIV. 11.) In this connection of faculties or activities, the relations of the Divine Persons are in a measure shadowed forth. The mind in knowing itself begets a knowledge equal to itself,—an offspring corresponding to the Son; and the love which embraces this offspring, and unites it to the begetter, corresponds to the Spirit. (De Trin., IX. 12. Compare De Trin., V. 11, VI. 5, VII. 3; De Fide et Symbolo, IX.)

Thus Augustine anticipated, in all essential respects, the leading attempt of after times at a philosophical exposition of the Trinity, according to which the Son is the image of the Father, which He objectifies in cognizing Himself, and the Holy Spirit is the bond of fellowship between Father and Son, the issue of their mutual love. It is not to be assumed, however, that Augustine regarded this illustration as entirely adequate. On the contrary, he specifies the following defects: "In the first place, the similarity is found

to be imperfect in this respect, that whereas memory, understanding, and will are not the soul, but only exist in the soul, the Trinity does not exist in God, but is God. In the second place, who would dare to say that the Father does not understand by Himself, but by the Son, as memory does not understand by itself, but by the understanding? or, to speak more correctly, the soul in which these faculties are understands by no other faculty than the understanding, as it remembers only by memory, and exercises volition only by the will?" (Epist., CLXIX.)

In reconciling the doctrine of the Trinity with that of the divine unity, Augustine had recourse to the idea that the divine transcends the category of quantity. To absolute perfection, as he taught, there can be no addition. "In God, when the equal Son, or the Holy Spirit, equal to the Father and Son, is joined to the equal Father, God does not become greater than each of them severally; because that perfectness cannot increase." (De Trin., VI. 8-10.) With this may be compared his statement, that while each Divine Person is Almighty, there are not three Almighties, but one God Almighty. (De Civ. Dei, XI. 24. Compare Dorner's remarks on Origen, Period I. Chap. II. Sect. 2.)

The ideas and the phraseology of Augustine served as the basis of the so-called "Athanasian Creed," which no doubt arose in the Augustinian school. The most prominent characteristic of this creed is the boldness and definiteness with which it asserts the opposite sides of trinitarianism;—on the one hand, the coexistence of three Divine Persons and the possession by each of all divine predicates; on the other, the unity of God.

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

THE continuance in this period of Gnostic and Manichæan notions still gave occasion for asserting the theory that the world was created from nothing. As having had a distinct beginning, the world was regarded as strictly subject to time measures. Origen's theory, that creation must be carried back into eternity in order to do credit to God's immutability, and to answer the inquiry as to what God was doing before creation, was commonly repudiated. To the first consideration, Augustine replied that creation was in the will of God from eternity, and that what appears to us to have been of the nature of change was not such to God, as having been already embraced in His unchanging will. "In God," he says, "the former purpose is not altered and obliterated by the subsequent and different purpose, but by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will He effected regarding the things He created, both that formerly, so long as they were not they should not be, and that subsequently when they began to be, they should come into existence." (De Civ. Dei, XII. 17.) To the second consideration, Augustine opposed the fact that it is as difficult to explain why God put the world *where* He did, as it is to tell why he created it *when* He did; and moreover, that we are not to imagine any interval of time prior to creation, inasmuch as time was called into existence by creation itself. (De Civ. Dei, XI. 5, 6; Confess., Lib. XI.)

“If eternity and time,” he remarks, “are rightly distinguished by this, that time does not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had not some creature been made, which, by some motion, could give birth to change? Since then God, in whose eternity is no change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do not see how He can be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be said that, prior to the world, there was some creature by whose movement time could pass.”

Meanwhile Augustine himself advanced a notion, which, though having its patrons in different ages, was destined to call forth not a little criticism. We refer to the passage in which he seems to assert a continuous creation, to make the divine activity in upholding the world equivalent to the ceaseless exercise of creative energy. (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 25.)

Certain sentences in the Mosaic account of creation (*Gen.* i. 1, ii. 4) were understood by some writers to indicate that the essence of all things was created at once, the process divided between the six days having reference only to the shaping or manifestation of individual things. Such is the import of the following sentence of Gregory the Great: “*Rerum quippe substantia simul creata est, sed simul species formata non est, et quod simul exstitit per substantiam materiæ non simul apparuit per speciem formæ.*” (*Moral.*, XXXII. 12. Compare Gregory of Nyssa, *Hexameron.*) Augustine notices that the creation of the heavens is mentioned prior to that of the earth, and seems to favor the supposition that by the former is to be understood an intellectual creation; namely, the angels. He conjectures, also, that the same order of beings may be denoted by the primal light. (*Confess.*, XII. 9, 17; *De Civ. Dei*, XI. 7, 9, 19.)

The age seems to have been inclined to regard the six

days as literal days. We find, nevertheless, with Augustine, a distinct suggestion of a different theory. "What kind of days these were," he writes, "it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible, for us to conceive, and how much more to say!" (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 6.) In several instances he implies that all things were made at once, the succession of days being used in the Mosaic account in accommodation to the succession which must enter into the contemplation of a finite intelligence. (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, Lib. Imperfect., cap. 7; *De Gen. ad Lit.*, Lib. IV. cap. 33.) But he appears not to have adhered uniformly to this conception. (*De Catech. Rud.*, XVII.) Of God's rest on the seventh day he says: "We are not to conceive of this in a childish fashion, as if work were a toil to God, 'who spake and it was done.' But God's rest signifies the rest of those who rest in God, as the joy of a house means the joy of those in a house who rejoice." (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 8, 31.) To this day, as Augustine further remarks, there is no evening; it signifies that day of rest for God's people upon which no nightfall shall ever come. (*Serm.*, IV.)

Physical evils, so far as they were imputed to the agency of the Creator, were regarded as a part of the discipline made necessary by the sinfulness of man. In forming the natural world, God designedly, as Theodoret taught, introduced defects, in order that there might be a safeguard against an idolatrous veneration of nature. (*Græc. Affect. Curat.*, III.)

SECTION II. — ANGELS AND DEMONS.

As respects the nature of angels, the fathers of this period agreed upon leading points very generally with each other, as also with the writers of the preceding centuries. They regarded angels as pure and blessed spirits, exalted above men by superior knowledge, and favored with exemption

from gross earthly bodies. Whether they have bodies at all, or not, was a question upon which many failed to render a definite verdict. Augustine evidently favored the supposition that they are possessed of refined ethereal bodies. (Epist., XCV.; De Civ. Dei, XV. 23.) Fulgentius says that the opinion that they possess corporeal as well as spiritual substance was held by many great and learned men. (De Trin., IX.) Mamertus Claudianus decides for the same view. (De Statu An., III. 7.) Gregory the Great speaks of them as spirits circumscribed by place. (Moral., II. 3.) Basil calls an angel an aerial spirit. (De Spir., XVI.) In another connection, however, he seems to include angels in the class of incorporeal things. (Adv. Eunom., IV.) Gregory Nazianzen describes angels as incorporeal, or very nearly so. (Orat., XXVIII. 31.) Ephræm is said to have ascribed to them igneous bodies. (Petavius, Theol. Dogmat., De Angelis, Lib. I. cap. 2.) A number of writers make the statement that God alone is strictly incorporeal, and so imply a kind of corporeity for angels. (Hilary, Comm. in Matt., Cap. V.; Cyril Alex., In Joan. Evang., Lib. IX. Cap. XIV. ver. 11; Faustus, Epist., IV.; Cassianus, Collat., VII. 13; Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XI., XII.) Perhaps, as has been suggested, some of these writers meant to denote by "corporeal" only the fact of subjection to space relations and limitations.

The notion that angels are divided into several ranks was carried out in an elaborate fashion by the pseudo Dionysius Areopagita. As he represents in his *De Cœlesti Hierarchia*, there are three classes of angels, each subdivided into three orders. The first class consists of Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim; the second, of Might, Dominions, and Powers; the third, of Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. The first class has immediate communion with God, and serves to enlighten the second, as that serves to enlighten the third. Only the inferior ranks recede from their heavenly station, in order to carry min-

istrations to men. Gregory the Great adopted substantially the scheme of Dionysius (*Hom. in Evang.*, XXXIV.), and prepared the way for its general acceptance in the Latin Church, though Augustine, before him, had confessed his total ignorance upon the subject of angelic ranks. (*Enchirid.*, LVIII.)

According to Augustine, and in harmony with his doctrine of the gift of perseverance, the angels, who kept their first estate in the time of the great apostasy, received, in reward for their fidelity, the assurance that they should never fall. (*De Dono Persev.*, XIII.; *Enchirid.*, XXVIII.) The scriptural evidence for this view he sets forth as follows: "The truth in the gospel promises to the saints and the faithful that they will be equal to the angels of God. (*Matt.* xxii. 30.) And it is also promised that they will go away into life eternal. But if we are certain that we shall never lapse from eternal felicity, while they are not certain, then we shall not be their equals, but their superiors. But as the truth never deceives, and as we shall be their equals, they must be certain of their blessedness." (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 13. Compare *De Corrept. et Grat.*, XXVII.)

Pride was especially emphasized as the motive which precipitated Satan into apostasy. (Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XII. 1; Cassianus, *De Cœn. Inst.*, XII. 4.) As regards the other angels that fell, the old notion that lust after the daughters of men drew them to their downfall was still taught by some of the earlier writers of the period; at least they accepted the fact of a commerce with women. (Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, V. 4; Ambrose, *De Noe et Arca*, IV.; *Expos. in Psal.*, CXVIII.; *Serm.*, VIII. 58.) This notion, being based upon the traditional sense attached to *Gen.* vi. 2, naturally gave way before the new exegesis of the passage which Chrysostom and others advocated. (*Hom. in Gen.*, XXII. Compare Theodoret, *Hæret. Fab.*, V.; Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XV. 23; Cassianus, *Collat.*, VIII.

21.) In the new interpretation the "sons of God," instead of being regarded as angels, were identified with the Sethites. This left the fall of the other angels to be explained by motives like those which actuated Satan.

Those holding the old view might draw somewhat of a distinction between evil angels in general and demons, identifying the latter with the souls of the giants supposed to have sprung from the commerce of angels with the daughters of men; but it is not clear how the advocates of the new view could discriminate very definitely between the two. The distinction, indeed, was one that was never held very steadfastly by any class of Christian writers.

Unfallen angels were supposed to have much to do with the welfare of men. Occasional references show that the theory of a special angelic guardianship for individual men was still entertained. (Ambrose, *De Vid.*, IX.; Cassianus, *Collat.*, VIII. 17.) There is also mention of the idea that nations have their angelic superintendents. (Epiphanius, *Adv. Hær.*, LI. 34; Theodoret, *Hæret. Fab.*, V.) But whatever scope was assigned to this subordinate agency, it was not regarded as a substitute for the direct care of God over all His creatures. The doctrine of a special providence was vigorously maintained. Jerome took a thoroughly exceptional position in assuming only a general providence of God over the irrational animal creation. (*Comm. in Abacuc.*)

The agency of evil angels or demons, very much as in the preceding period, was regarded as operative in corrupting the hearts of men, in stimulating to heresy and crime, in producing violent diseases (though Posidonius, an eminent physician, took exception to this notion), and in fostering the arts of divination and all the lying wonders of heathenism. At the same time, it was regarded as agency limited both by the limited knowledge and power of the agents, and by man's ability to resist. For example, Augustine teaches that the production of marvellous trans-

formations is beyond the ability of demons, and that it is probable that they secure the appearance of miracle by merely presenting certain phantasms to the minds of those whom they would delude. (*De Civ. Dei*, XVIII. 18.)

The polytheistic tendencies which the heathen masses brought into the Church as they came over to Christianity, no doubt favored the worship of angels. But the New Testament prohibition of such worship (*Col. ii. 18*) was too definite not to receive a certain consideration, at least in theory. Eusebius speaks of Christians as honoring angels, but reserving worship for God. (*Præp. Evang.*, VIII. 15.) According to Theodoret, Christians believe in angels and acknowledge in them a certain pre-eminence over men, but at the same time regard them as fellow servants, and do not divide religious worship between them and God. (*Græc. Affect. Curat.*, III.) In the fourth century, a council convened at Laodicea condemned as idolatry a species of angel-worship, which seems to have had its votaries in that region. As late a writer as Gregory the Great declared the worship of angels foreign to the Christian dispensation. The acts of homage paid to them in Old Testament times are, as he maintained, no longer appropriate, since human nature has been so honored and exalted by the work of Christ. (*Moral.*, XXVII. 15.) No eminent writer in this period, except Ambrose, can be quoted as inculcating the idea that the intercessions of angels are to be sought for. A guardian angel, in his view, might profitably be addressed to this end, as well as the martyred saints. (*De Vid.*, IX.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — Apart from the Audians, there was little inclination in this period to regard the body as any part of that image of God in

which man was formed. So far as a distinction was drawn between the words "image" and "likeness," the view of the Alexandrian fathers of the preceding period was followed. Intellectual and moral attributes, as opposed to all qualities of the body, were considered the components of the divine image and likeness in man. (Athanasius, *Orat. contra Gent.*, § 2; *De Incarn. Verbi*, § 3; Hilary, *Tractat. super Psalm. CXVIII.*, Lit. 10, CXXIX.; Ambrose, *Hexaem.*, VI. 8; Augustine, *De Doct. Christ.*, I. 22; *De Trin.*, XIV. 4.)

The scriptural description of Paradise was commonly understood to be true in a literal sense; but many added an allegorical to the literal interpretation. Augustine, who may be regarded as largely representative of his age upon this subject, adduces two lines of allegorical meanings, and adds: "These, and similar allegorical interpretations, may be suitably put upon Paradise without giving offence to any one, while yet we believe the strict truth of the history, confirmed by its circumstantial narrative of facts." In the first series of figurative meanings which he mentions, "Paradise signifies the life of the blessed; its four rivers, the four virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice; its trees, all useful knowledge; its fruits, the customs of the godly; its tree of life, wisdom, the mother of all good; and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the experience of a broken commandment." According to the second, and, in his view, more suitable series of meanings, "Paradise is the Church; the four rivers of Paradise are the four Gospels; the fruit trees, the saints, and the fruit their works; the tree of life is the holy of holies, Christ; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the will's free choice." (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 21.) Paradise was regarded as truly a garden of delights; the life of the first parents therein as a reflex of heavenly serenity and joy. "Nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man's

mental or bodily enjoyment. Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow." (De Civ. Dei, XIV. 10.)

As compared with the previous period the present showed a tendency to prefer the theory of a twofold nature in man to that of a threefold. The latter view still claimed some adherents in the Greek Church. Didymus of Alexandria, in particular, gave to it a definite and unmistakable expression. The Latin version of his work on the Holy Spirit gives his words as follows: "Sicut enim alia est anima, et corpus aliud; sic et aliud est spiritus ab anima." (§ 55. Compare Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XX.) On the other hand, Athanasius and Theodoret distinctly repudiated the threefold division. (Contra Apol., I. 13, 14; Dial., II.) A number of Greek writers also may be referred to who speak in general terms of man as twofold, thereby intimating that at least they did not distinguish widely and definitely between soul and spirit. (Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., III. 4; Basil, Hom. in Psalm., XXXII. 6; Gregory Naz., Orat., XL. 8.) The fact that Apollinaris employed the threefold division in the interest of his heretical Christology no doubt helped to discredit the trichotomist theory in the minds of some of these writers. In the Latin Church the leading theologians expressed themselves in favor of the twofold division. (Augustine, De Anima et ejus Origine, IV. 36, 37; De Fide et Symbolo, X.; Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XV., XX.; Gregory the Great, Moral., XI. 5, XIV. 15.) According to Augustine, the spirit is the nobler factor of the soul, "a certain rational portion of the same, of which beasts are devoid."

The natural immortality of the soul was universally accepted. As respects its incorporeal nature there was less

unanimity. Faustus of Rhegium maintained in distinct terms, that it is corporeal (Epist., IV.), and a number of writers (quoted under the subject of angelology) used language which seems to imply the same view. We may conclude, however, that Augustine and Mamertus Claudianus represented the main drift of the age in contending for the incorporeal nature of the soul.

On the generative function of human nature opinion was still very much divided. Gregory of Nyssa maintained that such a function was foreign to man in his original state, and that the human species was designed to be multiplied, not after the manner of irrational animals, but after the manner of angels. (De Hom. Opif., XVI.-XXII.) Augustine taught, that, apart from transgression, the command to increase and to multiply would have been fulfilled by the birth of children to the first parents; that, however, they would have been begotten without lust and born without pain. (De Civ. Dei, XIV. 23-26.) As to the actual origination of the individual, Gregory of Nyssa held the traducian theory. (De Hom. Opif., XXIX.) Athanasius seems to have adopted the same view; we find him teaching that in Adam was the principle of the propagation of the race. (Orat. contra Arianos, II. 48.) Theodoret, on the other hand, gave distinct utterance to the theory of creationism. (Græc. Affect. Curat., V.; Hær. Fab., V. 9.) In the Latin Church, Jerome, while stating that traducianism was the belief of the greater part of the Occidentals, expressed himself in favor of creationism. The same view had already been announced by Hilary. (Tractat. super Psalm., XCI. 3.) Augustine was not able to decide definitely between the two theories, though he saw that creationism involved some embarrassing points for his anthropology. (De An. et ejus Orig., Lib. I.; Epist. CLXVI. ad Hieron.) Jerome, yielding to the authority of Augustine, finally adopted the rôle of indecision, as did also Gregory the Great. (Epist., IX. 52.) Thus the

data which the period supplies certify to us the opinions of individuals, rather than any definite tendencies of the Church at large. Judging, however, from what appears in the next period, the drift was in the direction of creationism.

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — Unless the statement of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 21) was aimed at certain writers of an earlier age, it must be concluded that there were some in this period who allegorized the account of the fall, and denied its literal sense. However, a definite substitution of an allegorical for the literal sense is not discoverable (so far as we are aware) in the writings of any prominent church teacher. Universally in the Catholic Church the essence of the fall was located in a misuse of the free will. The alternatives were at the disposal of the dwellers in Paradise. By nothing within or without was their will absolutely determined to the fatal trespass.

On the results of the fall the developments are of peculiar interest. No era more fruitful in connection with this part of anthropology is known to history. Nearly all the theological systems of later times were here anticipated, inasmuch as the opposite extremes, together with various intermediate types had their following. An enumeration of the different parties and their tenets will serve to show how broad a field was covered.

(1.) *The Greek Church.* — Anthropology not having received definite and thorough consideration in the Greek Church, we can point here to but very few exact statements upon the subject. Writers did not feel the same need of guarded and precise expression upon this topic as upon those which were connected with sharp and searching controversy. More emphasis, therefore, must be laid upon the general bent of their teachings than upon isolated statements.

Some strong expressions may be found with the Greek fathers of the period upon the effects of the fall. Thus,

Athanasius speaks of man as corrupted and made like to the beasts by the primal apostasy, as obnoxious before his birth to the servitude of corruption and the curse of the law. (In Illud, etc.; Orat., II. 14.) Gregory Nazianzen indulges similar language, speaking of man as wholly fallen, and as condemned on account of the disobedience of the first man and the fraud of the devil. (Orat., XXII. 13.) But there is abundant evidence that these and similar statements are not to be taken in an Augustinian sense. The same writers who employ them assert for the fallen man an element of free will, so that his salvation is dependent upon his own choice and endeavor, rather than upon any unconditional election of grace; and in some instances they describe the condition into which he is born as free from demerit. Gregory Nazianzen, for example, speaks of the blessedness of the saint as his own acquisition as well as the gift of God, associates the free endeavor of the individual with the grace which bestows the original powers of the soul and assists their operation, and describes those dying in infancy as unworthy of any punishment, inasmuch as they are free from wickedness. (Orat. II. 17, XXVII. 13, XL. 23. Compare Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. IV. 19-21, VII. 3; Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. Catech., XXX.; De Infantibus; Chrysostom, Hom. II. and XXXIX. in 1 Cor.; Hom. XVI. in Epist. ad Rom.; Theodoret, Hær. Fab., V. 18.)

In fine, the Greek anthropology unmistakably ascribed to the fallen man a measure of ability for meeting divine requirements, and on the whole portrayed his state as one of moral infirmity, rather than as one of radical corruption or positive guilt. It taught, as in the previous period, that the fall robbed man of the strong support which he had in intimate communion with God, and left the soul exposed to the assaults of the devil, and to the pressure of the sensuous nature. As a fair summary on the topic, the following may be quoted from Kahnis: "We may regard as common to

the Cappadocian fathers [Basil and the two Gregories], Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Cyril of Alexandria, and other Greek fathers of this time, the teaching that through Adam's sin death has come upon all men, together with a predominance of the sensuous nature, still without the loss of the power for good which lies in the reason and the free will, in virtue of which man, with the assistance of divine grace, can lay hold upon salvation, and strive after moral perfection." (Dogmatik.)

(2.) *The Latin Church before the Pelagian Controversy.*—

The chief distinction between the Latin anthropology and the Greek at this stage was the more positive and distinct assertion by the former of the bearing of Adam's sin upon the moral condition of the race. Hilary speaks of a wickedness (*malitia*) which belongs to us on account of the condition of our common origin, of being separated in baptism from the sins of our origin, and affirms that in the error of Adam the whole human race went astray. (Tract. super Psal., CXVIII., Lit. 15; Comm. in Matt., X. 24, XVIII. 6.) We find him also quoted by Augustine as anticipating his own exegesis of Rom. v. 12, according to which the apostle teaches that the whole race sinned in Adam. (Contra Duas Epist., IV. 7.) Ambrose brings out still more amply and explicitly the corrupting force of Adamic connections. He teaches that an infant a day old is not free from sin; that the transgression of Adam and Eve sold us into servitude; that Christ alone among men was free from the contagion which is transmitted by generation; that we were all in Adam, fell with him, perished with him, and with him were ejected from Paradise. "Before we are born," he says, "we are stained with contagion, and before we see the light we receive the injury of the original transgression." (De Bono Mort., XI.; De Jacob, etc., I. 3; Apol. David, XI.; Expos. Evang. secund. Luc., VII.; De Excessu Frat., II. 6.)

At the same time neither Hilary nor Ambrose thought

that the inherited corruption is so unqualified as completely to bind the will. Both held the synergistic theory, which assumes a measure of moral ability in the fallen man. On this point Hilary went as far as the more radical advocates of free will among the Greek fathers, distinctly assigning to man the initiative in the process of moral recovery, and ascribing to divine agency the task of supplementing and perfecting what has already been begun. The following are among his statements: "Est quidem in fide manendi a Deo munus, sed incipiendi a nobis origo est. . . . Divinæ misericordiæ est, ut volentes adjuvet, incipientes confirmet, adeuntes recipiat: ex nobis autem initium est, ut ille perficiat." (Tract. super Psal., CXVIII., Lit. 14, 16.) Ambrose was inclined to give less scope to human agency, but he regarded it as a real factor in conjunction with grace, as is evident from the fact that he made predestination dependent upon foreknowledge of merit, and taught that abiding or not abiding in the blessings of salvation is in the province of the individual. (De Fide, VI. 83; Expos. in Psal., CXVIII. 9.)

Augustine, before the rise of the Pelagian controversy, stood substantially on the same ground as his predecessors in the Latin Church. This he himself abundantly acknowledged in his later works. In his "Retractions" he represents that at one time, not yet understanding the election of grace, he taught that God elected Jacob because of His foresight of Jacob's faith, that faith is the product of our own faculties which God follows with His gifts, and that all men can apply themselves to the fulfilling of God's commands if they will. (I. 23. 2, I. 10. 2. Compare De Prædest. Sanct., VII.)

(3.) *Pelagius and his School.* — Pelagius, a monk from Britain, came to Rome in the early part of the fifth century, and won there general esteem by his pure life. His peculiar theological views were first challenged in North Africa, where a synod in 412 excommunicated his disciple Cœles-

tius. Two synods in Palestine, whither Pelagius went, acquitted him of heresy. But the case was still pressed in the West. North African synods renewed their censure, and Roman bishops (416-418) pronounced the anathema against Pelagius and Cœlestius, and required neighboring bishops to concur in the sentence of condemnation. A few refused compliance, among whom Julian of Eclanum is especially noteworthy. He clung to his convictions until his death, and both in character and ability may be ranked as the most eminent representative of the Pelagian party.

Pelagianism never gathered a sect, though here and there individuals continued to affiliate with its views. As a subject of real controversy, it pertained almost entirely to the West. The East never took the questions at issue into thorough consideration. The sentence which the council of Ephesus, in 431, passed against Pelagianism, was little else than a party expedient, due to a seeming connection between the Pelagian exiles and Nestorius, and to the desire to pay tribute to the authority of the West as something that was indispensable in the crusade against the accused bishop.

An even and placid experience on the part of the cultured monk was no doubt a factor in shaping his anthropology. No one who had felt to the full the outbreking force of intemperate passions and desires, and had passed through profound moral struggles, only to experience successive defeats until rescued by divine grace, would have had any inclination to originate such a system as came from Pelagius.

Pelagianism proceeds from the standpoint of an extreme individualism. The idea of the solidarity of the race is left by it completely in the background. Each individual is regarded as independent morally, as if each had come into being in the same manner as Adam.

Adam's fall, therefore, according to the Pelagian teaching, was simply the fall of Adam. No corruption which his

nature may have imbibed therefrom was transmitted to his posterity. (Augustine, *De Peccat. Orig.*, II.) Even physical death is not to be traced to that source; for the body is naturally mortal, and death would have been the lot of Adam and of all the race had there been no sin. So, at least, some of the Pelagians taught; though it would appear that this last point was not unanimously and steadfastly maintained. (Augustine, *De Gest. Pelag.*, XXIII.; *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum*, II. 66; *Contra Duas Epist.*, IV. 1, 2, 6; Faustus, *De Grat. Dei*, I. 1.) So far as Pelagianism allowed that death comes in consequence of the first transgression, it was careful to declare that it is not indicative of any guilt (except in Adam), and in itself is not to be regarded as an evil.

From this it follows that the only real evil which descended from the disobedient Adam was the power of an evil example. Indeed, there is no other channel for the transmission of evil. In no way, save by the power of an evil example, can the sin of one person transmit moral harm to another. A perverse example in parents tends to excite perverse conduct in children; and so the earlier generations mislead the later, though not necessarily, inasmuch as it is the prerogative of the will of each moral agent to rise superior to every vicious precedent. (*De Peccat. Orig.*, XVI.; *Opus Imp.*, II. 47.)

Freedom of will is the indispensable condition of moral character, of personal merit or demerit. And the very essence of this freedom lies in the power of contrary or alternative choice, the power in any given instance to choose either the good or the evil, and the one as truly as the other. "Whatever is bound by natural necessity is deprived of all freedom of will and deliberate choice." (*De Nat. et Grat.*, LIV.; *De Perfect. Just. Hom.*, VI.; *Opus Imp.*, VI. 9.) At the starting-point of every moral career lies this freedom of will. Apart from its exercise, no positive moral character, whether good or evil, comes into being. A good

or an evil nature is the product of voluntary actions, is the habit of will which results from its employment in a particular direction. "Nothing good," says Pelagius, "and nothing evil, on account of which we are deemed either laudable or blameworthy, is born with us, but it is done by us, for we are born not fully developed, but with a capacity for either conduct; we are formed naturally without either virtue or vice." (*De Peccat. Orig.*, XIV.)

Inasmuch as each individual has free will as his birth-right, and a free will which at the outset is unhindered by any corruption of nature, the inference is unavoidable that each is capable, in the use of his own native powers, of perfectly obeying the law of God. This is a possibility, too, which, according to Pelagianism, the case of Abel and others shows to have been actually realized. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, III. 23; *De Gest. Pelag.*, XXII.) Divine grace, as something added to man's natural powers, is not strictly indispensable; eternal life may be reached without it. Grace, in this sense, has simply the office of facilitating the attainment of the ultimate end, making its acquisition less arduous. (*De Grat. Christi*, XXVII.-XXX.) The Pelagian theory, therefore, clearly limits the province of grace, and magnifies that of individual effort. This is evinced by the items which the Pelagians felt constrained to include under the term "grace," such as our creation from nothing, our original faculties which make righteous conduct possible, and external revelation, as well as the forgiveness of sins and the direct working of the Holy Spirit upon the inner nature. (*Opus Imp.*, I. 94, 95, III. 114; *De Nat. et Grat.*, LVI.; *De Grat. Christi*, IV., XL.-XLV.; *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.*, XXV.) Had more stress been laid by them upon the last item, evidently there would have been less occasion to dwell upon those first mentioned in answering the charge that they ignored grace. Indeed, it was counter to the essential spirit of Pelagianism to allow much scope to the inner working of the Spirit, since any large

concession in this direction appeared opposed to its supreme interest in the doctrine of human freedom and ability.

In justification of its denial of corruption and guilt, as pertaining to the state in which the descendants of Adam are born, Pelagianism appealed to the mode in which the soul originates. Inasmuch as each soul, it suggested, is the product of a special creative act of God, there is no chance for the transmission of sin from soul to soul. Transmission, if it occurs at all, must be from body to body, since this part alone of the individual comes through natural propagation, — the heretical theory which makes the body by itself capable of sinfulness and condemnation. Pelagianism also appealed to the divine holiness, benevolence, and self-consistency, maintaining that it is contrary to these attributes that God should seek to perpetuate sin, and should charge it upon those who have and can have no part in its perpetration. “It cannot by any means be conceded,” says Pelagius, “that God, who remits to a man his own sins, should impute to him the sin of another.” In a like vein, Julian indignantly exclaims against Augustine: “The very God, you say, who commends His love in us, who loved us, and spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us, He Himself so judges, He Himself is the persecutor of infants, He Himself delivers little children to the eternal fires on the score of an evil will, though He knows that they could have neither a good nor an evil will.” Again, the Pelagians claimed that, if the sin of another can harm men irrespective of all conditions on their part, then the righteousness of another ought to benefit them in the same unconditional way. “If Adam’s sin was injurious even to those who do not sin, therefore Christ’s righteousness profits those who do not believe.” The Pelagians, moreover, charged the opposing theory with fatalism. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, III. 5; *Opus Imp.*, I. 48, III. 82; *Contra Duas Epist.*, II. 10.)

In reconciling their own view with the importance and

worth which the Church of that age attached to infant baptism, the Pelagians could only say that baptism transfers the infant from a *good* to a *better* state,—consecrates to be a member of Christ one already innocent and uncondemned. (De Peccat. Orig., XXI. ; Opus Imp., I. 54.)

(4.) *Augustine*.—The profound moral struggles of Augustine gave him the most decided views of man's depravity and moral bondage, while his experience of salvation equally magnified his impression of the sovereign grace of God. From his first entrance upon a Christian life he was inclined to place the moral weakness and demerit of man in infinite contrast with the saving power and free compassion of God ; and it was only natural that this distinctive bias should grow in strength as he grew in years. For a time, however, the task of refuting Manichæism, with its necessitarian traits, tended to check his bent toward an unqualified emphasis upon the moral helplessness of the natural man. But this restraint was finally more than offset by the stimulus which he received from the radical tenets of Pelagianism ; and in opposition to its doctrinal innovation he brought forward a counter innovation.

The innovating character of Augustinianism is beyond question. His more extreme tenets are not to be found with a single one of the preceding fathers. Like Origen, whom he resembled in mental fertility and excelled in argumentative force and precision, he pushed out beyond the sphere of thought and belief in which the age preceding him had revolved. That the one passed under the imputation of heresy, while the other was honored as a master of orthodoxy, was due to something else than their relative divergence from the antecedent theology of the Church.

Augustinianism appears as the reverse of Pelagianism in its starting-point, its spirit, and its goal. While the latter set out from a strict individualism, was self-dependent and self-confident in spirit, and sought to honor the native ability in man, and to incite him to the working out

of his own salvation, the former started from the idea of the solidarity of the race, was self-disparaging in spirit, and sought to glorify divine grace and nurture entire dependence upon God. The one placed religion more in acting, the other in believing. The one deferred to the dictates of a keen understanding, the other insisted upon an attitude of awe before the overshadowing majesty of God, and of reverential submission to the oracles which reveal His will. In fine, the history of theological thought presents few contrasts as deeply significant as is that between these two systems.

Augustine begins the connected chain of his teaching with a lofty ideal of man's original estate. There was logical occasion for this, since the greatness of the disaster resulting from the fall is made to appear less of an anomaly in proportion to the greatness of the crime and demerit which it involved. Adam, in his view, was not in mind and heart as an undeveloped child. He was rather the man of commanding mental and moral stature, clothed with princely attributes of wisdom and positive holiness. Adam's holiness was not, indeed, independent of the divine support, since no creature has independent holiness; it was, however, positive, involving a hearty impulse toward the love of God and obedience to His laws. No neutral state served as the starting-point of man's moral career. From the outset he was endowed with a good will. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 68; *Opus Imp.*, V. 1, 61, VI. 16.)

Conjoined with the positive righteousness or holiness of the unfallen man was a noble freedom. In this, as Augustine very clearly teaches, two elements are to be distinguished,—a more essential and a less essential; or, to borrow a different terminology, a real and a formal. The former is the unshackled life which the soul finds in the perfect love and service of the good. In this lies the very essence of freedom. The more absolutely the will is given up to goodness, and is bound by it, the more free is the

individual. The highest freedom, therefore, coincides with a certain necessity; not the necessity of outward constraint, but the necessity established by a normal bent of full strength in the inner nature. God is perfectly free in His holiness; yet He is necessarily holy. We freely will our own happiness; yet we find ourselves unable to will the contrary. The other element of the freedom of Adam in Paradise, the one so emphasized by the Pelagians, was the power of contrary choice. This is to be regarded as an accident of freedom rather than its essence. While it may be necessary to constitute one a probationary agent, it is not necessary to constitute one a free agent. It was given to Adam for probationary purposes. He was designed to outgrow it, and to issue into that highest freedom where sin is no longer possible (where the *non posse peccare* has taken the place of the *posse non peccare*), the state which all the redeemed are to reach in the future life. "It was expedient," says Augustine, "that man should be at first so created as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong; not without reward if he willed the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter. But in the future life it shall not be in his power to will evil; and yet this will constitute no restriction on the freedom of his will. On the contrary, his will shall be much freer when it shall be wholly impossible for him to be the slave of sin. . . . The first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin; the last was much greater, not to be able to sin." (Enchirid., CV.; De Corrept. et Grat., XXXIII.; De Nat. et Grat., LIV.; De Spir. et Lit., LII.)

But the transcendent opportunity before Adam, in the proper use of which he would have passed beyond the possibility both of sin and of death, was not improved by him. His love began to diverge in a measure from the supreme and unchangeable good, and to be drawn toward self. The supports of his integrity having been thus weakened, he

yielded to the tempter and committed the deadly trespass. In proportion to his lofty endowments, and the blessed life in which he had been insphered, was the guilt of his disobedience. The simplicity of the broken command, and the ease with which it might have been kept, also enhanced the enormity of his demerit. Indeed, no words can exaggerate the heinousness of Adam's apostasy. "*Tanta impietate peccavit, quantam nos metiri atque existimare non possumus,*" — "He sinned with an impiety greater than we can measure or estimate." (*Opus Imp.*, III. 65, III. 57; *De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 12, 13, XXI. 12; *Enchirid.*, XLV., XLVIII.)

Results corresponding to his sin overtook the disobedient Adam. Upon body and soul the death sentence was speedily executed. At once Adam was smitten with mortality, and began to verge toward old age and corruption. The harmony of his nature was destroyed. The flesh began to war against the spirit. Affections common to man with the brutes arose in intemperate force. The will became enslaved; its freedom now amounted simply to a freedom to sin. The fallen Adam, left to himself, could not help sinning; he could at most only choose between greater and less sins; in no case could he act from that motive of pure love without which every act has an element of sin. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 21; *De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 17; *Enchirid.*, CVI.; *Serm.*, CLVI.)

All these features of the fallen Adam, the mortality, the corruption, the moral inability, and the guilt, pertain to his posterity no less than they did to him. His descendants are by birth what he was made by disobedience. (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 3.) "The whole race of which he was the root was corrupted in him." (*Enchirid.*, XXVI.) "All that are born mortals have the wrath of God with them, that wrath which Adam first received." (*Tract. in Joan.*, XIV. 13.) The corrupted and condemned man "begot corrupted and condemned children." (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 14.) "Una

erat massa perditionis ex Adam," — "There was one mass of perdition from Adam." (Serm., XXVI.) "Primus homo totam massam damnabilem fecit." (Serm. CLXV. Compare Epist. CLXXXVIII.; De Corrept. et Grat., XII.) "No man can will any good thing unless he is aided by Him who cannot will evil. And no man can believe on Christ, that is, come to Him, unless it be given to him." (Contra Duas Epist., I. 7.) "There is a necessary sin from which there is no freedom to abstain, which now is not only sin, but also the punishment of sin." (Opus Imp., V. 59.)

The reason for identity of moral condition between the fallen Adam and his posterity is the solidarity of the race, — the fact that all were in the first transgressor and shared in his trespass. "We were all in that one man, since we all were that one man who fell into sin. For not yet was the particular form created and distributed to us, in which we as individuals were to live, but already the seminal nature was there from which we were to be propagated; and this being vitiated by sin, and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man in any other state." (De Civ. Dei, XIII. 14. Compare Retract., I. 13. 5; De Nat. et Grat., III.; Epist. XCVIII.; Opus Imp., I. 48, IV. 104.)

The explanation, according to Augustine, of the unbroken transmission of the corrupt nature, notwithstanding parents are in many cases among the regenerate, lies in the fact that it is the old man rather than the renewed man that begets. Even in the regenerate, a certain concupiscence remains as a property, though not as a cause of condemnation; and this concupiscence, or lust, being operative in every natural generation, secures the propagation of the fleshly, fallen nature. Christ alone among men, as having been supernaturally conceived, escaped the taint with which the race is infected. (De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss., II. 11, 44; De Nupt. et Concup., I. 21, 28; Enchirid., XLI.; De Trin., XIII. 18.)

A parallel to the propagation of sin through diverse channels is supplied by nature, ordered on purpose of God (as Augustine suggests), that "this mysterious verity" might have some palpable evidence in its support. "As a wild olive grows out of the seed of the wild olive, and from the seed of the true olive springs also nothing but a wild olive, notwithstanding the very great difference there is between the wild olive and the olive; so what is born in the flesh, either of a sinner or of a just man, is in both instances a sinner." (De Nupt. et Concup., I. 21, II. 58; Contra Duas Epist., I. 11.)

The scriptural passage upon which Augustine especially depended for the proof of original sin, or the corruption and guilt descending to the race from Adam, was Rom. v. 12. (De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss., I. 11, III. 14; De Nupt. et Concup., II. 3; Contra Duas Epist., IV. 7; De Trin., IV. 12.) In this verse Augustine rendered ἐφ' ᾧ by *in whom* (in quo), instead of by *in that* or *because*, and thus found the doctrine that the race participated in the first transgression. Eph. ii. 3 was also quoted.

Having reduced the moral ability of the natural man to the vanishing point, Augustine could logically complete his scheme only by making divine grace the sole cause of man's recovery. The doctrines of unconditional election and irresistible grace came in, by natural sequence, after he had adopted his view of the results of the fall. But these topics may more appropriately be considered in another section.

(5.) *Semi-Pelagianism*. — A third party naturally came in between the Pelagian and Augustinian extremes. This had its headquarters in Gaul, and is known as the Semi-Pelagian school. Its earliest distinguished representative was John Cassianus, a learned monk and a disciple of Chrysostom. Later advocates of its tenets were Vincentius, Faustus of Rhegium, and Gennadius. A large proportion of the Gallic clergy were enlisted in its favor, and

it won the victory at the synod of Arles in 472, and that of Lyons in 475.

Semi-Pelagianism distinctly repudiated the Pelagian doctrine of man's complete moral ability. "No one of the righteous," says Cassianus, "is competent to maintain righteousness, unless moment by moment the divine clemency extends a supporting hand to his wavering and failing strength." (Collat., III., 12.) "It is most firmly to be believed," says Gennadius, "that in the transgression of Adam all men lost their natural power and innocence; and that no one through free will is able to rise from the depth of that ruin, unless uplifted by the grace of a pitying God." (De Eccl. Dogmat., XXII.)

On the other hand, Semi-Pelagianism distinctly repudiated the Augustinian doctrine of man's complete moral inability. It held that the fall of Adam entailed death and corruption of nature upon his posterity. This corruption, however, is not so radical as to eliminate the free will. The natural man can accept or reject the help of divine grace. Original sin in him involves moral infirmity, rather than complete impotence. "There remains in man always," says Cassianus, "a free will which is able either to neglect or to love the grace of God." (Collat., XIII. 12. Compare Faustus, De Grat. Dei et Lib. Arbit., I. 10; Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XXI., XLVI.) Holding this position, Semi-Pelagianism was, of course, exceedingly averse to the doctrine of unconditional election to eternal salvation.

(6.) *Moderate Augustinianism.*—While Semi-Pelagianism was of no little importance in Gaul for a century, it had in the same quarter opponents who were more or less decided advocates of Augustinianism. The drift finally turned, if not toward the latter, toward a modified form of the same. As represented by the council of Orange in 529, this moderate Augustinianism differed from Semi-Pelagianism in its greater stress upon inherited corruption, and in its distinct

declaration that divine grace always precedes the good works of men,—whereas some of the Semi-Pelagians, and among them Cassianus, taught that it was possible for man to take the initiative. The main distinction between it and strict Augustinianism was its negative attitude in respect to the doctrines of irresistible grace and absolute predestination. It commanded, no doubt, the favor of a very large proportion of the best minds in the Latin Church in the centuries succeeding its rise. “Gregory the Great,” says Schaff, “represents the moderated Augustinian system, with the *gratia præveniens*, but without the *gratia irresistibilis* and without a particularistic *decretum absolutum*. Through him this milder Augustinianism exerted great influence upon the mediæval theology. Yet the strict Augustinianism always had its adherents.”

The nature of sin in general, if not a subject of extended discussion, was considered by several writers. Among the more speculative fathers there was a tendency to adopt the negative conception of sin, the view which Origen had advanced. In thus allying sin, or moral evil, with non-entity, the idea seems to have been,—(1.) that there is no absolute will back of it, that it is not from the source of all being; (2.) that it is not a substance, but rather an accident; (3.) that as an accidental property it denotes pre-eminently a lack, a diminution of being, an encroachment of vanity and emptiness upon the soul.

A definition from this standpoint is given by Athanasius. “Non-existent,” he says, “are the evil things; but existent are the good, since they were made by the existing one.” (De Incarn., § 4; Contra Gent., §§ 4, 7.) “Evil,” says Basil, “is not a living and animated essence, but a condition in the soul contrary to virtue, produced in the sluggish by their falling away from the good.” (Hom. in Hexaem., II. 4.) Again he remarks: “Evil is the privation of the good,” as death is the privation of life and blindness the

privation of sight. (Hom., *Quod Deus*, etc., §§ 5, 7.) “We are not able,” says Gregory of Nyssa, “to think of any other origin of evil than the absence of the good,” — a view which he illustrates by the incoming of darkness upon the departure of light. (Orat. Catech., V.–VII.)

Augustine repeatedly defines evil as negation or privation. “What,” he asks, “is that which we call evil, but the absence of the good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present go away from the body and dwell elsewhere; they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere; when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.” (Enchirid., XI.) “Let no one look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is to that which has less of being, — this is to begin to have an evil will.” (De Civ. Dei, XII. 7. Compare Tract. in Joan., I. 13.)

Notwithstanding the asceticism of the age, and the tendency practically to associate evil with the body, theologians very generally repudiated the notion that the body itself is essentially evil, or the prime source of evil. “It was not the corruptible flesh,” says Augustine, “that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. And though from this corruption of the flesh there arise certain incitements to vice, and, indeed, vicious desires, yet we must not attribute to the flesh all the vices of a wicked life, in case we thereby clear the devil of all these, for he has no flesh.” (De Civ. Dei, XIV. 3.) “The flesh is not evil, but to live according to the flesh is evil. . . .

The flesh will live agreeably to the soul, if the soul lives agreeably to God." (Serm., CLVI. Compare Theodoret, *Interp. Epist. ad Rom.*, VI. 13; Pseudo Dionysius, *De Div. Nom.*, IV. 27.) Chrysostom is often at pains to emphasize the same idea. "Mortality," he says, "is not the cause of sin: accuse it not: but the wicked will is the root of all the mischief. For why was not Abel at all the worse for his body? Why are the devils not at all the better for being incorporeal?" (Hom. in 1 Cor., XVII. Compare Hom. in *Epist. ad Rom.*, XI.; *Comm. in Epist. ad Gal.*, V. 12, 17.)

Viewed from the standpoint of our relations to God, sin, according to Augustine, consists pre-eminently in pride or selfishness. "What," he asks, "is the origin of our evil will but pride? And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself." (*De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 13.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

DURING the earlier stages of the Arian controversy, very little attention was given to the subject of Christology. Catholic writers stopped short with the general assumption that Christ is both God and man, neither specifying the exact sense in which He might be called man, nor discussing the mode of harmonizing a plurality of natures with personal unity. But the Arian agitation itself finally served as an occasion of a specific consideration of Christology. While the stimulus may have come more immediately from Apollinaris, it was from Arianism that he received a principal incentive to the development and advocacy of his theory.

Arianism denied to the Redeemer a rational human soul, and charged the Catholic party with a substitution of two persons for the single Christ. Apollinaris of Laodicea, an ardent supporter of the Nicene faith, seems to have recognized a certain validity in the objection. He considered that it greatly simplified the view of the Redeemer's person to assume that, in incarnating Himself, He took simply the body with its life principle, or animal soul, the place of the rational soul being supplied by the Logos. This view, he argued, corresponds very exactly to the scriptural declaration that the Word became flesh. It is also specially commended by the fact that it removes from Christ's person the obnoxious factor of a human will, which in its nature

is mutable. To unite the Divine Son simply with the impersonal factors flesh and animal soul, is the most perfect offset to the Arian doctrine of a mutable Christ, and is also essential to the Saviour's perfection, since He alone is a perfect Saviour who stands above the liability to fall into sin. The doings and the sufferings of Christ appear clothed with a virtue adequate to their redemptive purpose only when they are associated directly with a divine subject. Moreover, without the human soul, Christ is a sufficient representative of humanity. He has the same three factors in His person which every man has, namely, spirit, soul, and body. While Christ as Logos or spirit is eternal and unchangeable and infinite, He is still, as spirit, in kinship with man, being the archetype of universal humanity, and destined from eternity to bear the human form.

The view of Apollinaris, notwithstanding the respect in which he had been held by the Nicene fathers, called forth their decided opposition. They regarded it as increasing the difficulty of scriptural exegesis by removing the factor with which Christ's exhibition of human traits might be associated, and as every way antagonistic to the saving office of Christ, since it neither brought the more essential part of human nature into union with the divine, nor made it possible to consider Christ a real example for men. Apollinaris, therefore, was formally censured, first by local synods, and then by the ecumenical council of Constantinople in 381. His Christology, viewed in its totality, was no doubt alien to the central current of thought in the Church. Still, a leading design of his, namely, to represent Christ's human nature as impersonal, was in harmony with the teachings which representative writers in the Church ultimately sanctioned.

The Greek fathers of the Arian era, who opposed Apollinaris, being chiefly interested in the divinity of Christ, greatly subordinated the human to the divine aspect. While they insisted upon the complete humanity of Christ,

they still regarded this as overshadowed by the associated divinity. By this order of representation, they thought to secure the unity of the Redeemer's person. "The teachers of this period," says Dorner, "thought it possible to avoid all dissonance, and to secure the unity by assigning to the divine aspect overpowering and sole-dominating power." This bent is especially noticeable in Gregory of Nyssa. As a drop of vinegar, he says, when cast into the sea, is transformed and becomes a part of the sea-water, so the flesh of Christ was transformed, and lost all its natural properties by union with the divine infinitude. (*Antirrhet. adv. Apol.*, XLII.)

Early Catholic Christology, in the Latin Church, was distinguished in general by considerable stress upon the human aspect. We find Hilary, however, the most eminent in christological respects among the Latin writers of the Arian era, assigning to the divine a marked predominance over the human. While he assumes a gradual development of the finite nature in Christ, he makes this not so much a free development of the human factor as the product of the shaping and controlling energy of the divine, which by this means prepares for a complete union of the two. He gives utterance also to the idea advanced by Clement of Alexandria; namely, that Christ was not by nature subjected to bodily necessities, and ate and drank merely to show the reality of his body. (*De Trin.*, X. 24.)

The more distinct recognition, in this period, of the human nature of Christ came from the Antiochian school. This was the school of biblical criticism. It studied the Bible in accordance with the maxims of a sober exegesis. Such study naturally drew attention to the wide contrasts which may be found among the attributes which the New Testament associates with Christ. At the same time much stress was laid upon freedom as a condition of moral excellence. Hence it came about that this school distinguished broadly between the divine and the human in Christ, — be-

tween Christ as Son of God and Christ as Son of Man, — and regarded the latter as developing much in the same free way as men in general. Theodore of Mopsuestia, in whom the tendencies of the school came to their boldest and most definite expression, undoubtedly did not fall far short of predicating simply a (peculiarly intimate) moral union between Christ as man and Christ as God, — a permanent association rather than a complete union of the two.

On the other hand, the Alexandrian school continued in the spirit of the Nicene fathers, who greatly subordinated the human to the divine. Instead of dwelling upon the distinction of the natures, they emphasized their unity. In pursuance of a mystical bent, they were disposed to regard the human as in some inexplicable way fused into oneness with the divine.

These two schools first came to a positive collision in the persons of Nestorius, Bishop of Constantinople, and Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria. Personal jealousies and ambitions had much to do with instigating and carrying forward the strife; but real doctrinal differences were involved. Perhaps neither the one nor the other was disposed to advocate, with a clear understanding of his own position, what might be called an heretical extreme; but each tended more or less toward such an extreme, — the one to the heresy of compromising Christ's personal unity, the other to the heresy of denying two natures in Him.

The immediate occasion of the outbreak was the declaration of Nestorius that *θεοτόκος* is not an appropriate term to apply to the Virgin, and that she ought rather to be called *χριστοτόκος*, — that is, mother or bearer of Christ, instead of mother of God. The term which he rejected had become quite well naturalized in the Church, and to challenge it seemed to the opponents of Nestorius a plain indication of a disposition to separate unduly the two natures in Christ, and indeed really to divide the one Redeemer into two persons. A crusade was accordingly begun against

Nestorius, which resulted in his defeat and banishment. The council of Ephesus, in 431, which sat in judgment upon him, accomplished little during its session in the way of a positive construction of Christology. The creed which came in as a supplement to its work, and was signed by representatives of the contending parties, was of the nature of a compromise, affirming at once the term *theotokos*, and ascribing two natures to Christ.

The extremists of neither party were satisfied with such a settlement. A sect was finally formed in the interest of the Nestorian doctrine, a refuge being found for the same within the Persian dominion. On the other hand, the radical wing of the Cyrillian party began to agitate for the doctrine of a single nature in Christ. This party found a mouthpiece in Eutyches, who presided over a cloister in Constantinople. He taught that the human attributes were assimilated to the divine in Christ, so that His body is not consubstantial with ours, and nothing human, in the stricter sense, is to be found in Him. Eutyches was condemned by a synod at Constantinople in 448; but his cause was zealously supported by the Alexandrian bishop Dioscurus, together with a large section of the Church in Egypt. The synod of Ephesus, in 449, was dominated by this party, and declared in favor of Eutyches. This decision, distasteful to the greater part of the Church, both on account of its doctrinal import and the violent measures by which it was gained, served as an incentive to the calling of a new ecumenical council. This was convened at Chalcedon in 451, and both in numbers and in doctrinal significance ranks among the foremost councils in the history of the Church.

Leo the Great, Bishop of Rome, was largely instrumental in the assembling of the council, and its decisions followed his definitions, as they had been expressed in his letter to Flavian. The creed of Chalcedon is as follows: "Following the holy fathers, we unanimously teach one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ; complete as to His God-

head, and complete as to His manhood; truly God, and truly man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; consubstantial with the Father as to His Godhead, and consubstantial also with us as to His manhood; like unto us in all things, yet without sin; as to His Godhead begotten of the Father before all worlds, but as to His manhood in these last days born, for us men and for our salvation, of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, known in two natures, without confusion, without conversion, without severance, and without division; the distinction of the natures being in no wise abolished by their union, but the peculiarity of each nature being maintained, and both concurring in one person and hypostasis. We confess not a Son divided and sundered into two persons, but one and the same Son, and Only-begotten, and God-Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ."

On the merits of this creed theologians, even those acknowledging both the divine and the human in Christ, have been divided. Some have regarded it as the most finished exposition of Christology which has been, or is likely to be, produced; but others, especially those writing from the standpoint of Lutheranism, have criticised it as seriously defective. While, as they maintain, it sets forth the factors that are to be acknowledged in Christ, it does not bring them into suitable reconciliation with each other. Dorner, among others, indulges this criticism. The one merit, in his view, of the Chalcedonian symbol, is that it points out the extremes that must be avoided, declaring "that no doctrine of the person of Christ can lay claim to the name of Christian which puts a double Christ in place of the incarnate Son of God, or which teaches either a mere conversion of God into a man, or, *vice versa*, of a man into God."

A long-continued agitation followed the council of Chalcedon. The cause of this was the opposition of a large party to the decisions of that council, their intrigues with

the government, and the attempts of the government to reconcile them to the Catholic Church. As advocates of only one nature in Christ, this party acquired the name of Monophysites. A sort of tribute was paid to them by the fifth ecumenical council, at Constantinople, in 553, inasmuch as it condemned certain objects of their special dislike; namely, Theodore of Mopsuestia, the anti-Cyrrillian writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas,—the so-called *Three Chapters*. This, however, is no indication that the views of the Monophysites were taken into favor by the Church, since the council was the mere product of diplomacy and governmental influence. At the sixth ecumenical council, held at Constantinople in 680, the doctrines of the Monophysites were decidedly repudiated. The compromise scheme, the so-called Monothelite, which acknowledged in Christ but one will, or one indivisible operation of will, (a scheme which the Emperors patronized with the design of winning back the Monophysites,) was condemned by this council. Thus was consummated the last prominent stage in a controversy which had disturbed the Church more or less for three centuries.

The Monophysites passed into a state of permanent schism. They are known to history in several branches, namely, the Jacobites, the Copts and Abyssinians, and the Armenians. The Maronites, as a sect, were an offshoot of the closing stage of the christological controversy, and were distinguished by their adherence to the Monothelite doctrine. It was the common tenet of the Monophysites that there is only one nature in Christ. They were not unanimous, however, in their conception of His person. Some favored the theory of Eutyches, and taught that the human attributes were changed in essence and assimilated to the divine. Others allowed the continuance of the human attributes, only denying that they were united into a second nature, and advocating accordingly a composite nature with two sets of attributes.

The section ought not, perhaps, to be concluded without a reference to the doctrine of the *kenosis*. When their statements are fully analyzed, the Catholic theologians of the period are found to agree upon this subject with the following sentence of Augustine: "When He [the Son of God] emptied Himself in order to assume the form of a servant, He laid not down what He had, but assumed that which He had not before." (Tract. in Joan., LV. 7. Compare Hilary, Tract. super Psal., LXV. 25; De Trin., X. 7; Fulgentius, Ad Tras., III. 10; Cyril of Alexandria, as interpreted by Dorner, Thomasius, and Bruce.)

SECTION II. — THE REDEMPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

THE subject of redemption remained still among comparatively undeveloped themes. In conjunction with other views, the theory found place that the redemptive work was specially connected with the rights and the dominion of Satan. A few went to the full length of the Origenistic doctrine, and spoke not merely of a right in Satan over fallen men, but also of the cancelling of that right by the payment of a redemptive price. This was the case with Gregory of Nyssa. As he represents, men had sold themselves to the devil, and, like those who have parted with their liberty for money, were in a condition of slavery from which they could not justly be rescued by force. The just mode of recovery was to give the possessor the ransom which he desired. Christ came to be such a ransom. The spectacle of His wonderful life attracted the eager attention and avaricious desires of the devil. At the same time the garment of flesh which He wore concealed His divinity, and caused that the adversary should not be repelled by fear. Hence it came about that the devil regarded Christ as a most desirable prize, and was willing to accept Him as an equivalent for all those whom he held in the prison of

death. Thus far the account by Gregory presumes upon a right in Satan and the payment to him of a ransom. But, as in the case of Origen's description, the issue is a defrauding of the devil rather than an exchange with him. The flesh of Christ, as Gregory represents, served as a bait by which the devil was lured to his own defeat. At once he found his right over men lost, and himself powerless against the unveiled divinity of the Son of God. (Orat. Catech., XXII.-XXVI.) The divine artifice, or fraud (*ἀπάτη*), which Gregory himself allows that the transaction involved, is regarded by him as justified by its design. It was like the act, he avers, of a physician, who secretly mixes medicine with the food of a patient. The deception was for the good of all, the devil himself included. In other words, the "fraud" had not so much the character of a real fraud as of a wise and legitimate stratagem. This idea that the devil was outwitted by the incarnation appears with a number of writers who do not, like Gregory, intimate that the satanic claim upon men was relinquished in virtue of a contract. In such cases the only deception imputed to God would consist in providing conditions likely to be misinterpreted by the devil, and allowing him, in his sinful greed and malice, to misinterpret them.

The total theory of Gregory of Nyssa, including the notion that Satan had a claim which was cancelled by the payment of a ransom, found but a limited acceptance in the Greek Church. Gregory Nazianzen rejects it in emphatic terms, characterizing it as an audacious theory, and exclaiming, "Then had the robber received, not merely something from God, but God Himself, as a ransom, and a surpassingly great reward for his tyranny." (Orat., XLV. 22.) Other Greek writers may be cited, either as making no reference to the theory in question, or as indulging statements contradictory to a belief in the same. Epiphanius, for example, in his comments on the word "redemption," teaches that it by no means signifies acquisition by the payment of a

price, and refers for illustration to the usage of Paul, who speaks of "redeeming the time." (Adv. Hær., XLII. 8.) John of Damascus, representing the final drift of doctrine in the Greek Church, rejected, in terms similar to those of Gregory Nazianzen, the theory that a ransom was rendered to the tyrant. (De Fide Orth., III. 27.) In fine, the data seem to accord with the following verdict of Kahnis: "The doctrine of the payment of a ransom to the devil found little acceptance in the East." (Dogmatik, II. 3.)

In the Latin Church the theory never became current that the devil was the recipient of a stipulated ransom. One of the main ideas, however, upon which that theory was based, was quite generally entertained by Latin writers in this period; namely, the idea that Satan possessed a certain right over the apostate human race. We find it with Augustine, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great. "By the justice of God, in some sense," says Augustine, "the human race was delivered into the power of the devil. . . . But the way in which man was thus delivered into the power of the devil ought not to be so understood as if God did this or commanded it to be done; but that He only permitted it, yet that justly. For when He abandoned the sinner, the author of the sin immediately entered." (De Trin., XIII. 12.) "The pride of the ancient enemy," says Leo the Great, "not undeservedly asserted a tyrannic right (*jus tyrannicum*) against all men, and exercised no unmerited lordship over those whom he had enticed with their own consent from the command of God into subserviency to his own will." (Serm., XXII. 3.) "The devil himself," remarks Gregory the Great, "securing our fall in the root of the first parent, justly, as it were, held man under captivity, who, created with free will, yielded assent to him who counselled injustice." (Moral., XVII. 30.) In this last statement the phrase "*quasi juste tenuit hominem*" is not a little significant; it shows at least a doubt in the mind of Gregory about the "right" of Satan being in the proper

sense a right. As respects the way in which the right of Satan was cancelled, these three writers held in common that he lost his claim, not in virtue of any contract, or any payment under a contract, but by his own act in assailing the innocent Christ, and compassing, through his agents, His death. By visiting the penalty of sin upon the sinless, he lost his right over sinners; by exacting what was not due, he forfeited what had been due. "Certainly it is just," says Augustine, "that we whom he held as debtors should be dismissed free by believing in Him whom he slew without any debt." (*De Trin.*, XIII. 14. Compare *Serm.*, CXXX.; *Leo*, *Serm.*, XII., LX., LXI.; *Gregory*, *Moral.*, XVII. 30.)

The conception which these and later writers of the Latin Church had of Satan's right over men is defined by Baur as follows: "While, according to Augustine, the devil had the full property-right over men, Leo the Great declared it at least a tyrannic right; and Gregory the Great, although, on the one hand, he could not deny the reality of the right, on the other declared it only a seeming right; and the following teachers of the Church remain rather by the indefinite representation that man, in consequence of his sin, fell into the power of the devil." (*Versöhnungslehre.*)

Whatever prominence was given in any quarter to Satan's right, and the bearing of the redemptive work upon the same, no eminent writer limited himself to this aspect of Christ's saving office. It was characteristic of theologians in this, as in the preceding period, to contemplate the work of Christ from a variety of standpoints. Very frequently the death of Christ was represented as being a tribute or sacrifice to God, a means of vindicating His justice in connection with the exercise of clemency toward transgressors. Says Cyril of Jerusalem: "We were enemies of God through sin, and God had decreed that the sinner should die. One of two things, therefore, was necessary: either God, re-

maining true, must destroy all, or, using clemency, must annul the sentence issued. But behold the wisdom of God. He maintained both the sentence and the exercise of His goodness. Christ bore our sins in His own body on the tree, so that we, through His death, dead to sins, might live unto righteousness." (Catech., XIII. 33.) A very similar line of thought is given by Athanasius. (De Incar. Verbi, §§ 6-9; De Decret. Synod., § 14.) Among the reasons for Christ's death which Eusebius enumerates, he expresses one as follows: "That as a victim of God, and a great sacrifice, He might be offered to the Most High for the whole world." (Dem. Evang., IV. 12.) "The Only-begotten Son," says Basil, "who gives life to the world, since He offers Himself to God as a victim and oblation for our sins, is called the Lamb of God." (Hom. in Psal., XXVIII. 5.)

Hilary speaks of Christ as voluntarily offering Himself as a sacrifice to God the Father. (Tract. super Psal., LIII. 13.) "The blood of Christ," says Ambrose, "is the price paid for all, by which the Lord Jesus, who alone has reconciled the *Father*, has redeemed us." (Enar. in Psal., XLVIII. 15.) Augustine characterizes Christ as "the great High Priest, who offered Himself to God in His passion for us," and who "was able to expiate sins by dying, since He both died, and not for sin of His own." (De Civ. Dei, X. 6, 24; Enchirid., XXXIII., CVIII.; Confess., X. 43; De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss., I. 56, 61; De Nat. et Grat., II. Compare Leo, Serm., LXIV.; Gregory the Great, Moral., III. 14, IX. 38, XVII. 30.) At the same time Augustine was careful to teach that it is not to be imagined that the sacrifice of Christ by itself wrought any essential change in the disposition of God toward the race. "Let not," he says, "the fact of our having been reconciled unto God be so listened to or so understood as if the Son reconciled us unto Him in this respect, that He now began to love those whom He formerly hated; but we

were reconciled unto Him who already loved us, but with whom we were at enmity because of our sin. In a wonderful and divine manner, even when He hated us, He loved us; for He hated us in as far as we were not what He Himself had made; and because our own iniquity had not in every part consumed His work, He knew at once both how, in each of us, to hate what we had done, and to love what He had done." (Tract. in Joan., CX. 6.)

Acknowledgment was also given, especially in the Greek Church, to the mystical theory which views the incarnation as bringing an incorruptible life into organic connection with humanity, and so working its transformation from the corruptible to the incorruptible. "The manifested Word," says Gregory of Nyssa, "mingled Himself with the perishable nature of men, in order that, by communion with the divine, the human might be rendered divine; for this reason, by the economy of His grace He distributes Himself through the flesh to all the believing, uniting Himself with the bodies of believers, whose substance consists of bread and wine, in order that, by union with the immortal, man also might be a partaker of incorruption." (Orat. Catech., XXXVII. Compare Athanasius, *De Incar. Verbi*, §§ 8, 9.)

Recognition was furthermore given to the moral theory of the atonement, the theory which emphasizes the moral power upon the hearts of men of Christ's manifestation and work. Augustine, above all other writers, dwelt upon this aspect. Two factors in particular in the moral power of Christ, namely, divine love and divine humility, claimed his attention. "It was mainly for this purpose," he says, "that Christ came, to wit, that man might learn how much God loves him, and that he might learn this to the intent that he might be kindled to the love of Him by whom he was first loved, and might also love his neighbor at the command and showing of Him who became our neighbor." (De Catechiz., IV.) "What was so necessary," he inquires, "for the building up of our hope, and for free-

ing the minds of mortals cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair of immortality, as that it should be demonstrated to us at how great a price God rated us, and how greatly He loved us?" (De Trin., XIII. 10.) With no less emphasis, Augustine dwells upon the remedial virtue of the divine humility. Indeed, it was one of the thoughts to which he most frequently and fondly reverted, that divine humility, as it presents the most striking contrast conceivable to the pride in which lies the essence of human sin, is the most perfect remedy for sin. "As the devil," he says, "through pride, led man through pride to death, so Christ, through lowliness, led back man through obedience to life." (De Trin., IV. 10.) "Cure pride, and there will be no more iniquity. Consequently, that the cause of all diseases might be cured, namely, pride, the Son of God came down, and was made low." (Tract. in Joan., XXV. 16. Compare De Peccat. Orig., XLVI.; Epist., CCXXXVI.; De Fide et Symbolo, IV.)

The doctrine of Christ's descent into Hades was generally accepted by the Church. (Athanasius, *Contra Apol.*, I. 5, 14; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, IV. 11; Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, XLV. 24; Cyril of Alexandria, *De Ador. et Spir.*, VIII.; Hilary, *Tract. super Psal.*, LIII. 14; Augustine, *Epist.*, CLXIV.; Leo the Great, *Serm.*, XXV.) Augustine, while he declared the mission to Hades to be beyond question, confessed that it was a rather perplexing subject to himself, since it was hard to see to whom a mission in that quarter could have applied. It could not have been for the benefit of the unsaved, since no probation after death can be admitted; and how it could have been needed by the saved, by saints who lived under the Old Testament dispensation, is far from clear.

That there was a supreme fitness in the chosen method of salvation was the universal belief; but it may be doubted whether theologians commonly entertained the idea that

no other method was in any wise possible. Augustine decidedly rejected the theory that God was absolutely limited to a single plan for saving men. (De Trin., XIII. 10. Compare Gregory the Great, Moral., XX. 36; Athanasius, Orat., II. 68.)

SECTION III.—APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

APART from Augustine, and those influenced by his teaching, it was the common belief of the Church that Christ died for all, and that it is the unfeigned will of God that all should partake of salvation through Him. The fact that some are saved and some are not was explained by reference to man's free agency, and not by an appeal to electing grace. The synergistic theory was taught, which affirms that the individual in his moral recovery works with God, and in such a way as to condition the result. In the Greek Church there was somewhat of a tendency to credit man with the power to take the initiative himself, or in some measure to anticipate grace. The same may be said of Hilary and of the Semi-Pelagian school in the Latin Church. (See references on p. 228 *et seq.*)

The Church at large, as in the previous period, regarded predestination, so far as it is connected with man's moral destiny, as conditioned by foreknowledge. Augustine himself at one time distinctly advocated this position, saying that God chose those whom he foreknew would believe, and conjoining with this the statement that believing lies within man's power. First man believes, he said, and then God gives grace for good works. "Quod ergo credimus, nostrum est; quod autem bonum operamur, illius qui credentibus in se dat Spiritum Sanctum." (Quarund. Prop. ex Epist. ad Rom. Expos., LX.) Augustine's later teaching, therefore, was a departure from his own doctrine, as well as from that of the Church in general. Theodoret stood fully on Catho-

lie ground when, in his exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, he carefully guarded against every meaning prejudicial to the moral opportunity of all men, and taught that there are no vessels of wrath except those who have made themselves such by their own will. The Semi-Pelagian Faustus also gave expression to the opinion, not of a sect, but of the great body of Christians up to his day, when he wrote: "If one has been assigned to life and another to death, we are born not to be judged, but already judged. Nor on such a supposition can there be, in consistency, any equity of judgment. For if God has given nothing to the servant, what shall He demand back from the servant?" (De Grat. Dei et Lib. Arbit., I. 4.)

Augustine, having renounced his earlier view and adopted the theory that the natural man is morally helpless, could explain the fact that some are saved and some are not only by reference to the divine will and agency. Every heir of the fallen nature of Adam, as he now taught, being destitute of the ability to exercise faith and to do good works, is totally dependent upon God for the attainment of salvation. Until the individual has received a new heart, the action of divine grace is purely monergistic. Up to this point the human subject is merely acted upon. While unable to co-operate, he is equally unable to resist. "Almighty God can turn to the practice of belief men's wills, however perverse and opposed to faith they may be." (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., XXIX. Compare De Prædest. Sanct., XIII.) Those whom He wills to save are certain to be saved; for others salvation is an utter impossibility.

No account can be given of the decrees of God by which He has determined from eternity who shall be saved, at least as respects their individual application. "I confess that I can find no answer to make," says Augustine, in response to the question why God should choose one rather than another. (De Dono Persev., XVIII.) However, in his view a reason is apparent why there should be the two

general classes, the elect and the reprobate. Their contrasted destinies are needed to display both grace and retribution. "For both could not be displayed in all; for if all had remained under the punishment of just condemnation, there would have been seen in no one the mercy of redeeming grace. And on the other hand, if all had been transferred from darkness to light, the severity of retribution would have been manifested in none." (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 12.)

Regeneration, according to Augustine, is no sure token of election. Men inducted into the family of God by the new birth may still be among the non-elect. In that case they will be sure to die in sin. The truly predestinated are made partakers, not only of regenerating grace, but also of the *gift of perseverance*. (De Corrept. et Grat., XX.) In this world the possessors of this crowning gift are in general known only to God. Few are informed by special revelation that they will persevere to the end. (De Civ. Dei, XI. 12. Compare De Corrept. et Grat., XL.)

The number of the elect, as Augustine taught, is small in comparison with that of the non-elect. (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 12; Serm., CXI.) Yet the latter in the eternal purpose of God were designed merely for the advantage of the former. The vessels of wrath, as is explicitly stated, are born for the benefit of the elect. (Contra Julianum, V. 4. Compare De Prædest. Sanct., XXXIII.) The benefit accruing to the minority from the perdition of the majority is not very elaborately specified, but appears to have been located by Augustine especially in the gratitude and love toward God awakened in the saved by the disclosure of what they have been saved from. "It was right," he says, "that those who are redeemed should be redeemed in such a way as to show by the greater number who are unredeemed, and left in their just condemnation, what the whole race deserved, and whither the deserved judgment of God would lead even the redeemed, did not His unde-

served mercy interpose." (Enchirid., XCIX.) That the vessels of wrath should be born into a condemnation from which there is no possibility of escape, is justified by the fact that they sinned in Adam. (De An. et ejus Orig., IV. 16.) This left them absolutely destitute of all claim upon God. "There was no injustice in God's not willing that they should be saved, though they could have been saved had He so willed it." (Enchirid., XCV.)

Augustine, in the main, uses the term *prædestinatio* only in connection with those elected to eternal life. Instances occur, however, in which he speaks of a predestination to punishment and eternal death. (De An. et ejus Orig., IV. 16; Tract. in Joan., XLIII. 13, CX. 4.) Still no such positive and efficient decree was assumed for the latter as for the former case. Inasmuch as Augustine did not include the fall of Adam in the divine decrees, and the fall was regarded by him as having ruined the race, he could have meant by predestination to eternal death simply a decree that certain should be left in the perdition in which they were already involved by original sin.

For the scriptural proof of his theory of unconditional election, Augustine refers in particular to Rom. ix. 16, 18, 20; Eph. i. 4, 5. In answer to such a passage as 1 Tim. ii. 4, he says, in one instance, that God wills all to be saved in the sense that He inspires us so to will, this being appropriate for those who are ignorant as to who are the heirs of salvation. (De Corrept. et Grat., XLVII.) In another instance, he makes the teaching of the passage to be, either that no one is saved except by the will of God, or that men of all varieties of rank and condition are included in God's saving purpose. (Enchirid., CIII.)

It is to be observed that, while Augustine differed from the Church at large in excluding foreknowledge of conduct from the grounds of predestination, he did not dissent from the current view as to the essential relations of foreknowledge and predestination. It was no part of his doc-

trine that the certainty of all events has its basis in the divine predestination or foreordination. To be sure, in one instance he says of God that He "has predestinated all that is to be by sure and unchangeable causes" (Tract. in Joan., CV. 4); but more explicit statements show that some things were not understood by him to be included in the divine predestination, except in a permissive sense. We find him teaching that foreknowledge and predestination are not co-extensive; that "predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge, although foreknowledge may exist without predestination." (De Prædest. Sanct., XIX. Compare Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, I. 24, 29; Prosper, Pro Aug. Respon. ad Capit. Gallorum, XV.) This principle Augustine applies to the transgression of Adam, stating that God foresaw that he would make a bad use of his free will, and that He arranged His plans with reference to the fall, the fall itself having no place in His plans, except that He purposed to *permit* it to occur. (Enchirid., CIV.; De Civ. Dei, XIV. 27.)

As in the previous period, no broad contrast was drawn between regeneration and justification. The former, being identified with the baptismal grace, was made to denote in particular the remission of sin, though the idea of a certain moral renovation was not excluded. The broader sense of the term was foreign to current usage. Augustine shows the limited scope which he assigned the term, by placing it in contrast with conversion of heart. "In infants," he says, "who are baptized, the sacrament of regeneration is given first, and, if they maintain a Christian piety, conversion also in the heart will follow, of which the mysterious sign had gone before in the outward body." (De Baptismo, IV. 24.) To him regeneration in the technical sense signified, aside from the remission of sin, only initial conversion of heart. As respects justification, Augustine adopted what became the standard definition in the Latin Church, and understood by the term, not merely absolution, but the

change in the individual which makes him just or righteous; in other words, sanctification. "God justifies the ungodly," says he, "not simply by remitting his evil deeds, but also by giving him love, that he may depart from evil, and do good through the Holy Spirit." (*Opus Imp.*, II. 165.) "*Gratia Dei qua justificamur, hoc est, justi effici-mur.*" (*Retract.*, II. 33.)

While the importance of faith as a pre-eminent means in the appropriation of salvation was universally acknowledged, little attention was given by theologians in general to a consideration of its nature. Apart from the writings of Augustine, who gave the matter an exceptional measure of attention, there is scarcely anything deserving of special mention. In agreement with leading writers of the preceding period, Augustine regarded evangelical faith as inclusive of a right moral disposition. In some instances, it is true, he speaks of faith in a different sense. He says, for example, that "belief is nothing else than consideration with assent." (*De Prædest. Sanct.*, V.) Again, he remarks that it is possible for one to have faith and not to have love. (*Serm.*, XC.) But in such cases he was viewing faith in its more general meaning. Evangelical or justifying faith, as he abundantly indicates, was made by him to involve the elements of self-surrender and love. The following sentences may serve to indicate his position upon this point: "He indeed believes in Christ who both hopes in Christ and loves Christ. For if he has faith without hope and without love, he believes that Christ is, but does not believe in Christ." (*Serm.*, CXLIV.) "It is faith which is the initial principle whence good works first proceed." (*De Gest. Pelag.*, XXXIV.) "*Illa est laudabilis fides, ipsa est vera gratiæ fides, quæ per dilectionem operatur.*" (*Serm.*, CLVI.) "*Difficile est ut male vivat, qui bene credit.*" (*Serm.*, XLIX.) One of the most frequent specifications of Augustine regarding faith is the antecedent relation in which it stands to knowledge. In order to know,

as he teaches, we must first believe. "A certain faith is in some way the starting-point of knowledge." (*De Trin.*, IX. 1.) "Ut intelligamus, prius credamus. Præcedit fides, sequitur intellectus. Fides gradus est intelligendi; intellectus autem meritum fidei." (*Serm.*, LXXXIX., CXVIII., CXXVI.)

A consistent following out of the conception that faith is the principle from which good works proceed, as denying independent virtue to the latter, would evidently exclude the notion that salvation is dependent upon the merit of good works. As a matter of fact, we find writers in this period, especially in the Augustinian school, emphatically repudiating all trust in the merit of works as a ground of acceptance with God. Faith, as a principle of dependence upon divine grace, is declared by Augustine to be the channel of saving benefits under the new dispensation. "By the law of works," he writes, "God says to us, Do what I command thee; but by the law of faith we say to God, Give me what Thou commandest." (*De Spir. et Lit.*, XXII.) In a like spirit, he teaches that the rewards which men receive from God are not so much rewards as free gifts. "We are to understand that man's good deserts are themselves the gift of God, so that when these obtain the recompense of eternal life, it is simply grace given for grace." (*Enchirid.*, CVII.) "It is His gifts that God crowns, not your merits." (*De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.*, XV. Compare *De Trin.*, XIII. 10, XIV. 15; Leo the Great, *Serm.*, XLIX.; *Epist.*, I.; Gregory the Great, *Moral.*, XXII. 9, XXXIII. 21.)

But whatever tribute may have been paid to faith and to dependence upon divine grace, there were tendencies in the Church at large in a contrary direction,—tendencies to exalt outward works above the plane of mere fruits, and to emphasize them at the expense of the great subjective conditions of salvation. Among other things, the disposition to confound faith with orthodoxy worked to this effect. The definitions of the foremost theologians may, indeed,

have avoided this confusion, but it was not universally escaped. In the heated controversies of the time, the faith which the Gospel requires was often counted identical with the holding of an orthodox creed. Says the so-called Athanasian symbol: "Whoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith, which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. But this is the Catholic faith," — viz. a long list of specifications on the unfathomable mysteries of the Trinity. Evidently faith, as an attitude of the soul toward God, was not likely to be duly regarded when subscription to an elaborate list of articles was so emphatically set forth as the test of saving faith. The symbol quoted is not, to be sure, a fair index of the feeling of the entire Church in these centuries, but it does represent no inconsiderable factor in the current of the age.

Another thing in line with the tendencies specified was the style in which works of mercy and self-discipline were commended. Even Augustine did not shun to speak of almsgiving as a means of propitiating God. (*Enchirid.*, LXX.; *Serm.*, XLII.) He describes this as the proper way of making satisfaction for the sins into which all are liable to fall daily, while for transgressions of the graver sort, such as violations of the Decalogue, greater severity must be practised upon one's self. (*Serm.*, CCCLI.) In like manner Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, John Cassianus, Theodoret, and others, emphasize the virtue of alms, and the need of special penitential inflictions to cancel sins involving serious demerit. Some of these writers, to be sure, may have had a way of reconciling their language with the supremacy of faith and the spirit of dependence upon grace; but their very language is indicative of a certain dogmatic drift of the Church in general.

A third thing favoring external works at the expense of the subjective conditions of spiritual life was the distinction

drawn between commands and evangelical counsels. "The church fathers of this time, in particular Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose, and Augustine, distinguished very definitely between commands and evangelical counsels, of which the first must be unconditionally observed by all Christians; the second rest upon free choice, but bring to those who observe them a higher reward." (Gieseler, *Dogmengeschichte*.) Such a distinction, made in the interest of monasticism, was no small step toward the mediæval view, according to which eminent holiness is the prerogative of a class, something dependent upon a special set of externals.

The growing practice of saint-worship may also be mentioned as an obstruction to spiritual conceptions of salvation. Before the close of the fourth century great value was very generally attached to the intercessions of the saints. During the next century a special pre-eminence among intercessors began to be assigned to the Virgin Mary. Two dogmatic principles favoring her exaltation were advocated, namely, her perpetual virginity and her freedom from actual sin. Writers quite generally, even in the early part of the period, speak of the former of these as though it was a matter of common belief. Of the latter, Augustine appears as the first prominent advocate, or rather as the first to state its credibility. Some of his contemporaries were very free to impute actual sins to the Virgin. (Basil, *Epist.* CCLX.; Chrysostom, *Hom. in Matt.*, XLIV.) While claiming in general, in opposition to Pelagianism, that none have lived without sin in this world, Augustine says: "We must except the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom I wish to raise no question, when it touches the subject of sins, out of honor to the Lord; for from Him we know what abundance of grace for overcoming sin in every particular was conferred upon her who had the merit to conceive and to bear Him who undoubtedly had no sin." (*De Nat. et Grat.*, XLII.) By this Augus-

tine meant to exempt the Virgin simply from actual sin, not from original. The doctrine of her immaculate conception had not yet been broached. Indeed, the Roman bishop, Leo the Great, indulges language which clearly assumes the contrary view. "Assumpta est," he says, "de matre Domini, natura, non culpa." (Serm., XXII. ; Epist., XXVIII. 4.)

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

TENDENCIES to ecclesiasticism inherited from the preceding period were re-enforced in this period. As the Church advanced in material resources, and became more like a kingdom of this world, it was but natural that it should magnify its own sovereignty and disparage all hope of salvation outside of its borders. The conditions strongly favored the growth of the very natural impulse to ascribe sole legitimacy to that which has once acquired the ascendancy.

An occasion for a specific consideration of the nature of the Christian Church came in particular from the Donatists, a schismatic party of North Africa. They were zealous advocates of a strict discipline, and maintained that purity is an essential characteristic of the Church. This idea they carried so far as to hold that the harboring of unworthy members dissevers from the body of Christ the congregations who tolerate or uphold the abuse, and renders their sacraments null and void. Augustine, who was long and actively engaged in the controversy with the Donatists, allowed the need in general of a strict discipline; but he repudiated the Donatist test of ecclesiastical validity, maintaining that a sudden severance of offenders from Church fellowship is not always expedient; that often the tares must be allowed to grow with the wheat, and that the presence of the unworthy does not unchurch the worthy. The proper tests, as he claimed, are catholicity and apostolic

connections. In other words, the Church which is spread through all lands, and which has remained in communion with the congregations founded by the apostles, is the true Church. Some may be externally connected with this Church who are not truly parts thereof, not members of the body of Christ. These excrescences, however, will be cut off in time, and cannot impair the claims of the Catholic Church to be the one true Church.

Augustine did not hesitate to affirm that union with the Church, as thus defined, is essential to salvation. "Whoso," he writes, "is not in this Church does not now receive the Holy Ghost." (Tract. in Joan., XXXII. 7.) "You were born," he says to the baptized schismatic and heretic, "by the same words, by the same sacrament, but you shall not attain to the same inheritance of eternal life unless you shall have returned to the Catholic Church." (Serm., III.) Speaking of those who, like the Donatists, rashly hurry into schism, he maintains that they, "having most openly placed themselves outside in the plain sacrilege of schism, cannot possibly be saved." (De Baptismo, V. 4.) Leo the Great uses language of similar import. "Extra ecclesiam catholicam," he says, "nihil est integrum, nihil castum." (Serm., LXXIX.) Gregory the Great declares that there is no true martyrdom outside of Catholic unity; that heretics are unworthy of life, and can in no wise escape the wrath of God unless they come into the Catholic Church. (Moral., XVIII. 26, XX. 7, XXXV. 8.) It should be observed, however, with respect to Augustine, that he did not make actual connection with the Catholic Church absolutely essential to salvation. "If any one," he says, "were compelled by urgent necessity, being unable to find a Catholic from whom to receive baptism, and so, while preserving Catholic peace in his heart, should receive from one outside the pale of Catholic unity the sacrament which he was intending to receive within its pale, this man, should he forthwith depart this life, we deem none other than

a Catholic." (De Baptismo, I. 2.) To the same effect is the following, regarding unjust excommunication: "If any believer has been wrongfully excommunicated, the sentence will do harm rather to him who pronounces it than to him who suffers the wrong." (Epist. CCL., ad finem.)

The episcopacy was deemed, as in the latter part of the previous period, a principal bond of church unity. The means of giving authoritative expression to the voice of the episcopal body was the ecumenical council. The Roman Bishop held simply the rank of a leading patriarch. While accorded a certain primacy in honor, he was not accorded a constitutional supremacy over the whole Church. This is clearly proved by the record of the ecumenical councils.

That no doctrinal infallibility was imputed to the Bishop of Rome is sufficiently evinced by the fact that the sixth ecumenical council anathematized Honorius I. for espousing the Monothelite heresy, and that, too, without betraying the least consciousness that the honor of the Roman see could be saved by fine-spun distinctions on the phrase *ex cathedra*. The council evidently regarded him as patronizing heresy in his highest official capacity; and its verdict has been concurred in by the most enlightened scholarship of the Romish Church in recent times. Hefele, for example, prior to the Vatican council of 1870, taught that Honorius *ex cathedra* sanctioned heresy. (Causa Honorii Papæ.) The anathema against Honorius was repeated by the eighth ecumenical council, and was also sanctioned, more or less explicitly, by a number of the Popes.

SECTION II. — THE SACRAMENTS.

By a sacrament was generally understood a holy mystery, a visible rite or transaction, which served as the medium of a secret grace. "These are called sacraments,"

says Augustine, "because in them one thing is seen, another is understood. What is seen has bodily appearance, what is understood has spiritual fruit." (Serm., CCLXXII.) Speaking of the baptismal washing, he remarks, "The word is added to the element, and there results the sacrament, as if itself also a kind of visible word." (Tract. in Joan., LXXX.)

A wide and indefinite range was still given to the term. We find Hilary, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great speaking of the sacrament of the Lord's Passion,—"*sacramentum passionis Domini*." Leo also styles it a great sacrament that man should be taken by God into the relation of sonship. (Serm., XXVI.) Augustine numbers among sacraments marriage, the Sabbath, circumcision, etc. (De Nupt. et Concup., I. 11; Tract. in Joan., IX. 2, XX. 2; De Spir. et Lit., L.; Serm., X.) The pseudo Arcopagite specifies six Christian mysteries or sacraments,—baptism, eucharist, anointing, priestly consecration, dedication to monastic life, and the ceremonial for the dead (an anointing of the body of the deceased). But while baptism and the eucharist did not stand alone as sacraments, a certain pre-eminence was assigned them among sacramental rites.

BAPTISM.—The conditions of the efficacy of baptism in case of adults were understood to be repentance and faith. "Whence has water," asks Augustine, "so great an efficacy as in touching the body to cleanse the soul, save by the operation of the word; and that not because it is uttered, but because it is believed?" (Tract. in Joan., LXXX. 3.) A spirit counter to these conditions, as he plainly states, can nullify the grace of baptism, however legitimately in other respects the rite may be consummated. (De Baptismo, I. 12. Compare Cyril of Jerusalem, Procatech.) In case of infants, the conditions were regarded as adequately met through the sponsors. The faith of the godfather, as Augustine teaches, answers for the infant candidate. "Cre-

dit in altero, quia peccavit in altero." (Serm., CCXCIV. Compare *De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 38; *Tract. in Joan.*, LXXX.)

Valid baptism was universally regarded as the rite of regeneration, and as such efficacious for the complete removal of the condemnation coming from foregoing sin, whether original or actual. It was also generally regarded as conducive to a certain inward illumination and renovation. (Eusebius, *De Eccl. Theol.*, I. 8; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Pro-catech.*; Basil, *Hom.*, XIII. 1; Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, XL.; Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunom.*, II.; Theodoret, *Hær. Fab.*, V. 18; Ambrose, *Enar. in Psal.*, XXXVI. 63; Leo the Great, *Serm.*, VII., XVIII., LXIII.; Gregory the Great, *Moral.*, IV. *Præf.*, IX. 34.) Augustine, who defines the effect of baptism more specifically than was customary, states that, while it wholly removes original sin as a matter of guilt, it does not wholly remove it as a corruption of nature. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 70, II. 4, 9, 44; *De Nup. et Concup.*, I. 28; *Contra Duas Epist.*, I. 27, III. 5.)

Baptism, being a necessary antecedent to church membership, was of course regarded not less than the latter a condition of salvation. Various writers indulge emphatic statements upon its necessity. Leo the Great declares that no one can be released from original sin, except through the sacrament of baptism. (*Epist.*, XV.) "Without the sacrament of regeneration," says Cassianus, "no one can escape eternal death." (*Collat.*, XIII. 19.) "We believe," writes Gennadius, "that to the baptized alone is there a way of salvation. We believe that no catechumen, except the martyr, though dying in good works, can have eternal life." (*De Eccl. Dogmat.*, LXXIV.) Augustine states that no one attains to God without baptism, — "*sine baptismo quidem nemo ad Deum pervenit.*" (*Serm.*, XC.) Fulgentius declares that whoever is not baptized, either in the name of Christ with consecrated water, or with His own

blood for the name of Christ and His Church, will undergo the burning of eternal fire. (*De Veritate Prædest. et Grat. Dei*, III. 19.) Gregory the Great teaches that those dying without the sacrament of salvation, before they have done good or evil, pass on to eternal death and perpetual torments. (*Moral.*, IX. 21.)

There was, however, a measure of exception to the theory of the strict necessity of baptism. Martyrdom, as in the preceding centuries, was commonly regarded as a full equivalent for the baptismal washing. Ambrose, while he declares in one instance (*De Mysteriis*, IV.) that a catechumen cannot receive remission of sins unless he is baptized in the name of the Trinity, affirms that this grace was no doubt received by the deceased catechumen Valentinian, in virtue of his desire and purpose to be baptized. (*De Obiit. Val. Consol.*, §§ 51, 75.) If, therefore, Ambrose is to be reconciled with himself, it must be concluded that in one instance he had in mind a voluntary neglect of baptism, and in the other an involuntary deprivation of the same. Augustine, too, while his theory leaves no chance for the salvation of an unbaptized infant, is constrained, at least in one instance, by the case of the dying thief, to admit that an eminent faith as well as martyrdom may save without baptism, where there is no opportunity for its administration. (*De Baptismo*, IV. 22.) In general, however, he emphasizes the indispensable need of baptism, and, in another connection than the above, suggests that the believing thief may after all have been baptized. (*Retract.*, II. 18.) The Pelagians were disposed to adopt a compromise theory as respects the fortunes of the unbaptized dying in infancy, holding that they receive salvation and eternal life, but not the kingdom of heaven, — “*salutem et vitam æternam præter regnum cælorum.*” (Augustine, *Serm.*, CCXCVI. Compare *De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 58; *De Peccat. Orig.*, XXIII.) A similar view was favored by Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa, both of whom declared the unbaptized

infant unworthy of any punishment, while at the same time they hesitated to affirm for it an heirship to the full measure of celestial glory. (Orat., XL. 23 ; De Infantibus.)

THE EUCHARIST. — That an extraordinary import should be attached to the eucharist accorded with the leading characteristics and tendencies of the period. An age more mystical than critical was naturally unwilling to stop with the more obvious sense of a rite which commemorates the crowning fact in the transcendent work of redemption. At the same time, the steady growth of hierarchical notions tended to magnify the significance of an ordinance, the manipulation of which was a prominent function of the priest.

As already intimated, the subject is one which gives much scope to expressions of a highly rhetorical nature. In such a case, it is an obvious rule of criticism that a single statement which cannot be understood in a figurative sense may outweigh, as evidence of real doctrinal belief, many statements which admit of being understood in such a sense. Applying this just rule, we need to feel no hesitation in laying down the proposition that the doctrine of transubstantiation was no part of the acknowledged doctrine of the Church at large, and that, if it was entertained at all, it was only as a peculiarity of individual belief.

In proof of the above proposition, we may quote the testimony of representative writers both of the East and of the West. Eusebius of Cæsarea speaks of memorializing at the table the sacrifice of Christ "by symbols, as well of the body as of the saving blood." (Dem. Evang., I. 10.) The same writer, referring to John vi. 61-64, remarks: "By which things He desired to teach them that what they had heard about flesh and blood was to be understood spiritually. 'Think not ye that I speak of the flesh which I bear about, as if it were fitting that you should eat that; nor judge that I command you to drink the sensible and corporeal blood.'" (De Eccl. Theol., III. 12.) Athanasius, commenting upon

the same passage, repudiates as emphatically as Eusebius the partaking of real flesh and blood. (Epist. ad Serapion, IV. 19.) With respect to both of these writers, it is to be noticed that their language implies a rejection in general of the idea that Christ imparts His literal body and blood, and not merely of this idea as connected with the single passage in question. Gregory Nazianzen calls the eucharistic elements types and antitypes of the body and blood of Christ, and of the salvation effected through Him. (Orat., VIII. 18, XVIII. 12.) He does this, too, with obvious reference to the *consecrated* elements. Referring to the claim that he had in mind the elements prior to consecration, Ullmann justly replies: "Not merely do the passages of Gregory contradict such a claim, but also the subject itself; for, before consecration, bread and wine are nothing but bread and wine without any further significance; and only by consecration can they become antitypes of the body and blood of Christ, let one understand thereby what he will." (Gregorius von Nazianz.) Theodoret testifies in the clearest manner to the belief that the consecrated bread and wine are symbols. "Say, therefore," he requests of his partner in the dialogue, "the mystical symbols, which are offered to God by the priests, of what are they the symbols?" (Dialog., II.) This language plainly gives the bread and wine the character of symbols *after* their consecration. With equal plainness he teaches that their essence is not changed, using, like other writers of the era, this very fact to illustrate the continuance of the human nature of Christ in its proper essence. The following passages need no comment: "He who termed His body grain and bread, and styled Himself the Vine, honored the visible symbols with the name of body and blood, not changing the nature, but adding grace to nature." (Dialog., I.) "The mystical symbols do not, indeed, after consecration, recede from their own nature. They remain in their former essence (*οὐσίας*), and figure, and

form, and can be seen and touched, even as before." (Dialog., II.)

So far as the Latin Church is concerned, the testimony of two writers will be ample to sustain the proposition laid down, — the one being acknowledged by that Church as a prince in theology, and the other occupying its highest official position. Augustine, while he follows universal custom in naming the consecrated elements the body and blood of Christ, shows clearly enough, when he attempts to discriminate, that he did not believe them to be such in a literal sense. It is only after a certain manner, and in virtue of a certain resemblance, that they are so named. "Sicut ergo secundum *quemdam modum* sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est, sacramentum sanguinis Christi sanguis Christi est, ita sacramentum fidei fides est." (Epist., XCVIII. ad Bonifacium.) Christ's declaration that He would give His flesh to eat, he says, must not be understood carnally. "His grace is not consumed by tooth-biting." (Tract. in Joan., XXVII.) He includes the eucharistic bread in a list of signs, such as the parted garment and the brazen serpent, and speaks as though it were consumed in its character as bread. (De Trin., III. 10.) Equally on the side of a symbolical interpretation, and against a transformation into actual body and blood, are the following declarations: "The Lord did not hesitate to say, 'This is my body,' since it served as a sign of His body, — Non dubitavit Dominus dicere, Hoc est corpus meum, quum signum daret corporis sui." (Contra Adimant., XII. 3.) "It is not any bread and wine that we hold sacred as a natural production, — as if Christ were confined in corn or in vines, as the Manichæans fancy, — but what is truly consecrated as a symbol." (Contra Faust., XX. 13.) "The feast, in which Christ commended to His disciples a figure (*figuram*) of His body and blood." (In Psal., III. 1.) The Roman Bishop Gelasius, arguing like Theodoret for the integrity of Christ's human nature, not-

withstanding its union with the Logos, states, in like unmistakable terms, that the bread and wine retain their essence after consecration. "Truly the sacraments," he says, "which we receive of the body and blood of Christ, are a divine thing, because through the same we are made partakers of the divine nature, and, nevertheless, the substance or nature of bread and wine does not cease to be, — *tamen esse non desinit substantia vel natura panis et vini.*" (De Duabus Naturis in Christo.) The attempt of Bellarmine to assign this work, De Duabus Naturis, to another than the Roman Bishop scarcely needs to be noticed. Petavius refers it in very positive terms to Pope Gelasius. (Theol. Dogmat., De Incar., Lib. III. cap. 2.) Fulgentius, a younger contemporary of Pope Gelasius, quotes it as his production. (Epist., XIV. § 19.)

The doctrine of transubstantiation, therefore, being no dogma of the Church in this period, if entertained at all, was entertained only as a matter of individual opinion. But was it even thus held by any prominent Church teacher? A consideration of this question will lead us to an examination of writers who took less pains than the foregoing to make accurate definitions upon the subject, and whose total representation, accordingly, leaves their real belief more in the mist.

Cyril of Jerusalem, in one case, uses language which a writer would not have been likely to use after the doctrine of transubstantiation had been distinctly formulated, without designing it to be understood in the sense of that doctrine. He pleads that the transformation by Christ of water into wine makes it entirely credible that He should be able to transform wine into His blood, and states, moreover, that the consecrated elements, though having the appearance of bread and wine, are not such, but are the body and blood of Christ. (Catech., XXII.) On the other hand, however, he employs a comparison which is far from suggesting an actual change of substance. "As the bread

of the eucharist," he says, "after the invocation of the Holy Spirit, is no longer common bread, but the body of Christ, so, after the invocation, that sacred unguent is no longer a mere, or, if any one prefers so to speak, common unguent, but a charism of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, made efficient by the presence of His divinity." (Catech., XXI.) Now the oil was conceived to be changed, not by loss of its proper substance, but by the presence of a divine factor. It is plainly suggested, therefore, that Cyril may have regarded the elements as ceasing to be (common) bread and wine, simply in the sense that they become something more than bread and wine, the Divine Logos being joined with them and giving them a sacred character by His presence. This view, already announced by Justin Martyr and Irenæus, appears in an elaborated form with Gregory of Nyssa. (Orat. Catech., XXXVII.) Nothing beyond this view is necessarily indicated by the language of Cyril of Alexandria: "Do not doubt that this [change in the elements which makes them the life-giving body and blood of Christ] is true, since He Himself distinctly says, 'This is my body,' and 'This is my blood.' Rather receive with faith the word of the Saviour, for He who is the truth will not lie." (Comm. in Luc., XXII. 19.) Chrysostom, in his fervid rhetoric, uses expressions which might be understood to indicate the presence of the actual body of Christ in the eucharist. (Hom. in Matt., L.; Hom. in 1 Cor., XXIV.; Hom. in Eph., III.; Hom. in Joan., XLVI.) But rhetoric is not dogmatic teaching; and, besides, Chrysostom uses language which at least distinctly repudiates transubstantiation. The consecrated bread, he says, is worthy to be called the body of the Lord, "although the nature of bread remains in it." (Epist. ad Cæsar Monachum, quoted in Ridley's works, with comments on genuineness, Parker Society edition.) Hilary states that in the eucharist the flesh of Christ is truly received, and serves as the means by which He is joined in natural connection (*naturaliter*)

with believers. (De Trin., VIII.) This language, however, does not necessarily imply anything more than the view imputed to Gregory of Nyssa. The bread and wine, transfused with a heavenly virtue by their union with the Logos, may have been regarded by him as answering in all essential respects to the body and blood of Christ, and hence worthy to be so designated. Ambrose probably goes beyond every other writer of the period in the profusion of images, by which he illustrates the change wrought in the elements, referring to the transformation of Moses's rod, of the Nile, of the waters of Marah, and to the bursting forth of fire at the command of Elijah. (De Mysteriis, IX.) He also uses this expression, which looks very much like a positive assertion of the doctrine of transubstantiation: "*Hoc quod conficimus corpus ex Virgine est*,—This which we prepare is the body from the Virgin." (Ibid.) But, on the other hand, he affirms that the eucharistic food is not corporeal, but spiritual, and intimates that it is made the living bread from heaven simply by the union with it of the divine nature of Christ. (De Mysteriis, IX.; De Sacramentis, VI. 1.) Moreover, the change accomplished is named by him, in certain instances, a transfiguration. (De Incarn., IV.; De Fide, IV. 10.) It must be confessed, however, that it is quite as much the historical environment of Ambrose as the facts of his language, which would dictate the conclusion that he did not entertain the strict doctrine of transubstantiation. It seems contrary to the position which he occupied that he should have embraced this dogma,—a dogma not to be found among his predecessors in the Latin Church, and still rejected by the balance of the scholarly authority of that Church in the ninth century.

It appears, then, that the doctrine of transubstantiation was neither an acknowledged doctrine of the Church, nor one which was held by any considerable number of eminent theologians, if indeed it was held by any. Still, the lan-

guage of certain writers was in close affiliation with such a doctrine. The Church in this period was evidently drifting through a mystical maze in the direction of the amazing dogma of transubstantiation.

As to the positive theory of the eucharist which was most prevalent, Gieseler expresses the following conclusion: "It was the dominant teaching at this time concerning the elements of the eucharist, that the Logos so unites Himself with them as He did once with humanity, and that they receive thereby a divine power, and to this extent undergo an inner change and transformation. As related to the body and blood which Christ assumed in His incarnation, bread and wine were pronounced mere images and signs." (*Dogmengeschichte.*)

The eucharist was currently styled a sacrifice. As such it was associated with the sacrifice of Christ which it memorialized. In proportion, however, as there was no apprehension of the doctrine of transubstantiation, it is obvious that the eucharistic sacrifice did not have the meaning which it came ultimately to possess in the Roman Catholic mass. The benefits of this sacrifice were supposed to extend to the dead. The prayers of the Church for the departed, as Cyril of Jerusalem teaches, have great virtue when the sacrifice is upon the altar. (*Catech.* XXIII. 8, 9.) From Augustine we have this description of the sacrificial virtue of the eucharist: "When sacrifices either of the altar or of alms are offered on behalf of all the baptized dead, they are thank-offerings for the very good, they are propitiatory offerings for the not very bad; and in case of the very bad, even though they do not assist the dead, they are a species of consolation to the living. And when they are profitable, their benefit consists either in obtaining a full remission of sins, or at least in making the condemnation more tolerable." (*Enchirid.*, CX.) Gregory the Great, writing nearly two centuries later than Augustine, illustrates the drift of the age in the strong emphasis which he

places upon the virtue of the eucharistic sacrifice both for the living and for the dead. The following are among his statements upon the subject: "*Quoties ei hostiam suæ passionis offerimus, toties nobis ad absolutionem nostram passionem illius reparamus.*" (Hom. in Evang., XXXVII. 7.) "*Si culpæ post mortem insolubiles non sunt, multum solet animas etiam post mortem sacra oblatio hostiæ salutaris adjuvare; ita ut hanc nonnunquam ipsæ defunctorum animæ expetere videantur.*" (Dialog., IV. 55.) This last statement Gregory supplements by narratives of instances in which souls were certified to have been released from their misery by the sacrifice of the altar.

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. CHILIASM. — According to the report of Epiphanius, the doctrine of Christ's personal reign on earth was still held by Apollinaris, and Jerome indicates that his view was shared by the uncultured multitude in Palestine. But already, in the early part of the fourth century, this doctrine had become comparatively obsolete. As to the thousand years which the Apocalypse specifies, Augustine suggests that they denote either the last thousand years of the world's history, or the whole duration of the world, the number one thousand being indicative not so much of definite time as of totality. By the reign of the saints in the millennial period, nothing further, as he teaches, is to be understood than the dominion which pertains to the Church. "The Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, even now His saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign hereafter." (*De Civ. Dei*, XX. 7-9.) To obviate a millenarian use of the reference to the "first resurrection," Augustine taught that this denotes simply the resurrection of the soul from sin. (*Ibid.*, XX. 6.)

2. CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION. — It was the current doctrine of the Church at the opening of this period, that there is a twofold intermediate state; that the righteous in general pass to a happy abode, and there anticipate the more perfect bliss of heaven; while the lost, in a place severed from the

region of the saved by a great gulf, have a foretaste of their final doom.

There was a tendency, however, not to abide by this general representation. It was conceived that many who have received the sacraments of salvation, and may be regarded as heirs of eternal life, depart from this life in a moral state which calls for purgation. The incentive to define the nature and conditions of this purgation naturally worked with increasing force in an era of dogmatic construction. We find, accordingly, the primitive idea of a fire operative as a testing and destroying agent in immediate connection with the judgment, enlarged upon in important respects. A purifying agency of the fire, as well as a testing and destroying, began to be emphasized; moreover, the period over which it was supposed to extend was lengthened out. Considerable stress was laid by Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa on the purgation to be accomplished by such a fire. (Orat. XXXIX. 19, XL. 36; Orat. Catech., XXXV.) Ambrose, besides indulging the indefinite Origenistic representation that every one must pass through the flames before reaching Paradise (In Psal., CXVIII.), represents that those who do not come to the first resurrection must undergo burning for an interval equal to that between the first and second resurrection. "Qui autem non veniunt ad primam resurrectionem, sed ad secundam reservantur, isti urentur, donec impleant tempora inter primam et secundam resurrectionem; aut si non impleverint, diutius in supplicio permanebunt." (Enar. in Psal., I. 54.) Augustine took a step beyond this by teaching, or at least conjecturing, that any part of the interval between death and the judgment may be a purgatorial period. "Temporary punishments," he says, "are suffered by some in this life only, by others after death, by others both now and then; but all of them before that last and strictest judgment." (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 13.) "If it shall be said that, in the interval between the death of this body

and that last day of judgment and retribution which shall follow the resurrection, the spirits of the dead shall be exposed to a fire of such a nature that it shall not affect those who have not in this life indulged in such pleasures and pursuits as shall be consumed like wood, hay, stubble, but shall affect those others who have carried with them structures of that kind, this I do not contradict, because possibly it is true." (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 26.) Gregory the Great wrote upon this subject with more explicitness and confidence. What Augustine in the passage last quoted expressed in the form of a supposition, Gregory regarded as a matter for unquestioning belief. Indeed, the Romish doctrine of purgatory was very definitely outlined by him. He taught that the purgatorial fire burns those who depart from this life with the stains upon them of the more pardonable class of sins, and that the release of the tortured may be hastened by the prayers and sacrifices of Christians in this world. (Dialog., IV.) In confirmation of his theory various examples were brought forward, among others the case of the deacon Paschasius, who was released from the purgatorial fire in answer to the prayer of a bishop. "*Quia enim non malitia, sed ignorantiae errore peccaverat, purgari post mortem a peccato potuit.*" As already indicated, Gregory attached great virtue to the eucharistic sacrifice as a means of shortening the purgatorial suffering. The Scripture proof that certain sins may be pardoned after death, was found by Gregory in the statement that there is a sin which is to be forgiven neither in this world nor in the world to come. The implication of this passage is, as he maintained, that certain sins can be forgiven in this life, and certain even in the life to come.

The theory of purgatory naturally tended to a modification of the conception of the intermediate state. It nurtured the idea that inbred impurities make the difference between the fortunes of souls in the hereafter. It long had

been an accepted maxim, that genuine martyrdom is a complete purgation, and secures immediate entrance into the celestial heritage. What should debar others than martyrs from the same privilege, except remaining impurity? Those who die free from all sin, it was naturally argued, being at once fit for heaven, should enter at once upon its fruition; and of others, none should be excluded longer than the period required for purgation. Gregory the Great seems to have reached conclusions of this nature. We find him giving emphatic expression to the conviction that the souls of the perfectly righteous (*perfectorum justorum animæ*) are received immediately into celestial abodes, and enjoy the visible presence of the Redeemer. (*Dialog., IV. 25.*)

3. THE RESURRECTION. — While the teaching of Origen continued for a long time to have its influence with individuals, and inclined them to spiritualize more or less the conception of the resurrection, the dominant tendency was toward a literal view. Jerome and Augustine show the drift of the age, in that they advocate a very literal view in their later writings, though this involved some modification of statements made in their earlier works. The fate, also, of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople in the sixth century, who taught that the resurrected body will be impalpable, indicates which way the current of belief was moving. He was vigorously opposed, and his book was condemned to the fire. An exceptional view was that of the Alexandrian Philoponus, who held, on Aristotelian principles, that the body, by dissolution, loses its identity, and that the resurrection, therefore, is nothing else than the creation of a new body.

According to the literalists, the body of the resurrection state will possess the same members and be composed of the same substance as the body of this life. But while substantially the same, it will exist in a very different condition and manifest very different qualities. The body of

the saint will be transfigured, and healed of all its blemishes. As being perfectly obedient to the spirit, it will be a spiritual body.

Among the distinguishing features of the glorified body, Augustine enumerates the following: 1. It will be composed of material purified in the conflagration by which the end of the world is to be signalized. (*De Civ. Dei*, XX. 16.) 2. It will be capable of receiving material food, but will not need the same for its sustenance. (*Epist.*, XCV., CII.; *De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 22; *Serm.*, CCCLXII.) 3. It will not embarrass movement by weight, and can probably be transported at will with a celerity like the glance of the eye. (*Enchirid.*, XCI.; *De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 18; *Serm.*, CCLXXVII.) 4. It will in all cases conform to the stature of early manhood; no one in the resurrection will appear in the bodily form of an infant. (*De Civ. Dei*, XXII. 15; *Serm.*, CCXLII.)

Various rational evidences were adduced to establish the credibility of the resurrection, but no essential advance was made upon the arguments brought forward in the previous period.

4. FINAL AWARDS. — Near the end of the fourth century an unusual number of exceptions appears to the standing doctrine of the early Church on the endlessness of future punishment. One of the most conspicuous among these was Gregory of Nyssa. In unmistakable terms he reproduced the Origenistic theory of the corrective design of punishment, and of its destined cessation in the ultimate cessation of moral evil. (*De Hom. Opif.*, XXI.; *Orat. Catech.*, VIII., XXXV.) Gregory, in truth, was more of a restorationist than Origen, inasmuch as he did not assume, like the latter, the probability that the restored will again fall. A philosophical ground for his conclusion was found by him in the limited nature of evil. "Since evil," he says, "is never unbounded, but confined within certain limits, it necessarily follows that good becomes a successor to evil." Didymus of Alexandria is also credited with teaching the

limited duration of future punishment. The same view was held by Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Gregory Nazianzen, while he did not deny the endlessness of future punishment, betrays a certain inclination to favor the contrary theory, in that he suggests that it might be more worthy of the Divine Avenger to soften punishment, than to carry out to the letter the doom foreshadowed in the Gospel. (Orat., XL. 36.) From the Latin Church no prominent writer can be quoted as favoring a limited term of punishment, though Augustine indicates that there were Christians in his day who declared in favor of the same. (Enchirid., LXVII., CXII.) The citation, in a recent work, of Ambrose, as an advocate of a universal restoration, must be regarded as a mistake. While some general expressions may be found which seem to savor of that theory, more specific utterances show that his restoration scheme embraced simply the different grades of believers. All of these may hope for a purgation. But the unbelievers, the *impii*, have no part in Christ. They rise not to judgment in the last day, but to punishment, since they are condemned already. As the Emperors who chastise offending *citizens* make no inquisition regarding the private life of the *barbarians*, but treat them in a mass as enemies, "so also Christ chastises those whom He loves; but aliens, as bound by a common condemnation for impiety, He delivers to eternal punishment, — *alienos tanquam generali damnatione impietatis adstrictos poenae donat aeternae.*" (In Psal., CXVIII.; Serm., XX. 24.)

The fact that already in the early part of the fifth century one could not advocate restorationism without incurring the odium of heresy, indicates that the doctrine of endless punishment must have been dominant in the closing part of the preceding century, notwithstanding the exceptions mentioned. Indeed, aside from these exceptions, nearly all the prominent writers of the period speak with-

out qualification of an eternal punishment or irreversible doom for the wicked. (Athanasius, *De Incar. Verbi*, § 56; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, II. 1, XV. 26, XVIII. 19; Basil, *Hom. in Psal.* XXXIII. 4, XLVIII. 5, LXI. 3; Chrysostom, *Hom. in Joan.*, XVII.; Epiphanius, *Adv. Hær.*, LIX. 10; Hilary, *Tract. super Psal.*, LV. 10; Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XXI.; Gregory the Great, *Moral.*, VIII. 15, 52, IX. 63, XXIV. 19; Jerome, *Comm. in Is.*, Lib. XVIII.; Genadius, *De Eccl. Dog.*, IX.)

That there are different degrees of punishment, as well as of reward, was the common verdict of theologians. Those denying the salvation of unbaptized infants regarded their lot as more tolerable than that of the lost in general. As respects the nature of future punishment, quite a literal view of the fire of Gehenna became prevalent, at least in the Latin Church. As eminent a writer as Augustine regarded actual fire as one of the agents in producing the torments of the lost. "The worm that dieth not," he says, "and the fire that is not quenched, which constitute the punishment of the wicked, are differently interpreted by different people. For some refer both to the body; others refer both to the soul; while others again refer the fire literally to the body, and the worm figuratively to the soul, which seems the more credible idea." (*De Civ. Dei*, XX. 22.) Not less in favor of the literal sense is the following: "For my own part, I find it easier to understand both [the burning fire and the gnawing worm] as referring to the body, than to suppose that neither does; and I think that Scripture is silent regarding the spiritual pain of the damned, because, though not expressed, it is necessarily understood that in a body thus tormented the soul also is tortured with a fruitless repentance." (*Ibid.*, XXI. 9.) Gregory the Great remarks on the peculiar nature of the Gehenna fire, — a fire which gives no light, and is able to burn forever without any replenishing of fuel. That he thought of it as material fire, is sufficiently evident from

the following language: "Gehenna ignis, cum sit corporeus, et in se missos reprobos corporaliter exurat, nec studio humano succenditur, nec lignis nutritur, sed creatus semel durat inextinguibilis." (Moral., XV. 29. Compare Dialog., IV. 29.)

The principal factors in the blessedness of the saved were conceived to be the knowledge of God, and fellowship with Him and with the household of heaven. In the Latin Church Augustine supplied the characteristic phrase for describing the crowning felicity of the world to come, in that he located this in the vision of God. (De Civ. Dei, XXII. 29, Serm., LXIX., CXXVII.) It is noteworthy, also, that Augustine supplied to succeeding Latin writers the most signal precedent for placing the whole reward of the Christian life in the hereafter. Before his glowing vision of the heavenly inheritance, all the happiness which may be found in this world, even in the noblest use of its opportunities, appeared as naught. After enumerating the manifold blessings of this life, he adds: "All these are but the solace of the wretched and condemned, not the rewards of the blessed. What, then, shall these rewards be, if such be the blessings of a condemned state? What will He give to those whom He has predestined to life, who has given such things even to those whom He has predestined to death? What blessings will He in the blessed life shower upon those for whom, even in this state of misery, He has been willing that His only-begotten Son should endure such sufferings, even to death?" (De Civ. Dei, XXII. 24.) "O that our hearts," he exclaims, "were in some measure aspiring after that ineffable glory! O that we were passing our pilgrimage in sighs, and loving not the world, and continually pushing onwards with pious minds to Him who hath called us! Were we loving God worthily, we should have no love at all for money. Money, then, will be thy means of pilgrimage, not the stimulant of lust. Thou art passing on thy journey, and this life is but a wayside inn.

Use money as the traveller at an inn uses table, cup, pitcher, and couch, with the purpose, not of remaining, but of leaving them behind." (Tract. in Joan., XL. 10.) A similar portraiture of this life as a sighing pilgrimage toward the object of all hope and aspiration occurs often in the writings of Gregory the Great.

Third Period.

726-1517.

INTRODUCTION.

WHILE in the preceding centuries the Greek Church was specially distinguished by theological activity, in the mediæval period the Latin Church holds by far the pre-eminence in this respect. The agency of the Greek Church in doctrinal development was wellnigh ended at the close of the Monothelite controversy. Subsequent to this there is little to record except the strife over the worship of images (726–842), and the consideration of this prolonged struggle belongs rather to general church history than to the history of doctrine. A prominent cause of this fixedness was the imperial despotism, with its policy of enforcing conformity to the chosen standards. To this was added the fact of a decline in the spirit and life of religion, such as naturally induced an unthinking acquiescence in ancient formulas, or left too little interest in truth to make it seem worth while to brave opposition in the assertion of private convictions. After the seventh century the activity of Greek theologians was confined mainly to collecting and systematizing the opinions of previous writers.

The most eminent example in this line of work was John of Damascus (about 676–756.) He distinguished himself in the iconoclastic controversy as the fervent and eloquent champion of images; but his great memorial is his dogmatic work, *Ἐκδοσις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου Πίστews*. This, if not distinguished by much originality of thought, appears,

in respect of orderly arrangement and compact statement, a very creditable specimen, for that age, of a systematic theology. The principal sources from which he drew were the writings of the Cappadocian Gregories, Basil, the pseudo Dionysius, Aristotle, and Nemesius. In his method John of Damascus may be regarded as a forerunner of the Latin scholastics, and indeed a distinct historical connection may be affirmed between them. His work was translated into Latin in the twelfth century, and was often quoted during the crowning era of the scholastic theology. Peter Lombard had recourse to it, and speaks of its author in these flattering terms: "Joannes Damascenus, inter doctores Græcorum maximus." (Sent., I. 19. 13.) In the Greek Church the writing of John of Damascus continued to hold a foremost place among dogmatic works. None of his imitators became fairly his rivals. Among the more noteworthy of these were two writers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Euthymius Zigabenus and Nicetas Choniates (or Acominatus), the former the author of a *Πανοπλία δογματική*, the latter of a *Θησαυρὸς ὀρθοδοξίας*. Nicolaus of Methone, who lived about the same time, is noted for his work in refutation of the Platonist Proclus.

The later movements in the Latin Church were without any marked effect upon the Greek Church. The pride of the latter was unwilling to receive anything from Latin barbarism. A growing separation ensued between the two branches, a separation fostered by the rival ambitions of the Patriarchs of Rome and of Constantinople, by the political severance which ensued as the Roman bishops made alliance with the princes of the Franks, and by certain differences in doctrine, discipline, and worship, the more important of these having reference to the procession of the Spirit, the enforced celibacy of the priesthood among the Latins, and their use of unleavened bread in the eucharist. The exact date at which the separation may be said to have been consummated is not easily fixed. Perhaps it

may be located most appropriately at the middle of the eleventh century, when Michael Cerularius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, issued a vigorous condemnation of the errors of the Latins, and closed the churches in his neighborhood in which worship was celebrated after the Latin mode.

Apart, then, from John of Damascus, in the period upon which we now enter, our consideration is limited almost entirely to the West. We have to review the protracted efforts of Latin Christianity to complete and to fortify its dogmatic structure. We shall find it building upon plans which had already been outlined, adding here and there a new feature, until in the issue there appears a near approach to what is known in the modern era as Roman Catholicism.

Unlike the writers who figured in the opening centuries of the second period, and still more unlike those who initiated the era of speculative theology in the first period, the mediæval theologians entered upon a domain which had already been pretty well traversed. In every department of Christian thought they were confronted by standards more or less distinct and authoritative,—by the unimpeachable decisions of councils, or by the verdict of great masters in theology, like Augustine and Gregory the Great, whose word was looked upon as wellnigh decisive. The task, therefore, which they regarded as assigned to themselves, was not so much to discover truth as to systematize and defend what the Church in the previous centuries had already discovered to be included in its faith.

An important index of the weight attached to current authorities may be found in the history of heresies. They hold here a subordinate place as compared with the strength and influence which they had commanded in the preceding centuries. Deviations from the authorized faith, though numerous, were in the main local and limited phenomena, as will appear from the following enumeration of the principal cases of dissent. (1.) *The Adoptionists*, who ap-

peared in Spain, and were an occasion of controversy for a brief interval at the close of the eighth and during the first years of the ninth century. Their name is indicative of their distinguishing tenet, namely, that Christ, as to his human nature, is the *adopted* Son of God. (2.) *Gottschalk*, condemned in the ninth century to life-long imprisonment for teaching a double predestination, — a doctrine which claimed at the time a number of adherents, but no other eminent victim of persecution. (3.) *Berengar of Tours*, condemned in the eleventh century on account of his keen and vehement antagonism to the doctrine of transubstantiation, and constrained by the terrors of threatened punishment to an unwilling recantation. Though, as he averred, many held at that time the same view which he advocated, Berengar appears in public controversy as a single champion. (4.) *Roscelin*, condemned near the close of the eleventh century for teaching tritheism, an individual case. (5.) *Anti-hierarchical sects of the less moderate and evangelical stamp*. The history of this order of mediæval sectaries is one of the obscurest in the range of investigation. While it is certain that such sectaries appeared in the West in the eleventh and the succeeding centuries, not a few points respecting their origin and beliefs are problematical. Very likely they were connected with the sects of the East, among which the Paulicians and the Bogomiles held a prominent place, the former originating in Armenia about the sixth century, and long persecuted by the Byzantine government, the latter flourishing in Bulgaria in the twelfth century. While both of these had the merit of opposing the current worship of images and saints, both carried their opposition to ceremonialism to the extreme of rejecting water baptism, both were inclined to docetism in their view of Christ incarnate, and both entertained a dualistic theory, making the creator of the material world an evil principle. Similar views were held by the parties in the West, who were unearthed

in Aquitaine, at Orleans, Arras, Cambray, and in the neighborhood of Turin, in the first half of the eleventh century. At Orleans in 1022 thirteen were sent to the stake. Sectaries of this description continued to appear, acquiring as their most common designation the name of Cathari, and finding harborage especially in Northern Italy and Southern France. Those included under this term were in common anti-hierarchical and dualistic, but differed as to the degree of dualism which they affirmed. The more extreme were absolute dualists, predicating two original principles, a good and an evil. The Albigenses, who were made the object of such a fierce crusade in the early part of the thirteenth century, represented various shades of Catharist belief. Shortly before the outbreak of the war with the Albigenses, a sect, born seemingly altogether out of due time, appeared in Italy, the Jewish Christian sect of the Pasagii, who combined a conception of Christ much like the Arian with the doctrine of the continued obligation of the Mosaic law. The same era also witnessed the encroachment of pantheistic beliefs. Amalrich of Bena, a teacher in the Paris University, who died in 1207, is said to have given a pantheistic sense to the proposition that true believers are members of Christ. David of Dinanto, a reputed disciple of Amalrich, but probably quite as much indebted to the Mohammedan commentators upon Aristotle as to him, fell decidedly into pantheism. According to Thomas Aquinas, while Amalrich held that God is the formal principle of the world, David of Dinanto taught that he is the material principle of the same. (Sum. Theol., I. 3. 8.) This pantheistic leaven was imbibed by the Sect of the Holy Spirit, who denounced the ruling Church as Babylon and the Pope as Antichrist, and in apocalyptic style proclaimed the ushering in of a new era,—the age of the Holy Spirit, whose incarnation, they claimed, was begun in themselves. A number of these sectaries were condemned to the stake in 1210. A kindred set of views, as respects

the corrupt state of the Church and the advent of the age of the Holy Spirit, was published by the Abbot Joachim, in Calabria, at the close of the twelfth century, and in course of the next century found acceptance with the rigid section of the Franciscans, the Fratricelli. They gained a place also in some of the semi-monastic societies of the Beghards, together with pantheistic notions, like those entertained by the Sect of the Holy Spirit just mentioned, or by the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit, who appeared in various parts of Germany at the beginning of the fourteenth century. (6.) *Anti-hierarchical sects of the more moderate and evangelical stamp.* Here belong the Waldenses, the Wycliffites, and the Hussites. The Waldenses, starting from Peter Waldo of Lyons, in the last half of the twelfth century, were distinguished at first simply by their zeal in the study and dissemination of the Scriptures, and their emphasis upon the teaching function of all Christians instructed in the truth. At this stage they were not conspicuous for hostility to the hierarchy or its doctrinal system; but persecution drove them into opposition to the former, and to a rejection of at least some of the specifically Romish features of the latter. Neander credits them with rejecting transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass as defined by Romish standards, saint-worship, and the doctrine of Purgatory. The remote valleys of Piedmont and Savoy became their principal asylum. Wycliffe, who was the most important reformer before the days of Luther, and anticipated the Reformation at almost every point, left at his death, in 1384, quite a strong party in England; but after a few decades, the repressing efforts of the government had driven it into obscurity. Huss, who was martyred at Constance in 1415, though exalting like Wycliffe the authority of Scripture, made a less sweeping attack upon the peculiarities of Romish dogma. His followers in Bohemia were strong enough for a time to bear the brunt of a desolating war, but at length were reduced

to a small remnant. The Moravians remain as the surviving memorial of the Hussite movement.

As is apparent from this review, dissent was almost a constant factor in mediæval history; but at the same time it was largely sporadic, was kept within limits by the church authorities, was prevented from becoming dominant over any wide stretch of territory. Notwithstanding the various reactions against the hierarchical system, it commanded a vast, overshadowing power.

It is to be noted, however, that in the dominant ecclesiastical system itself strict uniformity in spirit and belief was not maintained. Even within the circle of reputed orthodoxy diverging movements and marked contrasts appeared. While scholasticism may be allowed to give the name to the period, inasmuch as it was the more characteristic development, mysticism was an ever-recurring factor. Within scholasticism itself also noteworthy differences manifested themselves,—different philosophical affinities and different interpretations of some of the fundamental truths of Christian theology. Mysticism, too, had its varied types, ranging from a simple emphasis upon the inner life to that enthusiastic portrayal of union with God which seems barely to escape pantheism. In fine, the mediæval period had its characteristic features and drift, but it had also its significant diversities. As compared with the Roman Catholicism of the present, the Latin Christianity of the Middle Ages may be pronounced the more diversified.

Third Period.

726-1517.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHY held in general an important place in the estimate of the theologians of this period. Some regarded it as identical with revealed religion, being the theoretical side of the same, and pronouncing a concordant verdict upon all its essential truths. Others held that philosophy, so far as it is competent to proceed, is in agreement with revealed religion, but maintained that some important truths of the Christian system, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, lie beyond the range of the natural reason, and so could not have been ascertained by philosophy proper in the use merely of its own resources. Others again, while they were ready enough to philosophize, affirmed that philosophy and Christian theology might be, and indeed are, in antagonism upon certain points. Others, finally, were inclined to have little to do with philosophy, and to regard it as of little utility to the Christian Church. The first standpoint seems to have been characteristic of Erigena and Abelard. The second was the more prevalent view in the crowning era of scholasticism, and was held by Alexander Hales, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas.

The third view emerged as scholasticism was on the eve of its decline, and was represented initially by Duns Scotus, and in a more ample and positive way by William Occam. The last view was naturally, in the different centuries, the view of the less speculative advocates of practical piety.

There was a tendency in the Middle Ages to exalt Aristotle as compared with Plato. At the culmination of this tendency, the verdict of the early centuries was completely reversed. Aristotle was lifted to a place of unrivalled eminence, and was deferred to as the great philosophic master. The explanation of this development is to be found in the differing demands of the two eras, and in the corresponding differences between the two philosophers. The early fathers were chiefly interested in spirit and content. Their highest appreciation was naturally elicited for a philosophy most akin to the spiritual impulses, the fresh life, and the up-reaching aspirations which the new leaven of Christianity generated in the hearts of its converts. Hence Platonism, with its spiritual and ideal elements, commanded a foremost place among all the treasures of ancient philosophy. The theologians of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, had a superior interest in the task of embodying truth in formulas and systems. They had inherited a mass of dogmatic statements from the fathers. The materials for a great theological structure were at hand. Their work, as they understood it, was to put the materials together, and to prove the right of each to a place in the edifice of Christian truth. Hence they had a special appreciation for logical and encyclopedic works, and this turned them of necessity toward Aristotle, the father of logic, the most encyclopedic mind of the ancient world.

Notwithstanding their approximation in such an important point as the theistic character pertaining to both, the systems of Plato and Aristotle differed widely. Like the minds whence they emanated, the one may be characterized as poetic, the other as prosaic. "Plato is richly gifted with

genial fancy: in Aristotle this is entirely wanting. In the former, genius, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, is the most distinguishing element: a most eminent and sound understanding characterizes the latter. Hence, with the former, thought enters the regions of the supernatural and mystical, while with the latter it remains throughout rationalistic." (Ackermann, *The Christian Element in Plato*.) Again, the one may be characterized as deeply informed with a religious spirit, the other as predominantly secular in tone. "In Platonism, the religious element is innate, and is properly the living germ from which the whole life is developed: Aristotle, in his elaborately finished scientific edifice, has constructed for himself a kind of theology, but of empty names and conceptions." (Ackermann.) "His [Aristotle's] philosophy considers principally man's particular condition on earth; it purposes nothing more than a science suitable to this state; whereas the science which Plato sought to establish was intended to soar high above the narrow limits of earthly relations, and sought to contemplate man, not in his present misery, but emancipated therefrom, and enjoying a higher and disembodied existence." (Ritter, *History of Ancient Philosophy*.) Both gave place to the idea of a personal God, and both entertained high conceptions of His transcendence; but Aristotle brought God into less intimate moral relations with man. "While Plato speaks of being made like God through becoming just and holy, Aristotle asserts that all moral virtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God. He is not the God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to human cares, and interests, and sorrows." (B. F. Cocker, *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*.) Moreover, the doubt which Aristotle casts upon the personal immortality of the soul must be regarded as seriously abridging the significance of the relations between man and God. Again, Platonism may be described as distinguished by a strong interest in the ideal

and universal, while Aristotelianism had relatively a strong interest in the actual and the individual. "Plato finds his highest joy in the whole and the unit; Aristotle, in the mass and abundance of sharply defined particulars. The former raises himself above nature; the latter sinks himself into her, and into the observation of real objects." (Ackermann.) Hence the doctrine of ideas, in which Plato had such delight, was far from commanding the zeal, or even the assent, of Aristotle. Once more, in Platonism the element of intuition is conspicuous, in Aristotelianism that of analysis and systematizing. The course of the one was impelled more by deep, underlying convictions, that of the other by a bent to criticism and to logical construction. "Plato," says Prof. Cocker, "was intuitive and synthetical: Aristotle was logical and analytical. . . . To arrange and to classify all the objects of knowledge, to discuss them systematically, and as far as possible exhaustively, was evidently the ambition, perhaps also the special function, of Aristotle. He would survey the entire field of human knowledge, he would study nature as well as humanity, matter as well as mind, language as well as thought; he would define the limits of each department of study, and present a regular statement of the facts and principles of each science. And, in fact, he was the first who really separated the different sciences, and erected them into distinct systems, each resting upon its proper principles."

From these contrasted features it is evident that Platonism was the philosophy with which mysticism could most naturally form an alliance. History, to be sure, may point to instances in which mysticism has been found in conjunction with Aristotelianism; but a preponderance of instances verifies the judgment that Platonism is the congenial consort of mysticism, while Aristotelianism is suited to command special favor under a reign of scholasticism.

Viewed as the companion and patron of scholasticism, Aristotelianism may be credited with a certain practical

service. Without the control of such a factor, an age possessing so large an element of the romantic as did the mediæval, had it been left to the sole impulse of an ideal philosophy like Platonism, might easily have drifted into an exaggerated mysticism.

While Aristotle claimed a growing appreciation, in the first part of the Middle Ages he was still outranked by Plato, or at any rate not ranked above him. Eminent writers are found who repeat the verdict of the early fathers. Erigena speaks of Plato as *philosophantium de mundo maximus*, and as *philosophorum summus*. (De Divis. Nat., I. 31, III. 36.) Anselm, whatever his formal estimate may have been, shows a prominent affinity for Platonism in his system of thought. Abelard styles Plato *maximus philosophorum* and *summus philosophorum* (Intro. ad Theol., I. 17, II. 10; Theol. Christ., I. 5), and equivalent terms are used by John of Salisbury. At the same time each of these writers gives evidence that the age entertained a very high estimate of Aristotle. Erigena speaks of Aristotle as "the most acute among the Greeks," *acutissimus apud Græcos*. (De Divis., Nat. I. 14.) Anselm exhibits an appreciative acquaintance with the categories and logical methods of Aristotle. Abelard refers to him as *princeps dialecticorum* (Intro. ad Theol., III. 7); and John of Salisbury, while he was evidently not in love with his dialectics, allows that he is deservedly ranked next to Plato. (Polyc., I. 6, VII. 6.) But in the next century after Abelard and John of Salisbury, Aristotle claimed a vast pre-eminence over Plato. Philosophy became wellnigh identical, in the thought of theologians, with the system of Aristotle, and, instead of being called by his proper name, he was frequently mentioned simply as "Philosophus." So he is styled in innumerable instances by Thomas Aquinas, and the same usage appears with Duns Scotus and others.

Up to the twelfth century only a section of Aristotle's works, namely, some of his analytical writings, were in the

possession of Latin theologians. In that century his physics and metaphysics were made accessible. They came, however, by a roundabout course, being found with the Arabic scholars in Spain, and translated, together with the commentaries of Arabic philosophers, into Latin. The Jews, whose interest in trade led them from one country to another, were the chief agents in the work of translation, and sometimes rendered into Hebrew before rendering into Latin. But early in the thirteenth century translations directly from the Greek original were placed in the hands of Latin theologians. Alexander Hales is supposed to have been the first of the scholastics who was in full possession of the works of Aristotle. At this time the physics and metaphysics encountered the suspicion of the church authorities, the first being condemned in 1209, and both in 1215. In 1231, lecturing upon them was prohibited until further notice. Meanwhile this adverse verdict had little practical effect, and in 1254 the Paris University, without suffering any challenge, decreed the number of hours which should be given to the exposition of Aristotle's metaphysics and of his principal works on physics. Later, the voice of the Church declared that no one should obtain the degree of master who had not read upon Aristotle, this "precursor of Christ in things natural, as John the Baptist was in things of grace," — *præcursor Christi in naturalibus sicut Joannes Baptista in gratuitis*. (Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophie.)

As scholasticism waned, there was a relative decline in the appreciation of Aristotle. The closing part of the period witnessed a revived interest in Plato. This was especially conspicuous in Italy in the fifteenth century, where it was promoted in particular by the works of Ficinus. It is not without a certain justice, therefore, that Platonism has been styled the morning and evening red of mediæval philosophy.

Among subordinate sources, the writings of the Moham-

medan scholars are worthy of notice. The philosophy embodied in these may be described in general as Aristotelianism tinged with Neo-Platonism. Among those approaching most nearly to pure Aristotelianism was the distinguished Eastern sage and physician, Avicenna, who died in 1036. Most of his writings were made accessible to the West, in translated form, in the twelfth century, and won no inconsiderable appreciation from Christian theologians. Avicenna is quite frequently quoted by Thomas Aquinas. Less acceptable to orthodox tastes, but highly renowned for his genius and learning, was the Western philosopher Averroës, born at Cordova in 1126. Like Avicenna and others of the leading Arabic scholars, he was given more or less to the study and practice of medicine. His system was one of the products of a sceptical spirit which appeared within the bounds of Mohammedanism. It was essentially pantheistic, denying creation from nothing, the free determination of the Divine Being, and the personal immortality of the soul. On the Christian side, Raymond Lullus, that remarkable combination of scholastic logic with the fire of missionary zeal, is noted for his attempted refutation of Averroës. Of other Arabic scholars who acquired a reputation in the philosophic sphere, the principal in the East were Alkendi, Alfarabi, and Algazel; in the West, Avempace and Abubacer. Among the Jews who made alliance with the Aristotelian philosophy, Maimonides, born at Cordova in 1135, attained the highest fame. Avicbron, who preceded him, is also worthy of note as the author of the "Fons Vitæ," a work much quoted in the Middle Ages.

As already indicated, the writings of the pseudo Dionysius were held in high regard during the Middle Ages. John of Damascus speaks of him as a "man most eminent in theology." (De Fide Orth., II. 3.) In 824 the works of Dionysius came to the West, as the gift of the Greek Emperor Michael II. to Louis the Pious. Before the close

of the same century they had secured one of their most distinct memorials in the West, namely, the strong impress which they left upon Erigena's system of thought. If the leading scholastics of the succeeding centuries were less influenced by the theology of the pseudo Dionysius as a whole, they still treated him with conspicuous respect, and deferred to his authority upon individual points, such as the scheme for the angelic hierarchy.

A philosophic theme of special interest to many of the scholastics was that concerning the force of general terms, or the nature of the *universalia*. Are there realities corresponding to such terms? was the chief question under discussion. Those who held that universal terms are expressive of genuine realities acquired the name of "realists"; those who denied that they indicate anything actual, and laid the whole stress upon the individual as opposed to the general, were called "nominalists."

Already ancient philosophy had given the example of different views upon this subject. Plato was in the most emphatic sense a realist, inasmuch as he taught that the universal (that is, the super-sensible ideas) precedes the individual, and indeed that the latter has real subsistence only by participation in the former. His view may not inaptly be expressed by the scholastic formula, *Universalia ante rem*. Aristotle, while he did not deny that there is a reality corresponding to general terms, strongly criticised the Platonic view that this reality is to be regarded as independent of individual things, and in actual subsistence anterior to the same. The reality, as he maintained, is to be found in individual things. In the essence of the individual the universal has its subsistence; white, for example, existing really only in concrete white objects. The formula for this view became *Universalia in re*, which may be described as the formula of a modified realism. The Stoics, finally, were nominalists, denying that there is any reality corresponding to general terms, either in or without

individual things, and holding that such terms are used simply as a convenient substitute for an enumeration of the resembling individuals comprised under them; the term "man," for example, standing for Socrates, Plato, and the whole list. The formula used to designate this theory was, *Universalia post rem*.

In the early part of the scholastic era realism was in the ascendant. Erigena and Anselm were realists more after the Platonic than after the Aristotelian standard. While they did not deny that universals have a subsistence in individual things, they regarded the former as antecedent to the latter, and as possessed of superior reality. The first of the scholastics to advocate nominalism with a distinct repudiation of the rival theory was Roscelin, a contemporary of Anselm. That his theory was regarded as an innovation may be inferred from Anselm's reference to the "modern dialecticians" with whom he associates him. (De Fide Trin., III.) The condemnation of Roscelin served for the time being to discredit nominalism as being connected with his heterodox theory of the Trinity. Realism descended from Anselm to William of Champeaux, and was set forth by him in such radical propositions as seemed to threaten a total sacrifice of the reality of the individual in favor of that of the universal. William, however, was called to a halt by the criticisms of Abelard. As to the position of Abelard himself, some difference of opinion has been entertained. Certain is it that he assumed an attitude of criticism toward both extreme nominalism and extreme realism. He accredited to general terms at the very least the expression of a mental reality, the concept in the mind of the one who employs them, and opposed this view to the idea that such terms are mere sounds; in other words, he held at least the doctrine of conceptualism. It would seem probable also that he was inclined to a modified realism, whether he maintained this with strict consistency or not. Erdmann says that to the *ante res* of William and the *post*

res of Roscelin he opposed his own formula, namely, *Universalia sunt in rebus*.

After Abelard, during the middle era of scholasticism, the prevailing theory was somewhat of a compromise,—predominantly Aristotelian to be sure, but deferring in a measure to the Platonic view, inasmuch as some stress was laid upon the pre-existence in the divine mind of the forms and patterns of all things,—though these pre-existing forms were not so positively associated with the essence of things as they had been by Plato and Anselm. This view, of course, involved no denial of the truth maintained by the conceptualist doctrine. At this time, therefore, the teaching of the scholastics corresponded essentially to that of Avicenna, who affirmed that “not only the *genera*, but all *universalia*, are as well *ante multitudinem* [that is, prior to the sum total of individuals], namely, in the divine understanding, as also *in multitudine*, as the real common predicates of things; finally also *post multitudinem*, as our conceptions formed by abstraction from things.” (Erdmann.)

In the closing era of scholasticism there was a reaction in favor of the long-repudiated doctrine of nominalism. This emanated in particular from William Occam. His teaching, though vehemently opposed at first, finally gained the ascendancy in the Paris University, as well as a large following in other quarters. Though rejecting realism, whether in the Platonic form or in that ascribed above to Aristotle, Occam does not seem to have indulged the more extreme phraseology of nominalism. He does not characterize general terms as mere sounds, and in the place which he gives to the corresponding mental conceptions illustrates the fact that nominalism so called and conceptualism have not always been separated by any very marked line of division.

At first thought this whole subject might seem foreign to the consideration of theologians. But no doubt it had its bearings upon theology. Realism as emphasizing the

universal, and to a large extent the super-sensible, has naturally a different goal from nominalism, with its stress upon the individual, or upon that which comes within the range of observation. The one theory, provided it penetrates to the feelings, tends to give a certain impulse toward spirituality; the other, the same proviso being understood, tends to foster a secular bias. The one theory, carried to an abusive extreme, so disparages the individual, and emphasizes the superior reality of the universal, that the former is reduced to the merely phenomenal, and the true conception of personality disappears in the maze of pantheism; the other, pushed to an extreme, nurtures indifference toward anything beyond the range of observation, and lands in deism or practical atheism.

One other item may properly command a passing notice. A philosophical distinction which played quite a conspicuous part in scholasticism was that between matter and form,—*materia* and *forma*. In the current view of the scholastics, the distinction was taken in the Aristotelian sense. Matter was characterized as the principle of potentiality, form as the principle of actuality. The one gives the indefinite substratum; the other supplies the determinateness necessary to real or concrete being.

SECTION II. — AUTHORS, SCHOOLS, AND SYSTEMS.

1. *Authors and their Chief Works of Dogmatic Import.*

	Writings.	Date of Death.
John of Damascus . . .	Exposition of the Orthodox Faith	After 754
Theophylact	Commentaries on the New Testament	About 1112
Beda	Commentaries on the Scriptures	A. D. 735
Alcuin	Against Felix; Against the Epistle of Elipandus; Commentaries on the Scriptures	804
Strabo	Commentaries on the Scriptures	849
Rabanus Maurus	On the Institution of the Clergy; On the Universe; Commentaries on the Scriptures	856

	Writings.	Date of Death.
Paschasius Radbertus	On the Body and Blood of the Lord; On Faith, Hope, and Charity; Commentaries on the Scriptures	A. D. 865
Gottschalk	Confession of Faith	867
Ratramnus	On the Predestination of God; On the Body and Blood of the Lord	868, or later.
Erigena	On Divine Predestination; On the Division of Nature	After 877
Hincmar	On Predestination and Free Will	A. D. 882
Berengar of Tours		1088
Lanfranc	On the Body and Blood of the Lord; Commentaries on Paul's Epistles	1089
Anselm	Cur Deus Homo (a consideration of the atonement); Monologium; Proslogium	1109
Odo of Cambray	On Original Sin	1113
Roscelin		After 1119
William of Champeaux		A. D. 1121
Guibert of Nogent	On the Pledges of the Saints	1124
Rupert of Deutz	On Divine Offices; On the Will of God; On the Omnipotence of God; On the Trinity and its Works	1135
Hugo of St. Victor	Dialogue on the Sacraments of the Natural and the Written Law; On the Sacraments; Summary of Sentences	1141
Abelard	Introduction to Theology; Christian Theology; Epitome of Christian Theology; Commentary on Romans; Scito Te Ipsum; Sic et Non	1142
Robert Pullus	Eight Books of Sentences	1150
Bernard of Clairvaux	On Grace and Free Will; On the Errors of Abelard	1153
Gilbert Porretanus		1154
Peter Lombard	Four Books of Sentences; Commentaries on Psalms and on the Epistles of Paul	1164
Richard of St. Victor	On the Trinity; On the Incarnation of the Word; On the State of the Interior Man	1173
John of Salisbury	Polycraticus	1180
Walter of St. Victor	Four Books against the Errors of Abelard, Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert Porretanus	After 1180
Alanus	Summary upon the Catholic Faith, etc.	A. D. 1203
Peter of Poitiers	Five Books of Sentences	1205
Innocent III.	Decretals; On the Contempt of the World; On Alms; On the Holy Mystery of the Altar; Commentary on the Penitential Psalms	1216

	Writings.	Date of Death.
Alexander Hales . . .	Summary of Theology; Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences; Commentaries on the Psalms and the Apocalypse . .	A. D. 1246
Thomas Aquinas . . .	Summary of Theology; Summary of the Catholic Faith against the Heathen; Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences; Commentaries on the Scriptures . .	1274
Bonaventura . . .	Breviloquium; Centiloquium; Commentary on the Books of Sentences, etc.	1274
Albertus Magnus . . .	Summary of Theology; Commentary on the Books of Sentences, etc.	1280
Roger Bacon . . .	Opus Majus, etc.	1292
Henry of Ghent . . .	Summary of Theology; Quodlibeta in the Four Books of Sentences	1293
Duns Scotus . . .	Questions on the Books of Sentences; Questiones Quodlibetales	1308
Raymond Lullus . . .	On the Articles of the Christian Faith; Controversy with the Saracen Homerius; On the Demonstration of the Trinity	1315
Dante	Divina Commedia	1321
Eckhart	Sermons and short treatises . .	1328-29
Durandus	Work on the Sentences of Lombard	1333
Occam	Questions on the Books of Sentences, etc.	1347
Bradwardine	On the Cause of God against Pelagius	1349
Tauler	Sermons	1361
Suso		1365
Ruysbroek	The Ornament of Spiritual Marriage; The Mirror of Eternal Salvation; Samuel, or the Olden Contemplation	1381
Wycliffe	Triologus, etc.	1384
Huss	Tractate on the Church	1415
Gerson	On Mystical Theology; On Perfection; On the Meditation of the Heart, etc.	1429
Raymond of Sabunde .	Book of Natural Theology . . .	After 1430
Thomas à Kempis . .	Imitation of Christ	A. D. 1471
John Wessel	On Prayer; On the Sacred Eucharist; On Purgatory and Indulgences; On Ecclesiastical Dignity and Power; Propositions concerning the Power of the Pope and of the Church . . .	1489
Gabriel Biel	Epitome from William Occam on the Four Books of Sentences . .	1495
Savonarola	Compendium of Revelation; Triumph of the Cross; Sermons . .	1498

The writers of the Latin Church in this period may be grouped with reference to four different eras. The first era extends to the latter part of the eleventh century, the second to the beginning of the thirteenth century, the third covers the thirteenth century, and the fourth reaches from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the Reformation. Viewed in relation to scholasticism, the first may be described as in a measure an era of preparation, the second as a formative era, the third as a culminating era, and the last as an era of decline. At the beginning of these different eras stand in succession Beda, Anselm, Alexander Hales, and Duns Scotus. With respect to the last, however, it should be observed that he belongs quite as much to the culmination of scholasticism as to its initial decline, and so holds a position divided between the third and the fourth eras.

“Scholasticism” in this connection is used in the sense which is now currently attached to the term. By *scholasticus* was understood in the fourth century a man of culture; and this essentially was the significance pertaining to the word in the subsequent centuries. Each age, however, had its own conception of culture. A scholastic was one versed in the learning of the time, whether that was rhetoric, or logic, or dogmatics. In its modern acceptation, in the history of doctrine, the term designates a bent to dogmatic construction, both in the sense of a systematic presentation of dogmas, and an elaborate attempt to substantiate them by all available evidences. Mediæval scholasticism, accordingly, was the system which gave a comprehensive and orderly presentation of the dogmas of the Catholic Church, and endeavored to support them by the evidences of reason or philosophy, as well as by the recognized theological authorities. It was dominated by a formulating spirit, and was of the intellect rather than of the heart. Scholasticism was mediævalism on its intellectual side.

The first of the eras distinguished above, as compared

with the rest, was the period of minimum learning. Though embracing some intervals of partial illumination, especially that covered by the reigns of the early Carlovingians, it included the darkest sections of mediæval history. The writers of this time in general confined themselves within narrow limits. With little or no exhibition of intellectual boldness, they sought in the preceding Latin fathers both their propositions and the arguments by which they were to be defended. A remarkable exception, however, appeared in the person of John Scotus Erigena, a native of Ireland, but, as introduced to history, a resident of France. To the sources ordinarily consulted in his day he added the more speculative of the Greek fathers, such as Origen, the two Gregories, the pseudo Dionysius, and Maximus. Erigena's system was strongly tinged with Neo-Platonism. He proclaimed, indeed, no dissent from the traditional orthodoxy, but he was very ready, in his interpretation of its tenets, to bend it into conformity with his philosophical notions. Though subjected to a measure of criticism, Erigena escaped positive proscription. Some three centuries and a half, however, after his death, his principal work, "*De Divisione Naturæ*," was condemned to the flames. While he was less churchly in spirit than the great majority of the scholastics, and can hardly be placed within the bounds of the scholastic period, Erigena is nevertheless to be associated with scholasticism. He was in some sense a forerunner of the same. His maxim that "true philosophy is true religion, and conversely true religion is true philosophy," (*De Prædest.*, I. 1,) was only a more positive and unqualified statement of a principle that was fundamental with the leading scholastics. A certain relation also may be predicated between Erigena and mysticism. While his writings are in no wise conspicuous for the element of mystical devotion, they exhibit very decidedly the element of mystical speculation, or a class of ideas characteristic of the more radical and speculative mystics. Erigena appears as

an isolated phenomenon. We are obliged to pass on more than a century and a half before reaching any noteworthy manifestation of the scholastic spirit. Near the middle of the eleventh century we find somewhat of a presage of scholasticism in the use made by Berengar and Lanfranc of the Aristotelian logic, the former employing it in the interest of a free-spirited criticism, the latter in support of the orthodoxy of the day.

With Anselm, who followed Lanfranc as prior of the cloister of Bee in Normandy, and finally also as Archbishop of Canterbury, we may place the positive beginning of the scholastic period. While he gave a theoretical precedence to faith and emphasized the Augustinian maxim, *Fides præcedit intellectum*, he had at the same time a profound conviction of the rationality of the Christian faith, and placed a high estimate upon dialectics as a means of proving this rationality. Not a little skill and acumen were evinced by him in his endeavor to substantiate by reason the leading truths of Christian theology. At the same time, however, it must be allowed that he took too little account of the principle that something more than the mere weaving together of abstract conceptions is necessary in order to prove the actual. The high value which Anselm placed upon dialectics, or the exact employment of rational evidences, and his application of the same to specific questions of theology, may be regarded as supplying one great factor to the formative era of scholasticism. A second factor was the works designed to give a systematic presentation and defence of the whole system of the Catholic faith, and styled summaries of sentences. Such works were produced by Hugo of St. Victor, Robert Pullus, and Peter Lombard. The "Four Books of Sentences" by Peter Lombard, accommodated at once to a taste for dialectics and to a traditional spirit, since they both savored of logical method and quoted largely from the fathers, acquired an extraordinary popularity. For centuries this work served as a text-

book of theology, and was repeatedly made the subject of a commentary. Such was the standing accorded its author that he was currently mentioned as *Magister Sententiarum*, or simply as *Magister*. Peter Lombard, though a native of Northern Italy, is associated chiefly with Paris, having been first a teacher there and then bishop. Between Anselm and Lombard appeared a noteworthy character of the age, a brilliant dialectician, a teacher who won unbounded popularity with the younger generation, a representative specimen of the French mind, — Peter Abelard. Against the Augustinian maxim that faith precedes knowledge, Abelard was disposed to assert the rights of criticism, and to maintain that a secure and intelligent faith needs to be preceded by investigation. Less bound by the traditional faith than Anselm or Lombard, he no doubt deviated in some points from the dominant beliefs, though by no means so radically as some of his accusers assumed. Among these accusers was Bernard of Clairvaux, an advocate of faith as opposed to intemperate speculation, a representative of a piety at once practical and full of mystical ardor. Abelard was obliged to succumb before the opposition of Bernard and others, and, humbled by the condemnation of his teachings, spent his last days in retirement at the cloister of Cluny. In the school of St. Victor, founded by William of Champeaux, a mysticism having more affinity with dialectics than that of Bernard was cultivated. Among the leaders of this school Hugo presents a fine example of the union of scholasticism and mysticism. The same harmonious combination was also very well realized in Richard. Walter, on the other hand, judging from his principal work, lapsed into a feeling of bitter hostility to the methods characteristic of scholasticism.

Immediately after the Latin theologians came into full possession of the writings of Aristotle, scholasticism reached its highest bloom. Scarcely another century in Christian history has witnessed such elaborate efforts at dogmatic

construction as did the thirteenth. To be assured of this, one needs only to turn the leaves of the ponderous works of Alexander Hales, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, and Duns Scotus. These writers felt it their bounden duty to consider every conceivable question related to the Christian system, and from every possible point of view. So we find, for example, in the "*Summa Theologica*" of Thomas Aquinas, which may be regarded as the crowning product of scholasticism, propositions laid down by the thousand, and appended to each a minute specification of objections, and answers, and conclusions. It is to be noticed that all of these writers belonged to one or the other of the great mendicant orders, and also that each of them taught at Paris for an interval. Alexander Hales belonged to the Franciscans; Albertus Magnus and his more distinguished disciple, Thomas Aquinas, were Dominicans; Bonaventura and Duns Scotus were Franciscans. As these orders were rivals, it was only natural that they should fall into antagonism upon points where either of two views might be advocated without incurring punishment for heresy. Duns Scotus, in particular, showed a disposition to assume an attitude of criticism toward Thomas Aquinas, and, as each had zealous partisans, Thomists and Scotists were arrayed against each other. In this list of theologians the scholastic element was dominant. Bonaventura, however, like Hugo of St. Victor, combined with his scholasticism the characteristics of an orthodox mysticism, and laid strong emphasis upon the inner life of contemplation and intimate fellowship with God. A position outside the central current of his age was held by the English Franciscan, Roger Bacon. Possessed of an insight into the true method of investigation which distinguishes him widely from his contemporaries, he did not hesitate to criticise sharply the methods of the scholastics. He rebuked the acceptance of truth on the mere ground of custom, denounced a dependence upon the fathers which would lead

to a continual repetition of their errors, and insisted upon carrying back investigation to the original sources, to the Scriptures themselves, and to these as found, not in the Vulgate translation, but in the languages in which they were primarily written. A reference to Dante should also have place in this paragraph. He was the poet of scholasticism. In physics he followed mainly Albertus Magnus; in theology, Thomas Aquinas. No better index of his genius is needed than the fact that he was able to transform the dust of mediæval scholasticism into the flowers and foliage of an immortal poem.

Duns Scotus, as already stated, belongs at once to the culmination of scholasticism and to the era of its initial decline. To that decline he himself in a measure contributed. The extreme subtilty to which he carried his reasonings, together with the barbarous terminology to which he had recourse, was suited to call forth a reaction against the system which he represented. Moreover, there was a sceptical element in his thinking, not indeed as respects the dogmas of the Church, but as respects many of the arguments by which scholasticism had undertaken to defend them. "Strict faith," says Ueberweg, "in reference to the theological teachings of the Church and the philosophical doctrines corresponding with their spirit, and far-reaching scepticism with reference to the arguments by which they are sustained, are the general characteristics of the Scotist doctrine." (History of Philosophy.) Such a position (occupied quite as distinctly by Occam), abridging as it does the value of scholastic argumentation, was of course a poor recommendation of scholasticism. But other causes of decline combined with this. A current of doubt, not merely as respects the supports proffered by scholasticism to the system of Catholic doctrine, but as respects certain points in that system itself, made increasing progress, a current coming to open manifestation in the anti-hierarchical sects previously described, and existing no doubt more

or less where it was not openly manifested. Finally, the revival of classic learning in the fifteenth century begot a taste for polite literature which naturally was averse to the dry and ponderous elaborations of scholasticism.

As scholasticism declined, mysticism rose to greater prominence. Early in the fourteenth century mysticism of the more speculative type found in Eckhart one of its boldest and most gifted representatives. Tauler, Suso, and Ruysbroek, who followed him, while they touched upon some of the radical tenets of mysticism, did not on the whole give so wide a scope to a speculative temper. John Gerson, Thomas à Kempis, and John Wessel may be ranked as mystics of the more moderate class, so far as theoretical points are concerned. The last mentioned is fitly numbered among the important forerunners of Luther.

2. SCHOOLS.—Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury (668–690), a man of Greek antecedents, seems to have given a certain impulse to learning in England. In the century following him, England was able to boast of educating the most distinguished scholars of the time. The two most eminent centres of learning at the same date were the monastic schools of Yarrow and York. At the former Beda taught, from youth to the last days of his life. Six hundred monks, besides many strangers, are said to have been gathered under his instructions. York was the native place of Alcuin, and the theatre of his teaching, until he was called by Charlemagne to supervise the educational interests of his realm. The list of theologians which the ninth century records may be regarded as a testimonial to the work of the great prince, and the English scholar whom he called to his aid. Among these theologians, the pupil of Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, is specially noteworthy as an educator. The school at Fulda, with which he was connected for a long interval, accomplished not a little toward supplying a cultivated clergy to France and Germany.

After an interval of encroaching barbarism which reached

its climax in the tenth century, learning began to revive. In the eleventh century we find schools affording a theological training at Rheims, Chartres, Tours, and Bee. The last two, as already indicated by the reference to Berengar and Lanfranc, were in alliance with incipient scholasticism as fostering a new interest in dialectics. From this time an increasing zeal was manifested in the provision of schools,—a zeal which soon culminated in the great citadels of the scholastic system, the mediæval universities.

Toward the close of the twelfth century the schools existing at Bologna, Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge began to assume the proportions and the constitution of universities. Among these the University of Paris held a special eminence as respects theological culture. It remained throughout the Middle Ages the headquarters of scholastic philosophy and theology. Thither students streamed from all the lands of Latin Christendom. The number of strangers gathered in Paris for purposes of study is said to have exceeded at times the resident population.

3. ESTIMATE OF SCHOLASTICISM. — It cannot be denied that scholasticism has valid grounds of commendation. (1.) It was a product of wonderful intellectual industry, a complex, massive structure, which may well be compared with the great creation of mediæval art, the Gothic cathedral. (2.) It was a notable advance upon the method of dealing with theology in the previous centuries. The writings of the fathers in general give only scattered materials; to arrive at a system, the reviewer must himself go through the process of construction. In scholasticism we find the system already made, with divisions and outlines as definite and clear as could be desired. (3.) It was in large part the working out of a great and useful design, namely, the design to demonstrate the rational or philosophical nature of Christian truth. (4.) Many of its distinctions were of genuine worth as safeguards against errors, or as able

expositions of truths which Christian theology must ever acknowledge.

But, on the other hand, scholasticism may justly be charged with serious defects. (1.) It built its giant structure upon an insecure basis, in that it neglected historical criticism, and assumed that the existing Catholic faith was identical with that delivered by Christ and His apostles. (2.) It gave no proportionate or adequate place to Biblical study. Forbearing any searching or independent investigation, it was content to follow the traditional interpretations. (3.) It was quite largely characterized by an excessive valuation of formal logic, and spent time in constructing syllogisms that might better have been employed in finding trustworthy premises. (4.) It not infrequently gave place to questions and discussions that were prejudicial to a permanent interest in theology, inasmuch as they were irrelevant subtilties, and were better suited to serve as a means of mental gymnastics, than of real theological edification. (5.) In its striving for completeness of system and its readiness to invent a dogma to suit a custom, it introduced tenets which had no warrant either in Scripture or in the greater part of the preceding history of the Church. (6.) It bowed to the authority of the hierarchy, and aided spiritual despotism with the prestige of a theory subscribed by the most famous doctors of the Church.

4. ESTIMATE OF MYSTICISM. — It is the praise of mysticism that it is content neither with the exercise of the body in outward ceremonies nor of the mind in dogmatic distinctions, — that it is satisfied with nothing short of the life, that deep, unspeakable life, which is to be found only in the union of the soul with God. From this central trait it is evident that mysticism was a needed factor in the mediæval Church. It had an office to fulfil, as an offset to ceremonialism and scholasticism. And such an office it no doubt did fulfil to good effect. It helped to keep alive a sense of the claims of vital piety. It gave prominence to the indi-

vidual and subjective side of religion, and to such a means of nurturing this as the fervent preaching of the Word. In these respects it served in a measure as a forerunner of the Reformation. But, on the other hand, its nature exposed it to a twofold excess, to an ultra spiritualism or an undue depreciation of externals, and to a pantheistic conception of the relation of the creature to God. As is apparent from the list of heresies, neither of these forms of excess was wholly escaped by mediæval mysticism. Both no doubt were avoided by such men as Bernard, the Victorines, and Bonaventura. Whether the pantheistic extreme was avoided by Eckhart, and some others of the speculative mystics, is a question to be considered hereafter.

SECTION III. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

THE subject of Scripture inspiration was not accorded extended consideration in the Middle Ages. It may be inferred, however, that there was no essential departure from the dominant theory of the preceding period. While there was some recognition of the fact, that accounts of the same events, as given by different writers, differ in style and to some degree in apparent content, the general view awarded little attention to the human factor in the Scriptures. Theologians in the main were content to rest upon the simple assumption of infallible inspiration. The principles of interpretation most commonly accepted were substantially the same as those set forth by Augustine. The necessity of such an infallible revelation as is found in the Scriptures was maintained by Thomas Aquinas on the ground of the supernatural destiny of man. Inasmuch as man ought to live with reference to his true end, and this lies beyond the discovery of the natural reason, there is an imperative occasion for disclosures from the fountain of divine wisdom itself. (Sum. Theol., I. 1. 1.)

Much of the same lack of definite specifications which appears on the subject of inspiration is found also in connection with tradition, and its relation to Scripture. In the Greek Church, John of Damascus occupied about the same position as that ascribed to Basil (p. 183). Among the things authorized by tradition, but passed over by Scripture, he includes the veneration of images. (*De Fide Orth.*, IV. 16.) In the Latin Church, tradition no doubt was practically an authority of vast import; in the actual control of thought and belief, it took precedence of Scripture, since it both governed to a very large extent the interpretation of Scripture, and also insured the acceptance of tenets having no distinct Scriptural foundation. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be denied that theoretically somewhat of a preference was given to Scripture. "The authority of the sacred writings," says Erigena, "is to be followed in all things, since in them, as in certain sacred seats of its own, truth holds possession." (*De Divis. Nat.*, I. 64.) According to Thomas Aquinas, while reason and the testimony of the fathers may supply probable evidences in favor of doctrines, the fundamental and indispensable evidence is that contained in Scripture. "For our faith rests upon revelation made by the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, but not upon the revelation, if there has been any such, of other doctors." (*Sum. Theol.*, I. 1. 8.) "Authority," says Bonaventura, "resides principally in Holy Scripture, which in its entirety was originated by the Holy Spirit for the direction of the Catholic faith." (*Brevil.*, V. 7.) Nicolas de Clemangis quotes with approbation the following sentence of Jerome: "*Quod de scripturis sacris non habet auctoritatem, eadem facilitate contemnitur quam probatur.*" Within a limited circle a practical as well as a theoretical preference was given to the Scriptures. This was true to some extent of Roger Bacon. It was true of the more practical mystics, like John Wessel, as also of Wycliffe, Huss, and the Waldenses.

Wycliffe, in the most outspoken terms, declares the infinite superiority of the Scriptures to every other authority. "Since," he remarks, "according to Augustine all truth is in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly, it is plain that no other writing has authority or value, except so far as its opinions have been derived from Holy Scripture." (Trial., III. 31.)

Tradition, as heretofore, was commonly assumed to have an apostolic basis, being founded upon the oral as distinguished from the written word of the apostles. But meanwhile there was no care to prove the apostolic basis by the use of searching historical investigation. Long-continued currency of a tenet in the Church was taken as a sufficient evidence of its being substantiated by valid tradition. This, of course, gave a fictitious breadth to tradition. Church authority, that is, the existing hierarchy, had it in its power to seal as dogma that which was confirmed neither by Scripture nor by the opinion of the primitive Church. Indeed, *church authority* is a more accurate designation than *tradition* of the extra-Biblical basis of the Romish system. Some of the mediæval theologians were not far from discerning this. In individual cases we have acknowledgments respecting certain tenets, that neither Scripture nor tradition could be claimed for them. Thus Duns Scotus allows that the doctrine of the sacramental character is proved neither by Scripture, reason, experience, nor the writings of the fathers, and declares his acceptance of it on the sole authority of the [Roman] Church. (Sent., IV. 6. 9.) To the same effect are the statements of Gerson and Occam, that certain tenets rest upon revelations made to the Church subsequent to the apostolic era. Among tenets of this kind the former includes the immaculate conception and assumption of the Virgin, and the latter the doctrine of transubstantiation. (Gieseler.)

As the sheer authority of the Church became of such dogmatic import, it was natural to emphasize its infallibil-

ity in matters of faith. It was generally understood that the Church embraces a tribunal of unerring judgment. There was not, however, strict unanimity of opinion as respects the proper organ of this infallibility. Three different views came to the surface: (1.) that the prerogative to render infallible decisions on questions of faith belongs pre-eminently to the Pope; (2.) that it belongs to an ecumenical council; (3.) that it is to be predicated of the Church as a whole, and not of any specific member or section of the same. The Roman bishops were of course forward to advocate the first of these theories. Already in the eleventh century, Leo IX. showed himself an adept in exegetical magic, by finding the dogma of papal infallibility in the words of Christ to Peter, "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not." (Luke xxii. 32.) In the crowning era of scholasticism the papal claim seems to have been commonly accepted, as may be judged from the statements of Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, and Duns Scotus. The first of these quotes the passage in Luke in the papal sense, declares that the decision of difficult questions belongs to the Pope, and that he alone has authority to issue a new symbol of faith, — "*ad solam auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet nova editio symboli, sicut et omnia alia quæ pertinent ad totam ecclesiam, ut congregare synodum generalem, et alia hujusmodi.*" (Sum. Theol., II. 2. 1. 10.) But less than a century and a half after the death of Aquinas, the second theory came, at least for an interval, into the ascendant. The schism which disgraced the papacy, at the close of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, was adverse to the dignity of the papal office. At the same time, inasmuch as there were rival claimants, there was a pressing occasion to erect a supreme authority over the papal throne. There was a return, accordingly, to the opinion dominant in the great controversial era, that an ecumenical council is the highest tribunal of the Church, and the special instrument for defining the

faith. This view was explicitly and emphatically asserted by the council of Constance (1414-1418). The following is among its declarations: "The council of Constance, lawfully assembled in the name of the Holy Ghost, and forming an ecumenical council representing the Catholic Church, has its power immediately from Jesus Christ, to which [power] every person of whatever rank and dignity, the papal itself included, is bound to yield obedience in those things which concern the faith, the extirpation of the aforesaid schism, and the general reformation of the Church in its head and members." (Sessio V., Mansi.) The third view, which emphasizes the general consensus of the Church, rather than the determinations of a Pope or of a specific council, was held by Occam, and also by several writers of the fifteenth century, including Peter d'Ailly and Thomas Walden.

While the dogmatic pre-eminence of the Bible suffered from the encroachments of tradition and church authority, its practical influence was curtailed by its exclusion from the hands of the laity. In the Greek Church, though the reading of the Bible was no doubt reduced to a minimum, no general decree ever withheld it from the laity. In the Latin Church, also, no decree formally claiming to be ecumenical ever prohibited the Scriptures to laymen; but that occurred which was nearly equivalent. Inasmuch as the Waldenses and others were active in spreading the Bible in the language of the people, the reading of the same by laymen became associated in the minds of the authorities with heresy. A council held at Toulouse in 1229 forbade the laity to read the Old or the New Testament, with the exception of the Psalter in the Latin. A like decision was repeated by councils in 1233 and 1246. These were indeed provincial councils; but inasmuch as they were held under the sanction of the Pope, their decrees did not fall far short of a sweeping prohibition of the Scriptures to the laity.

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I. — EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES
OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE. — Anselm is distinguished among the scholastics by his confident attempt to establish the existence of God by an *a priori* argument, that is, by simple deduction from the idea or definition of God. We are to define God, he says, as the greatest that can be conceived, — “aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest.” (Proslog., II.) Even the fool, who says in his heart that there is no God, when he hears the above definition, understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, whether he recognizes its actual existence or not, just as the unexecuted design of a painter is in the painter’s understanding. So the fool is convinced that the greatest that can be thought is in the understanding (*in intellectu*). But the greatest that can be thought cannot be in the understanding alone, since to be in reality (*in re*), as well as in the understanding, or in the mental conception, is greater than to be in the latter alone. “Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu, et in re.” This is commonly styled the ontological argument.

Anselm’s argument was subjected to criticism by a contemporary. A monk by the name of Gaunilo suggested that to derive the actual existence of a thing from its mere idea is making too easy a matter of proof, and illustrated by reference to an imaginary island. According to report, there

is an island now lost to the knowledge of all voyagers. This island is blessed with such an affluence of riches and delights, that one would not venture to deny that it excels all other lands. But to be in reality, as well as in conception, is more excellent than to be in conception alone. Hence it follows that this undiscovered island has actual existence. (*Liber pro Insipiente.*) Anselm in his reply maintained that it is peculiar to God, as the highest conceivable entity, to be exempted from the possibility of being thought not to be; that all things which have beginning or end, or conjunction of parts, may be conceived not to be; but that the idea of a being who has neither beginning nor end, nor conjunction of parts, involves the necessity of predicating his actual existence. (*Lib. Apol. contra Gaunil.*)

The scholastics of the subsequent era accorded very little favor to the argument of Anselm. Some passed it by without notice, and others discredited its demonstrative force. Thomas Aquinas evidently regarded it as no satisfactory answer to one who is unwilling to admit that there is in reality any greatest conceivable entity. (*Sum. Theol., I. 2. 1.*) And this is no doubt true. Anselm in his argument does not get beyond mere conceptions, does nothing more than to call attention to the fact that one factor in the most perfect concept of the most perfect being is necessary subsistence. He starts with an idea, has nothing but an idea in his premises, and ought to have regarded himself as ending with a mere idea. Put into syllogistic form his argument is as follows:—

The idea of God is the idea of
the greatest conceivable being.

To be in reality, as well as in
conception, is greater than to be
in conception alone.

Therefore the *idea* of God (as
the greatest conceivable being) is
the *idea* of a really existing being.

The conclusion here is simply respecting the *idea* of the greatest conceivable being; and the argument is as far from

proving the real existence of such a being, as the idea of real existence is from identity with real existence itself.

Hugo of St. Victor, Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, and others of the leading scholastics, relied upon various applications of the *a posteriori* argument, or the argument from effect to cause. Hugo adduces, among other evidences, that which is supplied by the rational soul. As it belongs to the very nature of this to be active and self-conscious, and it is aware that it was not always so, it must have had a beginning. That beginning it could not have received from matter, inasmuch as in its spiritual essence it is widely distinguished from the sensible world. It must, therefore, have been created from nothing, and its author must have been unoriginated, since the unoriginated is the essential condition of originated things. (De Sac., I. 3. 6-9.)

"It is through creatures," says Thomas Aquinas, "that we arrive at the knowledge of God" (Sum. Theol., I. 88. 3), and he specifies five evidences for the existence of God, which may be derived from creatures: (1.) Motion implies a mover; and, since the chain of moving things cannot be carried back to infinity, there must be a mover who is himself unmoved. (2.) The efficient causes in the world must have, since nothing can be the cause of itself, as their antecedent, a cause which is uncaused. (3.) The existence of the class of contingent things, or things which are capable of not being as well as of being, involves the existence of something that is necessary; for the contingent is at some time out of existence, and the possibility of existence cannot be founded upon nonentity. The contingent must, therefore, be based upon the necessary; and as the necessary must have some fixed starting-point, there must be that which is *per se* necessary. (4.) Different grades of being are suggestive of an absolute crown to the series, being which embodies all perfections. (5.) The way in which the unintelligent things of the world are directed to the

attainment of beneficent ends, argues for a supreme intelligence over the world. (Sum. Theol., I. 2. 3. Compare Erigena, *De Divis. Nat.*, III. 4; Abelard, *Theol. Christ.*, Lib. V.; Pullus, *Sent.*, I. 1, 2; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, I. 5; Scotus, *Sent.*, I. 2. 2.) It is worthy of mention in this connection, that Thomas Aquinas had occasion to consider the objection that finite effects cannot give evidence of the existence of an infinite cause. His reply was, in substance, that effects are not necessarily proportionate to the cause; and, accordingly, while finite effects cannot fully acquaint us with the nature of the Infinite God, they may nevertheless indicate the fact of His existence. This is hardly satisfactory, and serves rather to support the negative proposition that the finiteness of effects does not disprove the infinitude of their author, than positively to establish the truth that there is an infinite author of the world.

Raymond of Sabunde is specially noteworthy as presenting a definite statement of the moral argument for the existence of God. The order and adaptation, as he infers by analogy, which exist in the outer world, exist also in the moral sphere. As corresponding to the eye there is the visible, to the ear the audible, and to the intellect the intelligible, so there must be that which answers to man's moral nature. Now in man's moral nature exists the fact of a felt responsibility or accountability. Every man knows that he is fitted for, and deserving of, rewards or punishments. His nature, therefore, points to a rewarder and punisher, to a judge of infinite perfections; for only such a judge can perfectly meet the conditions.

The mystics, with their strong emphasis upon man's native kinship with God, were of course inclined to emphasize the soul's spontaneous testimony to the fact of the divine existence.

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. — The mediæval theologians, like many of the writers of the preceding period, were disposed either to deny to man altogether a

knowledge of God's essence, or to reduce such knowledge to a minimum. "What the essence of God is," says John of Damascus, "we neither know nor are able to declare." (De Fide Orth., I. 2.) "Whatever we say affirmatively of God does not express His nature, but something about His nature. So when thou hast uttered the word *good*, or *just*, or *wise*, or any other term, thou hast not set forth the nature of God, but something about His nature," — τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν. (Ibid., I. 4.) Erigena maintains that God's essence is so hidden that He cannot be known by creatures even of the angelic order, except through the medium of theophanies. (De Divis. Nat., I. 8.) He teaches, moreover, that none of Aristotle's categories, or any terms known to language, are properly descriptive of God; that He is *ὑπερούσιος*, *ὑπερθεός*, *ὑπεραληθής*, *ὑπεραιώνιος*, *ὑπερσόφος*; that He is incomprehensible even to Himself. (Ibid., I. 14, 15, II. 28.) Hugo of St. Victor seems to deny that our present knowledge of God reaches to His essence, since he affirms that the different terms, such as *just* and *wise*, by which we describe Him, express not so much what is in God as the effects of His working in creatures, and states moreover that we cannot understand the *quid* or *qualis* of God. (Sent., I. 4; De Sac., I. 10. 2.) A knowledge of God *per essentiam*, or through a vision of His essence, is declared by Thomas Aquinas to be foreign to this life; God is known here by means of creatures, and the names applied to Him are derived from creatures, and are not properly expressive of His essence. (Sum. Theol., I. 12. 11, I. 13. 1.) "Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quod non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum." (Sum. contra Gentiles, I. 30.) According to Occam, it lies wholly beyond the province of man in this life to know what God really is, at least apart from direct revelation. Eckhart represents that the Godhead, or the Absolute (which, however, he regards as lying back of God), is void of all predicates; its nature is to be without nature.

But, on the other hand, we find, either stated or implied, a belief in man's ability to know somewhat respecting the essence of God. Such a knowledge is assumed by Anselm, notwithstanding his emphasis upon the divine transcendence, in his representation that the human mind, in its self-consciousness, intelligence, and will, affords a true image of the supreme essence,—“vera imago illius essentie, quæ per sui memoriam, et intelligentiam, et amorem in Trinitate ineffabili consistit.” (Monolog., LXVII.) Alexander Hales teaches that the knowledge of God is both positive and negative; that God in His immensity cannot be known by the human soul except by the way of negation,—a denial, not of a true, but of an adequate or exhaustive knowledge. (Sum. Theol., I. 2. 1. 1, 2.) Albertus Magnus admits that it is possible to touch God with the understanding, *attingere Deum intellectu*, although it is not possible to comprehend Him. To the same effect is the distinction which Bonaventura draws between *cognitio per apprehensionem* and *cognitio per comprehensionem*. (Sent., I. 3. 1. 1.) Thomas Aquinas, while he affirms that none of the names which the sphere of creatures supplies really expresses the essence of God as it is, does not hesitate to offer statements which seem to imply some real knowledge of that essence. He says, for example: “Hoc nomen, *qui est*, triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei.” (Sum. Theol., I. 13. 11.) “Deus est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate.” (Ibid., I. 3. 2.) “Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentie, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum.” (Ibid., I. 12. 1.) “In solo deo operatio est ejus substantia.” (Ibid., I. 77. 1.) It is to be observed, moreover, that Aquinas assumes that in the future life, by means of the gracious conjunction of God with the soul, a vision of His essence is to be enjoyed. (Ibid., I. 12. 1-11.) Duns Scotus

distinctly asserts that the human mind is competent in this life to form a valid conception of God, a conception in which God is apprehended quiditatively, or *per se*. His statement is as follows: "Dico, quod non tantum haberi potest conceptus naturaliter, in quo quasi per accidens concipitur Deus: puta in aliquo attributo, sed etiam aliquis conceptus, in quo per se et quiditative concipitur Deus." (Sent., I. 3. 2.) The threefold way of rising from creatures to the notion of God, which had been suggested by the pseudo Dionysius (De Div. Nominibus, VII. 3), is developed by Durandus. He distinguishes the *via eminentiæ*, the *via causalitatis*, and the *via remotionis*. (Sent., I. 3. 1.) By the first, we ascend from the relative perfections of creatures to the absolute perfection of God; by the second, we reach the First Cause; by the third, we eliminate from the notion of God the imperfections in creatures. In pursuance of this method we attain to a knowledge of what God is in general, but not of what He is in particular,—"*quid est in generali, non autem in speciali.*" (Ibid., I. 3. 2.) Finally, we have the statement, common to mediæval mysticism, that even in this life one may reach that supreme stage of contemplation in which he looks immediately upon God,—has a transient foretaste of the beatific vision. (See the mystical writings of Hugo and Bonaventura.) On the whole, the scholastic theology, notwithstanding some strong negative statements, assumes in reality a minimum of acquaintanceship with the essential nature of God.

The scholastics generally followed in the wake of Augustine in their conception of the absolute simplicity of God, and like him drew the inference that the different attributes assigned to the Divine Being are really one; that, in fine, all in God is God. (John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., I. 9; Erigena, De Prædest., II. 3; Anselm, Monolog., XVI., XVII.; Abelard, Theol. Christ., III.; Hugo, Sent., I. 6; Richard, De Trin., II. 18; Lombard, Sent., I. 5. 3, I. 8. 5, I. 45. 1.)

The argument of Abelard, that God is able to do only that which is becoming to Him, and that nothing is becoming to Him which He omits to do, and that consequently He cannot do more nor better than He does (Introduct. ad Theol., III. 5), was not favorably received by the scholastics. There was a common agreement, however, that the omnipotence of God is an infinite barrier against any act of sin by Him, inasmuch as to sin is to manifest a species of impotence. Says Thomas Aquinas, "God cannot sin, because He is omnipotent." (Sum. Theol., I. 25. 3. Compare Anselm, Proslog., VII.; Hugo, De Sac., I. 2. 22; Peter Lombard, Sent., I. 42. 3; Bonaventura, Brevil., I. 7.)

The omnipresence of God was so defined that it should appear that God is confined by no place, excluded from no place, partly included in no place, and wholly present in every place, — *ubique totus*. (John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., I. 13; Anselm, Monolog., XXII.; Hugo, De Sac., I. 3. 17; Richard, De Trin., II. 23; Lombard, Sent., I. 37. 1; Hales, Sum. Theol., I. 10. 2; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 8. 1.) The enigma of the divine omnipresence was set forth under the figure of a circle, whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. (Quoted by Alexander Hales from Hermes's Trismegistus; used also by Bonaventura, Itin. Mentis in Deum, V.) In opposition to a mere dynamical presence, Hugo of St. Victor maintained that God is present in all things *per essentiam*; and Peter Lombard and Alexander Hales taught that God is in all things *præsentialiter*, *potentialiter*, and *essentialiter*, while He is in the saints, still further, *per gratiam*. Thomas Aquinas emphasized in particular the presence of God, as a working agent or cause. "God is in all things," he says, "not indeed as part of their essence or as accident, but as an agent is present to that in which he acts."

The omniscience of God was closely associated with His eternity. By the latter was understood not so much unend-

ing time as timelessness, or superiority to temporal succession. “Æternitas est tota simul,” says Thomas Aquinas. (Sum. Theol., I. 10. 4.) Succession being ruled out, God’s knowledge was necessarily regarded as equally covering past, present, and future, and as incapable of increase or decrease. The term “foreknowledge,” it was claimed, is not strictly applicable to God, since all things are ever present to Him. (Anselm, De Casu Diab., XXI.) It was stated also, by different writers, that His knowledge of creatures is not derived from them, but has its basis in Himself. (Hales, Sum. Theol., I. 23. 2. 1; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 14. 5, I. 34. 3.) In conformity with this conception, Bonaventura speaks of God as knowing the contingent infallibly, the mutable immutably, the dependent independently. (Brevil., I. 8.) The same writer distinguishes three forms of the divine knowledge; namely, *cognitio approbationis*, *intelligentiæ*, and *visionis*. The first concerns the actual, which is at the same time acceptable to the will of God. The second concerns that which is possible to Himself or others. The third covers all the actual, all that has been, is, or shall be. (Sent., I. 39. 1. 2.)

The absolute impassibility of God was so far unquestioned that it was thought necessary to maintain that God is compassionate only in the sense of relieving the suffering, and not at all in the sense of being brought by the bond of sympathy to suffer with those in pain and misery. (Anselm, Proslog., VIII.; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 21. 3.)

While Aquinas regarded the will of God as fundamentally conditioned by His goodness, Duns Scotus made the will ultimate in God, and maintained that whatever is willed by God is good, for the very reason that it is willed by Him, and not, conversely, that He wills anything because it is good. (Sent., III. 19. Compare Abelard, Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., II. 5; Hugo, De Sac., IV. 1.)

SECTION II. — THE TRINITY.

A HETERODOX exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity was no doubt given by Roscelin. In maintaining that unless Father, Son, and Spirit are three things (*tres res*), like three angels, the Father and the Spirit must also have been incarnated, he obviously fell into tritheism. Roscelin proceeded from the nominalistic standpoint, regarding the term "God" under which the Persons of the Trinity are subsumed as a mere abstraction. Gilbert of Poitiers (or Porretanus), proceeding from the opposite realistic theory, indulged a representation which was thought to savor of heresy, though he succeeded in escaping condemnation. The divine essence, as he taught, is related to God as humanity to the concrete man; that is, it is not God, but the *form* of God, or that which makes Him to be God. This form is common to Father, Son, and Spirit; and it is in this respect that the three otherwise distinguished Persons are one. Abelard's exposition of the Trinity was also called into question, but it cannot justly be charged with heterodoxy. While he represents that the three Persons correspond to power, wisdom, and goodness or love, he takes pains to affirm that this application of terms is not to be taken in a too exclusive sense, and that the Son and the Spirit are no less potent than the Father. (Intro. ad Theol., I. 8-10.) Indeed, on this score, the charge of Sabellianism is no more justified against Abelard than against Hugo, Richard, and others using the same or an equivalent phraseology. Again, too much account ought not to be made of the fact that Abelard allows the world-soul of the Platonic system to stand for the Holy Spirit of the Christian scheme. This evinces simply his desire to show that the best heathen philosophy approximated to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and not that he for himself was satisfied to regard the Spirit as merely and strictly

the world-soul. The Platonic term, in his view, sets forth a prominent aspect of the Spirit as the principle of vitality in the world, and especially in the souls of men. (Theol. Christ., I. 5.) Moreover, the illustrations which he draws from the three persons of grammar, and from the wax as compared with the waxen image, ought not to count too much against the orthodoxy of Abelard, for he did not regard them as adequate; at any rate, he lays down the principle that in proportion as the divine excels the created, it is difficult to find in the latter suitable similitudes of the former. (Introd. ad Theol., II. 10.) Abelard, too, was not the only scholastic who employed imperfect illustrations. As great a master of orthodoxy as Anselm refers to fountain, stream, and lake, as affording an image of the Trinity. (De Fide Trin., VIII.) Eckhart, inasmuch as he allowed no distinctions in the Absolute, was obliged to deny the absoluteness of the Divine Persons, and to reduce them to the rank of accidents, superinduced upon the Absolute. (Lasson, Meister Eckhart der Mystiker.)

Within the circle of orthodoxy the Augustinian representation was dominant, and no essential advance was made upon the same. The equality of the Divine Persons was emphatically asserted, and the cardinal illustration of their interrelation was that which Augustine found in memory (or self-consciousness), understanding, and will (or love). The Father, eternally cognizant of Himself, presents eternally an image of Himself, and so begets the Son. Love eternally conjoins the Begetter and the Begotten, and this love is the Holy Spirit. (Anselm, Monolog., *passim*; Hugo, Sent., I. 6; Richard, De Trin., III. 2. 14; Lombard, Sent., I. 3. 7, I. 10; Aquinas, I. 27, I. 36. 1; Bonaventura, Brevil., I. 2.) The meaning of the scholastics in calling the Spirit love cannot of course be properly apprehended, apart from their doctrine of the simplicity of the divine essence, and the consequent substantial identity of one predicate with all. Among the writers referred

to in this paragraph, Richard of St. Victor deserves special mention, as developing the idea that in the very nature of love a demand is founded for a plurality of Divine Persons. Love requires an object other than self; and the only adequate object of a divine love is a second Divine Person, and the proper communion in this love requires a third Divine Person.

As already indicated, different views of the procession of the Holy Spirit formed the principal dogmatic wedge in this period between East and West, the former holding zealously to a procession from the Father alone, and the latter tenaciously maintaining a procession from both Father and Son. The doctrine of the West was authoritatively promulgated by the council of Florence in these terms: "Spiritus Sanctus ex Patre et Filio æternaliter est, et essentiam suam, suumque esse subsistens habet ex Patre simul et Filio, et ex utroque æternaliter tanquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit." Among the rational evidences which the Latin theologians brought to bear upon the case, those urged by Anselm and Aquinas were perhaps the most significant. Anselm argued that the Holy Spirit is from the essence or deity of the Father, and inasmuch as this same essence is in the Son, He is of necessity from the Son also. (De Process. Spir. Sanct., VII., VIII.) Thomas Aquinas maintained that the distinguishing of Son from Spirit is dependent upon the opposing relations (*relationes oppositæ*) between them, and that consequently, if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son as well as from the Father, the ground of distinction between them falls away. (Sum. Theol., I. 36. 2.) This argument was regarded by Duns Scotus as far from conclusive.

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

THE common scholastic doctrine was that the world had a positive beginning, and was created *ex nihilo*, though both Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus allowed that reason by itself is not competent to demonstrate that the world has not always existed. Says Aquinas: “Mundum non semper fuisse sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative probari non potest.” (Sum. Theol., I. 46. 2.) Some of the scholastics, however, while conceding only a temporal subsistence to the world as sensible, were not far from assuming its real subsistence from eternity. This was the case with the more radical advocates of realism, who regarded the ideas eternally present to the divine mind as the essential basis of all concrete things. To the nominalists, on the other hand, these ideas appeared to be only empty abstractions. The motive for creation was commonly described as simply the goodness or benevolence of God. Erigena held an exceptional position in maintaining that apart from sin there would have been no occasion for a sensible multifold world. (De Divis. Nat., II. 10.) In his representation also of the mode of creation, Erigena deviated from the standard doctrine, and affiliated with the Neo-Platonic theory of emanations. As a stream, he says, flows from its source without intermission, “so the divine goodness, and essence, and life, and wisdom, and all things which are in the Fount of all, flow forth, first into the primordial causes, and impart existence

to these; then, through the primordial causes, they pass into their effects in an ineffable mode, flowing always through the superior to the inferior; and again through the most secret pores of nature by a most hidden course they return to their fountain." (De Divis. Nat., III. 4.) In harmony with this view, and in the same connection, he describes the visible world as the form of the formless, the measure of the immeasurable, the locality of that without place, the temporality of the timeless, the utterance of the unutterable, the circumscription of the uncircumscribed, the essence of the superessential, etc.; and in more undisguised terms he says that God subsists in all things as their essence, — "*cum ergo audimus Deum omne facere, nil aliud debemus intelligere, quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam omnium subsistere.*" (De Divis. Nat., I. 72.) The emanational theory was taught also by Eckhart, together with the idea that the goodness of God always required the world. (A. Stöckl, *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, II. § 284.) In the system of either, therefore, there was undoubtedly a pantheistic element. It does not follow, however, from this that they adopted all the tenets (including the ultimate absorption of all finite being in the Absolute) of a radical pantheism.

As respects the time employed in the work of creation, the theory was frequently stated that the essence or material of all things was created at once, while the shaping and arranging of the material was extended over a period of six days. (Hugo, *De Sac.*, I. 5. 4; Lombard, *Sent.*, II. 2, II. 12; Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I. 74. 2.) The literal character of the six days seems not to have been generally disputed; Anselm, however, suggests that it might be necessary to assume that they were different from our present days. (*Cur Deus Homo*, I. 18.)

SECTION II. — ANGELS.

ANGELS were commonly described as incorporeal. In individual instances, however, a qualification was added. Thus John of Damascus says that they are incorporeal in comparison with material grossness, but not in an absolute sense, since God alone is absolutely incorporeal. (De Fide Orth., II. 12.) Peter Lombard notices that Augustine seems to have ascribed ethereal bodies to angels, but does not positively commit himself in favor of his view. (Sent., II. 8.) Bernard speaks of angels as *corpore æthereos*. (De Consid., V. 4.) The majority, however, spoke without qualification of the incorporeal nature of angels, and regarded the bodily form, in which they have appeared from time to time, as simply a means of manifestation assumed for the occasion.

While Hugo of St. Victor taught that it does not pertain to a created spirit, having no body, to be in place, though it is subject to time relations (De Sac., I. 3. 16), Peter Lombard evidently believed that the incorporeal character of an angel, or created spirit, does not exempt altogether either from space or time relations. (Sent., I. 37. 13.) Aquinas adhered to the opinion of Lombard, and taught that angels are in place, though not after the manner of bodies. He decided that two angels cannot be in the same place at the same time (Sum. Theol., I. 52. 3); and from the fact that they are not compounded of material and form, he drew the inference that there must be as many species as there are angels. (Ibid., I. 50. 4.) Duns Scotus rejected the first as well as the second of these conclusions, and maintained that it is conceivable that two angels might be in one place at the same time, or that one angel might be at the same time in two different places. (See Werner's Johannes Duns Scotus.) Bonaventura decided that the order of the universe, rather than a natural impossibility,

prohibits two angels from being in the same place at the same time. (Sent., II. 2. 2. 4.)

The standard classification of angels was that given by the pseudo Dionysius, and already brought to the notice of theologians in the sixth century. As respects the perseverance of unfallen angels, the cause of the fall of Satan and his angels, and the agency of good and of evil angels, the views advocated did not differ materially from those that were current in the preceding period.

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — While theologians were agreed in applying both of the terms "image" and "likeness," contained in the account of man's creation, to his supersensuous nature, they still manifested a disposition to distinguish between the two. John of Damascus drew the definite Alexandrian distinction, according to which image denotes such essential factors of human nature as the power of knowing and willing, the likeness, the capacity for virtue, or factors whose development or extinction depends upon the individual. (De Fide Orth., II. 12.) Among Latin theologians a less definite distinction was made. Hugo of St. Victor, if we put his statements together, includes in the image wisdom, righteousness, goodness, knowledge, and rationality; in the likeness he places innocence, love, immortality, indissolubility, and spirituality. (Sent., III. 2; De Sac., I. 6. 2.) With this representation Peter Lombard agrees in part, and in part disagrees. He says the image consists in memory, intelligence, and love, the likeness in the innocence and righteousness which are naturally in the rational mind; or the image may be found in the knowledge of truth, the likeness in the love of virtue; or the image is all else pertaining to the soul, the likeness the essence of the soul as

immortal and indivisible. (Sent., II. 16. 4.) Abelard offers the peculiar view that the image applies especially to man and the likeness to woman, and explains by the statement, that, while woman resembles God in rationality and immortality, man has a nearer resemblance to God as the author of all things, since from man was derived the whole race, woman included. (Expos. in Hex.) Bernard, viewing the subject from a particular standpoint, finds both the image and likeness, in which man was created, in the threefold liberty from necessity, from sin, and from misery. (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., IX.) In general, man's resemblance to God was regarded as placing him upon a lofty plane. Abelard's declaration that man is the crown and goal of the whole creation (beneath the angelic), as God is the goal of man (Expos. in Hex.), was in full harmony with the current estimate. The unfallen Adam, as the realization of this ideal, was regarded as a partaker at once of superior knowledge and superior blessedness. According to Hugo, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, his knowledge of God was intermediate between that which is attainable by us in this life and that which is possessed by the saints who enjoy the beatific vision. (De Sac., I. 6. 14; Sent., II. 23. 4; Sum. Theol., I. 94. 1.)

A topic of no little import in the scholastic anthropology was that concerning the conditions under which man was made a recipient of original righteousness. There was a general agreement in the view that the righteousness of the unfallen man was not independent of grace. But this left room still for the question whether the grace was conferred from the instant of creation, or whether an interval elapsed before it was imparted. Thomas Aquinas decided in favor of the first of these opinions. "That man," he says, "was created in grace, the rectitude itself of the primal state in which God made man seems to require, according to Eccl. vii. 30: 'God made man upright.' For this rectitude involved the subjection of the reason to God, of the inferior

powers to the reason, and of the body to the soul. But the first was the cause both of the second and the third." (Sum. Theol., I. 95. 1.) The opposite view, however, seemed to command the most favor, being adopted by Alexander Hales, Bonaventura, and Duns Scotus. (Sum. Theol. II. 96; Sent., II. 29; Sent., II. 28.) According to these writers, man was created *in puris naturalibus*, a state in which the natural powers were free from disarrangement, but a state of innocence rather than of positive righteousness, which finally was conferred as a *donum superadditum*. The principal argument for this theory was found in the fitness of requiring man to pass through different stages, and to acquit himself meritoriously in each, as a condition of ultimate perfection. Says Alexander Hales: "Licet posset [Deus] homini simul dare naturam, gloriam, et gratiam, ut pulchritudo ordinis servaretur, maluit primo hominem facere in statu naturæ bene institutæ, et post addere donum gratiæ, deinde superaddere complementum gloriæ." A passing suggestion of the doctrine of the *donum superadditum* had been thrown out by as early a writer as Augustine. (De Gen. contra Manich., II. 8.)

Erigena pronounces Epiphanius quite too simple in assigning an earthly location to Paradise, and quotes with seeming approbation the theory of Origen, locating Paradise in the third or intellectual heaven, "that is, in man himself, so far as he is intellect." (De Divis. Nat., IV. 18.) But this was one of the erratic notions of Erigena. As may be judged from the references of Hugo, Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Durandus (Sent., III. 4; Expos. in Hex.; Sent., II. 17. 5; Sent. II. 17. 3), Paradise, in the common belief, was regarded as a place in the Orient, loftily situated and separated from inhabited lands. According to the opinion adduced by Peter Lombard, it is sufficiently high to touch the moon's circle. The life in Paradise was regarded as full of the fruition which comes from inward and outward harmony. As respects its duration before

disobedience drew down the sentence of banishment, Abelard ventured the suggestion that it probably extended over several years, inasmuch as the invention of a language, not to mention other things, must have required a considerable space of time. (Expos. in Hex.)

The twofold division of human nature as opposed to the threefold, the incorporeal essence of the soul and its natural immortality, were matters of common belief. An exception, however, in respect of the last of these tenets appeared in the Greek Church in Nicolaus of Methone, who made immortality dependent upon divine grace. Among Latin writers a question was raised, not indeed about the fact of immortality, but about the evidences for the same. The more approved opinion seems to have been that there are adequate rational evidences to establish the soul's immortality. This side of the question was represented more or less positively by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond of Sabunde, and among later writers was elaborately defended by the Platonizing Ficinus. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, denied that the immortality of the soul is capable of proof, apart from the authority of revelation. The question continued to elicit discussion till the early part of the sixteenth century, when Leo X. formally declared the natural immortality of the soul an article of faith, and reprobated the assumption of an antagonism between philosophical and theological truths.

As respects the mode of the soul's origination, the scholastic theology gave a decided verdict in favor of creationism. Leading writers pronounced this the orthodox theory, or rejected traducianism as anti-catholic and heretical. (Odo of Cambray, *De Peccat. Orig.*, II.; Lombard, *Sent.*, II. 18. 8, II. 31. 1, 2; Hugo, *De Sac.*, I. 7. 30; Pullus, *Sent.*, II. 8; Aquinas, I. 118. 2, 3; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, III. 6; Duns Scotus, *Sent.*, II. 31.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — Erigena, with his allegorical interpretation of the account of Paradise, was

of course disinclined to accept the literal sense of the story of the fall. In his view, the primal sin of man antedated this mundane existence, and indeed was its cause. An earthly body, described in Genesis as a garment of skins, was given in consequence of the fall; and the division of man into two sexes, so far from being included in his ideal condition, was one of the most serious consequences of transgression, a deplorable example of that breach of unity which results from sin. (Comm. in Joan.; De Divis. Nat., II. 6, 9, 25, 26, IV. 5, 6, 10, 12.) Erigena reveals here his study of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. It is needless to state that his views were entirely outside of the main currents of belief, and that theologians generally saw in the fall the literal transgression of a literal command.

In the Greek Church, the view entertained of the results of the fall was the same as in the preceding period. In the Latin Church the position occupied upon this subject may be described as Augustinian, with an increasing tendency, however, especially in the latter part of the period, toward dissent from some of the characteristic tenets of Augustinianism. The authority of Augustine was evidently a factor of profound influence; and consequently, even when it did not govern altogether the opinions of a writer, it was likely to incline him to disguise his disagreement as far as possible. Some of the most eminent writers did not differ materially from Augustine. This was the case with Anselm, Hugo of St. Victor, and Thomas Aquinas. In Alexander Hales, on the other hand, not to mention writers of less significance, a perceptible factor of dissent is manifest, and this becomes more conspicuous in the Scotist and Occamist schools. While, therefore, the scholastic theology was largely Augustinian in its conception of the fallen man, at the close of the scholastic era there was an anti-Augustinian current in the Latin Church. This current may not have been as wide and controlling as it became after the council of Trent, and especially after the Jansenist con-

troversy, but it carried the Romish Church a long way toward its later standpoint. This will be made to appear in the course of this section, as also in the concluding section of the next chapter. The topics considered here are (1.) the nature of original sin; (2.) the manner in which original sin is transmitted, or the ground of its imputation; (3.) the essence of free will; (4.) the amount of free will to be accredited to the fallen man.

In their conception of original sin, the scholastics in general agreed with Augustine in finding in it a defect or corruption of nature, and also personal guilt or condemnation. Abelard was an exception, in that he affirmed but a single element in original sin, denying that it has anything of the nature of guilt, and making it to consist simply in the bond to punishment to which the posterity of Adam were made obnoxious by his transgression. (*Scito Te Ipsum*, III., XIV.; *Comm. super Epist. ad Rom.*, II. 5.) Among those who connected original sin both with the nature of the individual and with his standing before God, there was some diversity of representation on the first of these points. Some maintained that original sin, as related to the nature, is simply defect, simply the absence of original righteousness, which absence, as it ought not to exist, is made a ground of condemnation. This was the case with Anselm. He did not deny, indeed he expressly affirms, that the soul of the fallen Adam was infected with carnal affections, and that this nature, thus infected, was transmitted to his posterity. But at the same time he located sin, not in the bodily appetites, but in the will, which follows them inordinately, and so remained by the conclusion that original sin is the absence of righteousness. (*De Concept. Virg.*, II., III.) Duns Scotus also, with express reference to Anselm, taught that original sin consists simply in the absence of original righteousness; the fleshly appetites, or concupiscence, as being natural, not falling by themselves under the category of sin. (*Sent.*, II. 30-32.) On the other

hand, Thomas Aquinas included the concupiscence in original sin, and declared that it is not mere privation; that while formally considered it is the privation of original righteousness, materially considered it is concupiscence, and involves a wounding of the soul. He says: "*Peccatum originale habet privationem originalis justitiæ, et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animæ. Unde non est privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus. . . . Peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis justitiæ. . . . Originalis justitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis. Et ideo omnes vires animæ remanent quodammodo destitutæ proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem; et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturæ dicitur.*" (II. 1. 82. 1-3, II. 1. 85. 3.) Hugo of St. Victor also included the concupiscence in the idea of original sin. He defines as follows: "*Original sin is lust of evil and ignorance of good, — Originale peccatum est concupiscentia mali et ignorantia boni.*" (Sent., III. 11; De Sac., I. 7. 26-28.) Bonaventura and Alexander Hales regarded the destitution of original righteousness as the *culpa*, or ground of condemnation, and styled the concupiscence the *pœna*, or punishment of original sin. (Brevil., III. 5; Sum. Theol., II. 122. 2. 1. Observe, however, Bonaventura's language in Sent. II. 30. 2. 1.) The following is the statement of Hales: "*Originale [peccatum] habet utrumque in se, et culpam et pœnam: culpa est carentia debitæ justitiæ sive deformitas quædam qua ipsa anima deformatur; concupiscentia vero est ipsa pœna quæ in parvulis dicitur concupiscibilitas; in adultis vero dicitur concupiscentia actu.*" This theory evidently was closely akin to that of Anselm and Duns Scotus, the really distinguishing feature of which was that it placed the concupiscence, as an unregulated incentive, rather among the consequences than in the *culpa* of original sin.

There was also some diversity of representation as respects the way in which the sin of Adam gives rise to origi-

nal sin in his posterity. Anselm offered quite a significant account of the subject. He manifestly had no favor for the theory of direct imputation; he did not regard the race as having such an agency in the first transgression as to be immediately responsible therefor. His theory was that of mediate imputation. When his statements are put together, it is made to appear that the new-born infant is under condemnation, not because *he sinned* in Adam, but because he *possesses a nature* which was robbed in Adam of original righteousness, and mortgaged to sin. In a word, he is condemned, not because he was properly a coagent in Adam's trespass, but because he possesses in his nature the effects of that trespass. This interpretation of Anselm will be seen to have a sufficient basis in the following declarations of his: "In Adam omnes peccavimus, quando ille peccavit, non quia tunc peccavimus ipsi qui nondum eramus, sed quia de illo futuri eramus, et tunc facta est illa necessitas ut cum essemus peccaremus. . . . Aperte videtur [Rom. v. 14] significare quod non illis personaliter imputetur ipsa Adæ prævaricatio, aut aliquid tam magnum. . . . Quia natura subsistit in personis et personæ non sunt sine natura, facit natura personas infantium peccatrices. Sic spoliavit persona naturam bono justitiæ in Adam; et natura egens facta omnes personas, quas ipsa de se procreat, eadem egestate peccatrices et injustos facit." (De Concept. Virg., VII., XXII., XXIII. Compare Odo of Cambray, De Peccat. Orig., II.) According to Anselm, the condemnation involved in original sin is not cancelled except by baptism; and he declares, in the most undisguised terms, that all infants dying in original sin are without distinction damned,—"quod [peccatum originale] aestimo in omnibus infantibus naturaliter propagatis esse æquale, et omnes qui in illo solo moriuntur æqualiter damnari." (Ibid., XXVII.) Anselm's theory was closely connected with his emphatic realism, according to which he regarded the universal as preceding the individual, and the

person as only a concrete manifestation of a pre-existing nature. He seems, therefore, to have regarded the corruption of human nature at its source, in the first parents, as directly involving its corruption in all the race. But the majority of the scholastics felt the necessity of finding some other link between the individual and the corrupted Adam. As creationists, maintaining the independent origin of each soul, they could discover in the body alone a continuous chain of connection reaching back to the head of the race. Hence they regarded the concupiscence, inseparably connected in man's fallen condition with the propagation of the body, as in some way conveying a taint to the soul. So, among others, Hugo of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, Bonaventura, and Albertus Magnus interpreted the subject. (De Sac., I. 7. 24; Sent., II. 30. 4; Brevil., III. 6; Sum. Theol.) This view was criticised by Thomas Aquinas, as not properly accounting for the *culpa* in original sin, and seems not to have been altogether satisfactory to some who adopted it as the best available solution of the case; at any rate we find Hugo remarking, "We think it must be said that it is the secret justice of God by which the soul is held responsible for that sin which it had no power to avoid, and which it did not commit by its own will." (Sent., III. 12.) The theory to which Aquinas gives the preference falls back upon the general notion of race unity. "All men," he says, "who are born of Adam can be considered as one man, in so far as they agree in the nature which they receive from the first parent; as in the civil sphere all men who are of one community are regarded as one body, and the whole community as one man." (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 81. 1.) In the same paragraph Aquinas illustrates still further, by comparing the descendant of Adam to a hand, which is the instrument in a case of homicide. The homicide cannot be charged against the hand viewed by itself, but it can be charged against it in so far as the hand is a part of the man committing the homicide. So

the sin of Adam, and the wounds which it has inflicted upon a God-given nature, cannot be imputed to a descendant of Adam viewed by himself, since he had no independent will in their production; but they can be imputed to him viewed as a member of the Adam who, by a guilty exercise of will, gave them birth. The difference between this view and that of Anselm is quite apparent. Anselm emphasizes the fact that through race connection we are personally possessors of a *nature* which is defective and prone to sin; Aquinas emphasizes the fact, that through race connection we are members of a *person* who sinned, and by his sin insured to us a corrupted nature.

The formal element in freedom, or the power of contrary choice, was recognized with sufficient distinctness by various writers. This was the case with Duns Scotus, who styles the will the total cause of its own acts. (Sent., I. 39. 5. 15; II. 25. 1. 6.) It enters also into the definition of Durandus (Sent., II. 24. 2), and was emphatically asserted by Occam. Some of the statements of Thomas Aquinas seem to give it a place; however, the wide range which he assigns to divine efficiency reduces all second causes, the human will included, wellnigh to the rank of mere instruments. (Sum. contra Gentiles, III. 67, 89, 148; Sum. Theol., I. 83. 1, I. 105. 5.) Suarez numbers Aquinas with those who, at least in some passages, appear to identify the free with the voluntary. (Opuseula, p. 2.)

At the same time, the Augustinian notion of real freedom received much recognition from the scholastics. Anselm reproduces very distinctly and emphatically the theory of Augustine. "Free will," he says, "I do not think to be the power of sinning and not sinning; since, if this were its definition, neither God nor the angels, who are unable to sin, would have free will. . . . Power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom. . . . Since all freedom is power, freedom of will is the power to preserve rectitude of will, for the sake of rectitude." (De Lib. Arbit.) So, ac-

cording to Anselm, the essence of free will is not the power of contrary or alternative choice, but the power to pursue righteousness with unchanging fidelity, and he is most free who is farthest from the possibility of choosing evil. A kindred conception of free will appears with Hugo, Peter Lombard, and Bernard, in the specification that the ideal freedom is the *non posse peccare*, the inability to sin. (De Sac., I. 6. 16; Sent., II. 25. 6; De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., VII. 10.) Richard of St. Victor, while he probably agreed with the foregoing writers in the idea that the ideal state excludes the liability to sin, seems to have placed this feature under the category of power rather than of freedom, and he defines the latter as simply exemption from compulsion. "To be able," he says, "to do evil, pertains to infirmity; to be able to do good, to power: neither pertains to freedom. It is characteristic of freedom that its consent cannot be extorted or restrained. . . . It is one thing to have freedom, and another to have power. It pertains to freedom that it cannot be compelled to will anything; the privation of power consists in not sufficing for the doing of anything good." (De Statu Interioris Hom., I. 13.) According to Richard, therefore, infirmity and freedom are not at all antagonistic.

As respects free will in the fallen man, there was an unmistakable departure from Augustine, a drift toward a less radical position. Augustine had taught that the fall extinguished the free will as a power to choose the good, so that, to become operative in this sense, it needed to be fundamentally resurrected. And this theory had its advocates all through the Middle Ages. The party in sympathy with Gottschalk in the ninth century, and at a later date theologians as representative as Thomas Aquinas, stood substantially upon Augustinian ground in affirming the moral inability of the natural man. (Aquinas indeed is credited with admitting, on the whole, a larger element of necessitarianism than did Augustine.) But those who impliedly

or openly adopted a less emphatic view represent quite as strong a current of belief. Bernard associates free will with grace in the work of man's moral recovery, and in a way which, notwithstanding the strong emphasis which he places upon man's spiritual dependence, seems to reject the Augustinian theory of irresistible grace. "No one," he says, "is saved contrary to his will. For what is read in the Gospel, 'No one comes to me except my Father draw him,' likewise in another place, 'Compel them to come in,' is no obstacle; for truly however many the benignant Father, who wishes all to be saved, seems to compel to salvation, He judges no one worthy of salvation whom He has not first proved to be willing." (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., XI.) More noteworthy still is the position of Alexander Hales, as being one of the great masters of systematic theology. We find him teaching that the reception of grace is determined, not by the sovereignty of God, but by the receptivity of the one to whom grace is proffered; and that, while no one is able adequately to prepare himself for salvation, he who does what lies within his own power will obtain the needful assistance. (Sum. Theol., I. 28. Compare Neander's interpretation, Kirchengeschichte, VIII.) Duns Scotus made a still larger concession to the moral ability of the fallen man. Holding that the fall simply robbed man of original righteousness, that *in puris naturalibus*, or his estate by birth, he has the will intact, only without the beneficent guidance which the *donum superadditum* provided in the unfallen Adam, he maintained that, while man cannot reach the supernatural end designed for him without grace, he can in his own virtue avoid resisting grace, can fulfil all the requirements of natural morality, and can very likely love God above all else. (Sent., II. 25. 28. See also Werner.) Durandus did not fall much short of the position of Scotus. (Sent., II. 28. 2-4.) Quite as emphatically as the Scotist, the later nominalist school, represented by Biel and Occam, asserted the ability of the

individual to co-operate efficiently in the achievement of his salvation.

A departure from Augustine, as respects acknowledging a moral ability in the fallen man, involved logically a proportionate departure on the subject of the acquisition of merit, and also upon the dogma of unconditional election; but these topics are reserved for the section on the appropriation of the benefits of Christ's work.

As respects the nature of sin or moral evil, in general, it was characteristic of mediæval theologians to define it as negation or privation, and as needing, like darkness and cold, only a *causa deficiens*. Such expressions as the following are found: "Malum nihil aliud est quam privatio boni." "Omne quod est recte est." "Omne quod est bonum est." "Injustitia omnino nihil est, sicut cæcitas." "Peccatum nihil est." "Injustitia est nihil." "Causa omnis peccati est voluntas a Deo deficiens." "Peccatum non appetitio malarum rerum, sed desertio meliorum." (John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., I. 4, II. 30, IV. 20; Erigena, De Prædest., III. 3, X. 4, 5; Anselm, De Casu Diab., IX., XX.; Dial. de Ver., VII.; De Concept. Virg., V.; Abelard, Scito Te Ipsum, III.; Hugo, Inst. in Dec., IV.; Sent., III. 14; De Sac., I. 1. 10; Pullus, Sent., I. 11; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 14. 10; Bonaventura, Brevil., III. 1; Centil., I. 3; Wycliffe, Trial., III. 4.)

With this dominant representation others were conjoined; and the definition of sin was varied, according as the bearing of the sinner toward God, toward self, or toward finite good in general, was made the prominent point of consideration. Abelard was disposed to define sin as contempt of the Creator. "To sin," he says, "is to condemn the Creator; that is, not to do for His sake what we believe we ought to do for His sake, or not to abandon for His sake what we believe we ought to abandon." (Scito Te Ipsum, III.) Thomas Aquinas says in one place, "All sin consists

in the desire for some changeable good which is inordinately desired." (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 72. 2.) Again he remarks, "Inordinate love of self is the cause of all sin." (Ibid., II. 1. 77. 4. Compare Bonaventura, Tract. de Trib., etc.) Sin, according to Aquinas, has both an infinite and a finite aspect: as an aversion from the infinite and unchangeable good it is infinite; as a turning to changeable and finite good it is finite. (Ibid., II. 1. 87. 4.) Duns Scotus emphasized in particular, as the central feature of sin, an inordinate thirst after happiness (Werner); and Anselm touched upon the same thought when he represented the rational creature as having the two ends, righteousness and blessedness, set before him, and ascribed apostasy to the fact that the pursuit of blessedness was not properly subordinated to that of righteousness. (Kahnis, Dogmatik.)

The theory that evil on the whole is no detraction from the perfection of the universe claimed a measure of assent. Hugo represents that the added ornament and beauty which accrue to the good from contrast with the evil are a full compensation for the otherwise disfiguring presence of the latter. (De Sac., I. 4. 6.) Thomas Aquinas teaches that the perfection of the universe requires that there should be different grades of goodness, and hence, at the lower end of the scale, a changeable goodness, with the contingency, or rather certainty, which it involves of more or less defection from righteousness. "*Ordo universi requirit quod quædam sint quæ deficere possint, et interdum deficiant.*" (Sum. Theol., I. 48, 49.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE subject of the section may conveniently be treated under the following three topics: the theory of John of Damascus, Adoptionism, and the teaching of the Latin Church after the rise of Adoptionism.

The Christology of John of Damascus is interesting, as showing the interpretation of the Chalcedonian symbol, which became current in the orthodox Greek Church. That symbol states that Christ has the human nature in full, and the divine in full, and that these two concur in one person; but the precise relation of the natures to the personality it does not attempt to define. In John of Damascus we find an endeavor to give a further development upon this point. He teaches that the human nature in Christ never had any personality of its own; that in the God-man the pre-existing Logos supplied the element of personality. The moment a human nature came into existence, it appeared as the human nature of the Logos. In other words, in the incarnation the Son of God assumed, not a distinct personal being, but a human nature, to which personality was supplied by union with the already existing divine person. (De Fide Orth., III. 2.) From the united subsistence of the two natures, as he further teaches, there results a species of interpenetration. Especially is the human glorified by union with the divine. As fire penetrates iron, so that one cannot touch the iron without at

the same time touching the fire, so one cannot disconnect the human in Christ from the divine; and this it is which makes it proper to adore the flesh of Christ. (Ibid., III. 8.) Still each nature retains its own attributes. "We do not attribute," he says, "those things to the humanity which are proper to the divinity." (Ibid., III. 4.) The human soul of Christ, to be sure, had perfect knowledge from the first, but this knowledge is to be regarded as derived; it accrues to the soul through its union with the Logos. In general, the representation of John of Damascus emphasizes the subordination of the human to the divine factor. He acknowledges, indeed, a human will in Christ as a faculty, but places it in subject relation to the divine will, to which pertains the initiative in all acts of the God-man. (Ibid., II. 22, III. 18.)

The West, from early times, manifested relatively a strong interest in the human nature of Christ. While Monophysitism won the adherence of a large section of the East, its obscuration of the human attributes of the Redeemer commanded very little sympathy upon Western soil. Adoptionism may be regarded as a special and culminating manifestation in the West of the tendency to give emphatic acknowledgment to the human nature in Christ. It originated in Spain, and largely pervaded the Spanish Church in the latter part of the eighth century. Its chief exponents were Felix of Urgellis and Elipandus of Toledo. Condemned by several synods in the last decade of the eighth century, it soon lost adherents, and was reckoned in the list of vanquished heresies. Among the contemporary theologians who attempted its refutation, a conspicuous place was held by Alcuin.

The peculiarity of Adoptionism was expressed in the affirmation that Christ, as to His human nature, was not naturally the Son of God, and to become the Son of God in respect to this nature needed to be adopted. In His humanity Christ is the adopted head, of which believers, as

adopted children, are the members. The point in His earthly life at which His adoption was consummated was not very definitely fixed by the adherents of this view, but most placed it at the time of His baptism.

The distinction between an adopted and a natural Son of God seemed to the Church like a revival of the error of Nestorius. Hence we find Aleuin charging Felix with dividing Christ into two sons,—“*dividens Christum in duos filios, unum vocans proprium, alterum adoptivum, et in duos deos, unum verum Deum, alterum nuncupativum Deum.*” (Adv. Felicem, I. 1, 10, 11.) To this it was replied by the Adoptionists, that it was not at all in their intention to compromise the unity of Christ; that they acknowledged in Him but a single personality, the different terms applied having reference to the same person under different aspects. They maintained, moreover, that the distinction between a natural and an adopted Son is not only allowable, but requisite, since a natural son cannot have two fathers (the omnipotent God and King David), and if the term “adopted” is discarded, it is left to be inferred that the human, like the divine, is generated from the substance of the Father. (Quoted by Aleuin, Adv. Fel., I. 12, II. 12.) To this it was replied by Aleuin, that no father is able to have a son who is at the same time a son both by nature and by adoption. He argued also, that as soul and body, the mortal and the immortal, constitute one man, so the divine and the human in Christ, in virtue of the simple fact of their union, form the one Son of God. In other words, nothing but the union of the human with the divine was necessary in order that the former should participate, in the fullest sense, in sonship. No doubt the Adoptionists were not so deep in error as the charges of their opponents insinuated; but their phraseology was properly subject to criticism, as seeming to assign a kind of alien position to Christ’s human nature, until by a special act of adoption it was made to partake of sonship.

After the controversy with Adoptionism, there was a strong bias in the Latin Church toward the type of Christology represented by John of Damascus. Mediæval theologians not only concurred in his representation that the Son of God (or, as several were careful to state, the person, rather than the nature, of the Son) assumed a human nature, as distinguished from a human person, but in general allowed His humanity to fall into the background as compared with His divinity. This lack of an appreciative consideration of Christ as the Son of Man may perhaps be placed among the causes which, to a large extent, turned the stream of devotion toward the Virgin and the saints.

One of the more fruitful occasions of christological discussion in this era was the manner in which Peter Lombard treated the question, whether by reason of the incarnation God became anything which He was not before, or whether man became God. After mentioning two different senses in which the question might be answered affirmatively, and rendering his criticisms, he states the theory of those who would answer in the negative. (Sent., III. 6, 7.) This negative answer, as involving the denial that the human nature was incorporated into a divine person, left to that nature simply the place of a husk, or envelope, or external adjunct. As Peter Lombard took no pains to refute this theory (known as nihilianism), it was made a ground of severe censure from various quarters; but the fame of the Master of Sentences was too strongly supported to give way before the unfavorable comments.

The more radical doctrine of a *communicatio idiomatum*, or of the receptivity of the human nature for the divine predicates, seems not to have been generally entertained. Hugo of St. Victor teaches that, as the Spirit was given to the human nature of Christ without measure, the knowledge of all things must have been imparted to His human soul. (Sent., I. 16.) Thomas Aquinas, defining more specifically, says that, while the soul of Christ does not

comprehend the essence of God, or know the possibilities embraced in Him, it comprehends, through the Word, everything in the sphere of creatures,—“comprehendit enim in Verbo omnis creaturæ essentiam, et per consequens potentiam, et virtutem, et omnia quæ sunt in potentia creaturæ.” (Sum. Theol., III. 10. 2.) As he denies omniscience proper to the human soul of Christ, so also omnipotence. “Since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it is impossible that it should have omnipotence.” (Ibid., III. 13. 1.) Bonaventura speaks of a *communicatio idiomatum*, but it is evident that he regarded the divine predicates as belonging to the human nature of Christ only on the ground that all that is within the person may be viewed as the property of either nature belonging to the person, and not on the ground of an actual communication; indeed, he says, “It is not possible for the soul of Christ to be made equal to the Word, either in knowledge or in anything else.” (Brevil., IV. 6.) Duns Scotus took a more emphatic view (than appears in these statements of Aquinas and Bonaventura) of the receptivity of the human for the divine, and taught that the soul of Christ sees in the divine Word all that the Word Himself sees. (Werner and Dorner.)

SECTION II.—THE REDEMPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

1. THE THEORY OF ANSELM.—While preceding writers may have touched upon the fundamental ideas of soteriology, none of them gave such a definite and organized development of the subject as we find in the “Cur Deus Homo” of Anselm. More than any theologian of an earlier date, he attempted what may be called a science of redemption. His endeavor was to show that the Christian plan of saving men through the agency of a God-man is not only a fit method, but the only possible method under the given con-

ditions. In accordance with the design of his treatise, he appeals, not to Biblical data, but to rational evidences.

Anselm repudiates at the outset the idea of any right in Satan over fallen men. That God did not rescue man from his thralldom by the strong arm of power, was in no wise due to the adversary himself. Having cast aside this stumbling-block, Anselm endeavors to show that the nature of God, and the relations of the creature to Him, require, as a condition of human salvation, the atoning work of a God-man.

No words, as Anselm conceived, can exaggerate the exaltation of God above the creature, or the absolute obligation of the creature to love and to obey Him. The maintenance of the divine honor is an end to which any end pertaining to the created universe, yea, to which the created universe, with the sum total of its interests, is utterly subordinate. Nothing can be conceived more intolerable than for the creature to rob the Creator of the honor due to Him. But all sin, as denying to God the obedience due, is of the nature of this heinous robbery. God cannot, therefore, make any concession to sin, and at the same time maintain the consistency and fitness to which He must be supposed to be supremely attached. He cannot remit sin, unless satisfaction is rendered. To remit the offence of a transgressor, and to restore without satisfaction, would be placing him who sins and him who does not upon the same footing; indeed, it would be granting larger freedom to unrighteousness than to righteousness, since if sin is neither atoned for nor punished it is subject to no law.

A demand for satisfaction, as a condition of remission, may also be seen when we consider the destiny for which men were designed. It entered into the Creator's purpose that they should fill up the gap made by the fall of angels. In order to do this properly, men must appear upon an equality with the unfallen angels. But a man who has sinned, and for whose sin no satisfaction has been made,

cannot be the equal of an angel who has never sinned. For God to exalt him to such a position would be to act contrary to the fitness of things.

So the nature of God, the relations of the creature to Him, and the divine purpose, require satisfaction to be made for sin, if it is to be remitted. But the sinner himself cannot make satisfaction for his sins. Every moment he is under obligation to render his utmost service to God. He can never do more than fulfil present duty ; past transgressions incur a debt that he can never cancel, and it is no small debt either, for all sin against God has infinite demerit. No reasonable being will say that he would be justified in violating any, even the smallest, command of God, for the sake of anything or of all things outside of God. As one, then, ought not to sin against God, even for the sake of all that is not God, so, to make good his sin, he ought to give that which is of more value than all that is not God.

From these considerations it follows that God alone can make satisfaction for sin. But while none but God can make it, none but man ought to make it. "It is necessary, therefore, that the selfsame Person who is to make the satisfaction be perfect God and perfect man, since He cannot make it unless He be really God, and He ought not to make it unless He be really man." (II. 7.)

Christ incarnate, then, appears as perfect God and perfect man. As a sinless being, He is under no obligation to die. Consequently, in voluntarily surrendering Himself to death He establishes a merit, — a merit proportioned to the dignity of His person, and fully adequate to offset man's demerit. So great a merit deserved an extraordinary reward. But Christ, as being already possessor of all things, needed no gift for Himself. It remained, accordingly, that He should be allowed to elect man to receive the benefits which had been purchased by His sacrifice.

The theory of Anselm centres the redeeming work of Christ in His voluntary death. While he does not overlook

the healthful influence which comes from His example, he makes but minor account of this, and associates it rather with the appropriation, than with the primary provision, of salvation. The obedience which Christ rendered during His life he regards as no factor at all in the acquisition of merit, inasmuch as Christ, in rendering a righteous obedience to God, only rendered what is due, without distinction, from every rational creature.

It is to be observed that, according to Anselm, Christ renders satisfaction to divine justice, not directly, by bearing the penalty of broken law in the transgressor's place, but indirectly, by the acquisition of merit. The merit which he acquires in behalf of men is transferred to them, or placed to their account, and offsets the demands of divine justice, so far as those demands were a fixed barrier against any forgiveness of sins. The meritorious work of Christ satisfies divine justice, in the sense that it secures the honor of that justice, notwithstanding the forgiveness of sins is proffered. This may seem quite a liberal use of the term "satisfaction"; and indeed Ritschl charges against Anselm, that, while he begins with the idea of satisfaction, he ends with the quite different idea of merit, and its imputation to the sinner. (History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.) But in a certain sense, a merit which supplies to God a *sine qua non* of man's forgiveness, or of the maintenance of His honor in conferring such forgiveness, may be termed a means of satisfaction.

2. THE THEORY OF ABELARD.—No less than Anselm, Abelard repudiated the notion of a right in Satan, it being deemed by him absurd that a right claiming the respect of God could be secured by a crime. But in his positive conception of the atonement he differed widely from his predecessor. In place of the satisfaction theory, he advocated the moral theory; in place of a necessary tribute to the honor and justice of God, the constraining power of His revealed love. In other words, the central idea of Abelard

was that God reveals in Christ His great love; that this love prompts to returning love in us, from which follows naturally our emancipation from sin, and our acceptance with God. "Our redemption," he says, "is that supreme love wrought in us through the passion of Christ, which not only frees us from the servitude of sin, but acquires for us the true liberty of the sons of God; so that we fulfil all requirements rather through the love than the fear of Him who has exhibited toward us so great a grace, — a grace than which a greater, according to His own testimony, cannot be found." (Comm. super Epist. ad Rom., II. 3-5.) Abelard, to be sure, does not discard altogether the sacrificial aspect of Christ's work, or the idea of imputed merit. He recognizes a vicarious efficacy in the merit acquired by Christ, inasmuch as this comes in to supplement, in the sight of God, the deficiency of merit in the elect, or the imperfection of that love which is called forth in them by the revelation of divine love. But this is a subordinate consideration. Love revealed and drawing to returning love, this is the essence of Abelard's theory of the redemptive work of Christ.

3. VIEWS OF OTHER WRITERS. — Scholasticism as a whole was not characterized by an unqualified acceptance of either of the foregoing theories. Most of the mediæval theologians diverged, more or less, from Anselm's representation. In particular, there was a disposition to challenge the doctrine that the satisfaction made by a God-man was the sole possible means of accomplishing man's restoration. While it was allowed that this way was supremely agreeable to the divine nature, it was maintained by the majority of eminent writers that it lay within the sovereignty and the unlimited resources of God to adopt some other method. (Hugo, *De Sac.*, I. 8. 10; Bernard, *De Error. Abælardi*, VIII.; Lombard, *Sent.*, III. 20. 1; Hales, *Sum. Theol.*, III. 1. 4; Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. 1. 2, 46. 2; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, IV. 1; Scotus, *Sent.*, III. 20, IV. 15. 1.)

The idea of a right in Satan, though appearing in the ref-

erences of certain writers, claimed in reality but little place. The most emphatic statements in the direction of this idea, when analyzed, are found to concede only a *quasi* right. Bernard, indeed, in his intemperate polemic against Abelard, sharply rebukes him for his denial of a right in Satan; but when he comes to define that right, he makes it himself a pretty thin shadow of a right. He says: "This right of some sort (*quoddam jus*) in the devil against man, even if it was not justly acquired, but iniquitously usurped, was nevertheless justly permitted." (De Error. Ab., V.) In other words, it was just for God to permit Satan to hold sinful men in captivity, not that Satan had any right apart from this permission. It would seem that Bernard might easily have discerned that nothing was necessary to cancel this permission, or the so-called right based upon the permission, except the will of God to withdraw it; but, as a matter of fact, he held on to the Augustinian idea that it was cancelled by the violence of Satan against the sinless Christ. Bernard, it is hardly needful to state, was not confined to this line of representation, but rather was distinguished by his appreciation of the work of Christ as a satisfaction to God, and by his exhortations to believers to depend upon the same, instead of trusting in their own merits. Peter Lombard also adhered somewhat to the old phraseology respecting Satan's connection with the redemptive work; but how far he was, after all, from according a valid right to Satan, is sufficiently clear from the following statements: "Unjustly the devil, so far as he was concerned, was holding man; but man was justly held, because the devil never deserved to have power over man, but man deserved, on account of his guilt, to suffer the tyranny of the devil. If, therefore, God, who was over both, had been pleased to liberate man by power, he was able most rightly to liberate by the sole virtue of His command." (Sent., III. 20. 2.) A similar statement is given by Hugo, of whom it is to be noticed also that he borrows but mod-

erately from the traditional phraseology, since he pictures in the sequel, not a cancelling of a right in Satan, but rather an atonement for man's sin, which made it proper for God to become the champion of man against Satan. With Thomas Aquinas, as with Abelard, we find distinctly stated, in place of the idea of a right in Satan, the idea of God's right to punish man through Satan. (Sum. Theol., III. 48. 4.)

Any very positive drift on the subject of redemption, among the post-Anselmic writers, cannot be affirmed. The theme was treated with great freedom, the Church having set forth no authoritative doctrine. Most writers made account of a plurality of aspects, giving the greater emphasis to the one or the other, according to their preference. Hugo placed not a little stress upon the idea of satisfaction. "That man," he says, "might justly escape the punishment due, it was necessary that a man to whom no punishment was due should receive punishment for man. But no such man was found, except Christ." (Dial. de Sac. Compare De Sac., I. 8. 4.) Richard of St. Victor also dwelt upon the idea of satisfaction, and brought out very forcibly its subjective worth. "If man," he says, "had made no satisfaction, even though he should have no external avenger of his offence, he would suffer the vengeance of a gnawing conscience, and would never be able to obliterate fully the mark of confusion." (De Verb. Incarn., VIII.)

Peter Lombard gave prominence to the moral theory advocated by Abelard. After quoting from the apostle on the incomparable mode which God chose for commending His love, he adds: "The earnest of so great a love toward us having been given, we also are moved and enkindled to the love of God, who has done so great things for us; and through this we are justified, that is, being freed from sins, we are made just. The death of Christ accordingly justifies us, while by means of it love is excited in our hearts." (Sent., III. 19. 1.) But other points of view are

combined with this by Peter Lombard. In connection with the above statement, and in distinction from its explanation of justification by the death of Christ, he styles the death of Christ the one true sacrifice for extinguishing the punishments due to the demerits of men. He also represents Christ as providing for the salvation of men by the acquisition of merit, and says that He "merited for His members redemption from the devil, from sin, and from punishment, and the opening of the kingdom." (*Ibid.*, III. 18. 1.)

Thomas Aquinas likewise viewed the subject from varied standpoints. Among other conceptions, he gave a prominent place to that of satisfaction, and indeed satisfaction in the more direct sense. "The Son of God," he says, "came into the world that He might make satisfaction for the sin of the human race. But one makes satisfaction for the sin of another, while he takes to himself the penalty due to another's sin. . . . He made a plenary satisfaction for us, in that He bore our griefs and carried our sorrows. . . . His goodness is shown in this, that when man was not able to make any adequate satisfaction, through any punishment which he might suffer, He gave to him one who should make satisfaction. . . . Anything is properly called a sacrifice which is done in consideration of the honor properly due to God, to the end of placating Him. It is manifest that the death of Christ was a true sacrifice." (*Sum. Theol.*, III. 14. 1, 22. 3, 47. 3, 48. 3.) Again, satisfaction in the Anselmic sense, or by the acquisition of merit, is taught by Aquinas. The ground, however, of the imputation of this merit, he finds in the union of Christ with His members. "The sin of a single person," he says, "injures no one but himself; but the sin of Adam, who was constituted by God the source of the entire [human] nature, is carried over to others through the propagation of the flesh; and in like manner the merit of Christ, who has been constituted the head of all men in the things of grace,

extends itself to all His members." (Ibid., III. 19. 4, 48. 1, 49. 1.) Aquinas also evinces a very appreciative estimate of the points embraced in the moral theory. (Ibid., III. 46. 3, 49. 1.) Bonaventura moved in much the same circle of thought as Aquinas. (Brevil., IV. 1-10; Sent., III. 1 *et seq.*)

The conclusion of Anselm respecting the infinite worth of Christ's work, and its adequacy in itself to atone for the sins of the race, seems to have been generally acquiesced in by succeeding writers. According to Thomas Aquinas, it was more than an offset for the sins of mankind. "The passion of Christ," he says, "was not only a sufficient, but a superabundant, satisfaction for the sins of the human race." (Sum. Theol., III. 48. 2.) Duns Scotus made a new departure, by taking direct issue with this opinion. He argued that, inasmuch as the human will in Christ is the principle acquisitive of merit, and this must be regarded as finite, it was only finite merit which He acquired. He allowed, indeed, that in fact it suffices for an indefinite number of souls; but the ground of this sufficiency he located, not in itself, but in the divine will, which is the supreme law of right and propriety, and which can make the merit of Christ of as great a value as it is pleased to accept it for, — the so-called doctrine of acceptilation. (Sent., III. 19.) The representations of Durandus on the subject are much like those of Scotus. (Sent., III. 20. 1, 2; IV. 15. 1.)

The descent of Christ's soul into Hades was understood as in the previous period. The fruits of His mission there were supposed to be confined to His members. Unbaptized children, not being included in this category, were in no wise liberated by the visitation of Christ, as is distinctly taught by Aquinas. (Sum. Theol., III. 52. 1-7.)

The question whether Christ would have become incarnate if man had not sinned, received a measure of attention. Rupert of Deutz, Alexander Hales, Duns Scotus, Lullus, John Wessel, and some others, were in favor of an affirma-

tive answer. (Comm. in Matt., XIII. ; Sum. Theol., III. 2. 13 ; Sent., III. 7. 3 ; De Incarn.) As the subject was argued by Duns Scotus, a principal reason for this conclusion was discovered in the incongruity involved in the supposition that so grand an end as is realized in the glorified soul of Christ should have been conditioned in the divine purpose upon the contingency of man's apostasy. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, argued that, in a matter so entirely dependent as this is upon the will of God, we have no means of deciding except by reference to the Scriptures, and that the Scriptures, by everywhere associating the incarnation with the purpose to redeem from sin, make probable the conclusion that it would not have taken place if man had not fallen. (Sum. Theol., III. 1. 3.) Bonaventura also was favorable to the negative conclusion. (Sent., III. 1.)

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

IN the Greek Church the teaching of John of Damascus appears in no wise distinguished from that of his predecessors as respects the opportunity of every man to partake of saving grace, predestination in his view being conditioned by God's foreknowledge of the conduct of the individual. (De Fide Orth., II. 29, 30, IV. 19.)

In the Latin Church the doctrine of predestination in the Augustinian sense was largely current ; but at the same time many who accepted it were moved in so doing rather by the constraint of authority than by any hearty appreciation of the doctrine on its merits, and there were some in high standing who indulged statements involving its renunciation. On the whole, the drift was adverse to the doctrine of unconditional election. Some indication of such a drift may be discovered as early as the ninth century. It was then that Gottschalk advocated the doctrine of a twofold

predestination. According to his way of stating the case, the righteous are predestinated to eternal life, and eternal life is predestinated to them; the wicked are predestinated to perpetual punishment, and perpetual punishment is predestinated to them. (Confess. Prolixior. Compare Ratramnus, De Prædest.; Remigius, De Trib. Epist.) Now, the amount of exception which was taken to this teaching indicates something like an under-current of alienation from strict Augustinianism. It may be allowed, indeed, that the technical accord of Gottschalk's teachings with Augustine might be called into question, since the latter, in the great majority of instances, applied the term "predestination" only to the heirs of salvation. Inasmuch, however, as Gottschalk taught that God did not predestinate to sin, but only to punishment for sin, his view did not differ essentially from that assigned by his opponents to Augustine; namely, that the non-elect are simply left in their naturally sinful and condemned condition, this condition meanwhile making certain their everlasting punishment. It may also be allowed that a very respectable body of theologians agreed with Gottschalk, and openly proclaimed their agreement; as, for example, at the council of Valence, which declared in favor of a double predestination and a limited atonement. But to this it is to be replied that the issue was practically adverse to the doctrine of Gottschalk, and discouraging to its propagation. The general facts, then, of the controversy may be pronounced indicative of a drift adverse to strict Augustinianism. There was, indeed, no open disclaiming of the doctrine of predestination. The opponents of Gottschalk spoke freely of the predestination of the righteous. They also spoke of the predestination of everlasting punishment to the wicked, though not of the wicked to everlasting punishment. (Hinemar, De Prædest., XIX.; Erigena, De Prædest., XIV. 5, XV. 2.) But at the same time they employed statements showing a bias quite different from the Augustinian, and in fact verging pretty

close upon a denial of predestination as an unconditional decree of God. This appears especially in their teaching that Christ died for all, — a doctrine expressly asserted by a synod convened by Hincmar, and also affirmed more than once in his writings. (*De Prædest.*, XXIV., XXVIII., XXXIV.) Now, if Christ truly died for all, then the benefits of His death ought to be available to all; and election or non-election ought to be conditioned upon the use or the neglect of means that are set before all alike. That Hincmar and his associates definitely asserted this conclusion cannot be affirmed. Their position is perhaps best described as a kind of illogical mean between Augustine and the Greek theologians (among whom Chrysostom is frequently quoted by Hincmar). They showed, at the same time, a certain disinclination to Augustinianism, and a disinclination to cut loose from the same.

Theologians generally, between Gottschalk and Alexander Hales, taught in tolerably clear terms the doctrine of a single predestination; but at the same time some of them gave place to statements indicative of more or less of an inclination to modify the doctrine. Hugo of St. Victor, it must be allowed, does not reveal much of this inclination. Some of his statements embody, in the most explicit terms, the doctrine of unconditional election. "God does not will," he says, "that all men should be justified; and yet who doubts that he is able?" (*Sent.*, I. 14.) "Those who, according to their merits, are justly damned, through the grace of God could have been justly saved, if God had so willed. And again, those who through the grace of God are justly saved, according to their own merits, could have been justly damned, if God had not willed to save them." (*De Sac.*, I. 8. 9.) In Anselm, we find quite a strong interest manifested in conserving the free will, and some of his statements look rather counter to the predestinarian basis. Thus, he seems to assign to predestination quite as little of a positive bearing upon the futurity of events as

he does to foreknowledge. He says: "Sicut præscientia quæ non fallitur, non præscit nisi verum sicut erit, aut necessarium, aut spontaneum; ita prædestinatio quæ non mutatur, non prædestinat nisi sicut est in præscientia. Et quemadmodum quod præscitur, licet in æternitate sit immutabile, tamen in tempore aliquando antequam sit, mutari potest, ita est per omnia de prædestinatione." (De Concord. Præscient. et Prædest. cum Lib. Arbit., Quæst. II.) Too much account, however, is not to be made of this representation of Anselm; for in the very treatise under consideration he declares for the doctrine of unconditional election, maintaining that grace alone can liberate the will from the bondage to sin in which it is placed by nature, and that this grace, according to the good pleasure of God, is given to some and withheld from others. Abelard, in one connection, seems to charge it wholly to the guilty torpor and negligence of the reprobate, that grace does not produce the same effect in them as in the elect. (Comm. super Epist. ad Rom., IV. 9.) Bernard, while he strongly emphasized dependence upon divine grace, like some others of the mystics, had a lively sense of the ethical value of a teaching favorable to freedom and responsibility; and accordingly, as was noticed in a previous section, we find him indulging some representations adverse to strict predestinarianism.

Among those representing the crowning era of scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas taught predestination in terms as emphatic as those employed by Augustine. His definition of predestination is as follows: "Predestination is a certain kind of disposition (*quædam ratio ordinis*), in the divine mind, of some unto eternal salvation; the execution, however, of this disposition is indeed passively in the elect, but actively in God." (Sum. Theol., I. 23. 2.) Reprobation is defined on this wise: "Since through divine providence men are disposed unto eternal life, it pertains also to divine providence that it should permit some to fail of that end;

and this is called reprobating." (Ibid., I. 23. 3.) That predestination is conditioned upon nothing in man, but is dependent solely upon the divine will, is stated very explicitly in the following: "It is impossible that the total effect of predestination should in any degree be caused from our side; because whatever is in man disposing him to salvation is altogether comprehended under the effect of predestination, including even the preparation itself for grace. For this does not take place except through divine aid." (Ibid., I. 23. 5. Compare II. 1. 109. 6, 1. 112. 3.) But other theological chiefs of the same era made a positive departure from the proper doctrine of predestination. This was the case with Alexander Hales. While he reproduces to some extent the traditional phraseology, he plainly evinces, on the whole, a disposition to deny the unconditional character of predestination. "Predestination," he says, "expresses not alone the will of God, but the will together with the foreknowledge that they [the elect] will make a good use of His gift. . . . He occupies the same attitude toward all, but not all occupy the same attitude toward Him; and accordingly predestination is not of all, because predestination is conditioned upon the foreknowledge that he [who is its object] will make a good use [through free will of divine gifts]," — *dicendum quod equaliter se habet ad omnes, sed non omnes equaliter ad ipsum; et secundum hoc non est prædestinatio omnium, quia prædestinatio ponit præscientiam quod iste sit bene usus.* (Sum. Theol., I 28. 2. 2.) Bonaventura, while he employs some representations that savor of unconditional election, uses others which seem to make salvation dependent upon the use of power and privilege available to each individual. "Although the free will," he says, "is not able to fulfil the law, or to work grace in itself, nevertheless it is inexcusable if it does not do what it is able, because grace gratuitously given (*gratia gratis data*) always is at hand to fortify, by whose support it is able to do what lies in itself, which being done, it has

the grace inducing a gracious condition (*gratiam gratum facientem*), which being obtained, it may fulfil the divine law." (Brevil., V. 3. See also Sent., I. 40. 2, 3; I. 46. 1. 1.) Duns Scotus, much in the same way as Alexander Hales, represents predestination as conditioned. He argues that it is possible for a predestinated person to be damned, in that it is possible for him not to be predestinated; in other words, that predestination depends upon something in the individual, and not merely upon the arbitrary will of God. "His will," he says of one assumed to be predestinated, "is not confirmed on account of his predestination, and so he is able to sin, and so for the same reason to stand finally in sin, and so to be justly damned; but as he is able to be damned, so he is able not to be predestinated." (Sent., I. 40.) Of reprobation he says: "Since to reprobate is to will to damn, reprobation will have on the part of the object some ground, namely, foreseen final sin." (Ibid., I. 41.) From the emphasis which Duns Scotus placed upon the absoluteness of the divine will, it might have been expected that he would have assigned to it a complete determining power over the destinies of men; but while he emphasized the divine will, he emphasized the human also, and really made the former conditioned to some extent upon the foreseen determinations of the latter. According to the testimony of the English theologian Bradwardine, in the decades following the death of Duns Scotus, there was a wide-spread defection from the Augustinian doctrine. In the preface to his work he compares the state of the Christian world to the apostate condition of Israel when Elijah stood alone against the prophets of Baal. "Almost the whole world," he says, "has gone after Pelagius into error." (De Causa Dei.) His own creed was a stringent predestinarianism. "Salvatio et damnatio cujuscunque procedit a voluntate divina, quæ invariabilis est omnino." (Ibid., I. 45.) The tenor of Wycliffe's teaching on this subject was the same as Bradwardine's. (Trial., II. 14; III. 7.)

Regeneration and justification were understood by the scholastics as by Augustine. By the latter was denoted, not simply absolution, but also the inward change wrought by infused grace, the being made just or righteous. The sentence of Peter Lombard, "Justificamur, id est, soluti a peccatis, justi effieimur," may be regarded as a standard exposition of the subject. Both of the two elements mentioned were included by Thomas Aquinas in the conception of justification. It is to be observed, however, that one at least of his specifications affiliates not a little with the Protestant view. He says that the justification of the sinner is wrought by God instantaneously,—*"justificatio impii fit a Deo in instanti."* (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 113. 7.) Now, unless in this connection he means simply inchoate justification, or the first distinctive stage of justification, his language needs reconciling with the canon of Trent, which speaks of a progressive increase of justification.

The assurance that one is in possession of the grace of justification is not, according to Aquinas, the common privilege of believers. In the main, one must be content with a reasonable conjecture, based upon the proper signs of the grace. In exceptional cases, however, in order to inspire confidence and courage for the prosecution of great undertakings, or for the endurance of great sufferings, assurance is bestowed by means of a special revelation from God. (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 112. 5.) This view found general acceptance in the Romish Church.

In the current definition of theologians, the faith which justifies was declared to be inclusive of the right inward disposition, the *fides formata* (*charitate*), as distinguished from the *fides informis*, or a mere intellectual assent. (Anselm, Monolog., LXXV., LXXVII.; Abelard, Comm. super Epist. ad Rom., II. 4; Lombard, Sent., III. 23. 4; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., II. 1. 114. 4, 2. 4. 3, III. 49. 1; Bonaventura, Centil., III. 37.) Meanwhile, it accorded with the interests of the hierarchy to emphasize the idea that un-

questioning submission to the authority of the Church is especially characteristic of faith, and the teachings of theologians were not altogether destitute of encouragement to the notion. Among formal definitions of faith, we have the following from Hugo of St. Victor: "Faith is a voluntary certitude respecting things unseen, holding a place above opinion and below knowledge,—*Fides est voluntaria absentium certitudo supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta.*" (Sent., I. 1; De Sac., I. 10. 2.) Very similar is the definition of Bernard: "Faith is a voluntary and certain foretaste of truth not yet unveiled." (De Consid., V. 3.) Bernard also, like Hugo, distinguished faith both from opinion and from knowledge proper.

Upon the subject of merit there was quite as wide a departure from Augustine as upon that of predestination. Augustine, indeed, spoke of the merits of the believer, but he regarded them all as essentially the gifts of God. In the system of Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine of radical dependence upon grace involved the placing of all human merits under the category of gifts. But Aquinas was not content with this general representation. We find him distinguishing between two orders of merit,—*meritum ex congruo* and *meritum ex condigno*. "A meritorious work of man," he says, "can be considered in a twofold wise: on the one hand, according to that which proceeds from the free will; on the other, according to that which proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit." (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 114. 3.) As the act of the free will bears no proper proportion to the transcendent destiny of the believer, so it cannot merit that destiny in the more positive sense, or *ex condigno*. Only so far as the Divine Spirit is the producing cause, can merit of this kind be acquired. As, however, it is fitting or congruous that, when a man acts according to his power, God should reward him according to the excellence of His power, man can merit, *ex congruo*, the great bestowments of God. Now, inasmuch as Aquinas

nas regarded the free will, in the natural state of man, as incapable of any movement toward God, it follows logically from his premises that even *meritum ex congruo* is based primarily upon divine grace, and that man can point to no merit as properly his own acquisition. But while this may be said when the different parts of his system are brought into connection, it must still be allowed that there was a certain tendency in the above distinction, at least in an age already on the road to legalism, to magnify human merit, to foster the idea of earning the rewards of the Christian life. The practical impression of the representation that a man in a certain sense earns a proprietorship in Christian rewards, would naturally be different from the simple Augustinian representation that all of man's merits are only gratuitous gifts of God. Even among those distinctly recognizing the Thomist principle that a certain primary grace lies back of all merit, there was room for the disposition to regard their works as purchasing an *increase* of grace. Among those giving a larger scope to human ability, there was naturally a broader concession to the idea of acquiring merit by works. Such was the case with Durandus. *Meritum de congruo*, as he teaches, is not dependent upon grace. (Sent., I. 17. 2.) In the Nominalist school, which commanded a wide place in the Church for a century and a half before the Reformation, a theory respecting merit was taught which had vastly more affinity with Pelagianism than with Augustinianism. In this school it was maintained that man *in puris naturalibus*, that is, prior to all action of grace, can obtain *merita de congruo*, and upon the ground of these the grace is bestowed which enables him to obtain *merita de condigno*. Here, evidently, merit, as a purely personal acquisition, takes precedence of grace, as a foundation of man's salvation. (Ritschl, History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.) With this aberration upon the subject of merit is to be compared another extreme development, namely, the doctrine of works of supererogation.

According to this tenet, many of the saints, excelling the requirements placed upon them, have earned (as did also Christ) merits beyond their own needs; and these, being in the keeping of the Church, may be applied by its authorities to the cancelling of the temporal penalties which are due to sins. This theory was outlined by Alexander Hales, and more fully elaborated by later writers. The following is the version given by Thomas Aquinas: "The reason why they [indulgences] are able to avail is the unity of the mystical body, in which many have exceeded in works of penitence their obligations (*supererogaverunt ad mensuram debitorum suorum*); and many also have patiently borne unjust tribulations, through which a multitude of punishments could have been expiated, if it had been due to them. Of which merits so great is the abundance that they exceed all the punishments due to those now living; and especially on account of the merit of Christ, which, although it works in the sacraments, is nevertheless not confined in its efficacy to the sacraments, but in its infinitude exceeds the efficacy of the sacraments. But the saints in whom is found a superabundance of works of satisfaction have not done works of this kind specifically for him who needs remission, but for the whole Church in common. And so the aforesaid merits are the common property of the whole Church. But things which are common to a multitude are distributed to individuals of the multitude, according to the decision of him who is at the head of the multitude." (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 25. 1. — Migne.) It is manifest, therefore, that the popular notions respecting works of merit, the great emphasis placed upon the atoning virtue of alms, pilgrimages, and various forms of penitential inflictions, were not altogether alien to the dogmatic teaching of the age. When we find such specifications as the above, or when we find great masters like Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas commending the repetition of the Lord's Prayer, the sprinkling of holy

water, beating upon the breast, etc., as efficacious means of cancelling certain kinds of sins (Sent., IV. 16. 4; Sum. Theol., III. 87. 3), we are compelled to allow that there were points of affinity between the theories of the doctors and the crude practices of the ignorant masses.

In investigating the subject of this section, one can hardly fail to observe how far the impersonal expression *grace* takes precedence of the personal expression *Christ*. While there were noteworthy exceptions, the ruling conception of Christian life among mediæval writers was a supply by various means from a treasury of grace, rather than appropriation of Christ as the soul's companion, and the all-sufficient spring of its life. The personal Redeemer stood in the background. While this result may be ascribed largely to a general conception of salvation, having its starting-point at least as far back as Augustine, it was no doubt helped on by the great prominence given to the saints and the Virgin. So much was interposed between the individual and Christ that He was placed of necessity at a distance.

Dogmatic specifications respecting the worship of the saints were made by different writers. Analogous to the distinction drawn by the Greek theologians between *λατρεία* and *προσκύνησις*, the Latins made a distinction between *latria* and *dulia*, the former denoting the species of worship due to God, the latter that due to the saints. (Hugo, Inst. in Dec., I.; Sent., IV. 3.) Between these the later scholastics placed the *hyperdulia*, as expressive of the worship due alone to the Virgin. (Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 25. 5.) With the worship of saints the veneration of their relics was associated, and the latter as well as the former was distinctly commended. (Ibid., III. 25. 6.) That the saints are cognizant of the prayers addressed to them was the prevalent theory, though Hugo was inclined to Augustine's view, that the saints of their own accord pray for men in this world; that God, knowing their prayers as well as the

petitions addressed to them, gives efficacy to the former in the direction of an answer to the latter. (De Sac., II. 16. 11.) The argument for the common view, as presented by Thomas Aquinas, is as follows. Perfect blessedness implies that one should have what is properly an object of desire. To know that which pertains to one's self is properly an object of desire. It pertains to the saints to render aid to those in need. Hence they have the knowledge which is suited to such a vocation; they understand in the Word, or through their vision of God, the vows, devotions, and prayers of men who have recourse to themselves. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 72. 1. — Migne.)

The perpetual virginity of Mary, and her freedom from actual sin, were regarded in this period as items of Catholic belief. The doctrine of her assumption, also, was commonly accepted after the ninth century. The dogma of her immaculate conception, on the other hand, claimed no very prominent advocate before the time of Duns Scotus. The contrary view appears with Radbertus, Richard of St. Victor, and others, who spoke of her as being sanctified in the womb, such a work of sanctification having of course no occasion, if she had been immaculately conceived. (Radbertus, De Part. Virg.; Richard, Explicat. in Cant., XXVI.) Bernard directly controverted the immaculate conception of the Virgin, and expressed surprise that such a novelty as a celebration of the dogma or fact in question should have found place among the clergy of Lyons. (Epist. CLXXIV.) Thomas Aquinas, also, distinctly denied the immaculate conception. "The blessed Virgin," he says, "contracted indeed original sin, but was purified from the same before she was born from the womb, — *Beata Virgo contraxit quidem originale peccatum, sed ab eo fuit mundata, antequam ex utero nasceretur.*" (Sum. Theol., III. 27. 2.) Bonaventura, too, notwithstanding he went beyond bounds in veneration of the Virgin, taught very clearly that Christ alone of all the race was without original sin. (Tract. de

Trib. Tern.; Sent., III. 3.) Duns Scotus argued for the immaculate conception, on the purely theoretical ground that it was a fitting display of saving power, and specially honoring to Christ, that some one should have been constituted free from all sin even original, and that in behalf of no one could this power have been so properly displayed as in behalf of the virgin mother of the Lord. (Sent., III. 3. 1.) The Franciscans ere long adhered generally to the view of their master theologian; the Dominicans, on the other hand, contended against the same. Not till the pontificate of Pius IX. was an official verdict rendered in favor of the dogma of the immaculate conception. The topic, by the way, affords a fine example of how hierarchical authority in the Romish Church is able to set tradition at naught; for the fact is beyond question that the opinions of the fathers and of their successors, down to the closing part of the thirteenth century, are arrayed in substantial unanimity against the theory of the immaculate conception.

But if the Middle Ages failed to reach the highest point in the line of dogmatic tribute to Mary, they did not fail of rendering to her the highest tribute as respects actual worship. She was ranked as the crowned queen of heaven, and to the compelling power of her requests the divine will was supposed to yield ready assent. Books of devotion were written in her honor, and the language which is applied to God in the Davidic Psalms was transferred to her. As eminent a writer as Bonaventura did not hesitate to engage in this species of deification. The following sentences may serve to show how he put *Domina* in place of *Dominus*, or the Virgin in place of the Lord. “*Domina mea in te speravi, de inimicis meis libera me domina. In domina confido. Diligam te domina cœli et terræ, et in gentibus nomen tuum invocabo. Judica me domina, et discerne causam meam de gente perversa. Domina refugium nostrum tu es in omni necessitate nostra. Exsurgat Maria, et dissipentur inimici ejus. Beati omnes qui timent dominam nostram.*”

Domina probasti me, et cognovisti me, ruinam et transgressionem meam." (Psalterium Beatae Virginis.)

After surveying the mediums which were interposed between the individual and Christ, one can appreciate the discernment which led Wycliffe to suggest that it would be better to pass by the inferior mediators, and to appeal to Christ alone as being incomparably the best mediator, the most accessible, the most benignant, and the most compassionate. "Truly," he says, "it seems to be folly to leave the fountain yielding the more ready supply, and to approach to some turbid and remote rivulet, and especially where faith does not teach that the said rivulet has emanated from the living fountain." (Trial., III. 30.) In the closing reference, Wycliffe had in mind the doubtful saints, such as the scramble after the canonization of a favorite by monastic orders, and other parties, was likely, in his view, to introduce into the calendar.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

THE curtailment of Christian empire in the East by the Mohammedans, and the final separation of the East from the West, gave free scope in Latin Christendom for the development of the Roman idea of the Church. No strong ecclesiastical power appeared now to dispute the pretensions, or to limit the prerogatives, of the Roman bishops. Already in the latter part of the eleventh century, Gregory VII. vigorously asserted the leading points of the theory of papal supremacy, and in the thirteenth century the papal theocracy reached its culmination.

At the crowning era of papal rule, two ideas were dominant respecting the Church: (1.) that as a visible organism it is identical with the kingdom of God upon earth; (2.) that it is the patrimony of Peter, or, in other words, of the Roman bishop. In pursuance of the former idea, salvation was limited to those in actual connection with the Church, and subject to its authority. A measure of exception, however, was allowed. We find statements to the effect that an unjust excommunication is no cause of harm to the one whom it severs from church fellowship. Thus Robert Pullus declares that an anathema is of no effect against one not deserving censure, and that, while such a one is excluded by the priest, he is received by God. (Sent., VI. 61.) Thomas Aquinas also teaches that an unjust excommunication does not injure its victim, provided he

endures it with becoming meekness. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 21. 4. Compare Abelard, *Scito Te Ipsum*, XXVI.) In conformity with the second idea, a constitutional primacy was assigned to Peter among the apostles, the Roman bishop was regarded as heir to that primacy, and consequently as the head of the Church, the vicegerent of Christ upon earth.

The popes themselves, in this era, in defining their prerogatives, had a special occasion to place their position in contrast with that of temporal sovereigns, inasmuch as these were their most conspicuous rivals. Gregory VII. found in the sun and the moon what seemed to him an apt means of illustrating the relative dignity of the papal and the princely power. Innocent III., the greatest of the ecclesiastical monarchs of the Middle Ages, reaffirmed and enlarged upon the illustration. The following sentences of his leave no ambiguity as respects his view of papal rank. "Although the primary and principal foundation of the Church is Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, the second and secondary foundation of the Church is Peter. . . . After he [Peter] had consecrated the Roman Church with his own blood, he left the primacy of the Church to his successor, transferring in him the whole plenitude of power. . . . Single kings have single realms. But Peter, as in fulness, so also in breadth, surpasses them all, because he is the vicegerent of Him to whom belongs the earth and the fulness thereof. . . . As the moon derives its light from the sun, and is inferior to it at once in quantity and quality, in position as well as in effect, so the regal power derives the splendor of its dignity from pontifical authority." (Prima Collect. Decret., Tit. II., III. — Migne.) If anything was lacking on the part of Innocent III. to the most complete assertion of pontifical sovereignty, the lack was supplied in the bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII. In this bull the claim of the temporal power to anything like autonomy over against the spiritual is likened to

Manichæan dualism. With all the formality and precision of an *ex cathedra* decree, Boniface proclaims: "We declare, say, define, and pronounce, that to be subject to the Roman pontiff is for every human creature an altogether necessary condition of salvation," — *subesse Romano pontifici, omni humanæ creaturæ declaramus, dicimus, definimus, et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis.* (Quoted in Gieseler's *Kirchengeschichte*.)

By the earlier theologians of the period the full theory of the papacy was not entertained. Among other evidences of this is the interpretation that was given of Matt. xvi. 18. We find Beda, for example, saying that the rock upon which the Church is built is the Saviour whom Peter confessed, and in general commenting upon the passage in a way which assigns no exceptional eminence to Peter. (Expos. in Matt.) Radbertus draws out the same meaning, and condemns as false the representation that Peter is the foundation of the Church. "*Non enim, ut quidam male putant, Petrus fundamentum totius ecclesiæ est.*" (Expos. in Matt.) But later writers were in better accord with the papal theory. At the crowning era of scholasticism, which was also the crowning era of the papacy, theologians were not much behind the Popes themselves in their descriptions of papal sovereignty. Says Abelard: "The kingdom of Christ is the universal Church, so delivered into the power of Peter that nothing in it can take place without the command or permission of the Roman pontiff." (Serm., XXIII.) "Earthly power," says Hugo, "has the king for its head: spiritual power has the supreme pontiff. By as much as spiritual life is of higher rank than earthly, and the spirit than the body, by so much the spiritual power excels in honor and dignity the earthly or secular power." (De Sac., II. 2. 3.) Thomas Aquinas assigns to the Pope the supreme headship over the Church in matters of faith and administration, and speaks of him as ruling the Church in place of Christ. (Sum. Theol., II. 2. 1. 10, 2. 39. 1.)

Bonaventura styles the Pope the vicar of Christ, and the source of all ecclesiastical sovereignties. (Brevil., VI. 12.) Duns Scotus was also in full accord with the radical conception of papal absolutism. Soon after Duns Scotus, however, as was intimated in the closing section of the first chapter, the decline of the papacy in actual power and prestige was accompanied by a wide-spread tendency to modify the theory of the papacy in favor of the superior prerogatives of an ecumenical council. This tendency came to its most noteworthy expression in the decisions of the council of Constance. The council of Florence, on the other hand, was favorable to the dignity of the Pope, and styled him "the head of the whole Church and the father and teacher of all Christians." The scheme preferred by Wycliffe left no place at all to the Pope, nor indeed to any of the grades of the hierarchy, except presbyters and deacons. (Trial., IV. 15.) The principles of Huss, if less radical, still involved important modifications of the theory of the papal office.

A conception of the papal monarchy like that promulgated by Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries, was admirably suited to serve as a basis of spiritual despotism. This is not saying that they were actually in favor of despotic maxims and practices, but only that their theory was suited to give free scope to such. However, as a matter of fact, there is evidence that despotic notions were not altogether foreign to their minds. At least, we find Thomas Aquinas arguing for the entire legitimacy of bringing heretics and schismatics to terms, where it is possible, by physical coercion. Speaking of these classes, in distinction from those who have never embraced the Christian faith, he says: "Such are to be compelled by corporeal means (*corporaliter compellendi*), to fulfil what they have promised, and to hold what they have once received." (Sum. Theol., II. 2. 10. 8, 2. 39. 4.) Capital punishment, he maintains, is none too severe for the heretic. "Far more

grievous is it to corrupt the faith, which ministers life to the soul, than to falsify money, which subserves the interests of temporal life. If, therefore, falsifiers of money and other malefactors are at once and with justice delivered to death by secular rulers, much more heretics forthwith, after being convicted of heresy, can be, not only excommunicated, but justly put to death." (Ibid., II. 2. 11. 3. Compare Durandus, Sent., IV. 13. 5.) As a guaranty that the practice should not fall behind the theory, the Fourth Lateran Council bound both temporal and spiritual lords to spare no diligence in searching out and punishing heretics and dissenters. If the temporal lord should delay to purge his land of heretical defilement, it was provided that he should be excommunicated, his subjects released from their allegiance, and his territory given over to those who would carry out the behests of the Church in exterminating heretics.

SECTION II. — THE SACRAMENTS.

A SACRAMENT was regarded by the scholastics as including two elements, namely, sign and grace. It was understood to be a visible sign and medium of an invisible grace. Among the formal definitions offered we have the following: "A sacrament is a visible form of an invisible grace conferred in it." (Hugo, Sent., IV. 1.) "A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing." (Lombard, Sent., IV. 1. 2; where also a sacrament is defined as the visible form of an invisible grace.) "Sacraments are visible signs divinely instituted as means of healing, in which, under the covering of sensible things, divine virtue secretly operates, so that from a natural similitude they represent, from their institution they signify, and from their sanctification they confer, some spiritual grace, by which the soul is cured of the infirmities of vices." (Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 1.) "Anything can be called a sacrament, either because it has in

itself some secret sanctity, or because it has some relation to this sanctity, either in the way of cause or sign, or something else." (Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 60. 1.) In its character as a sign, a sacrament, according to Aquinas, has a threefold bearing, as recalling the accomplished fact of Christ's passion, evidencing the grace which now has place in us through that passion, and preannouncing the glory that is to come. (Ibid., III. 60. 3.)

The relation of the grace to the visible sign was differently represented by different writers. Thomas Aquinas mentions an opinion that the grace is not made properly to reside in the visible sacrament, but is immediately communicated by God, as the ceremony of the sacrament is performed. This view he rejects, and teaches that the grace is truly made to reside in the visible sacrament, not indeed as a complete and abiding entity, but as the passing cause or instrument of a spiritual effect. "As there is," he says, "in the sensible voice a certain spiritual power for exciting the intellect of man, in so far as it proceeds from a conception of the mind, in this way also there is a spiritual power in the sacraments, in so far as they are ordained by God to a spiritual effect." (Sum. Theol., III. 62. 1-4.) The view of Duns Scotus was more in affinity with that rejected than with that accepted by Aquinas. (Sent., IV. 1.) Durandus makes the sacrament simply the *sine qua non* of grace, and distinctly denies that a causative virtue is made to reside in it. (Sent., IV. 1. 4. Compare Bonaventura, Sent., IV. 1. 1, 3.)

According to the theory toward which scholasticism gravitated, the sacraments work *ex opere operato*, or in their own virtue, so that the reception of the sacramental grace is conditioned neither upon the spiritual devotion of the candidate, nor upon the character of the officiating priest. What is required of the candidate is simply a general assent, or freedom from voluntary opposition to the sacrament. "A sacrament," says Duns Scotus, "confers grace from

the virtue of the work wrought; so that it is not required that there should be a good motion within, which may deserve grace, but it is sufficient that the recipient should not present an obstacle," — *sufficit, quod suscipiens non ponat obiectionem*. (Sent., IV. 1. 6. Compare Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 4; Biel, Collectorium, IV. 1. 3, quoted by Charles Hodge, System. Theol., Pt. III. chap. 20, § 4.) Meanwhile, however, it was not denied that a candidate receives certain extra benefit from those positive motions of the soul which befit a sacramental occasion. (Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 69. 8.) On the part of the priest, as was claimed, it is requisite merely that he cherish a general intention (*intentio habitualis*) to perform the sacrament, the formula of which he assumes to transact. "When any one," says Thomas Aquinas, "does not intend to confer a sacrament, but to do something derisively, such perversity takes away the verity of the sacrament, especially where he manifests his intention externally. A sportive or jocose intention excludes the primary rectitude of intention, through which a sacrament is accomplished." (Sum. Theol., III. 64. 10. Compare III. 83. 4; Lombard, Sent., IV. 6. 5; Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 5; Durandus, Sent., IV. 6. 2.)

The number of the Christian sacraments proper was far from being fixed in the earlier centuries of the period. John of Damascus speaks of but two sacraments. Some of the Latin writers mention two, others four, others, using the term in the broad sense current in the preceding centuries, a much larger number. Peter Lombard fixed upon seven. There was no special authority for his list, and some of the succeeding writers did not consider themselves bound by it. It was accepted, however, by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura (Sum. Theol., III. 65. 1; Brevil., VI. 3), and became the standard list. As enumerated by Peter Lombard, the seven sacraments are as follows: "Baptismus, confirmatio, panis benedictio, id est, eucharistia, poenitentia,

unctio extrema, ordo, conjugium," — baptism, confirmation, eucharist, penance, extreme unction, holy orders, marriage. (Sent., IV. 2. 1.) Pope Eugenius IV. (1431-47) gave his official sanction to this list.

1. BAPTISM. — The representations respecting the conditions of baptism, on the part of infants and adults respectively, were much the same as in the previous period. Speaking of adults, Hugo says, "In such, faith of their own is required, without which they obtain no remission." (Sent., V. 5.) To similar effect is the statement of Peter Lombard, that "those who come without faith, or feignedly, receive *sacramentum*, but not *rem*," — in other words, the form of the sacrament, without its gracious effect. (Sent., IV. 4. 2.) Bonaventura, also, taught that personal faith is requisite in an adult, in order that baptism should be efficacious. (Brevil., VI. 7.) The harmony of this demand for faith with the doctrine that the sacrament works *ex opere operato*, is not apparent at first sight. But probably all the faith that was deemed strictly essential in this connection was simply a general habit of belief, or *fides ut dispositio*, as Bellarmin terms it, and this much was regarded as involved in the absence of opposition to the sacrament. The Trinitarian formula was regarded as requisite, though the statement appears with Peter Lombard, that baptism in the name of Christ alone might be valid, provided no denial of the Trinity was designed. (Sent., IV. 3. 5.) The form of administering the water was not regarded as strictly of the essence of baptism. Peter Lombard, as not entering into a specific consideration of the form, speaks of baptism simply as immersion. (Ibid. IV. 3. 9.) Thomas Aquinas expressed somewhat of a preference for immersion, but regarded aspersion or affusion as equally valid. He says: "Ablutio fieri potest per aquam, non solum per modum immersionis, sed etiam per modum aspersionis vel effusionis, et ideo quamvis tutius sit baptizare per modum immersionis (quia hoc communior usus), potest tamen fieri

baptismus per modum aspersionis." (Sum. Theol., III. 66. 7. Compare Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 7; Sent., IV. 3. 2. 2.) In case of the imminence of death before the presence of a priest could be secured, it was considered allowable for a layman to baptize.

The effect of baptism proper was affirmed (as by Augustine) to consist in absolution from the guilt of all foregoing sin, original and actual, and in such an impartation of grace as modifies, but does not wholly eradicate, the corruption or concupiscence in the moral nature. (Anselm, De Concord. Præscient. cum Lib. Arbit., III. 8, 9; Pullus, Sent., VI. 1; Lombard, Sent., II. 32. 2; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 69; Bonaventura, Brevil., III. 7.) As regards the grace which ameliorates the inward corruption, and works a renewal in the heart, it was apprehended by different writers that this might be experienced in virtue of repentance and faith anterior to baptism. It was maintained, however, that in such a case there was still ample occasion for baptism, since there was left a certain obligation to punishment, and baptism could remove this as well as confer an increase of positive grace. (Hugo, Sent., V. 7; Lombard, Sent., IV. 4. 6; Aquinas, Sum. contra Gentiles, IV. 72.)

Exceptions to the necessity of baptism were allowed on the same grounds as by Augustine. Deprivation of the opportunity to be baptized was not regarded as excluding from salvation where an earnest desire for baptism had existed, accompanied by a suitable faith, or where life had ended in martyrdom. (Hugo, Sent., V. 5; De Sac., II. 6. 7; Bernard, De Bap., I., II.; Lombard, Sent., IV. 4. 5; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 68. 2.) As these compensations were out of question in case of the unbaptized dying in infancy, nothing was left, on the accepted premises, but to predicate their everlasting punishment. A mild type of punishment, however, as will be seen, was allotted them. Moreover, a few writers favored the possibility of their salvation.

Of such Klee mentions Biel, William of Paris, and Cajetan, and Petavius cites Gerson as well as Biel.

Baptism, together with the other two sacraments incapable of repetition, namely, confirmation and holy orders, was regarded as giving a certain indelible signature, or *character*, to the recipient. "In these [three sacraments]," says Bonaventura, "a triple character is impressed, which is not obliterated. In accordance with the first arises the distinction of believers from unbelievers; in accordance with the second, the distinction of the strong from the infirm and the weak; and in accordance with the third, the distinction of the clergy from the laity." (Brevil., VI. 6. Compare Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 63. 1-6; Duns Scotus, Sent., IV. 1.)

2. CONFIRMATION. — According to Bonaventura, the ordinary formula for confirming was as follows: "I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen." (Brevil., VI. 8.) The same writer states that the chrism is to be made from olive-oil and balsam. While in the Greek Church priests and deacons were regarded as qualified to confirm, in the Latin Church this function was confined to bishops. In its effect, confirmation was regarded as supplementing baptism, conferring strength in the standing to which the latter introduces. (Hugo, Sent., VI. 1; Lombard, Sent., IV. 7. 1; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 72. 5.)

3. THE EUCHARIST. — While some of the statements of John of Damascus suggest that he held the view current among his predecessors in the Greek Church, namely, that the bread and wine are made the body and blood of Christ simply in the sense that, in their union with the Divine Word, they hold a place analogous to that which was held by the body and blood which He received from the Virgin, other expressions of his savor of the full doctrine of transubstantiation. (De Fide Orth., IV. 13.) The Greek

Church in his time was no doubt upon its way to that doctrine, though not as yet united upon the same. This is sufficiently indicated by the diverse action of the two great councils convened during the iconoclastic controversy. The council of Constantinople, in 754, representing the party adverse to image-worship, declared in favor of the theory, that the eucharistic elements are related to the real body and blood simply as types or symbols. On the other hand, the council of Nicæa, in 787, dominated by the friends of image-worship, declared that the elements are types only before their consecration, and that by the act of consecration they are changed into the veritable body and blood of Christ. Later authorities of the Greek Church decided quite definitely for transubstantiation. The question, however, was not treated at the same length as in the West.

In the Latin Church, Paschasius Radbertus marked a new era, by inculcating with full intention, and in unequivocal terms, the complete dogma of transubstantiation. Alcuin, before him, seems indeed to have favored the dogma, but we have from him only brief references to the subject. (*Ad Paulinum*, *Epist.* XLI. Compare *Libri Carolini*, IV. 14.) As the words of institution are uttered, so taught Radbertus, the substance of the bread is changed into the very body of Christ, the body born of the Virgin and suspended upon the cross; and likewise the substance of the wine is changed into His blood. That the body and blood, thus made present, are concealed under the accidents remaining from the previously existing bread and wine, has an adequate occasion in the principle that concealment stimulates desire, and gives exercise to faith, and so results in a higher valuation than would come from open disclosure. Among the evidences brought forward by Radbertus are instances of miracles, suited, as he maintains, to establish the fact of the real presence. The following may serve as an example: "While the blessed Basilus was publicly performing divine mysteries, a Hebrew mingled, as if he were a Christian,

with the people, desiring to examine into the nature of the service which was being administered. He saw an infant being divided in the hands of Basilus, and as all were communing he also came, and there was given to him that which was truly made flesh. Then he approached the cup filled with blood, as it truly is, and was made a partaker of it; and preserving remnants of both, and departing to his home, he showed them to his wife as a confirmation of the things told, and narrated what he had seen with his own eyes." Evidently Radbertus, though a man of fair ability and scholarship, was not in advance of his age as respects a critical turn of mind. The work, "*De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*," in which he developed his theory, was first given forth in the year 831.

While the theory of Radbertus was no doubt in affinity with the tendencies of the age, still among his contemporaries the preponderance of learned authority was against it. Ratramnus, in a treatise bearing the same title as that of Radbertus, attempted an express refutation of the doctrine of transubstantiation. Speaking of the elements, he says: "As respects creaturely substance, what they were before consecration, this also afterwards they continue to be," — *Secundum creaturarum substantiam, quod fuerunt ante consecrationem, hoc et postea consistunt.* (LIV.) He remarks, also, that as the people who believe in Christ are called His body, not in a corporeal, but in a spiritual sense, "so also it is necessary that the body of Christ should be understood, not corporeally, but spiritually," — *sic quoque Christi corpus non corporaliter sed spiritualiter necesse est intelligatur.* (LXXIV.) The reference of Hincmar, among other evidences, indicates that Erigena was no advocate of transubstantiation. (*De Prædest.*, XXXI.) The general tenor of his thinking favors the acceptance, in an unqualified sense, of the following words from his pen: "We immolate Him spiritually, and we feed upon Him intellectually, with the mind, not with the teeth." (*Comm. in Joan.*) The

writings of Rabanus Maurus and Walafrid Strabo, if they do not expressly repudiate transubstantiation, do not inculcate it, and indicate, by their line of representation, the same view that was advocated by Ratramnus. In the same category are placed also, by Baur and Gieseler, Christian Druthmar and Florus Magister; and Kahnis includes Amalarius of Metz. On the side of Radbertus were Hinemar of Rheims, and Haimo of Halldberstadt. It is evident, therefore, that scholarly authority in the ninth century was rather against than in favor of the theory of Radbertus.

In the dark and confused interval which lay between the ninth and the eleventh centuries, the doctrine of transubstantiation seems to have advanced toward ascendancy. As Berengar, in the eleventh century, boldly declared the unfounded and irrational nature of the doctrine, he found, indeed, those who sympathized with his views, but at the same time an opposition sufficiently strong to overwhelm him. Between Berengar and Innocent III. there was an occasional writer who departed, more or less, from the strict doctrine of transubstantiation. Rupert of Deutz, for example, held that, while the body of Christ is in some way conjoined with the eucharistic elements, the substance of the latter remains meanwhile undisturbed. In 1215, transubstantiation was definitely sealed by the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III., as a dogma of the Church. Thereafter only the bolder critics of the hierarchical scheme ventured upon open dissent. Wycliffe not only regarded the dogma as an error, but declares that among all infidelities it plunges men most subtly and deeply into apostasy from faith and from Christ. (Trial., IV. 6.) Wycliffe rejected also the doctrine of *impanation*, or coexistence, which had been entertained by John of Paris and some others, and according to which the bread and wine do not cease to be after consecration, but subsist in a modified character, together with the body and blood. The theory of coexistence is credited also to Biel.

While the Church came to assert as dogma that the real body and blood of Christ are received in the eucharist, a total survey of the specifications made is not calculated to foster a very profound sense of the reality in question. Thus it was held that in the last supper before the crucifixion the blood was in the chalice, and was received by the disciples before it was shed (Radbertus, *Expos. in Matt.*); that Christ held His body in His own hands, and divided it into parts and distributed it to His disciples, while yet He was sitting entire and unharmed in their presence (Odo, *Expos. in Can. Mis.*, III.); that Christ partook of His own body, so that, in the same indivisible instant, He was that which eats and that which was being eaten (Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. 81. 1); that the body of Christ is entire, not only in all the eucharistic services which may be simultaneously celebrated, but is entire under every particle of the apparent bread, so that it is not in any case divided by being distributed and eaten (Aquinas, *Ibid.*, III. 76); that while the whole body of Christ—flesh, bones, nerves, and things of this kind—is under the appearance of bread, the body of Christ is not in the sacrament *localiter*, or *per modum dimensionum*, but only *per modum substantiæ*. (*Ibid.*) So the *real* body of Christ in the eucharist turns out to be the most unreal and ghostly thing of which human ingenuity ever attempted to draw the outlines. What is meant by eating this body, which so marvellously contradicts the characteristics of body, no ordinary mind can understand, any more than it can understand what is meant by combining circularity and rectangularity into a single notion, and getting the same between the teeth.

Among the curious questions discussed was whether the body of Christ would be received by a mouse or other irrational animal, if by mischance it should consume the host. Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Innocent III. answered in the negative. (*Epit. Theol.*, XXIX.; *Sent.*, IV. 13. 1; *De Sac. Altar. Myst.*, IV. 11.) On the other hand, Alexan-

der Hales and Thomas Aquinas decided in the affirmative. (Sum. Theol., IV. 45. 1. 2; Sum. Theol., III. 80. 3.)

The completion of the dogma of transubstantiation fully supplied the proper theoretical basis to the doctrine of the eucharist as a sacrifice. All through the Middle Ages immense stress was laid upon this feature. The beautiful Christian idea, designed to be embodied in the rite, was made to recede behind an inferior Jewish conception; and the eucharist was associated with an altar of sacrifice, rather than with a table of communion and fellowship. As has already been stated, the benefits of the eucharistic sacrifice were supposed to extend to the dead in purgatory, as well as to the living in this world.

Among the practical consequences of the doctrine of the real presence in the eucharist, and the sacrificial character of the rite, was a tendency to limit the privileges of the laity as respects communing. The custom of administering the communion to children, in close connection with their baptism, was discontinued in the twelfth century. About the same time the practice of withholding the cup from the laity was set on foot. This was pure innovation, the common assumption of writers up to this era having been that those entitled to commune at all are to commune in both kinds. This was still the assumption of Hugo of St. Victor and Peter Lombard. Alexander Hales, who followed Pulus in justifying the withholding of the cup, speaks of this as being at that time practised wellnigh universally, — *fere ubique*. (Sum. Theol., IV. 53. 1.) Thomas Aquinas sanctioned the practice, but speaks in less emphatic terms of its actual prevalence. He says: "As respects, indeed, the sacrament itself, it is befitting that both the body and the blood should be partaken, because the perfection of the sacrament consists in both; and, therefore, because it pertains to the priest to consecrate and to perfect this sacrament, by no means ought he to take the body of Christ without the blood. But on the part of those partak-

ing there is need of the highest reverence and caution, lest anything happen which may tend to injure so great a mystery. But this is specially liable to occur in taking the wine, which, indeed, if it is taken incautiously, can easily be spilled. And because the multitude of Christian people has increased, in which are contained old persons, youth, and children, of whom some have not sufficient discretion to employ the caution which is due in the use of this sacrament, therefore the prudent custom obtains in certain churches (*quibusdam ecclesiis*), that the blood is not administered to the people, but is taken only by the priest." (Sum. Theol., III. 80. 12.) In justification of this robbery, the doctrine of *concomitance* was used, — the doctrine that the blood is by natural connection in the body, and so is necessarily taken with the latter. This, however, was an imperfect disguising of the fact that only a mutilated sacrament was given to the laity. Why have any cup at all, or any partaking of the cup, if the blood, in its full sacramental virtue, resides in the consecrated bread, or the body? It is noteworthy that as late and eminent a scholastic as Albertus Magnus recognized the force of considerations like this, and was adverse to withholding the cup from the laity. (Gieseler.) The first ecumenical sanction of the custom in question was given in 1415 by the council of Constance, though by this same body it was allowed that the custom was an innovation on ancient practice.

4. PENANCE. — The early Church emphasized inward repentance as a condition of forgiveness, and of those who had been excommunicated it required certain outward exhibitions of repentance. Auricular confession to a priest was not made binding, or regarded as necessary. In course of time, however, stress began to be given to the idea that one who had fallen into any grievous sin would pursue the course most to his advantage in taking the matter privately to the priest. This, in the first instance, was done, not for

the sake of being absolved by the priest, but to gain the benefit of his intercession with God, and perhaps also his prescription as to the works of satisfaction pertinent to the case. Far into the Middle Ages, the truth was recognized that sin may be pardoned without such confession, and that the priest has no higher than a declarative power in the matter, the forgiveness of sins belonging to God alone. But the hierarchical tendencies of the age were continually working toward a more emphatic conception of the priestly prerogative.

In the twelfth century, we find the belief current that three things are required of the sinner as a condition of remission; namely, contrition of heart, confession of mouth, and satisfaction by works. As respects the part of the priest, there was a conspicuous lack of unanimity at that time. One class of writers describe his office as simply declarative. His part, as they conceived, is to seal, by appropriate outward manifestations, the remission which God accomplishes. Here belongs Peter Lombard. Speaking of God's agency, he says: "He Himself alone through Himself remits sin, who also purifies the soul from interior stain, and releases from the debt of eternal death. But He has not conceded this to the priests, to whom, nevertheless, He has assigned the power of loosing and binding, that is, of showing men bound or loosed," — *potestatem solvendi et ligandi, id est, ostendendi homines ligatos vel solutos*. (Sent., IV. 18. 5, 6.) To the same effect are the words of Pullus: "A peccatis presbyter solvit, non utique quod peccata dimittit: sed quod dimissa sacramento pandat. Et quid est opus pandi nisi ut consolatio fiat pœnitenti." (Sent., VI. 61.) On the other hand, the Victorines Hugo and Richard taught expressly that the office of the priest is not merely declarative,—that while he cannot remit sins in his own virtue, he can take an actual part in the work of remission, as an appointed instrument of God. (De Sac., II. 14. 8; De Potest. Ligand. et Solv., XII.) The part as-

signed by Richard to the priest appears in the following sentence, from his work on binding and loosing: "Through Himself He absolves from the bond of obduracy; through Himself, and at the same time through His minister, from the debt of eternal damnation; through the minister from the debt of future purgation." (VII.)

Thomas Aquinas developed the subject still further in the direction taken by Hugo and Richard. In his theory, the absolving act of the priest appears as an integral and indispensable part of the sacrament of penance, and is not merely declarative of remission, but instrumental in effecting the same. His view of the priestly prerogative is clearly indicated by the formula which he prefers. Discountenancing the use of any such formula as "The omnipotent God have compassion upon thee," he says that the proper form of absolving is, "I absolve thee," — *Ego te absolvo*. (Sum. Theol., III. 84. 3.)

Among the three parts required of the penitent, the contrition was regarded as always requisite. As respects the confession, there was a manifest tendency to reduce to a minimum the exceptions allowed to its necessity. Later writers exhibit a less liberal tone than the earlier. Abelard allowed quite a wide margin to the discretion of the individual, even declaring it advisable that sins liable to occasion scandal should be withheld from confession. (Scito Te Ipsum, XXV.; Epit. Theol. Christ., XXXVI.) Peter Lombard considered confession to a layman as adequately meeting the case when no priest is at hand, and allowed, moreover, that remission might take place without any outward confession. (Sent., IV. 17. 2-5.) Thomas Aquinas declared in general terms the necessity of confession. "Confession," he says, "is necessary to him who has fallen into mortal sin." (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 6. 1.) He allowed, however, that in case of necessity confession might be made to a layman, but not as though a layman could administer the sacrament of penance proper. (Ibid., 8. 1, 2.)

Duns Scotus was adverse to the idea of confessing to any one but a priest. Confession, to be valid, was required to include all mortal sins that could be recalled. (Aquinas, *Ibid.*, 9. 2.) Respecting venial sins, the more general view was that they are not to be confessed; but Thomas Aquinas argued, that, inasmuch as the Church (at the Lateran council under Innocent III.) made it obligatory upon all Christians of suitable age to confess once a year, it followed, even if one had committed no mortal sins, that he should confess. Wycliffe was of opinion that it would be better for the Church if private confession to a priest were not required at all.

According to the teaching of the scholastics generally, contrition, confession, and the priestly absolution occasion the removal of the guilt of sin and the eternal penalty due to the same, but still leave a temporal penalty. This, unless cancelled by works of satisfaction or by indulgences, must be endured in purgatory. Hence satisfaction was enumerated with contrition and confession, as antecedent to the complete remission of sins (committed after baptism.) That indulgences cannot reach further than the temporal penalty was the accepted theory of theologians; but, on the other hand, the decrees of the Popes were so worded, in some instances, as to foster the impression that indulgences have efficacy to cancel the eternal as well as the temporal penalty.

5. EXTREME UNCTION. — According to Bonaventura, the integrity of this sacrament requires consecrated oil, vocal prayer, and the anointing of the sick in seven parts; namely, the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, the lips, the hands, the feet, and the loins. He says, also, that the sacrament is not to be administered except to adults and those who in the belief that death is at hand request it, and only by the ministry of a priest. (*Brevil.*, VI. 11. Compare Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. Sup. 30–33.) Among the spiritual benefits attributed to the rite was the cancelling

of venial sins. It was regarded also as an instrument of bodily alleviation, where this might be consistent with spiritual welfare. The repetition of the sacrament, in case of the recovery of the sick, was declared admissible by Thomas Aquinas.

6. HOLY ORDERS.—This sacrament was regarded as transferring its recipient across the wide interval, which, according to the hierarchical scheme, lies between the layman and the priest. Among clerical orders the priestly was ranked as the highest, ecclesiastical dignities above this not being accounted distinct orders. Seven different orders were distinguished, of which Peter Lombard gives the list as follows: “ostiarii, lectores, exorcistæ, acolyti, diaconi, subdiaconi, sacerdotes.” (Sent., IV. 24.) Among impediments to receiving holy orders, Thomas Aquinas places female sex, condition of slavery, guilt of manslaughter, and illegitimate birth. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 39.) Not all of these, however, were regarded as strictly insuperable.

7. MARRIAGE.—The analysis of this sacrament afforded the scholastics great difficulty. They were faithful heirs of the opinion that the state of virginal purity is superior to that of marriage. To reconcile this with the sacramental character of the matrimonial union was not easy, to say nothing about the difficulty of harmonizing such union with the definition of a sacrament in general. The best they could do was to assign an inferior rank to marriage, as compared with the other sacraments. (Abelard, Epit. Theol. Christ., XXXI.; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 65. 2.) Durandus took the exceptional position that marriage is not so strictly and properly a sacrament as are the others, and only in a general sense (*largo modo*) can be so named. (Sent., IV. 27. 2.) The bond established by marriage was declared to be indissoluble, so long as both parties continue to live. (Lombard, Sent., IV. 31. 2; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 62. 5; Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 13.)

Evidently, from the Protestant point of view, the mediæval doctrines respecting the sacraments include some of the most objectionable features of the scholastic theology. To say nothing about such astounding particulars as the assumed change of a piece of bread into the body of Christ, the scholastic teaching, by its immense emphasis upon the value of the sacraments, and upon the prerogatives of the priest in ministering the same, lays strong and deep the foundations at once of an exaggerated ceremonialism and of spiritual despotism. It urges the individual to look to the sacraments for every grace, and yet gives him valid assurance of no grace, since the bare intention of the priest is able to nullify a sacrament.

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. **CHILIASM.**—Scarcely any place was given to chiliasm proper in mediæval thought. There was, indeed, in the tenth century, a wide-spread reference to a thousand years' reign of Christ. But the thousand years were regarded as dating from the beginning of the Christian era. The belief entertained, therefore, was quite unlike the chiliastie theory of a visible reign of Christ upon earth; it was simply a popular conviction that the year 1000 would witness the end of the world. In general the mediæval mind seems to have imitated Augustine in looking to the past, rather than to the future, for the beginning of the millennial reign.

2. **CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.**—The standard view upon this subject was substantially that which had already been advanced by Gregory the Great. Hell was regarded as receiving at once every departed soul not included among the heirs of salvation. Of the heirs of salvation, those free from all stain of sin were believed to pass at once into the enjoyment of the blessedness of heaven. (Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, II. 1. 4. 5, III. 59. 5.) At least, this was the thoroughly dominant view, as the Avignon Pope, John XXII., discovered when he attempted to propagate the opposite opinion, namely, that the righteous are not favored with the beatific vision till after the resurrection. Those in need of purification, as was taught, are detained in purgatory, — which Dante describes as a mountain, rising on the opposite side of the earth through a

succession of stages or terraces, and crowned with the earthly Paradise. One factor in the work of purgation is corporeal fire. (Bonaventura, Brevil., VII: 2.) The pains of purgatory, though less than those of hell, are greater than any endured in this world. (Bonaventura, Ibid.; Peter Lombard, Sent., IV. 20. 1.) The length of the purgatorial process depends upon the amount of the corruption to be purged away, and also upon the amount of assistance which is rendered through the sacrifices, alms, prayers, etc., of the living. As the rich can provide more abundant means of this kind, it would appear to follow logically that they have a certain advantage over the poor in the next world, as well as in this. And we find actually with Peter Lombard an open suggestion that this is the case; for he seems to favor the view that the rich man, having both the general and the special aids of the Church, while the poor man has only the general, is in a condition to obtain a more speedy, though not a more complete absolution,—“*celiorem absolutionem, non plenior.*” (Sent., IV. 45. 4.) Naturally, men like Wycliffe, who were disgusted with the practical abuses connected with the subject, were averse also to the theory of purgatory. The council of Florence gave the authoritative decision upon the general question. It decreed that those who die free from all stain of sin are received at once into heaven, and enjoy the vision of God in proportion to their merits; while those who die in mortal sin, actual or original, descend to different degrees of punishment in hell. Others are sent for a longer or shorter period to purgatory. Respecting these, the council defined as follows: “*Si vere pœnitentes in Dei caritate decesserint, antequam dignis pœnitentiæ fructibus de commissis satisfacerint et omissis, eorum animas pœnis purgatoriis post mortem purgari, et ut a pœnis hujusmodi releventur prodesse eis fidelium virorum suffragia, missarum scilicet sacrificia, orationes, et eleemosynas, et alia pietatis officia.*” (Concil. Collect., Mansi.)

3. THE RESURRECTION. — The Augustinian theory of the resurrection, as a literal restoration of the body, was completely in the ascendant. Erigena, however, was inclined to Origenistic views, and Durandus suggested that it would in no wise detract from the identity of the individual, even if the same material particles which composed the old body did not enter into that of the resurrection, inasmuch as matter by itself, not yet specialized by form, has no distinctive character, — “nullam entitatem, vel unitatem, vel pluralitatem habeat, sed omnia ista competunt ei per formam quæ si eadem est totum compositum erit idem.” (Sent., IV. 44. 1.) As respects the peculiar qualities and capabilities of the resurrection body, little advance was made upon Augustine’s representations. We note simply the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, that the body of the saint will reveal the glory of the soul, as a vessel of glass reveals the color of the liquid contained, and that a just gradation of punishments seems to forbid the idea that all the defects in the bodies of the wicked are to be retained in the resurrection. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 85. 1 and 86. 1.)

4. FINAL AWARDS. — Erigena uses some expressions, which, taken by themselves, might be regarded as teaching the doctrine of universal restoration. Such are the following: “If the divine goodness, which always, not only in the good, but also in the evil, operates in a goodly manner, is eternal and infinite, its contrary necessarily will not be eternal and infinite. . . . Wickedness is altogether opposed to the divine goodness. Therefore, wickedness will receive a consummation, and will remain, in no nature, since in all divine goodness will operate and will appear.” (De Divis. Nat., V. 26.) But in spite of such declarations (based upon the writings of Gregory of Nyssa), Erigena still found place for a species of future unending punishment. While he affirms that as to nature every one is to be completely saved, he does not affirm that every one in respect to his inward exercises is to be completely saved.

"It is one thing," he says, "that all wickedness generally in all human nature should be thoroughly abolished; it is another thing that its fantasies (*phantasias*), in the consciences of those whom it has vitiated in this life, should always be preserved, and in this way always punished." (Ibid., V. 31.) Erigena, as the above language indicates, was inclined to regard future punishment as merely subjective, and to make it consist in the disturbing fantasies of objects or ends which the worldly have illicitly pursued in this life, and for the acquisition of which the future life offers no opportunity. "As with empty dreams they will be tortured." (Ibid.)

Mediaeval theology, as a whole, had no affinity with restorationism. On the contrary, it strongly asserted the endless doom of the wicked, and emphasized such elements of positive infliction as bodily torture. Dante was expressing beliefs that were regarded as beyond question, when he placed upon the entrance to the infernal region, —

"All hope abandon, ye who enter here";

or when he declared of the unhappy shades within, —

"No hope doth comfort them forevermore,
Not of repose, but even of lesser pain."

Dante's representation of hell, as a dark subterranean region, agrees with the view set forth by leading theologians. (Hugo, *De Sac.*, II. 16. 4; Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. Sup. 97. 4; Bonaventura, *Centil.*, II. 4.) The view of Guibert of Nogent, that by the fire of hell is perhaps denoted the inward burning of evil desire (*De Pignor. Sanct.*, IV. 4), was exceptional, the approved opinion being that it is corporeal fire. (Hugo, *De Sac.*, II. 16. 3; Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. Sup. 70. 3; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, VII. 6; *Centil.*, II. 4.) To give the subject a still grimmer aspect, some writers added to the torture of fire that of ice and piercing cold. (Pullus, *Sent.*, VIII. 32; Innocent III., *De Contempt. Mund.*, III. 4; Dante, *Inferno*, Cantos III.,

XXXII.) Innocent's statement upon this point is as follows: "The infernal punishments are diverse, according to the diversity of sins. The first punishment is of fire, the second of cold. Concerning these the Lord said, 'There shall be weeping and grating of teeth.' Weeping [there will be] on account of the smoke of fire, grating of teeth on account of cold."

Meanwhile, it was conceived that hell embraces many gradations of punishment,—an idea which Dante carried out by picturing hell as descending through successive and narrowing circles. The upper part was deemed the place of least punishment, and here were placed the *limbus patrum* and the *limbus puerorum*, that is, the quarter occupied by Old Testament believers till they were released by Christ, and the everlasting abode of unbaptized infants. These terms, according to Thomas Aquinas, while significant of different conditions, are not necessarily expressive of different localities; but, if they are distinguished in the latter respect, the *limbus patrum* is to be regarded as the superior place. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 69. 6.) The teaching of Peter Lombard, that the punishment of unbaptized infants consists simply in perpetual deprivation of the vision of God, was favorably received by the majority of subsequent writers. (Sent., II. 33. 5. Compare Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. Sup. Append. I. 1.) Peter Lombard seems to have concluded that a certain inward grief results from this deprivation, but Aquinas exempts even from this. So also Durandus, who assumes that his view on this point was the accepted view among the theologians of his time. (Sent., II. 33. 3.) Dante describes the *limbus puerorum* as "the foremost circle that surrounds the abyss," and as a place of sighs rather than of wailing:—

"A place there is below not sad with torments,
But darkness only, where the lamentations
Have not the sound of wailing, but are sighs."

According to the poet, the same quarter includes the

more blameless of the heathen, those who have kept faithfully all the virtues, except the three theological virtues, faith, hope, and love. (*Inferno*, IV.; *Purgatorio*, VII.; Longfellow's translation.)

Over against the dark descending circles of perdition was pictured the region of reward, rising upward beyond the planetary spheres through three heavens filled with light, inhabited by beings who shine with bodily glory, and are still more radiant in the lustre of spiritual excellence, and who ever are refreshed with new draughts of knowledge and love, from Him in the vision of whom is their crowning felicity.

With writers of mystical tendency there was a disposition to pass by every other conception of future reward, in favor of the absorbing idea of union with God. Their language sometimes pictures such an emphatic reversion into God as seems to leave no place to human personality. This is the case with Erigena and Eckhart. The former mentions five stages in the process of reversion. "The first is the reversion of human nature, when the body is dissolved, and is recalled to the four elements of the sensible world of which it is composed. The second is fulfilled in the resurrection, when each one will receive his own body from the common mass of the four elements. The third is when the body shall be changed into spirit. The fourth is when spirit, and, to speak more clearly, the whole nature of man, shall revert into the primordial causes which are always and unchangeably in God. The fifth is when nature itself, with its causes, shall be moved into God, as air is moved into light. For God will be all in all, when there shall be nothing except God alone." (*De Divis. Nat.*, V. 8.) Eckhart uses quite as emphatic terms in describing the return into God, teaching that the whole universe of creatures, and the revealed God Himself, shall finally sink back into the primordial abyss of the Absolute. Still, after all, neither of these writers seems to have in-

tended to teach a complete elimination of the finite, or of human personality. Erigena, in immediate connection with the passage quoted, says: "The change of human nature into God is not to be regarded as a destruction of substance, but as a wonderful and ineffable reversion into the pristine state which it lost by sinning." He adds, also, illustrations which imply rather a certain assimilation to the divine in the way of glorification, than an absolute absorption into the same. As for Eckhart, while he conceived that the soul at its centre is to become identical with the divine essence, he seems still to have held that there is a certain periphery, or a certain fragment of finiteness, which will perpetually conserve a species of individuality.

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